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 FOREWORD 9
FOREWORD
The Cold War History Research Center was established in December 1998, 
as the first scholarly institution founded as a non-profit organization in East 
Central Europe. The Center is specialized in historical research in the Cold War 
era, focusing on the former Soviet Bloc. From the outset the Center has been 
contributing to the flourishing of the “new Cold War history” aimed at trans-
forming the previous one-sided approach based primarily on Western sources, 
finally into a really international discipline through the systematic exploration 
of the once top secret documents found in the archives in the former Soviet 
Union and the Eastern Bloc countries.
The Center’s English language website (www.coldwar.hu), providing a great 
number of articles, documents, chronologies, bibliographies and finding aids 
is the only such institution in the former Soviet Bloc and now it is an indispen-
sable resource for international scholars and students interested in the history 
of the Cold War, Communism, Eastern Europe and the Soviet Bloc. Since 2009 
the Center has been affiliated with the Institute of International Studies at Cor-
vinus University of Budapest, and beginning in 2017, also with the Centre for 
Social Sciences, at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences.
The Center works together with researchers and various international coop-
erating partners from all over the World, among others, the Cold War Interna-
tional History Project at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 
Washington DC, the Parallel History Project on Cooperative Security (formerly: 
on NATO and the Warsaw Pact), the National Security Archive, Washington 
DC, the Ludwig Boltzmann Institute for Research on War Consquences, Graz 
and the European Institute, Columbia University, New York.
One of the Center’s main projects has been the creation of an extensive English 
language online Cold War history chronology on East-Central Europe: The Chro-
nology of the Soviet Bloc, 1945–1991. Parts 1, 2 and 3 covering the period 1945–
1980 were already available earlier, while Part 4 and 5 up to 1991 were published 
in December, 2017. All this was made possible by the (unpaid) internship project 
of the Center which was started in 2009. So far the internationally renowned 
research activity of the Center has attracted more than 180 interns from Western 
and Eastern Europe – mostly in the framework of the Erasmus program –, the 
United States, China, Ukraine, Turkey, Greece; altogether from 33 countries. In 
2017 the Center also became an official internship partner of Oxford University. 
Since 2010, the Center has also organized an annual two-day English lan-
guage international student conference on the history of the Cold War, with the 
participation of BA, MA and PhD students. This volume publishes 29 papers 
selected from the 144 presentations from 14 countries of the first seven con-
10 CSABA BÉKÉS – MELINDA KALMÁR: STUDENTS ON THE COLD WAR
ferences between 2010 and 2016. Our Center proudly presents these excellent 
research results by motivated students and young would be scholars.
Csaba BÉKÉS 
Founding director
Cold War History Research Center 
CHAPTER 1: 
EXPLAINING THE COLD WAR, 
DEBATES AND REPRESENTATIONS
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COLD WAR OR NOT? THE INSTITUTE OF WORLD 
ECONOMY AND POLITICS AND SOVIET FOREIGN 
POLICY (1943 – 1948)
AndreA BOreLLI
INTRODUCTION
The literature available on the Institute of World Economy and Politics has re-
constructed its role within the Soviet State.1 During my studies, I have recreated 
relations between Stalin’s power system and the Institute through the analysis 
of its members especially in times of cooperation between the Soviet Union and 
Western democracies in which pro-Western positions emerged in Soviet Union.2
The article is based on various original sources available in the Russian lan-
guage:
•	 The	 Journal	 of	 the	 Institute	 “Economy	 and	World	 Politics”,	 published	
from 1926 to 1947.
•	 A	 vast	 array	 of	 documents	 conserved	 at	 the	 Archives	 of	 the	 Russian	
Academy of the Science in Moscow (Archivy Rossiskoi Akademi Nauk: 
ARAN) and at the Russian State Archive of the social-political history 
(Rossijskij Gosudarsvennyj Archiv Social’no- politiceskoj Istorii: RGASPI).
Furthermore, this paper is of significance because these documents are not 
yet available to the international scientific community.  
The research is based on the methodological guidelines suggested by Anna 
Di Biagio.  She reconstructed the archival sources and the Soviet newspapers 
learning the crucial role of Bolshevik political culture in the development of 
Soviet foreign policy at the late 1920s. Moreover, the works of Silvio Pons re-
garding the relationship between ideology and Realpolitik during the Stalin era 
1 G. Duda, Jenö Varga und die Geschichte des Instituts für Weltwirtschaft und Welt-
politik in Moskau 1921-1970. Zu den Möglichkeiten und Grenzen wissenschaftlicher 
Auslandsanalyse in der Sowjetunion, Akademie Verlag, Berlin, 1994; O. Eran, Mezh-
dunarodniki an assessment of professional expertise in the making of Soviet foreign 
policy, Turtle Dove Press, Tel Aviv, 1979.
2 A. Borelli, Ideologia e Realpolitik. L’Istituto di economia e politica mondiale e la po-
litica estera sovietica, Aracne, Roma.
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have been central to my research.3 In regards to the years from 1928 to 1948, 
I have shared the thesis on the “specificity” of Stalinism4 and the idea that 
Stalin’s regime represented a driving force for the modernization of Russia.5
In the last three years, I looked in greater depth at those cultural norms and 
values, a contradictory but effective mix of nationalism and socialist interna-
tionalism, which characterized the Stalinist leadership.6 Furthermore, during 
my work, the study of the Soviet political culture and the relationship between 
the intellectual world and the leadership in the Soviet Union has been useful.  
My hypothesis is that this relationship has determined, in the past as well 
as today, the Kremlin’s choice between a policy of cooperation or isolation 
toward the Western countries. For those reasons, the history of the Institute 
of World Economy and Politics helps to show that the Soviet political culture 
combined with the perception of external threats played a decisive role in the 
elaboration and legitimization of the foreign policy of the Kremlin. Here new el-
ements are included: soviet political culture and perception of external threats. 
THE MIROVIKI7 AND EUGENE VARGA
The Institute of World Economy and Politics was born as a center for studies of 
international relations to help the Kremlin in 1924.8 The first Director of the Insti-
tute was Fyodor Rothstein. Rothstein was a member of the People’s Commis-
sariat for Foreign Affairs, Narkomindel, and was the head of a bureau that studied 
international relations. With his colleagues at this bureau, he was appointed as 
director of the Institute in 1924. Several members of the Institute were important 
members of the Party also, such as Preobraženskij, Radek, and Rakovskij. 
During the early years, the Institute had two different functions: studying 
capitalist countries and international relations in general.  Additionally, it was 
also controlled by the Trotskyist faction. For example, Trotsky wrote the first 
article published by the Institute’s journal. During the Stalinist power consoli-
dation, after the defeat of the opposition in the party, the function and role of 
the Institute changed. 
3 S. Pons, Stalin e la guerra inevitable 1936-1941, Einaudi, Torino, 1995 [Stalin and the 
inevitable War].
4 S. Fitzpatrick, (ed.), Stalinism: New Directions. Routledge, New York, 2000.
5 S. Kotkin, Magnetic Montagn Stalinism as a Civilization, University of California 
Press, Los Angeles, 1997.
6 D. Brandenberger, National Bolshevism: Stalinist Mass Culture and the Formation of 
Modern Russian National Identity, 1931-1956, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 
2002; D.L. Hoffmann, Stalinist Values: The Cultural Norms of Soviet Modernity, 1917-
1941, Cornell University Press, 2003.
7 Miroviki stands for globalists in English. Originally it’s written in Russian as мировики
8 Institut Mirovogo Chozjaistva i Mirovoj Politiki”, in ‘Izvestija’, 19 December 1924
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At the end of 1927, Eugene Varga was named Director of the Institute and 
members close to Trotsky were expelled.9 In the 1930s, the Institute played 
a crucial role in the ideological justification of foreign policy and in collecting 
information about the capitalist world. The fate of the Institute was linked to 
Varga.10 For example, during the Great Terror, his personal relationship with 
Stalin allowed the survival of the Institute. Stalin intervened directly to protect 
Varga and his colleagues and allowed the spread of the miroviki’s non-dog-
matic interpretation of the world political and economic system with the goal 
of justifying his choices in foreign policy. 
Most of the works on Varga tend to describe him either as a loyal advisor of 
Stalin or as a non-dogmatic thinker.  Regarding to the first interpretation, Varga 
was never accused of treason, but between 1947 and 1948 he was persecuted 
because he was Jewish. Regarding the second trend, Varga was considered 
as a non-dogmatic thinker, because he also showed his opposition to Stalin’s 
foreign policy. This article will aim to go beyond these two views, framing Var-
ga’s contributions in the wider debate about the formation of the Soviet foreign 
policy during Stalin’s regime.
Eugene Varga grew up and studied in Budapest, where he was born in 1879 
in a Jewish family. Influenced in his youth by the Marxist ideology, he joined 
the Social-Democratic Party in 1906 and then the Hungarian Communist Party. 
During the short-lived Hungarian Soviet Republic, the political regime estab-
lished in 1919, he became Minister of Finance, a position that forced him to 
find protection in Moscow, amidst a period of repression that followed the 
collapse of the republic.  At this point, his career took off. He worked for the 
Comintern thanks to Lenin’s support, becoming first the head of the Information 
Bureau and a member of the plenum of the IKKI (the Executive Committee of 
the Third Communist International). The Information Bureau was re-named as 
“Bureau Varga”, demonstrating the prestige achieved by the economist during 
the 1920s.11 However, the most important achievement for Varga’s career came 
with the Institute of World Economy and Politics. Here, Varga found a proper 
environment to discuss his thesis with a team of highly specialized colleagues. 
In 1931, Rothstein and many of his colleagues were expelled and the In-
stitute, led by Varga, lost its connection with the Narkomindel. The Institute’s 
members became the miroviki (“globalists” in English), a group of scholars 
highly specialized in the study of capitalist economy, politics and ideological 
propaganda. In 1936, the Institute entered the Academy of Sciences of the 
9 Aran, Fond 354, Opis 1, Delo 22.
10 A. Di Biagio, “L’Urss e l’Occidente nell’analisi di E.S. Varga”, in A. Masoero e A. 
Venturi (a cura di), Il pensiero sociale russo. Modelli stranieri e contesto nazionale, 
Milano, Franco Angeli, 2000.
11 RGASPI, F. 504, Op. 1, D. 1.
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Soviet Union, which was established that same year.12 The miroviki and Varga 
shared a multicultural background, the knowledge of various foreign languag-
es, and an open-minded attitude towards capitalist dynamics. During Stalin’s 
regime, they represented an important part of the Russian intellectual world 
quite different from the nineteenth-century intelligentsia. 
The miroviki were not just strongly influenced by the political regime, as oc-
curred in the past, but they also played an organic role in the new state. Indeed, 
they were researchers and bureaucrats at the same time. As researchers, they 
could access to a vast range of rare sources about the capitalist world such 
as foreign academic publications and international press. As bureaucrats, they 
were required to provide all this information to state institutions and to the 
Communist Party to support their activities. This status as both scholars and 
members of the Soviet bureaucratic pyramid made them less independent 
than most Western intellectuals. For this reason, they cannot be considered an 
independent political group in the traditional sense, and they could not criticize 
or directly influence the foreign policy of the regime.  However, their work must 
not be underestimated. In several ways, they contributed to a deeper and non-
dogmatic understanding of the development of capitalism and international 
relations. During the 1930s, the Institute organized a three-year course about 
these topics. Many graduates worked at the Institute or at other Soviet acad-
emies and state institutions. The miroviki were the first official think tank on 
international relations in the Soviet Union. 
In contrast to most of the Soviet political elite, Varga and the miroviki main-
tained a more positive attitude towards Western Europe during the Stalin era, 
shared by the pre-revolutionary intelligentsia, and consequently, with the rise 
of the Cold War, they faced the consequences of these sympathies.
When Stalin consolidated his dictatorship in 1927 and 1928, the catastrophic 
interpretation became the official one. Consequently, during the first half of the 
1930s, scholars dealing with the capitalist world, under the pressure of Stalin’s 
regime, adopted a more dogmatic view of  international relations. However, in 
1934, with the rise of the “collective security” campaign and Popular Fronts 
against Fascism, Varga and his colleagues could again advocate pro-Western 
positions. In these ways, they legitimatized collaboration between the Soviet 
Union and “bourgeois democracies” against Hitler’s Germany. 
After the agreement with Nazi Germany, the Institute reworked the previous 
analysis and played a propagandist role against the Western democracies, but 
this situation changed with the outbreak of the Great Patriotic War, when Varga 
and his colleagues proposed again a pro-Western position. 
These pro-Western opinions were not only a response to the new interna-
tional situation, but also the natural development of the positions that the mi-
12 Aran, F. 1993, Op. 1, D. 1.
 COLD WAR OR NOT? THE INSTITUTE OF WORLD ECONOMY...  17
roviki had already proposed during their career. They were convinced that the 
integration of the USSR into the Post-War international system would be the 
natural and better choice for the Kremlin.
FROM THE SECOND WORLD WAR TO COLD WAR
In 1946, Varga published his most famous work, Changes in the Economy of 
Capitalism as a result of the Second World War, a collection of essays from the 
journal of the Institute.13 The analysis was based on the concrete observation 
of the ongoing economic changes that occurred during the War in the global 
scenario. According to Varga, the analogies between Soviet and Western mod-
els were progressively growing. In particular, the emerging role of the state in 
the capitalist economies looked like the crucial element shared by the two 
systems.
This trend would entail three main changes.  First, it would facilitate the trans-
formation of the capitalist economic model into a socialist one. This would be 
linked to the rise of new forms of collaboration between social-democratic par-
ties and the communists, inspired by the French and Spanish “popular fronts”. 
Second, the USSR would be integrated into the new world system, contribut-
ing, for example, to the creation of a new international organization for global 
security. 
Third, the Eastern European countries, which were now under the influence 
of Moscow, would develop democratic socialist systems, which he defined as 
“democracies of a new type”. This transition would reflect also the national 
peculiarities and respect political pluralism without being forced into the Soviet 
model.
Varga and his colleagues’ analysis implied a peaceful evolution of capital-
ism, which contradicted Lenin’s notion of the “inevitability of the war” under 
capitalism. The miroviki suggested that not just peaceful coexistence would 
be possible, but also the cooperation and integration between socialist and 
capitalist states. 
In 1946, it was remarkable that those ideas were not censored, and it sug-
gests the persistence of some cultural openness and pluralism in the post-
war Soviet intelligentsia and establishment about the future of international 
relations. 1946 was a chaotic year for the Soviet relationship with Western 
countries which was marked by “insecurity” across the entire decision-making 
process in foreign policy. Between 1943 and 1947, no dogmatic project orient-
ed Stalin’s foreign policy and even a possible collaboration with the Western 
countries was seriously considered by the regime. It is in this context that the 
13 E.S. Varga, Izmeniia v ekonomike kapitalizma v itoge vtoroy mirovoy voyny, Gosudart-
vennoe izdatel’stvo politicheskoj literatury, Moskva, 1946
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non-dogmatic positions of miroviki can be framed. Those theories could circu-
late because in 1946 they could still provide an ideological basis for possible 
cooperation between the West and Soviet Union. 
This kind of relationship between the Institute and Stalin implied that the 
miroviki analysis began to be inconvenient as soon as the international and 
domestic situation changed at the beginning of the Cold War.
In 1947 and 1948, Varga and his colleagues were accused of being “re-
formists” and “anti-Marxist”. A public discussion of Varga’s book was organ-
ized for 7, 14 and 21 May 1947.14 Konstantin Ostrovitianov, a dogmatic Soviet 
economist, criticized Varga and his colleagues for asserting that the struggle 
between socialist and capitalist countries had been halted during the Second 
World War. In other words, the Institute was an anti-Soviet centre of capitalist 
propaganda. 
In his reply, Varga defended himself and the miroviki from the accusation 
of being reformist, declaring, “I regret very much if the comrades who have 
expressed criticism here are of the opinion that I have insufficiently recognised 
my mistakes. There is nothing to do about it. It would be dishonest if I were 
to admit this or that accusation while inwardly not admitting it”. This meeting 
reflected the confusion and confrontation within the Soviet Union in the first 
months of 1947.
In 1947, the Marshall Plan and the foundation of Cominform changed the 
international situation. At the end of the year, the Institute was closed. Varga 
asked in vain for Stalin’s help, but this did not change the destiny of the insti-
tute. Nevertheless, Stalin may have reserved preferential treatment to Varga 
due to his reputation. While most of the miroviki were deported to the Sibe-
rian Gulag, Varga was not arrested and he was allowed to work and live in 
Moscow. Fifty members of Varga’s former institute were dismissed and some 
were arrested. The Institute of World Economy and Politics was closed and 
re-organized under the umbrella of the new Institute of Economy.15 There were 
no reasons to justify the work of the miroviki and to tolerate further ideologi-
cal pluralism. As shown by the statements from meetings held in October of 
1948 in the new institute, the works of Varga and his colleagues continued to 
be debated and harshly criticized by central authorities.16 At the conference, 
Varga argued that the new imperialist war against the Soviet Union was “highly 
improbable”. This point of view was incompatible with the Cold War and the 
participants of the meeting, including his former colleagues, attacked Varga. 
14 Diskussija po knige E.S. Varga ‘Izmenenija v ekonomike kapitalizma v itoge vtoroj 
mirovoj vojny’, in Mirovaja Chozjajstva i Mirovoe Politiki, Nº 11, 1947.
15 “Ob Institute ekonomiki i Institute mirovogo chozjajstva i mirovoj politiki”, in Akadem-
ija Nauk v rešenijach Politbjuro CK RKP(b)-VKP(b)-KPSS 1922-1991, Sost. V. D. Esa-
kov, Moskva, Rosspen, 2000, p. 361
16 «Voprosy Ekonomičeskie», Nº 8, 1948.
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Furthermore, during the discussion, the miroviki rejected their own analysis 
and admitted to being “reformist” and anti-Marxist.
At last, Varga repented publicly on 15 March 1949, when he published a let-
ter to the editor in Pravda17. Varga argued that he had been the “first scientist 
in the Soviet Union to oppose the Marshall Plan publicly” and that he wasn’t a 
“pro-Western scholar” because “today, in the present historical circumstanc-
es, that would mean being a counter-revolutionary, an Anti-Soviet traitor to the 
working class”.
Three major changes that occurred at both the national and the international 
levels can explain these decisions towards Varga and the work of the Institute:
1) the new order established by the Marshall Plan in 1947;
2) the spread of a shared anti-Western attitude in the Soviet Union after the 
Second World War;
3) the transformation of Stalin’s power.
The introduction of the Marshall Plan changed the state of international af-
fairs. Stalin suggested that the collaboration could not persist between the 
USSR and the Western countries. In other words, he re-adopted a dogmatic 
interpretation of international relations to justify the rise of the Cold War.18 It 
must also be added that during the Second World War, the propaganda of the 
regime promoted feelings of patriotism, the need for national unity and Soviet 
superiority. The Soviet identity became more and more flattered by Russian 
nationalism. For example, let’s think about Zhdanov’s propaganda, approved 
by the dictator and orchestrated in 1946 against some segments of the intel-
ligentsia accused of admiring Western countries during the Second World War. 
As known, Zhdanov combined anti-cosmopolitan and anti-Semitic feelings.19
Finally, in the second half of the 1940s, Stalin began to manage his power 
in even more paranoid and authoritarian ways than in the past. He elimi-
nated most of his closest allies such as Molotov, Mikojan and Vorošilov. In 
this context, Varga’s point of view was naturally no longer necessary to the 
regime.20
17 ‘Pravda’, 15 March, 1949.
18 S.D. Parrish and Narinskij, M.M. “The turn toward confrontation: the soviet reac-
tion to the Marshall Plan, 1947: two reports”, Cold War International History Project 
Working Paper Nº 9; G. Roberts, “Moscow and the Marshall Plan: Politics, Ideology 
and the Onset of the Cold War”, 1947, in Europe-Asia Studies, Vol.46, Nº 8, 1994.
19 Mezhdunarodnyj fond demokratiia Rossiia XX Vek (ed.), Stalin i kosmopolitizm 1945-1953 
dokumenty, ROOSPEN, Moskva, 2005; N. Krementsov, Stalinist Science, Princeton Uni-
versity Press, Princeton, 1997; B. Tromly, Making the Soviet Intelligentsia: Universities 
and Intellectual Life under Stalin and Khrushchev, Cambridge University Press, 2013.
20 Y. Gorlizki, “Ordinary Stalinism: The Council of Ministers and the Soviet Neo-pat-
rimonial State, 1946-1953”, in Journal of Modern History 74, Nº 4, 2002, pp. 699-
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CONCLUSION
To sum up, the experience of Varga and the Institute of World Economy and Poli-
tics provides fresh insights to the debate about the role of ideology in Soviet 
political strategies and the origin of the Cold War. The ideology played a crucial 
role at the beginning of the Cold War, but it was not monolithic. The experience 
of the Institute clearly shows that intellectual efforts to facilitate the cooperation 
with the Western countries existed in the 1940s, though the repression against 
Varga and his colleagues showed why pro-Western position remained marginal 
and couldn’t halt the advent of the Cold War.  While in the 1930s and 1940s Stalin 
was interested in the miroviki’s nondogmatic analysis, he later condemned them 
when his strategic goals changed. This article argues that the miroviki were perse-
cuted in 1947 and 1948 because they were Jews as well as reformist thinkers. In 
these years, the regime began a propaganda campaign against the Jewish people 
accused of being pro-Western and of having anti-patriotic feelings. The end of the 
Institute shows the transformation of the USSR and the mentality of the establish-
ment during Stalinism. At the end of the war, after twenty years of Stalin’s regime, 
the nation was dominated by nationalistic feelings. However, part of the Soviet 
intelligentsia (especially the miroviki and the diplomats) rejected those feelings 
and proposed a collaborative foreign policy with the European countries.
In this context, 1948 represents the turning point. At this time, Stalin con-
demned every interpretation of international relations that could weaken the 
balance of the bipolar order and the superiority of the Soviet system.  In other 
words, part of the Soviet political culture justified the collaboration with West-
ern countries, but Stalin was unfit to oversee that dialogue. The members of 
the Institute participated in a peculiar struggle of modern Russian history: the 
dialectical struggle within the Russian intelligentsia and establishment between 
anti-European/isolationist and pro-European/integrationist positions. 
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THE LOGIC OF FORCE:  
HENRY KISSINGER’S PHD DISSERTATION ABOUT 
THE SENSE OF INSECURITY AND  
THE ORIGINS OF THE COLD WAR
SArA rOdA
INTRODUCTION
In early 1954, Henry Kissinger, student in the Department of Government at 
Harvard University, completed his PhD dissertation on the European path from 
Napoleonic revolutionary chaos to the international order created at the Vienna 
Congress. The title of his thesis was Peace, Legitimacy, and the Equilibrum (A 
Study of the Statesmanship of Castlereagh and Metternich), later published under 
the title A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace 
1812-1822.21 There is a gossip that tells that when Kissinger chose this topic, his 
colleagues from the Department of Government were quite surprised and sug-
gested him moving to the History Department.22 I would like to note that history 
was at that time considered out of fashion. In the post-war era, students and pro-
fessors at most of the American Universities were mainly concerned with inter-
national relations, particularly between the Soviet Union and the United States. 
That is why historical work focused on 19th century European policy seemed 
out-of-date. Despite this suggestion, Kissinger did not relent. Later, when he was 
already a well-known politician, he even admitted in an interview for The New 
York Times that: “I think of myself as a historian more than as a statesman.”23
However, to think that the future diplomat and Secretary of State would be 
content just with analyzing Napoleon’s and Metternich’s political moves is mis-
taken. Rather, A World Restored is an analysis of the relations between two 
main powers in the international arena. For his theory, Kissinger chose histori-
cal background but I think that the general rules illustrated by the 19th century 
examples could be applied to many other political situations.   
Kissinger’s dissertation had one more aim: to present the European method 
of diplomacy in the US.  Certainly of great importance for Kissinger’s views was 
21 H. Kissinger, A World Restored, Castlereagh, Metternich and the Restoration of 
Peace 1812-1822, London 1957 (also: Boston 1957, New York 1964). In this essay 
all the quotations will be taken from the London edition.
22 W. Isaacson, Kissinger. A Biography, London – Boston 1992, p. 74.
23 Secretary Kissinger Interviewed for the New York Times, “Department of State Bul-
letin”, Vol. 71, Nº 1846, November 11, 1974, p. 629. 
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his origin. Due to his German roots, he understood the mentality and the Euro-
pean way of conducting foreign policy. He shaped his views based on European 
philosophy: “His conservatism is more Hegelian than Burkean, more German 
than Anglo-Saxon, and more European than American.”24 Such an understand-
ing of political theory and history was missing in the American tradition.  For 
Americans, the freedom of nations was the overriding principle. Since Wilson’s 
political philosophy expressed by the League of Nations did not work on the Eu-
ropean political stage, the Americans did not tolerate anything connected with 
the European way of conducting foreign policy and was based on the disagree-
ment between countries and it minimised the development of nations. They did 
not understand the rules of the European policymaking, because they looked at 
it through the prism of America’s own isolated, privileged position:25  “We never 
had to face the problem of security until the end of the Second World War, so 
we could afford to be very idealistic and insist on the pure implementation of our 
maxims.”26
In 1969 Kissinger, as President Nixon’s national security advisor, wrote: “in 
the years ahead, the most profound challenge to American policy will be philo-
sophical: to develop some concept of order in a world which is bipolar militarily 
but multipolar politically. But the philosophical deepening will not come easily 
to those brought up in the American tradition of foreign policy.”27 Understand-
ing A World Restored is possible only by realizing why Kissinger dealt with 
the analysis of the Congress of Vienna and the politicians who built the so-
called “Metternich system.” The way Kissinger wrote his text indicated that 
his purpose was not to provide the reader with specific events taking place 
in Europe in the period 1812-1822. Strictly historical data was marginalized in 
favor of philosophical arguments about the nature of international relations and 
historical events as examples. Kissinger was also not overly interested in the 
biographies of Lord Castlereagh and Metternich. 
He presented a fairly detailed picture of these politicians due to his individu-
alistic view of the history, but more important for him were the problems these 
politicians confronted. Furthermore, he chose to focus on the times after the 
Napoleonic period because he believed they reflected his own times. Kiss-
24 B. Mazlish, Kissinger. The European Mind in American Policy, New York 1976, p. 
155. Kissinger refers to Burke also in A World Restored, p. 192 195; H. A. Kissinger, 
“The Conservative Dilemma: Reflections on the Political Thought of Metternich”, The 
American Political Science Review, Vol. 48, Nº 4 (December 1954), pp. 1017-1030, 
p. 1018-1019.
25 M. Howard, “The World According to Henry. From Metternich to Me”, Foreign Affairs, 
Vol. 73, Nº. 3 (May - June 1994), pp. 132-140, pp. 132, 138-140.
26 Secretary Kissinger Interviewed for the New York Times, “Department of State Bul-
letin”, Vol. 71, Nº. 1846, November 11, 1974, p. 630.
27 H. A. Kissinger, American Foreign Policy: Three essays, New York 1969, p. 79.
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inger himself explained that he decided to deal with post-revolutionary Europe 
because it was “a decade which throws these problems into sharp relief: the 
conclusion and the aftermath of the wars of the French Revolution. Few peri-
ods illustrate so well the dilemma posed by the appearance of a revolutionary 
power, the tendency of terms to change their meaning and of even the most 
familiar relationships to alter their significance.”28
In 1957 Kissinger published another book,29 Nuclear Weapons and Foreign 
Policy,30 which quickly became a bestseller. At first glance, it seems that con-
trary to A World Restored, the topic of Nuclear Weapons was more fitting to 
modern trends. However, both books presented certain contemporary ideas. 
Stephen Graubard31 wrote in the biography of Henry Kissinger that “few who 
read Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy were at all aware of Kissinger’s other 
interests; not many who read that book thought it necessary to look also at A 
World Restored. Had they done so, they would have noticed at once the extent 
to which Kissinger made use in the nuclear weapons volume of insights drawn 
from his early-nineteen-century researches. […] Some of the most important 
concepts in Nuclear Weapons derived from the prolonged, almost leisurely 
study that Kissinger had made of diplomacy and politics in the Napoleonic 
era.”32 A few years earlier, in 1946, American charge d’affaires in Moscow 
George F. Kennan wrote the most famous diplomatic telegram to the State De-
partment. His message from February 22, 1946 became known as the “Long 
Telegram.” After the Second World War, the direction of Soviet policy was not 
clear for the U.S. 
First sign of the direction was provided by Stalin in his speech, made on 
February 9, 1946. He announced the policy based on the concept of perma-
nent and inevitable conflict of interests between capitalism and communism. 
He also threatened any opponent of the communist system with conflict. Sta-
lin’s speech explicitly determines the path of Soviet post-war policy.33
Kennan was asked to write an interpretive analysis of Soviet policy, its mo-
tives and expectations of the Soviet behavior after implementation of their 
28 H. A. Kissinger, A World Restored, p. 3.
29 A World Restored was published the same year, but few months later than Nuclear 
Weapons; see: S. R. Graubard, Kissinger. Portrait of a Mind, New York, 1973, p. 13.
30 Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy,  New York, 1957.
31 Stephen R. Graubard was born in 1924. He got PhD degree at Harvard University. 
He was a colleague of Henry Kissinger since their studies at Harvard University. 
Also, they conducted together the Harvard International Seminar in its inaugural 
year. Graubard was professor of history at Brown University in Providence.
32 S. R. Graubard, op. cit., p. 13.
33 A. Bógdał-Brzezińska, Ewolucja doktryny i koncepcji polityki zagranicznej Stanów 
Zjednoczonych u progu zimnej wojny, in Historia. Stosunki międzynarodowe. Am-
erykanistyka. Księga Jubileuszowa na 65-lecie Profesora Wiesława Dobrzyckiego, 
ed. S. Bieleń, Warszawa 2001, pp. 73-121.
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policy34. That’s why Kennan wrote this over 5,500-words long telegram. His 
text was not only an in-depth analysis of Soviet policy, but also a presentation 
on the historical background and motives of Soviet government actions, infor-
mation about Russian society and communist ideology. Moreover, it contained 
suggestions for the U.S. on how they should respond to the inflexible and ag-
gressive policy of Stalin. The “Long Telegram” shaped American foreign policy 
in the post-war period. Kennan became known as the “father” of the strategy 
of containment.35 A modified version of ‘Long Telegram’ was published in 1947 
in Foreign Affairs, under the title “The Sources of Soviet Conduct.”36 For politi-
cal reasons, the author was hidden under the letter “X.”
In my essay, I will present a partial analysis of Kissinger’s A World Restored. 
First of all, I will focus on his theory on the world powers and rivalry among 
them as shown in Napoleonic France. Next, I will briefly discuss the basic 
features of the Soviet Union as described in Kennan’s ‘Long Telegram.’ Finally, 
I will compare these two texts and propose that Kissinger took certain basic 
ideas for his book from Kennan’s telegram. I believe that actually he was writ-
ing about the features of Soviet Union through the example of France ruled by 
Napoleon. 
A WORLD RESTORED
The period of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic era changed the Eu-
ropean continent so drastically that a return to the old order was impossible. 
Politicians that gathered in Vienna seemed aware of this. They knew also that 
Europe was tired of wars and revolutions, which was why a return to a peaceful 
existence was the only way of conducting international policy. At this moment 
Europe was ready for the first time in history to create an international order 
based on a balance of power.37 Therefore, the main role of the Congress was 
the pursuit of the Iustum Equilibrum and legitimacy, as well as the fight against 
any manifestation of power. Iustum Equilibrum means to stabilize the interna-
34 The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State, in: United States 
Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, Vol. VI: Eastern 
Europe, the Soviet Union (1946), p. 696, note 44. [University of Wisconsin Digital 
Collection: http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/FRUS]
35 J. L. Gaddis, Strategie powstrzymywania. Analiza polityki bezpieczeństwa naro-
dowego Stanów Zjednoczonych w okresie zimnej wojny [Strategies of Containment: 
A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold War], trans. 
Piotr Ostaszewski, Warszawa, 2007, p. 43-80.
36 X [G. F. Kennan], The Sources of Soviet Conduct, “Foreign Affairs”, Vol. 25 (1947), 
Nº. 4, pp. 566-582.
37 H. A. Kissinger, Dyplomacja [Diplomacy], trans. S. Głąbiński, G. Woźniak, I. Zych, 
Warszawa, 1996, s. 81.
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tional arena with the balance of power, and its main proponent was the United 
Kingdom. Legitimacy means respecting the internal order and lawful validation 
of the monarch’s power. Supporters of this principle were Talleyrand and Met-
ternich. These two concepts are key for understanding the Congress of Vienna 
and Kissinger’s analysis in A World Restored.
Kissinger based the history of the Napoleonic era on contrasts. He presented 
a bipolar vision of the international relations between European powers. Every 
basic element of this world has its opposite. The first and basic pair of oppo-
sitions in his conception is the opposition between two international orders, 
“legitimate” and “revolutionary”. These two forces define the nature of inter-
national relations. There can be “legitimate” power and “revolutionary” power. 
Legitimate power accepts the frameworks of the international order, while the 
revolutionary state opposes the international system: “Whenever there exists 
a power which considers the international order or the manner of legitimizing it 
oppressive, relations between it and other powers will be revolutionary. In such 
cases, it was not the adjustment differences within a given system which will 
be at issue, but the system itself.”38 Every state can belong to only one or the 
other and they were thus “very distinct categories.”39
Kissinger based his theory of legitimacy on the philosophy of Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau (1712-1778), echoing his question of what can make authority le-
gitimate.40 The Enlightenment philosopher developed the theory of ‘The Social 
Contract’ in regards to the legitimacy of power. The theory states that a group 
gives up its freedom for universal sovereignty resulting in a single ‘social body’ 
with each member as an integral part. This “social body” creates a certain 
framework which becomes the general law.41 Kissinger generalized this theory, 
replacing the unit with the state and society with the international community. 
The rules that defined international order became a general framework ac-
cepted by the individual states.42 If power undermines this international order, 
it was defined by Kissinger as revolutionary. 
According to Kissinger, France in the Napoleonic era was a revolutionary 
power. He wrote: “There have been societies, such as United States or Britain, 
in the nineteenth century, which have been basically conservative. […] There 
have been others, such as France over a century, where all issues have been 
basically revolutionary”.43 In the book A World Restored, Kissinger built the 
opposition of Napoleonic France and two kinds of legitimate powers, con-
38 H. Kissinger, A World Restored, p. 2.
39 S. R. Graubard, op. cit., p. 17.
40 Ibid., p. 3.
41 J. J. Rousseau, Umowa społeczna [The Social Contract], trans. A. Peretiatkowicz, 
Kęty 2002.
42 H. A. Kissinger, A World Restored, p. 4.
43 Ibid., p. 192.
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servative and continental Austria and isolationist, insular Great Britain. I will not 
write about these powers because they need a separate analysis. However, 
it is very interesting that even in the case of two legitimate powers, Kissinger 
saw them as being in opposition with one another. I emphasize further that 
Kissinger based all his concepts on duality and contrasts. Below, I present the 
diagram of the basic concept of the book A World Restored. 
Back to my main topic, Napoleon’s problem was not fighting, but stabilizing 
the external and internal field. After 1807, he already defeated Austria and Prus-
sia and entered the alliance with Russia. There was no more serious opponent to 
fight. Now he had to create stability and maintain his power, which is when his 
problems started. Kissinger wrote: “For now, the incommensurability between 
Napoleon’s material and moral base was apparent, the intermediary powers had 
been eliminated, the time of unlimited victories gained by limited wars was over. 
Victory henceforth would depend on domestic strength, and Napoleon, having 
failed to establish a principle of obligation to maintain his conquest, would find 
his power sapped by the constant need for the application of force.”44
There are two possibilities in building the internal structure. It can be based 
on loyalty or on duty. Stable order builds its internal structure on duty, which 
is followed by a notion of responsibility. It is not connected with the individual, 
current ruler but with the individual sense of responsibility for the state. On the 
contrary, loyalty is typical with revolutionary power. This loyalty is to an individ-
ual or group of individuals. People are united in absolute obedience to the ruler. 
The ruler is strong, unless somebody undermines his authority. In the structure 
based on loyalty, it is not important that power is right or wrong or its rules are 
good or bad for the state. In this system, transferring power from one individual 
44 Ibid., p. 16.
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to another is a mortal danger to the stability of the state.45 Internal order built 
on a sense of duty leads citizens to accept principles for the good of society. In 
this case, transfer of power from one person to another, within the same model, 
does not threaten the stability of the state. However, the ruler, whose power 
is based on loyalty feels insecure. In consequence, this insecurity is followed 
by “the constant need for the application of force.” Napoleon established his 
power based on loyalty, and thus with the first defeat, he could lose everything. 
Therefore, in order to maintain his power, he always referred to the possibility 
of force. Napoleon is an example of a ruler who believed that power based on 
loyalty could survive even with the help of force, but as Kissinger said, “force 
may conquer the world but it could not legitimize itself.”46
The second problem of the revolutionary power is the coexistence with other 
states. This is also connected with the legitimization of the power. For Napoleon, 
the only justification of his rules was force. It was the reason why he could not 
admit that his power was limited. If he had admitted this, it would have meant 
that somebody was stronger in some aspect. For revolutionary power, showing 
the limits is the beginning of its collapse. Kissinger wrote in A World Restored, 
“for Napoleon, everything depended on exhibiting his continuing omnipotence; 
for Metternich, on demonstrating the limitations of French power.”47 However, 
every power that wants to have peaceful relations with other countries has to 
find its place in the international system within the framework of this structure. 
Negotiations are part of the process of “finding one’s own place”, which is why 
the art of diplomacy and negotiations are necessary for every state. But nego-
tiation requires every state to admit its own limits. For revolutionary power, this 
again results in the sense of insecurity, and in consequence, the use of force. 
“A man who has been used to command finds it almost impossible to learn 
to negotiate, because negotiation is an admission of finite power.”48 If revolu-
tionary power cannot use diplomacy as a tool for external contacts, the only 
tool that persists is force. “A ruler legitimized by charisma or by force cannot 
easily accept the fact that henceforth he must seek his safety in self-limitation, 
that events are no longer subject to his will, that peace depends not on his 
strength but on his recognition of the power of others.”49 Acceptance of this 
self-limitation does not fit into the revolutionary ruler’s vision of the world as he 
knows that it would lead to the recognition of other powers in a certain area. 
Hence, a situation in which there is a natural threat to the revolutionary power 
would arise, which creates a sense of insecurity and again of the necessity of 
using force.
45 Ibid., p. 192.
46 Ibid., p. 17.
47 Ibid., p. 43.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid., p. 63.
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The main features of a revolutionary power and a legitimate power is pre-
sented in the table, showing also the oppositions marked by Kissinger in A 
World Restored: 
Revolutionary power Legitimate power
Does not accept the framework of 
the international order.
Accepts the framework of the 
international order.
Undermines the system itself. It just needs matching individual differences within the system.
Looking for a way to legitimize itself 
It becomes legitimate by social ac-
ceptance, or at least by the major 
powers.
It creates a situation in which one 
country feels absolutely safe and 
others fully insecure. There is 
therefore a risk of continuous 
revolution in the dissatisfied 
countries.
It creates a situation where no 
country feels completely safe, but 
there is not one that would be 
absolutely in danger. None of the 
members of the international 
structure is unhappy enough to lead 
to a social explosion.
Nothing can satisfy it besides 
complete elimination of the enemy.
It achieves relative satisfaction 
through balance.
It considers itself to be all-powerful 
and not limited. War is the only 
means of communication.
Conflicts are possible, but they have 
their limits. War is conducted in the 
name of preserving existing 
structures.
The only form of communication 
with other countries are power, 
war or arms race.
The main form of communication 
with other countries is diplomacy.
It is based on loyalty to the ruler. It is based on duty and respect to the established structures.
As we can see, according to Kissinger’s concept, revolutionary power has 
problems in both building internal order and in forging stable relations with 
other countries. In both cases, Napoleon came to the same point, that the 
revolutionary state had a sense of insecurity. Kissinger explains that the basic 
motive of using force is almost in any case insecurity. It should be noted that 
the motives of the revolutionary power do not have to be negative: 
To be sure, the motivation of the revolutionary 
power may well be defensive; it may well be sin-
cere in its protestations of feeling threatened. But 
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the distinguishing feature of a revolutionary power 
is not that it feels threatened, such feeling is inher-
ent in the nature of international relations based on 
sovereign states, but that nothing can reassure it. 
Only absolute security, the neutralization of the op-
ponent, is considered a sufficient guarantee, and 
thus the desire of one power for absolute security 
means absolute insecurity for all the others.50
That is why revolutionary power will always use force as a remedy of all prob-
lems and at the same time every problem will be based on and cause the sense 
of insecurity.  The only satisfaction for the revolutionary power would be total se-
curity, which is excluded in the international order based on the balance of forces. 
Full security of one country would mean the absolute danger to others. According 
to this philosophy, a revolutionary government seeks to completely eliminate the 
enemy, because only this can ensure its security. Kissinger stated that legitimate 
powers cannot apply the tools of diplomacy as methods of contacting the revo-
lutionary power. In this situation, diplomacy is replaced by war or an armaments 
race51 and some tools of diplomacy merely have supporting positions.
Before the final part of my essay, I would like to summarize this section by a 
diagram, presented below. It is a chain of causation of the logic of the revolu-
tionary power. As is visible, every action leads to the sense of insecurity. 
50 Ibid., p. 2
51 Ibid., p. 3.
Necessity of recognition 
of one’s own limits
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LONG TELEGRAM:  
THE SOURCES OF SOVIET CONDUCT 
Kennan pointed out in his telegram a few main features of the Soviet Union. 
First, he summarized the main points of Soviet ideology. This was based on 
antagonism to everything connected with the ‘capitalist world.’ The Soviets 
were building an internal order based on this antagonism by demonstrating to 
society that an enemy could justify the need for a dictatorship. Also, it helped 
mobilize all forces in one direction, in this case led by the Communist Party.52 
It combined concepts of offense and defense. The Soviet Union was also op-
posed to the logic of reason, which was replaced by the logic of force. They did 
not want to help create the international order but instead wanted to defeat the 
enemies as the only method of defense, which therefore generates a constant 
feeling of insecurity.53
The author of the telegram also raised the issue of the stability of power in 
the USSR, which was not yet validated. This issue is connected with the trans-
fer of  power from one person to another. Kennan wrote that it had not been 
fully tested.54 This problem was also raised by Kissinger in A World Restored. 
If there was a change in object of loyalty, than it was not sure that this new 
person would be accepted. This loyalty of the Soviet society was based on the 
fact that nobody tried to officially undermine the authority of the government. 
As Kennan wrote, there was no objective truth in the Soviet Union, it was cre-
ated by the Party, because it represented the embodiment of the “ultimate 
wisdom” and the logic of history.55 If anybody tried to undermine the authority, 
he would be defeated by force.
Kennan also wrote about the problem in the external relations of the Soviet 
Union claiming that “at the bottom of the Kremlin’s neurotic view of world affairs 
is traditional and instinctive Russian sense of insecurity.”56 Kennan sought the 
motivation of the Soviets in this sense of insecurity. In his article, he wrote, “easily 
persuaded of their own doctrinaire rightness, they insisted on the submission or 
destruction of all competing power.”57 When comparing this with Kissinger’s con-
cept of insecurity and neutralization of the opponents, it seems almost the same. 
The last aspect which I would like to present is the first part of the summary 
in Kennan’s ‘Long Telegram.’ He wrote that the Soviet Union was “impervious 
52 X [G. F. Kennan], The Sources of Soviet Conduct, p. 570.
53 Ibid., p. 557.
54 G. F. Kennan, Telegraphic Message from Moscow of February 22, 1946, in: G. F. Ken-
nan, Memoirs 1925-1950, Boston-Toronto 1957, p. 558.
55 X [G. F. Kennan], op. cit., p. 573.
56 G. F. Kennan, op. cit., p. 549.
57 X [G. F. Kennan], op. cit., p. 568.
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to logic of reason, and it is highly sensitive to the logic of force.”58 Kennan often 
brings up this primacy of the logic of force. In any case, the U.S. should have 
supposed that the Soviets would use force. Again it is very similar to Kissinger’s 
theory. Force is a final result of every action. It was best for anyone who had con-
tact with the revolutionary power to assume that force would be used. Similarly, 
it was best to assume that the Soviet Union was able to use force in any case.
CONCLUSION
Henry Kissinger presented in his work a well-defined vision of the world. We 
get a picture of a bipolar world, in which one force is trying to eliminate the 
other, creating a constant struggle. Kissinger clearly favored the legitimate au-
thority. Moreover, his vision of nineteenth-century France is quite often com-
pared to the Soviet Union in the early Cold War period.59 We can suppose that 
the aim of Kissinger was to present that resemblance. However, while reading 
A World Restored, it seemed that the author made a comparison of the two su-
perpowers in the reverse order. First he established the idea and then proved 
it through history.
In my essay, I wanted to demonstrate similarities between Kissinger’s con-
cept and Kennan’s analysis. It seems to me that Kissinger based his PhD the-
sis on Kennan’s ideas. He just presented it in a historical background and 
developed his ideas. Aside from obvious similarities such as the sense of in-
security, logic of force, loyalty in the internal structure, central position of the 
authority, there is also one more argument for my thesis.
Kissinger did not use any source about France under Napoleon’s rule. In his 
bibliography, we can find many books about Metternich and Castlereagh, but 
none about Napoleon. The author of A World Restored declined reading the lit-
erature on the Vienna Congress, opting to read Metternich’s memoirs instead. 
Finally, as he began to write his work, he read some basic literature about 
the Congress, but these books did not make a good impression on him.60 
He mostly criticized61 the two historians who devoted their life to researching 
the “Dancing Congress”, Charles Webster (1886-1961)62 and Harold Nicolson 
58 G. F. Kennan, op. cit., p. 557.
59 Zob. S. R. Graubard, Kissinger, p. 18; G. J. Klein Bluemink Kissingerian Realism in 
International Politics. Political Theory, Philosophy and Practice, Leiden, 2000, p. 82; 
B. Mazlish, Kissinger, The European Mind in American Policy, New York, 1976, pp. 
172-183.
60 T. J. Noer, “Henry Kissinger’s Philosophy of History”, Modern Age, Vol. 19, Spring, 
1975, pp. 180-189, p. 181.
61 H. A. Kissinger, A World Restored, p. 342.
62 Ch. Webster, The Congress of Vienna, London, 1934.
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(1886-1968).63 In A World Restored, Kissinger rarely used the references to the 
literature and when he did, he did so only to give specific historical data, which 
is strange, especially in a PhD dissertation. For me, it means his concept of 
Napoleon’s rule was based on different, contemporary ideas. While reading A 
World Restored, it appears that Kissinger had a theoretical thesis and tried to 
prove it by the historical example, using data that fit the concept, without de-
veloping superfluous details. As Stephen Graubard noted, “Kissinger’s major 
resource was his intelligence.”64
It is clear that Kissinger did not want to be an expert on the Vienna Congress, 
but was trying to learn from the nineteenth-century statesmen who lived in 
the revolutionary period and who tried, in their own way, to build an interna-
tional order from the ashes of the old, conservative, eighteenth-century world 
destroyed by the French Revolution and Napoleon. For Kissinger, A World 
Restored is a form of dialogue with himself conducted in order to understand 
contemporary politics through the lens of history.65
It is worth mentioning that Kissinger referred to Kennan‘s “Long Telegram” in 
1994  in his article on the containment strategy.66 However, he did not mention 
in the article his approach during his studies at university. Therefore, the ques-
tion remains open whether Kissinger’s vision stemmed only from the study of 
the Congress of Vienna or the study of the nineteenth-century combined with 
the knowledge of the concepts of Kennan.
Kissinger’s world was in almost every aspect bipolar, and thus it was intimately 
linked to the post-war period. The cause of all problems is the sense of insecurity. 
It is characteristic of revolutionary power and thus makes international relations 
unstable.  The only remedy is stabilization achieved by the balance of powers 
and coexistence of legitimate powers. The Soviet Union in early post-war times 
exactly suited the theoretical concept created by Kissinger. In both diagrams pre-
sented in this essay, we could classify the Soviet Union as a revolutionary power 
since from an American point of view, it was a revolutionary power.
It would be also interesting to compare Kissinger’s concept with modern 
American and European diplomacy. In a world that has become a global vil-
lage, there cannot exist a state that plays the role of a lonely island, and in this 
global village, a revolutionary power is even more dangerous. Therefore, the 
question arises: which elements of Kissinger’s concept have survived in con-
temporary U.S. and European foreign policy?
63 H. Nicolson, The Congress of Vienna. A Study in Allied Unity: 1812–1822, London, 
1946.
64 S. R. Graubard, Kissinger, p. 16.
65 Stephen Graubard uses the expression that Kissinger was ‘writing for himself’: Ibid., 
pp. 13-17.
66 H. A. Kissinger, “Reflections on Containment”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 73, Nº 3 (May-
June 1994), pp. 113-130.
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COLD WAR REPRESENTATIONS IN  
U. S. MUSEUMS
JuLIA dAnYLOW
The Cold War was a basic condition of life for nations all around the globe from 
1946 until 1990. Scarcely anyone ever thought it possible to overcome the 
ideological rift between East and West, originating from the different political 
positions on post-war reconstruction in Europe. 
When looking at historical museums, there seem to be different approaches to 
the topic of Cold War History; contrasting views from American, European and 
Asian nations exist, depending on their respective historical involvement and their 
coming to terms with the past. In this article I will analyze four different U.S. Ameri-
can institutions – some being government funded, others products of public-pri-
vate partnerships or completely privately funded. Each institution represents one 
of the four characteristic aspects of historical culture – the academic, the aestheti-
cal, the political and the economic dimensions. The German historian Jörn Rüsen 
developed the prototype of this classification in 1994.67 My leading question is 
whether Cold War history in the described museums follows an American master 
narrative or allows for broader international perspectives. In concluding this paper, 
I will discuss some challenges of Cold War representation in museums in general.
MUSEUMS AS AN EXPRESSION OF HISTORICAL CULTURE
The British cultural anthropologist Carol McDonald specifies museums as the 
“key cultural loci of our times”68. They are symbols and sites for exemplifying and 
illustrating social relations, identity and difference, knowledge and power, theory 
and representation of national and international culture.69 The task of historical 
museums is to provide orientation for their visitors in time and space. Historical 
narratives are constructed and deconstructed to vividly picture times long gone. 
That is to say that exhibitions themselves create certain narratives of the past. 
In my analysis the exhibitions are evaluated as sources, regarding their way 
of dealing with Cold War history and of their date of origin. Which events and 
67 Jörn Rüsen, Was ist Geschichtskultur? Überlegungen zu einer neuen Art, über Ges-
chichte nachzudenken, in: Klaus Füssmann et al, Historische Faszination. Geschich-
tskultur heute (Köln, 1994) 5f.
68 Sharon Macdonald, Gordon Fyfe, Theorizing Museums. Representing Identiy and 
diversity in a changing world (Cambridge 2006) p. 2.
69 Ibid.
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objects are shown? Are there mainly original objects, or rather replicas? Is the 
presentation a standard cabinet display or a scenic experience for the visitors? 
What is the curatorial intention behind the exhibitions?
Museums and exhibitions representing Cold War history have different pur-
poses. Some are intended for the improvement of historical knowledge, others 
engage their visitors emotionally. At the same time, public history projects de-
pend on economic preconditions as well as political decisions. These four as-
pects, the academic, the aesthetic, the political and the economic dimension 
are to be found in every exhibition – but their weighting differs. The following 
four case studies will explain this idea.
THE ACADEMIC DIMENSION OF HISTORICAL CULTURE – 
THE SPACE RACE GALLERY AT NATIONAL AIR AND SPACE 
MUSEUM (NASM)
Part of the Smithsonian Institution, the National Air and Space Museum (NASM)70 
on the National Mall in Washington D.C. is a government-funded museum. With-
in the scope of its permanent exhibition, the NASM focuses on a specific aspect 
of the Cold War – the history of the Space Race between the U.S. and the USSR. 
In the mid-1990s the exhibition team developed a narrative called “From Com-
petition to Cooperation”, comparing the American space program to the Soviet 
one.71 For them, it was a close fight over presenting the Enola Gay debacle. The 
idea to display the fuselage of the Enola Gay aircraft, which dropped the atomic 
bomb on Hiroshima on August 6, 1945, provoked a major controversy between 
historians and veteran groups.72 In the end, it did not prove possible to consoli-
date the perceptions and beliefs of war participants with the post-war research 
evidence gathered by professional historians. The exhibition was cancelled.
The Space Race exhibition delivers a well-balanced display of American and 
Soviet space artifacts to illustrate the race to the moon and the effects of this 
technological competition on the military confrontation. The aesthetics of the 
exhibition are not fashionable. Bulky cabinets, poor lighting and uniformity of 
explanatory texts refer to the early 1980s. But on the content level, Space Race 
is not outdated at all. In particular, the chapter on the Military origins of the Space 
Race and the former Nazi-German V-2 weapon, in addition to the NASM internal 
discussion about its presentation, serves as an example of successful transgres-
70 See The National Air and Space Museum, Washington D.C., USA, URL: http://air-
andspace.si.edu (09/15/13).
71 Interview with Michael J. Neufeld, Curator, 09/26/11.
72 Richard H. Kohn, “History at Risk. The Case of the Enola Gay”, in: Edward T. 
Linienthal, Tom Engelhardt, History Wars. The Enola Gay and other Battles for the 
American Past (New York 1996) 140-170.
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sion of historical-political boundaries. The presentation of the V-2 in the NASM 
proceeded in two stages. At first the rocket was entitled “captured German V-2 
missile as a prominent and persistent symbol of Space Age”.73 But the retaliatory 
weapon was intended by the Third Reich’s leaders to demoralize the civilian pop-
ulation of the enemy.74 This rocket is therefore an object with at least two levels of 
memory. Repainting the originally camouflaged V-2 in black and white, to present 
it as a space artifact, was thereby erasing [also camouflaging] its Nazi past.
Moreover, it was supplemented with further large objects (a Viking, a large 
liquid-fueled rocket and a WAC Corporal, the first American sounding record), 
which strengthened the purely technological nature of the presentation. A new 
director and a little luck concerning the budget made an update of the V-2 rep-
resentation in the Space Race gallery possible.75 Using new research results, 
visitors are now informed as to how the weapon fell into the hands of the United 
States and about its role as the technological beginning of the American space 
program. In addition to this, American businessman Ross Perot76 donated some 
objects reflecting the Russian perspective. The V-2 presentation, in its new form, 
features a great starting point for the topic of the Space Race. That is why Space 
Race is a good example for a scientific-based understanding of historical culture.
THE AESTHETICAL DIMENSION OF HISTORICAL CULTURE 
– THE PRICE OF FREEDOM.  
AMERICANS AT WAR AT THE NATIONAL MUSEUM OF 
AMERICAN HISTORY (NMAH) 
The National Museum of American History (NMAH)77 in Washington D.C. sees its 
task to survey the major themes of American history and culture to the pub78. One 
of its permanent exhibitions is The Price of Freedom. Americans at War (POF). POF 
spans the time from the War of Independence to the present. It was built within 
three years, thanks to an $80 million donation by real-estate developer Kenneth 
E. Behring.79 This type of funding is not possible for public museums in Germany.
73 Interview with Michael J. Neufeld, Curator, 09/26/11.
74 David H. DeVorkin and Michael J. Neufeld, “Space Artifact or Nazi weapon? Display-
ing the Smithsonian´s V-2 missile, 1976-2011”, in: Endeavour (2011), 1.
75 Interview with Paul Cerruzzi, Curator, 09/26/11.
76 Gerald Posner, Citizen Perot. His Life and Times (New York, 1996).
77 See The National Museum of American History, Washington D.C., USA, URL: http://
americanhistory.si.edu (09/15/13).
78 See Mission Statement of NMAH, URL: http://americanhistory.si.edu/about/mission 
(09/15/13).
79 See Smithsonian Institution Announces Biggest Single Donnation in ist 154-year 
history, URL: http://americanhistory.si.edu/press/releases/smithsonian-institution-
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The Cold War has its own section in POF covering the period from 1945 to 
1989, but focuses mainly on the Korean and Vietnam Wars. These parts are 
presented with dramaturgical and scenographic elements. Illuminated images 
of war printed on canvas, enhanced by music and sounds of war, show up in a 
seven-minute loop to catch the visitors emotionally right from the beginning of 
the exhibition. The music is reminiscent of dramatized films like Saving Private 
Ryan.80 As a continuous subtheme, POF operates with “War in media” – an im-
portant topic referring to the Vietnam War as The Television War.81 The curators 
rebuilt a typical American living room of the 1970s. One wall is covered with a 
pyramid of old TV sets playing a compilation of U.S. media coverage on the Vi-
etnam War. The living room leads directly into a larger room that contextualizes 
both the Vietnam War and the Cold War in general. There is a scenographic 
presentation of the largest object in the collection of the NMAH – a Bell-Huey 
helicopter.82 The helicopter is presented in a shaded room; loudspeakers de-
liver the sound of rotors. Exhibition designers transformed the surrounding 
area with grass and sands into a Vietnamese paddy field.  Two display dum-
mies dressed as American soldiers are lying in front of the helicopter on the 
ground – one holding the other one, who is wounded, in his arms. The door 
of the helicopter is open, showing a large TV screen. Visitors can select film 
clips with interview sequences of veterans. This kind of scenic and emotional 
presentation has a disconcerting effect on European visitors. 
Drama is definitely in the foreground throughout the Vietnam part of POF. 
Only visitors with background knowledge and the power of endurance will dis-
cover contrasting views behind this emotionally loaded presentation. Covered 
behind the helicopter are two display cases where the typical equipment of 
American soldiers and Vietnamese Vietcong are presented.   The comparison 
of an original Ho Chi Minh Trail-wood bike and American military equipment 
conveys that the Cold War was a real war, not merely a TV-event, with real 
victims and veterans on both sides. Unfortunately, there is no reference to 
international media coverage and reactions on the conflict. Concerning the in-
ternational dimension, there is one mandatory element, a segment of the Berlin 
Wall, but with no elaboration on the European dimension of the Cold War. A 
multifaceted global Cold War, as stated by the historian Odd Arne Westad in 
2007,83 is not visible in POF. 
announces-biggest-single-donation-its-154-year-history (09/15/13).
80 Saving Private Ryan is a Hollywood movie by Steven Spielberg from 1998, dealing 
with the Allied Invasion of Normandy on June 6th 1944.  The soundtrack was com-
posed by multiple Academy Award Winner John Williams.
81 See Michael Mandelbaum, The Television War, in: Deadalus (111/44) 1982, 157-169.
82 Interview with Dick Daso, Curator, 09/29/11.
83 Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War. Third World Interventions and the Making of 
Our Times, Cambridge, 2007.
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THE POLITICAL DIMENSION OF HISTORICAL CULTURE 
– THE JOHN F. KENNEDY PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND 
MUSEUM
The John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum84 in Boston, MA is 
one of thirteen Presidential Libraries in the U.S. and is administrated by the 
National Archives and Records Administration. The associated museums are 
sponsored and maintained by both presidential families and private donors. 
The Presidential Libraries represent a particular form of a public-private part-
nership, and such a model of funding exemplifies one crucial difficulty, as 
stated by Presidential Library expert Benjamin Hufbauer, “Important historical 
material is often repressed when it is unflattering”.85 Only through the pass-
ing of time does the influence of the president, his family and his supporters 
weaken, which is a basic requirement for a more balanced view.86 This step is 
yet to be completed in the case of John F. Kennedy, and is discussed in the 
following.
The concept behind the exhibition is that John F. Kennedy himself tells the 
story of his life. Movies and sound files from the Audiovisual Collections87 of 
the Kennedy Library are used to illustrate his political decisions. The visitor is 
to re-experience Kennedy’s extraordinary career, the challenges he faced and 
his political decisions. His role as a decision maker concerning the Bay of Pigs 
disaster and his handling of the Cuban Missile Crisis, however, are presented 
from his perspective only – not as a whole from different perspectives. Further-
more, some negative but all too human aspects of his life, including illnesses 
and his womanizing, are not mentioned at all.
The museum building created by the Chinese-American architect I.M. Pei,88 
a white structure with many windows, promises openness and transparency 
for which visitors of the exhibition search in vain. The ethical guidelines of the 
National Council on Public History postulate that historians owe society the 
historical truth, insofar as it can be determined from the available sources.89 
84 John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum, Boston/Massachusetts, USA, 
URL: http://www.jfklibrary.org (09/15/13).
85 Benjamin Hufbauer, Spotlights and Shadows: Presidents and their Administrations 
in Presidential Museum Exhibits, in: The Public Historian, 28/4 (2006), 118.
86 Ibid.
87 See Audiovisual Collections,: http://www.jfklibrary.org/Research/About-Our-Collec-
tions/Audiovisual-collections.aspx (09/15/13).
88 Ieoh Ming Pei is characterized as the master of modern architecture. He built other 
cultural institutions like the pyramid of the Louvre in Paris, the National Gallery of Art 
in Washington D.C. and the modern wing of the Germany Historical Museum in Berlin.
89 See National Council on Public History, Bylaws and Ethics,URL: http://ncph.org/
cms/about/bylaws-and-ethics/ (09/15/13).
42 CSABA BÉKÉS – MELINDA KALMÁR: STUDENTS ON THE COLD WAR
Following the argument of Benjamin Hufbauer, the Kennedy Library exhibition 
does not always meet this standard in the historical interpretation it presents 
to the public.90 The Harry S. Truman Presidential Library, however, seems to 
be a positive example for a more critical approach. “The diverse voices in this 
exhibition also acknowledge an important truth: History never speaks with one 
voice. It is always under debate – a manuscript that is continually being re-
vised, and is never complete.”91 In contrast to the Kennedy Library, the Truman 
Library curators succeeded in avoiding a pure hagiographic representation. 
Thereby the constructive character of historiography becomes visible.
THE ECONOMIC DIMENSION OF HISTORICAL CULTURE – 
THE INTERNATIONAL SPY MUSEUM
Open to the public since 2002, the International Spy Museum92 is a private muse-
um and part of the Malrite Company93 based in Cleveland, Ohio. Its founder is the 
media mogul Milton Maltz.94 After having served as a Navy soldier in Korea, he 
worked for the National Security Agency for some years. He held on to his fasci-
nation for espionage, even after retiring to civil life. The brand name International 
Spy Museum was tested in public by an advertising agency before the museum 
was in business.95 Spy Museum was the term with the highest attractiveness for 
potential visitors. This procedure demonstrates other possible motives behind a 
museum besides the sole desire to transfer knowledge about history and espio-
nage, namely, as in this case, making money. Besides the museum, the Malrite 
Company owns the Spycafe and three other restaurants throughout Washington 
DC. The company employs about five hundred people, however only eight of 
them are working in the Exhibition and Programs Department of the museum.96
Conceptually the Spy Museum consists of two parts – the School of Spies and the 
exhibition space The Secret History of History. While the School of Spies is an interac-
tive museum, the latter deals with the history of intelligence and espionage, beginning 
with the Trojan horse. The geographical focus clearly lies on the United States; some 
excursions are made to the British, Soviet and East German intelligence institutions. 
90 Benjamin Hufbauer, Spotlights and Shadows: Presidents and their Administrations 
in Presidential Museum Exhibits, in: The Public Historian, 28/4 (2006), p. 124.
91 Ibid., p. 126.
92 See International Spy Museum, URL: http://www.spymuseum.org (15/09/13).
93 See About the Malrite Company, http://www.jfkmontreal.com/john_lennon/cache/
mmaltz/spymuseum.pdf (09/15/13).
94 See Milton and Tamar Maltz biography, URL: http://www.maltzmuseum.org/about/
board-of-trustees/milton-tamar-maltz-bio/ (09/15/13).
95 Interview with Mark Stout, Curator, 09/26/11.
96 Ibid.
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The section on Cold War history starts with an animated wall about espio-
nage and the construction of the atomic bomb. A narration explains the con-
nections between the parties. At the end of the story, there is a countdown to 
an audiovisual detonation of the atomic bomb. The floor vibrates and the lights 
dim. The rest of the area is limited, interestingly enough, to the city of Berlin as 
a center of the bloc confrontation. Alongside the following stairs are warning 
signs and propaganda posters for nuclear war. The Berlin Wall has its place, 
as well as a black Trabant that was used to smuggle refugees across the inner 
German border. Even a non-scale reconstruction of the spy tunnel of Rudow, 
the original version of which is shown in the Allied Museum in Berlin, can be 
passed through by the visitor.
With their scenographic presentation, the makers of the Spy Museum take 
advantage of the childlike curiosity that arouses even adults when confronted 
with the topic of espionage. Historian Robert Hanyok criticizes: 
“If anything, this museum is about atmosphere, 
the physical and emotional environment to espio-
nage. After paying admission, visitors are told re-
peatedly things are not what they seem. They are 
asked to join in on the game and memorialize an 
alias and expect to be questioned about it later.”97
Having become a part and a product of popular culture – already during the Cold 
War itself (just think of the James Bond movies and John Le Carré’s spy novels) – 
the topic of espionage works as an amazing catalyst for interest in Cold War histo-
ry. The hype about espionage reflects the grade of public interest. Current political 
developments, such as those in Korea, show the actual importance that the Cold 
War can claim approximately one generation after the Soviet orbit has collapsed. 
CONCLUSIONS AND CHALLENGES
Cold War history, as presented in museums in the U.S., is incomplete at this 
time and exists with a clear American bias. NASM concentrates on one special 
aspect – the Space Race. The gallery focuses on technological developments. 
NMAH, on the contrary, plays with scenographic presentations with a human fac-
tor. Hiring a stage designer to install an exhibition means that Cold War history 
can be emotionally experienced by exposure to representations of soldiers in a 
reproduced Vietnamese landscape. Music and the noises of a helicopter rotor 
dislocate the visitor in place and time. The partly privately funded museum at the 
97 Robert Hanyok, “International Spy Museum”, in: The Public Historian, 30/4 (2008), p. 
159.
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Kennedy Library does not yet take advantage of the fact that it has more money 
to spend on its presentation. It remains stuck in an old-fashioned and sometimes 
hagiographic style of historiography. The International Spy Museum turns the ta-
bles. By choosing a bestseller topic like espionage, a lot of visitors are intrigued 
right from the beginning. It actually also attracts the so-called “non-visitors”, a 
target group that every curator would love to see in his or her institution.
Of course, there are more players in the U.S. museum landscape dealing with 
Cold War history. Francis Gary Powers Jr., for instance, decided as early as 
1996 to found a Cold War Museum. He aims to preserve Cold War history and 
honor Cold War veterans, such as his father who was shot down on a reconnais-
sance mission over the Soviet Union in 1961 and later exchanged for the Soviet 
spy Rudolf Abel in Berlin. Still up to today, nothing exists beyond a homepage. 
From time to time there are announcements on the progress of the project at 
the permanent location in Vint Hill, Virginia. The legally protected title “Cold War 
Museum” and its mission statement promise a comprehensive discussion of the 
Cold War era. Apparently though, it is not so easy to present Cold War history in 
a museum. How should this important historical period be exhibited? 
Today, in times of scarce funding, it is more important than ever for a museum to 
find and occupy its own niche. The historical research on the Cold War era, as well 
as its presentation to the public, need a global perspective to visualize the unique 
character of this unconventional war. No museum, in the U.S. or anywhere else in 
the world, has tried to tell a global Cold War history (the different hot and cold spots 
and their mutual linkage) in a multifaceted way (not only the macro-perspective of 
the two blocs but also micro-perspectives, the fates of human beings). National 
master narratives, the scars of the Cold War and actual conflicts resulting from the 
Cold War, have a strong impact on not only the exhibition agenda of public muse-
ums, but also on policymakers and investors. A real challenge is also the range of 
objects on display. Of course, there are many large military objects representing 
Cold War history, but how to display the typical daily routine under a constant 
nuclear threat, the human factor? It is not always sufficient to spend money on the 
latest exhibition techniques to present a topic in an aesthetically appealing way.
There are plans to establish a Center of Cold War at Checkpoint Charlie in 
Berlin, Germany. In September 2012 a temporary exhibition pavilion of the Cold 
War Center, called Black Box, opened there, at Checkpoint Charlie. Berlin’s state 
government funded it. It is thought to have won new supporters for the project 
and to have given a first glimpse into how an exhibition of the Cold War could 
look. Unfortunately, the project faces the obstacle of a political-ideological op-
position against the foundation of a new museum. As a matter of fact it is a 
question of money as well as a struggle for interpretive predominance.98
98 See Jula Danylow, Andreas Etges, “A Hot Debate over the Cold War: The Plan for a 
Cold War Center at Checkpoint Charlie, Berlin”, in: Jennifer Dickey, Samir El Azahar, 
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A museum for the history of the Global Cold War is nevertheless an impor-
tant and necessary desideratum for the worldwide museum landscape. This 
exceptional conflict is longing for historicizing in a museum, which is open at 
the same time to both its global impacts and to private human fates. 
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“THE CUBAN MISSILES CRISIS:  
A TRIANGULATED VISION”
KAte LeVCHuK
INTRODUCTION
The Caribbean Crisis is one of the most researched periods in historical schol-
arship, boasting not only depth but also a variety of interpretations and view-
points. The novelty of this work is the presentation of the perspectives of the 
immediate participants with an aim to reveal the existing differences, simi-
larities and conclusions in view of newly released documents. While perform-
ing this kind of comparison, scholars tend to focus disproportionately on one 
side’s vision, either Soviet or American. This work will not only provide a reader 
with both, but will also show the tendencies and understanding of the Cuban 
side, which was paramount in the crucial October days of 1962. A common 
belief is that as time goes by, it is harder to reinvent the wheel, especially in re-
gard to such a well-known case as the Caribbean Crisis. However, accounting 
for a number of new sources becoming open to the public each year, there is 
no doubt the topic can be built on new evidence and valuable additions can be 
made. The aim of this work, however, is not to present a new truth, but rather 
to show that there is no monopoly on truth and that the truth is usually found 
somewhere at the crossroads of a wide variety of opinions and vantage points. 
The Caribbean Crisis period was the most tense and dangerous time during 
the Cold War. The world was at the brink of an apocalypse and if the two nu-
clear superpowers had not resolved their disagreements peacefully, our lives 
today would be very different, if they would be at all. As Albert Einstein once 
said, “I don’t know what will be used during a Third World War, but have no 
doubt that the Forth one will be fought with sticks and stones”. The quote 
captures the fatality of the possible Third World War, which was so close in 
1962.  Indeed, the state leaders’ fears and mood, wrong interpretations of or-
ders, bad connection or any unfortunate coincidences and mismatches could 
have lead to a thermonuclear war. Thus, in-depth and careful research allows 
us to analyze and comprehend what led the people in power to turn from the 
cornerstones of national pride and prestige to the realization of human value, 
dignity and security. The work puts a particular emphasis on the psychological 
aspect of the decision-making and consequences evaluation. 
In accordance with the aim and ambition of this research paper, the follow-
ing research question has been formulated: how were the perceptions of the 
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American, Soviet and Cuban sides different and how have these variations and 
vantage points influenced the decision-making of the participants of the con-
flict and their assessment of its aftermath? The time frame of this work is from 
January 1959 to November 1963. The paper captures not only the 13 days of 
the Caribbean Crisis, but also the period preceding it. We will start with the 
victory of the Cuban revolution, which brought Fidel Castro to power (Janu-
ary 1st, 1959)  as this enabled the conflict to occur, and then we will examine 
time following the crisis and the  “détente” in American-Soviet relations up to 
Kennedy’s assassination on the 22nd of November, 1963. 
A range of literature has been analyzed for this work with a special focus on 
memoir sources and newly released documents. The secondary sources used 
can be conditionally divided into Russian and English language sources. Rus-
sian sources allowed us to understand the Soviet perspective of the crisis and 
the rationale behind crucial decisions.99 Khrushchev’s son wrote an especially 
revealing book on his interactions with his father in the days during the Cuban 
Crisis and afterwards.100 The Cuban perspective was significantly improved in 
Alekseev’s memoirs, in which he claims that the missile withdrawal has been a 
complete surprise for him as well as for the whole Cuban government.101 Mem-
oirs of R. Kennedy,102 Dean Rusk103 and Arthur Schlesinger104 were paramount 
in understanding the work of ExComm, the importance of personal connec-
tions and psychological reasons directing the actions of American leaders. 
The limitations of the undertaken research are the ongoing time distortion of 
the events and deeds as well as the shortage of the relevant material. Working 
with contemporaries’ memoirs and the declassified files on the period helps us 
to overcome inaccuracies and generalizations.
In order to give an answer to the research question, the work is divided into 
three interrelated chapters. First chapter, “Soviet View”, will show the perspec-
tive of Soviet officials and modern Russian scholars on the events of 1962. 
Second chapter, titled “American Side”, will reveal the American approach and 
evaluations of the crisis while in the third chapter called “Cuban Perspective”, 
99 A.F. Dobrynin, “Absolutely Privately. Soviet Ambassador to Washington DC During 
the Presidency of Six American Leaders (1962-1986).” In USSR in the Contempo-
raries’ Memories (1939-1991) in 5 Books, 2: 656, Odessa: Astroprint, 2007; A. A. 
Gromyko, Memorable. Moscow, Politizdat, 2003; G. M. Kornienko, Cold War: A Tes-
timony of Its Participant. Moscow: Interbook, 1987.
100 S.N. Khrushchev, Birth of Superpower: A Book About Father. Century and Personal-
ity, Moscow: Time, 2003.
101 A. I. Alekseev, The Caribbean Crisis: As It Was. Edited by N.V. Popov. International 
Questions; Events and People. Moscow: Politizdat, 1989.
102 R.F. Kennedy, Thirteen Days. A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis. New York: W.W. 
Norton Company Inc., 1969.
103 Dean Rusk,  As I Saw It. New York: Penguin Books, 1991.
104 A.M. Schlesinger, A Thousand Days of John Kennedy in the White House. New York, 1966.
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Castro’s rise to power and assessments and reactions to his leadership and 
role in the crisis will be provided. This work will be concluded with some nec-
essary evaluations and a response to the research question. 
THE SOVIET VIEW: “WE WANTED TO PROTECT  
THE CUBAN REVOLUTION AND WE SUCCEEDED”
By 1960, the USSR had established an international position as a strong state 
promoting its vision and goals in world geopolitics. Having validated itself dur-
ing the Second World War, the Soviet Union had been only strengthening its 
international position as a world power and a carrier of Socialism, an ideology 
pervading more and more states throughout the 20th century while receiving 
unambiguous approval by many Western states. The US was the only coun-
try openly hostile to leftist inclinations, taking every measure to prevent “the 
spreading of the red disease”.105 That is why the American reaction to Cuban 
events was so strong, especially since Cuba adopted Socialism.106
There is solid evidence that after the defeat of the Cuban emigrants’ as-
sault at the Bay of Pigs, the Americans were preparing a large-scale invasion 
of regular troops. According to the data of the Soviet Foreign Minister at the 
time, A.A. Gromyko, outspoken anti-Cuban propaganda was accompanied by 
the mobilization of 150,000 reserve troops.107 Khrushchev took such American 
steps seriously and viewed a possible Cuban defeat as his own.108 He was sure 
this was a perfect time to show the authority and power of the Soviets. An as-
sertion by one of Khrushchev’s approximates regarding the existent “inferiority 
complex” of the Soviet leader is of a particular interest for the understanding of 
the rationale behind missiles stationing.109 According to the assertion, Khrush-
chev was concerned that the USSR and the hardliner political elite (so-called 
Stalinists) were not given due respect, and he wanted people around him to 
fear him as they feared Stalin.110 While seemingly far-fetched, such thoughts 
by the closest advisors of the Soviet leader shed light on the psychological 
background on the fateful decisions of the fall of 1962. 
It is imperative to say a few words about the head of the Soviet Union in those 
difficult times as he played a crucial role in the escalation and resolution of the cri-
105 G.M. Kornienko, Cold War: A Testimony of Its Participant. Moscow: Interbook, 1987.
106 S.N. Khrushchev, “Cuban Missile Crisis. The Events Went Out of White House and 
Kremlin Control.” International Life Nº 5, 2002, pp. 57–79.
107 A. A. Gromyko, The American Foreign Policy: Lessons and Reality: 60-70s. Interna-
tional Relations. Moscow, 1978.
108 Khrushchev, Birth of Superpower, op. cit.
109 A.A. Troyanovskiy, Through Years and Distance. Moscow: Misl, 1997.
110 A.I. Adgubey, The Crash of Illusions. Moscow: SP Interbook, 1991.
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sis. Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev was realistic, pragmatic, understanding and of-
ten respondent to the needs of Soviet people. However, according to Adgubey, the 
First Secretary’s best qualities were his humanity and compassion.111 Braveness 
equally was an important quality to him, though this occasionally led to unneces-
sary risk and recklessness, notably during the Caribbean Crisis. Indeed, as we can 
judge post factum, the crisis was caused by these qualities of the Soviet leader. 
In regards to more objective factors directing Soviet foreign policy decision-
making, the strategic ratio of nuclear weapons was outrageously advantageous 
for the American side (8:1 according to Soviet and 17:1 according to American 
evaluations). While definitely pessimistic for the manifestation of Soviet power, 
the given numbers do not account to more than mathematic calculations when 
it comes to their actual destructive power.  Krushchev is known to have stated, 
“we are not that bloodthirsty – they are going to bomb dead – one time would 
be enough for us”.112 Nevertheless, a desire for a psychological advantage 
could have been a reason for getting into such a reckless enterprise, especially 
since the stationed missiles were able to enhance deterrence between the 
superpowers and thereby reduce the risk of nuclear war. 
A more important reason for Khrushchev’s psychological unrest were the Amer-
ican naval bases in Turkey and Italy.113 American missiles thus could bomb Soviet 
cities in any moment, which, of course, was not reciprocated and could not be 
ignored by the Soviet side. Indeed, Khrushchev is known to point to the other 
side of the sea when having foreign guests and ask them whether they could see 
the American base. After a negative response, he pointed to their bad vision and 
claimed he could see the change of guard next to American missiles targeting 
Soviet cities, saying, “probably this summer house is put on the map too”.114
According to contemporaries as well as Khrushchev’s own explanations, the 
main reason for sending missiles to Cuba was his genuine desire to protect 
the Cuban revolution. During his informal visit to Bulgaria, Khrushchev was 
constantly thinking about the ways Soviet Union could help a newly estab-
lished ally.115 Back in May of 1962, Khrushchev shared his apprehensions with 
A.I. Mikoyan and asked for advice on how to protect Cuba from the imminent 
invasion.116 “Cuban defense was not only the question of Khrushchev’s pres-
tige but of a national prestige and validity of Soviet Union, its ambitions for the 
status of a superpower,” explains S. Khrushchev in his memoirs titled “Birth of 
A Superpower: A Book About Father”. 
111 A.A. Troyanovskiy, Through Years and Distance, op. cit.
112 Khrushchev, Birth of A Superpower, op. cit.
113 Dean Rusk, As I Saw It, op. cit.
114 Adgubey, The Crash of Illusions, op. cit.
115 Khrushchev, Birth of Superpower, op. cit.
116 S.A. Mikoyan, “A Jump Over The Ocean: Why the Missiles?” Latin America Nº 1 
(2003): 94–103.
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In terms of how to help the allied state, Khrushchev was contemplating sev-
eral alternative strategies. Thoughts on mutual help and cooperation were con-
sidered useless and unproductive. Due to geographical proximity and naval 
superiority, military assistance was deemed irrelevant.117 Sending missiles was 
seen as the only way to drastically change the status quo. Although Krushchev 
was the main decision-maker and risk-taker in 1962, he did not make this de-
cision without assistance from his closest advisors. The Soviet Commission, 
created for this end, came to a positive evaluation of the Cuban landscape’s 
appropriateness and its ability to mask all military preparations.118 Despite a 
widespread misconception on the unilateral viewpoint of the Soviet command-
ership, the assessments and opinions were varied in regards to the plan. 
While Marshal Biruzov was adamant in pleasing Khrushchev with his posi-
tive conclusions on the ability of Cuban soil and landscape “to obscure all the 
military installations”, A.I. Mikoyan, who visited Cuba in 1960 in order to inves-
tigate the revolution and ideological underpinnings of Fidel Castro, claimed 
that Cuban plantations would not allow Soviet troops to mask offensive weap-
ons.119 However, people often focus on the facts and opinions that further 
credit their original views, and thus Khrushchev was absolutely satisfied with 
Biruzov’s assessment. 
In May 1962, the Soviet leader presented to the Central Committee Presi-
dium the plan of Operation “Anadyr”, a transatlantic transportation and secret 
stationing of Soviet troops and missiles on the Cuban territory. The plan was 
supported almost unilaterally.120 The question arises as to why the USSR did 
not inform the US about missile stationing as the Americans had done regard-
ing US missiles in Turkey, especially considering the diplomatic advantage 
and validity it could have lended to the operation. Some experts believe that 
Khrushchev was confident Americans would do everything possible to prevent 
a public, openly proclaimed stationing.121 Thus, Khrushchev deprived himself 
of such an international tool and the whole operation acquired the flavor of 
dishonesty and diplomatic cheating in the eyes of the world. He was sure the 
Americans would have to put up with the missiles once they were in Cuba. 
Unfortunately, the Soviet commandership had not taken into account the pe-
culiarities of American foreign policy and its geopolitical configuration, which 
allowed the US to enjoy its full security as an island-like territory engulfed by 
waters and weaker states. The Monroe Doctrine, accepted in 1823, was cor-
117 A.I. Mikoyan, “That Is How It Was: Discussions over the Past.” In USSR in the Con-
temporaries’ Memories (1939-1991) in 5 Books, 2:656. Odessa: Astroprint, 2007.
118 S.A. Mikoyan, “A Jump Over The Ocean: Why the Missiles?”
119 J.G. Blight, and D.A. Welch. On The Brink. New York, 1990.
120 V. Zubok, “A Warmongering Premier: Khrushchev’s Foreign Policy.” Motherland Nº 3 
(2004): 13–19.
121 S.N. Khrushchev, Birth of Superpower.
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nerstone of American foreign policy worldview. The Doctrine prohibited any-
body’s military presence in the Western hemisphere, which was incompatible 
with the presence of nuclear ballistic missiles 90 miles from its border. 
Moreover, a secret realization of such an operation was a powerful psy-
chological factor that left the American government with no alternative but 
to declare the USSR an aggressor and to implement the required measures. 
Interestingly, Castro realized the importance and significance an openly pro-
claimed stationing could bring to his state, as well as to the process of missiles 
transportation itself.122 Shortly after the beginning of the stationing, he sug-
gested that Khrushchev make the operation public.
However, it was the Americans who made it public before the Soviet leader-
ship could blink. The Soviets had to maintain appearance and international 
pride after their plan was revealed by an American reconnaissance plane and 
Kennedy’s speech of October 22. Khrushchev wrote a letter of anger and out-
rage towards the unilaterally taken American decision, “issuing an ultimatum” 
and passing resolutions without any international right.123
The letter says that the Soviet government considers declared quarantine to 
be “the violation of the freedom of navigation in international waters and con-
stituting an act of aggression propelling humankind into the abyss of a world 
nuclear-missile war”. Therefore, the Soviet government instructed the captains 
of Soviet ships bound for Cuba to ignore the orders of American naval forces 
and use weapons in case of an attack. 
On October 24, the world was on the brink of nuclear war. Neither sides 
wanted nor could afford to cede ground. Nerves were strained to the limit. So-
viet ships had several miles left to the quarantine line. Luckily, common sense 
triumphed within both states. Khrushchev ordered military ships to pause. De-
spite the quarantine, all other Soviet vessels were let into Cuban waters.124 
Both leaders were giving silent signals: we are strong, but ready for a compro-
mise. No one wanted a nuclear apocalypse. Despite clear political character 
and motives both leaders were pursuing in this crisis, no one even entertained 
the idea of sacrificing millions of their citizens’ lives for the sake of a political 
and tactical victory. Khrushchev’s quote is best at illustrating the idea, “life is 
more precious than prestige”.125
While the world was experiencing these tense and dangerous times, the 
122 F.M. Burlatskiy, Leaders and Advisors. On Khrushchev, Andropov and not only. Mos-
cow: Political Literature, 1990, p. 232.
123 N.S. Khrushchev, “Letter from Khrushchev to John F. Kennedy.” Woodrow Wilson In-
ternational Center for Scholars, October 24, 1962. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.
org/document/111552.
124 S.N. Khrushchev, “Cuban Missile Crisis. The Events Went Out of White House and 
Kremlin Control.” International Life Nº 5 (2002), p. 73.
125 Ibid. 73.
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Soviets had to recontemplate how they could benefit from for the situation. 
Khrushchev was concerned with the proximity of American missiles and naval 
bases to the Soviet cities. These missiles could destroy Soviet cities at any 
moment, but the same positioning was being denied to the Soviet side in the 
Cuban crisis.126 Beyond a doubt, it was an outrageous injustice. After a con-
siderable time to weigh the alternatives and evaluate his position, Khrushchev 
wrote a new letter in which he offered a quid pro quo exchange to withdraw 
Soviet missiles if the Americans did the same in Turkey. As we now know, the 
letter was never answered. Part of the reason is the huge role of the behind-
the-scenes diplomacy and its influence on the leaders’ decision-making. The 
role of reporters and journalists should not be understated, such as the fateful 
conversation between Fomin and Scali in “Oxidental” or a report on the pend-
ing landing of American troops in Cuba. 
Regarding the latter example, one of the Soviet agents sent a cable to his 
government on the imminent American invasion from the coast of Florida, 
which he heard from a “New York Herald Tribune” journalist during his visit to 
the international press club.127 Whether it was the imprecise information of an 
American newspaper or carefully thought-out disinformation, it had a strong 
influence on the Soviet leader and made him remove the reference to Europe-
based American missiles from his letter to Kennedy.128 Thus, it can now be 
safely stated that it was actually him who stepped back first.129 Another impor-
tant meeting, which happened on October 26, was Robert Kennedy’s meeting 
with a Soviet Ambassador A. F. Dobrynin, where the same crucial question on 
Soviet and American missiles was raised. Robert Kennedy explained to his 
colleague that due to national pride and allied considerations in NATO, the US 
could not withdraw Turkey-based missiles unilaterally as it would have looked 
like a weak concession to Soviet pressure130 and a sacrifice of international 
NATO members’ interests in order to secure those of the US.131
 The American side was never short on diplomatic justifications and the art 
of persuading an opponent. Another reason for not publically announcing the 
withdrawal of American missiles was the perceived bureaucracy of NATO and 
126 Allison Graham. Essence of Decisions: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, p. 107.
127 A.M. Schlesinger, A Thousand Days of John Kennedy in the White House. New York, 
1966, p. 257.
128 S.N. Khrushchev, “Cuban Missile Crisis. The Events Went Out of White House and 
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129 A.F. Dobrynin, “Absolutely Privately”, p. 556.
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Nuclear War.” Guardian (October 12, 2012). http://www.theguardian.com/comment-
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a need for a joint decision to perform a withdrawal, coupled with a minimum 
4-5 months time frame for withdrawal if approved.132 Nevertheless, R. Kennedy 
gave confidential assurances on the secret removal of the missiles in the near 
future. Interestingly, later it was written in his memoirs, “President Kennedy 
was going to remove them shortly anyway”.133
There is no doubt the Soviet side put itself into a diplomatically disadvanta-
geous position and missed out on the opportunities of the period. As it became 
later known, Kennedy was ready to publicly announce the withdrawal of Amer-
ican missiles if the situation spun out of control.134 What the American side was 
afraid of was an ultimatum regarding West Berlin,135 which the Soviets did not 
even hint at.  After the Soviet leadership was notified of Dobrynin’s unofficial 
meeting with Robert Kennedy, Khrushchev realized his letter was rushed. Due 
to technical setbacks, the American side had not received the letter yet, so he 
decided to write a new one including the quid pro quo request. For the sake of 
speed, the second message was transmitted by radio. Khrushchev wanted to 
pretend the first letter did not exist, and the Kennedy brothers did the same to 
his second message.136
On Sunday morning of October 28, the Soviet leadership gathered in Novo-
Ogarevo. Whether they were cautious of a possible military strike on the Krem-
lin or decided to show the world its cold-bloodedness, they eagerly waited 
for two messages from the American counterparts: an official one from John 
Kennedy and an unofficial one, from his brother. The President’s message did 
not boast much creativity or innovation. The central message was the same, 
stating “missiles withdrawal on your behalf in exchange for the security guaran-
ties towards Cuba on our behalf”. The messages’ tone was official and dry. The 
existent White House tension could be easily read. The impression was that the 
President was crying for help. Thus, the ball was on the Soviet side and it was 
obvious that a decision had to be made as soon as possible. War was not an 
option. In case the Americans had undertaken a strike on Soviet installations 
in Cuba, Khrushchev would have had to swallow it or fight back with nuclear 
weapons. 
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Nevertheless, whatever the American sources could have consequently 
said, the Soviet side never even entertained the possibility of a nuclear strike. 
Khrushchev excluded war as a solution as he understood the consequences. 
Actions had to be taken promptly. A recent uncoordinated shooting of an Amer-
ican reconnaissance plane by Soviet generals in Cuba was the last drop in the 
bucket. As Khrushchev later confessed, this was the moment when he under-
stood how easily the events could go out of control and the “missiles have to 
be taken”.137 In his answer, Khrushchev stated that the “President’s concerns 
find understanding in Moscow because the weapons he was talking about as 
offensive really constitute a formidable threat”.138 The decision to cease instal-
lation as well as to dismantle and return already stationed weapons was an-
nounced on October 28.139 Was not this a pure humiliation? Was not that similar 
to a naughty child’s play with a forbidden toy, which had to be returned as soon 
as he was caught? Should not it have been a direct cause of his removal from 
power? Opinions differ greatly, even within Soviet historiography. Khrushchev 
himself said that with the US’s sincere assurances on Cuban security, “the mo-
tives which prompted the Soviet side to help Cuba are no longer relevant”.140 
From such a vantage point, the Soviet Union achieved its aims. Of course, the 
American interpretation differs from the Soviet one and blames Soviet leader’s 
weakness as a failure in achieving a desired nuclear parity. The discussion is 
endless. The facts stand strong: Kennedy was assassinated in November of 
1963, Khrushchev was ousted from power in 1964, while  Castro remained 
head of an independent and sovereign Cuban state until 2008. 
Looking at the situation without prejudice, the “USSR’s plan was pointless. 
The transportation of missiles costs millions of dollars and Khrushchev’s po-
litical reputation. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that the Socialist regime in 
Cuba would have been destroyed if not for Khrushchev’s decision to play with 
fire. A verbal assurance on Turkish missiles allowed Khrushchev to avoid politi-
cal catastrophe when he agreed to withdraw Soviet weaponry from Cuba.141
The hurried decision taken by the Soviet side was not coordinated with the 
Cuban government, resulting in grave consequences for Cuban-Soviet rela-
tions immediately after the crisis.142 Why had not Khrushchev sought advice 
137 N.S. Khrushchev, Memories. p. 308.
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from his confidant? There was no time for formalities.143 As the Soviet leader 
later stated, transmission of the message started before the ending was ed-
ited.144 Fidel had a straightforward assessment of such a decision, “retreat, 
cowardice, surrender”.145 A.I. Mikoyan was sent there to improve relations with 
the Cuban leadership. Despite the moribund condition of his wife, the First 
Deputy Chairman was so devoted to his country that he promptly left for Cuba. 
There, he was met with a cold shoulder.146 Throughout their conversation, 
Fidel stated outrageously that “the Cuban people did not understand how it 
was even possible to decide its destiny behind its back”.147 Only the experi-
ence and diplomatic skills of the Soviet chairman turned Cuban frustration and 
rage into a genuine understanding. Castro left for Moscow in April of 1963 and 
spent more than a month there.148
The direct consequences of the crisis for the Soviet Union were positive. For 
the first time, America acknowledged the power and validity of the USSR as 
a world superpower. Only after the crisis of 1962 did Kennedy understand the 
importance of realism in world politics.149 The Soviet Union caused a significant 
psychological change in the American worldview. Both leaders understood 
that the nuclear race could not be viewed as a power game as the whole of 
humanity laid on the other side of the scales. A sign of relief of the two leaders 
in the moment of agreement on withdrawal was a guarantee of a great change 
in the bilateral relations of the world superpowers. The détente period began. 
THE AMERICAN SIDE: “WE MET EYEBALL TO EYEBALL, 
AND THEY BLINKED FIRST”
The 1960s were a time of genuine American domination and prosperity. The vic-
tory in the Second World War brought money and importance to America. And 
if due to some reasons, such as its limited potential caused by an ongoing con-
frontation, America had not yet succeeded in spreading its influence into every 
corner of the world, the Western Hemisphere had been gained for good. The 
idea of Western Hemisphere domination dates back to the Monroe Doctrine, 
which declared both Americas to be a zone with no European control whatso-
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ever. During periods as intense as the Cold War, this region gained increased 
importance for the US as a superpower. According to Kennedy’s new foreign 
policy strategy the balance of power should not change to the disadvantage of 
the US150, and by no means did the American government intend to lead defen-
sive policies. The US was eager to “help oppositions inside the communist re-
gimes” and to pursue  programs aimed at eroding the iron curtain.151 Obviously, 
in pursuit of such  staunch anti-Communist foreign policy, the American govern-
ment could not allow the spread of Communism in its main sphere of influence. 
It is easy to imagine Kennedy’s amazement and disillusionment when an island, 
situated 90 miles away from the American coast became Communist. He stated 
that the “communist forces should not be underestimated in Cuba or anywhere 
else”.152 After the failure in the Bay of Pigs invasion, he famously stated that the 
““the complacent, the self-indulgent, the soft societies are about to be swept 
away with the debris of history. Only the strong […] can possibly survive”.153
America was fast to act upon Castro’s rise. It brought together members 
of regional organizations in order to exclude Cuba and take collective meas-
ures. Apart from all the possible legal measures, secret CIA plans became 
known recently, ranging from cigar poisoning to spattering Castro’s shoes 
with poisonous chemicals. There is no official reference of Kennedy’s orders 
to kill Castro, but the desire to “get rid” of him clearly became an imperative of 
American foreign policy at the time.154 Kennedy’s personality played a crucial 
role in the Cuban crisis, in its escalation as well as its settlement. Since early 
childhood, his father taught him always to be the first and to yield to no one.155 
An Irish temper and brilliant family roots predestined him to play the leading 
role wherever he found himself. Thus, his failure to put up with the presence of 
Soviet missiles in such proximity to America should not have been a surprise. 
Kennedy’s personality as well as political factors such as the November mid-
term elections led Kennedy to escalate the conflict to a qualitatively new level. 
It is possible he was looking for an event to overshadow his Bay of Pigs 
failure. As we know “all politics is local”.156 Both Robert McNamara and Roger 
Hillsman claimed that it was the American administration rather than the coun-
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try itself that was in mortal danger.157 The official Kennedy foreign policy, such 
as the flexible response doctrine, allowed the American government to find 
the necessary solutions to arising conflicts and, most importantly, to achieve a 
compromise in the Cuban Missile crisis.158
The Cuban government’s nationalization of American property at the island 
was a major reason for the deterioration of American-Cuban relations. Numerous 
American companies previously present and dominant on the Cuban market lost 
their market leverage and profits. The puppet regime of Batista was overthrown 
and America had to face the willful and ideological government of Castro, which 
the US was reluctant to tolerate. The Bay of Pigs invasion was the first powerful 
indication of American hatred towards a new Cuban regime. The surprising neg-
ligence of American forces was the reason for its failure, which brought relentless 
criticism towards the American President and his advisors from all sides of the 
political spectrum.159 The immediate reaction of the United States was diplomatic 
(exclusion of Cuba from the Organization of American States followed by break-
ing off diplomatic relations) and economic (they stopped buying Cuban sugar, 
their main export item).160 American actions pushed Cuba towards the Soviet 
Union, which provided Cuba with economic aid and adopted Cuban support as 
its major diplomatic strategy.161 Khrushchev understood that Kennedy was not 
going to give up that easily after a recent military defeat. Thus, he started provid-
ing Cuba with military equipment as early as May of 1962.162 The Americans be-
came aware only after their agents started reporting nightly movements of huge 
machines full of obscure containers on Cuban territory.163
A threshold moment in the history of the Cold War occured on October 14, 
1962, when Major Richard Heyser took photographs of Cuban soil showing a 
drastic divergence from those taken a month before. American experts con-
cluded that the masked objects in the photos contained medium-range bal-
listic missiles.164 Kennedy was informed on October 16. From the start, his goal 
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was to get rid of these missiles by all means possible.165 He was confident that 
if he did not act decisively, his cabinet would stop taking him seriously and the 
US would lose the support of its NATO allies.166
“Last month I said we weren’t going to [permit 
Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba] and last month 
I should have said … we don’t care. But when 
we said we’re not going to, and [the Soviets] go 
ahead and do it, and then we do nothing, then … I 
would think that our … risks increase.”167
Thus, it can be concluded that Kennedy believed he had to remove missiles in 
order to restore his authority and protect American superpower status.  Soon after 
the information reached the American cabinet, Kennedy had a meeting with the 
Soviet Foreign Minister, A. A. Gromyko. The discussion was tense and sharp, with 
the conversation mainly concerning Cuba and the superpowers’ relations with the 
island. Nevertheless, missiles were not mentioned during this important dialogue. 
It is clear why Gromyko remained silent on the matter. Possible explanations for 
Kennedy’s containment could be his unwillingness to engage in a diplomatic set-
tlement, which could have been viewed as a reminiscent of Hitler’s appeasement, 
as well as a lack of guidelines for the situation.  According to some Soviet political 
scientists, instead of looking to deescalate the situation, the US used  “crisis diplo-
macy”, in which a situation close to military collision is created in order to demand 
an unconditional surrender from the opposite side,168 since the Americans believed 
the Soviets would withdraw from a “hot” confrontation as the decision-making 
side bearing the responsibility of the possible escalation. Dean Rusk, the United 
States Secretary of State from 1961 to 1969, claimed that the fact the crisis had 
not become public in the first week gave the President an opportunity to evaluate 
all pros and cons in order to make a balanced and mutually acceptable decision.169
On the other side, Thomas Paterson argues that Kennedy has greatly over-
stated the Cuban threat and exacerbated the already existent problem.170 In 
any case, we should not underestimate the courage and wisdom of the Ameri-
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can leader, which not only allowed America to become a perceived winner of 
a confrontation but also improved its world standing and authority. Dean Rusk 
is known to remind American reporters that American and Soviets met eye to 
eye and the Soviets blinked first.
It is imperative to understand the American interpretation of Soviet motives 
for the crisis escalation as well as the American evaluation of possible Soviet 
actions. This will give us insight into the rationale and main reasons for the 
behavior and actions of the US. Importantly, the United States saw the Cu-
ban affair as a Soviet attempt to change the disadvantageous status quo and 
achieve a nuclear parity. Some American experts go as far as to suggest that 
the Cuban Crisis was the “cry of despair” and the result of Soviet realization 
that they were losing the Cold War.171 American officials understood the under-
taking as an attempt to bolster an offensive advantage and consequently their 
positions in other foreign policy situations, such as in Berlin.172
It is interesting that in contrast to the Soviets’ desperate effort to give the 
USSR the appearance of arms parity, Kennedy’s narrow victory in the 1960 
election relied upon a fabricated “missile gap” in the Soviet favor concocted 
to terrify the country and to condemn the Eisenhower administration as soft on 
national security.173 The Americans would not recognize that Khrushchev might 
have had altruistic motives for missiles stationing, and they piled up their expla-
nations into a Soviet desire to “restore justice” in a strategic and psychological 
sense (giving Americans a taste of their own medicine and to feel the threat just 
like Soviet citizens of facing close proximity of missiles in Turkey). The Socialist 
explanation of the allied help is viewed as a bluff and “laughable” rhetoric.174
Summarizing extensive research of Soviet motives, American experts Blight 
and Welch came to the conclusion that the Soviet decision could be attributed 
to three main concerns: a desire to prevent American invasion and abolition of 
the revolutionary Cuban government, an obvious necessity to change a strate-
gic nuclear imbalance, and national pride considerations in that the USSR had 
a reciprocal right to deploy one’s nuclear missiles next door.175
The logic of the American people was also a major factor in political deci-
sion-making. Unlike the Soviet citizens, Americans were confident that if the 
Soviets had an opportunity to push the button, there were no reasons for them 
not to.176 The aforementioned rationale explains a great psychological crisis 
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America experienced during the Cuban crisis and its leader’s determination to 
remove the missiles from Cuban territory as quickly as possible. 
Immediately after the spotting of missiles, a crisis group was formed, called 
ExComm, in which major figures in American politics gathered to achieve a con-
sensus as to how to respond to the aggressive actions of the Soviet govern-
ment. It is worth noting that unlike Khrushchev, Kennedy decided to hold the 
meetings without being present. This allowed the members to speak openly 
without trying to please the President. Kennedy’s brother Robert played a crucial 
role in the meetings of the ExComm as well as in the crisis resolution in general. 
 According to Arthur Schlesinger, Robert was an irreplaceable partner, 
who helped the President resist strong pressure from the military to employ 
weapons.177 It was Robert Kennedy who headed the ExComm meetings, 
prevented a suggested “massive nuclear strike on Cuba”, maintained 
correspondence with the Soviet leadership and held secret meetings with the 
Soviet Ambassador, A.F. Dobrynin, which according to Khrushchev were the 
most important part of the political dialogue between the states and allowed a 
peaceful settlement.178 However, even the assessment of his role in the crisis is 
debated by some, with Sheldon M. Stern’s account describing Robert Kennedy 
as one of the most consistently and recklessly hawkish advisers, pushing not 
for a blockade or even air strikes against Cuba, but for a full-scale invasion.179
It is important to note the diversity of opinions and ideas of its members 
within the Executive Committee. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara stat-
ed that there was no difference in the territorial stationing of the Soviet mis-
siles, as the USSR-based intercontinental missiles had the same destructive 
power as the medium-range ones in Cuba.180
The balanced position of such a distinguished person was crucial to pushing 
back against the doomed “strike scenario”, advocated by the higher military com-
mandership. Robert Kennedy viewed everything through the lens of domestic 
politics and the President’s standing within the government. As claimed by Ameri-
can historiography, eventually both Robert Kennedy and McNamara advocated 
for a blockade.181 American UN representative Adalai Stevenson II proposed an 
extensive political plan on the neutralization of American troops in Cuba under 
direct UN supervision, withdrawal of American “Jupiters” from Turkey and Greece 
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and territorial guarantees to Cuba.182 The American higher command on the other 
side was confident that the Bay of Pigs failure was a direct consequence of Ameri-
can indecisiveness and claimed that the Cuban crisis was a perfect moment to 
solve the problem of revolutionary Cuba. Among the notorious warmongers, Dean 
Acheson, Paul Nitze and C. Douglas Dillon were the most sophisticated and linked 
the Soviet missiles problem to the American leadership’s positions in the Western 
Hemisphere, advocating immediate and decisive military actions such as a tacti-
cal strike.183 Senator Richard Russell requested an immediate direct invasion of 
the island.184 Eventually the “war party” found itself distanced from the decision-
making process, which, while beneficial for world security and the settlement of 
the conflict, was a cause of enduring political disagreements.
Evaluating the possible alternatives, the Americans were also trying to pre-
dict the reaction of international actors in view of various historical precedents. 
It was hard to overlook the parallel to Pearl Harbor when contemplating a mas-
sive air strike. At the last meeting of ExComm, Robert Kennedy sent his brother 
a note saying, “now I know what Tojo must have felt planning Pearl Harbor”.185
An obvious association to the Soviet blockade of Berlin helps us understand 
why this was not an option for an American government. Finally, McNamara’s 
assurances that the targeted strike would not be 100% effective was a last 
straw as remaining missiles could have been directed towards American cit-
ies, and the strike option was given up. In his speech on October 22, Kennedy 
declared an establishment of naval quarantine for offensive weapons. He stat-
ed that all vessels carrying weapons of mass destruction to Cuba would be 
stopped and returned to the ports they had left.186 He also pointed out that any 
missile launched from Cuba would be regarded as a Soviet attack and would 
lead to a full-scale counter-attack on the USSR. The reaction of the world lead-
ers to the American decision varied greatly. 
Nevertheless, everyone understood the danger of the situation and the pos-
sible consequences of mutual miscommunication. European NATO allies were 
especially concerned with the escalation of the conflict due to the fact that 
in the tense days of October 1962, the alliance with the United States po-
tentially amounted to, as Charles de Gaulle had warned, “annihilation with-
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out representation.”187 UN General Secretary U Thant suggested a high level 
meeting between Kennedy and Khrushchev in order to reach a settlement. In 
the case of such meeting, however, the American President could have been 
accused of cowardice and incoherence, and the political spectrum of the US 
could tilt to the Republicans. Thus, Kennedy took the only possible decision – 
to put negotiations on hold until the missiles were removed.188
It is hard to overestimate the panic of the Americans during October of 1962. 
Throughout the world, forces went on high alert. World War III seemed im-
minent and, across the globe, terrified people prepared for Armageddon.189 
People built bomb shelters, bought provision for years to come and waited 
for the worst while hoping for the best. The order was given for the evacuation 
of Washington DC. Kennedy was decisive and pertinacious. Recently declas-
sified sources show that the American government was planning a full-scale 
military invasion in case a compromise was not reached.190 An important factor 
in such a tense atmosphere was Jacqueline Kennedy’s refusal to evacuate, 
which, according to some scholars, helped smooth the belligerent attitude of 
her husband.191 Apart from Jackie’s position, the meeting between Aleksandr 
Fomin, the counselor of the Soviet Embassy, and John A. Scali, an ABC re-
porter, was a decisive point in turning the American position to a more realistic 
approach. Fomin invited Scali for a lunch at the old Occidental Restaurant, two 
blocks from the White House in hope of getting some first-hand information. 
According to Fomin’s interpretation, during lunch, Scali suddenly began 
threatening, “if Moscow does not remove missiles in the next 48 hours Pen-
tagon will tear Cuba apart and leave neither missiles nor Castro intact.”192 An 
outraged Fomin took the responsibility to retort with the blackmail regarding 
Soviet retaliation in West Berlin,193 leaving Kennedy in jitters. West Berlin was 
an important American foreign policy success and since it was located in the 
middle of Soviet East Germany, the Soviet threat was real. Thus, Scali was 
instructed by a concerned American government to transmit the newly formed 
suggestions on the removal of Soviet missiles in exchange for a guarantee of 
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non-intervention on the US side.194 This was the final pronounced deal, apart 
from the secret assurances on the withdrawal of Turkish missiles. 
American assessment of the events can be summarized as a unilateral ac-
count of American victory and a shameful backing of the Soviet leader. Schol-
arship immediately following the crisis largely supported this harmful idea. Ac-
cording to James Nathan, such a false characterization of the events had the 
unfortunate adoption of a “resolve” rather than an acceptable compromise as 
a main goal of American Cold War policy.195 Despite an apparent victory of the 
American side, an obvious change in the US attitude towards USSR-directed 
foreign policy warrants consideration.
A pronounced evidence of the increased soberness of American policy mak-
ing is Kennedy’s famous speech at American University in Washington on June 
10, 1963, where he acknowledged that the US could not perform the gen-
darme role forever, but should rather strive to make the world a safer place by 
accepting a whole multitude of ideologies and worldviews.196 A degree of real-
ism shown by Kennedy caused some violent assaults by American reactionary 
powers. Extremist and pro-fascist American organizations operating in the 60s 
were confident that it was Kennedy who turned out to be a “weakest link.”197 
Some accusations go as far as to suggest that Communists infested the State 
Department and the war plans were transferred to the Soviet Union.198
According to Dean Rusk, the deterrent was as important as power.199 As a 
result of this frightening stand-off, the parties were able to get to know each 
other and form their opinion on the representatives of the opposite camp. In 
the aftermath of the crisis, JFK said, “Khrushchev has made an important input 
in the peace and stability of the world”.200 Khrushchev was equally impressed 
by the statecraft and wisdom of his American colleague. 
The Cuban crisis showed that nuclear war was not an option. Both Russians 
and Americans understood that they were just people and not blind system 
apologists.201 Talking about the leaders’ role, Khrushchev noted, “any fool can 
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start war and not a hundred of wise man would be enough to finish it.”202 In-
deed, it is hard to imagine what would have happened if Eisenhower had been 
in Kennedy’s place and Stalin had been the USSR leader at the time.
THE CUBAN PERSPECTIVE:  
THE CUBAN PEOPLE DO NOT UNDERSTAND…”
It would be wrong to view only the positions of the superpowers in the Caribbean 
Crisis. Looking only at the global side of the ideological contestation of two 
world systems would be the same as playing basketball without a court. Cuba 
was that court during 1962. To a great extent, the October events were linked 
to the preceding Cuban revolution, the result of which was Castro’s ascent to 
power. Castro was born to a prosperous Spanish immigrant father and poor 
Cuban peasant mother. His parents strived to give Fidel the best education 
and from early childhood, his educational success was remarkable.203 His 
revolutionary temper did not go unnoticed either. At age 13, he participated 
in the workers’ revolt at his father’s sugar plantation. Max Lestnik, Castro’s 
school friend said, “he possessed unbelievable braveness. They say who 
follows Castro will either die or win!” 
Initially America was favorably disposed towards the new regime.  Una-
ware of the pending turn in Cuban foreign policy, Senator Robert Kennedy 
joined in on the approval of a new Cuban government as an improvement 
to the “despotic” Batista’s dictatorship.204 Castro was equally inclined to-
wards friendly relations with the US. Indeed, during the Cuban revolution, 
Cuba had diplomatic relations with the US, but not the USSR. The mistrust 
and lack of information on the other side precluded the Soviet Union and 
Cuba from any meaningful interaction until the Soviets examined Castro’s 
plans and ideological standing. Rapid nationalization of American property 
could not go unnoticed by the Americans and created a fear that Castro’s 
regime would have a profound effect on the leftist movements in the other 
Latin American states and start a detrimental impact on American business. 
The Cuban agrarian reform led to the expropriation of American property 
amounting to 1 $ billion. 
The change in American attitudes was drastic and ill conceived. An ostenta-
tious neglect of the Cuban leader by the American President played a signifi-
cant role in the decline of mutual relations. Eisenhower redirected Castro to 
his Vice-President, R. Nixon, choosing to play golf over a scheduled high-level 
202 S.N. Khrushchev, “Cuban Missile Crisis. The Events Went Out of White House and 
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meeting. Castro considered such an attitude towards the President of an in-
dependent and proud Cuban republic humiliating.205 Had Eisenhower met with 
Castro and promised support in his fight with corruption and chaos, would 
there have been a crisis in the first place? There is reason to believe that Wash-
ington did everything possible to push Cuba into the Soviet embrace. 
The role of the US economic embargo cannot be overstated. The cessation 
of sugar imports signified the end of previously blossoming bilateral trade and 
put Cuba on the brink of economic collapse.206 Soon afterwards the US broke 
all diplomatic interactions with the republic. In a bipolar world,“my enemy’s en-
emy is my friend”. The US left Cuba with no choice. The alternative of a strong 
ally instead of waiting to be annihilated was a welcoming option. The USSR 
was happy to support a friendly Communist regime in the sphere of American 
interests. Soon, the Soviet Union became Cuba’s lifeline.207 Due to its reliance 
on the USSR and in light of the  recent Bay of Pigs invasion, Castro turned 
Cuba into a socialist state. 
The Americans called Castro’s revolution treason and set out on the annihila-
tion of Castro and his regime.208 The 1961 failed plan, Mongoose, is the most well 
known though many plans existed before 1962, some of which were really curi-
ous. One plan was to apply thallium salts to Castro’s shoes in order for his beard 
to fall off and destroy his charisma. Another one was to sprinkle Castro’s cigars 
with a chemical substance, causing temporary disorientation before he was to 
give a speech.209 The duplicity of American liberalism was especially evident in its 
relation to Cuba, when the notions of state sovereignty, democracy and the will 
of the nation were disregarded for the selfish national interest of the US. 
“We cannot overestimate to what extent CIA officers felt the pressure and 
urges to take actions in regard to Castro and his regime,“ said a CIA agent in 
1967.210 The politics of the time were to get rid of Castro. So why was the US so 
persistent in its fight of the Castro regime? How can we explain its irreconcil-
able position? According to American political scientist, Thomas Patterson, the 
major reason for American leaders’ anxiety was the challenge to American su-
periority in Latin America.211 Castro’s survival was an affront to American pride. 
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A plausible explanation for American reaction at the time of Castro’s rise to 
power as well as today might be an account of ontological security, thus the 
need to define itself in opposition to another. The Monroe Doctrine and the 
perception of Cuba as a defiant power in the American sphere of interests 
could not leave the Americans silent. On August 23, 1963, Kennedy issued 
National Security memorandum #181, “a directive to engineer an internal re-
volt that would be followed by US military invasion”. One of the most popular 
planned operations was operation Mongoose, tacitly approved by Kennedy 
in March 1962, which, again stated that the eventual success of the program 
would require a decisive US military intervention.212 Military exercises called 
Filbrixlex-2213 involving 40,000 military personnel directed against an imagined 
dictator called Ortsac (Castro backwards) was a powerful indication of Ameri-
can intentions to invade as well as a validation for the Soviet missile stationing. 
Accounting for the numerous sophisticated plans to invade the island, there 
is no wonder Cubans constantly felt existentially threatened. After the Bay of 
Pigs invasion, Castro called Kennedy a “new Hitler”.214 Cuba persisted that its 
problem was not that the opposition of geopolitical West and East, but rather 
its pursuit of independence and sovereignty. Nevertheless, it is important to 
note a sharp geopolitical contention over the island. At a time when the US 
was planning yet another full-scale invasion, the Soviet leadership was think-
ing of options to protect the Cuban Revolution. The drastically different stand-
ing towards the Cuban Revolution for the attainment of political objectives was 
the main reason for the Soviet success with an enduring Cuban government. 
The result of Soviet deliberations was Khrushchev’s decision to station nuclear 
missiles on its territory. Indeed, the missiles’ transportation would prove Soviet 
ability to strike the heart of American interests with impunity, and thus signify 
an important victory for the Soviet people, who were used to seeing the world 
as a zone of geopolitical contests.215
One roll of a dice could restore Soviet international standing, frighten Ameri-
cans, save Cubans, shut up Stalinists, frustrate the Chinese and gain a po-
tential advantage in the bargain over West Berlin. Risk was medium, reward 
great.216 Thus, a Soviet delegation was sent to Cuba to explain the situation 
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and reach an agreement for weapons stationing.217 Surprisingly, Cubans were 
more than willing to accept murderous weapons. “Let us be the first victims 
in the fight against American imperialism”, stated Castro. Despite being an 
extravagant character, his decision was motivated by an altruistic sacrifice in 
the name of socialism.218
Soon afterwards, Raul Castro arrived in the USSR to prepare all the neces-
sary documents. A final meeting of Raul Castro and Khrushchev took place 
on July 8. The secrecy of the operation was especially important. All possible 
measures were taken to ensure the safety of documents. All materials were 
written by hand in a single copy.219 The Cubans offered to make the station-
ing of missiles public. This not only heightened the prestige of the agreement 
but also gained Cuba greater importance in the international community. Who 
would try to preclude the agreement between the two independent govern-
ments? If someone in Moscow was considering making Soviet intentions pub-
lic, it was a recently appointed Soviet Ambassador to Washington Anatoly Do-
brynin, who claimed, “we could have predicted a violent reaction of America to 
Khrushchev’s undertaking as soon as it becomes known”.220 The covert nature 
of the operation only escalated the negative perception of it. 
The veterans of the Cuban administration acknowledge that if the Soviet 
missiles stationing had been public, the US would have had more difficulty 
resisting due to the precedent of American missiles in Turkey and elsewhere in 
Europe.221 Kennedy himself declared repeatedly that the Jupiter missiles were 
“the same” as the Soviet missile in Cuba.222 Thus, the only role they performed 
was to enhance nuclear deterrence by complicating America’s planning for a 
successful first strike. 
The psychological factor of a secret stationing and a newly acquired US 
awareness of the fact could not allow them to “sit back and let them do that 
to us,” as the US Assistant Secretary of State Edwin Martin put it.223 The fact 
remained. Missiles were stationed. US leaders were informed. In his speech 
on October 22, Kennedy did not even try to hide an obviously hostile attitude 
towards Cuba. 
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He did not even recognize Cuban attempts to protect itself and ensure its re-
gime’s future. The State Department published a brochure, which called Cas-
tro a traitor to common American interests and viewed its Communist regime 
as a challenge to the stability of the Americas.224 The considerations of the 
security dilemma were at work here. According to Gromyko, the roots of the 
Cuban crisis can be found in the American desire to ensure its monopoly on 
security while rejecting the right of other states to protect themselves.225
Indeed the explanatory force of the security dilemma in the Cuban Crisis case 
is an astonishing one. It was at play when Americans refused to accept the 
validity of the Soviet rationale for the stationing of the missiles as well as when 
the Cuban government did not trust American guarantees of non-aggression. 
The tension during October was remarkable. In such a situation, the third 
player was an additional burden on the decision-making and control. It was 
hard for two leaders to come to terms and put themselves into each other’s 
shoes in order to reach a compromise. To know what was going on in the 
heads of mysterious and irascible Cuban leaders was even harder. In these 
crucial days when the Cold War tension reached its peak and the order of any 
Cuban general could cause a nuclear Armageddon, the connection and infor-
mation exchange with the Cuban side bore a prodigious importance. 
An illustrative episode was the shooting down of an American reconnais-
sance flight U-2 on October 27, which consequently has been called “Black 
Saturday”.226 Even though the American public has been long misinformed as 
to the responsibility of shooting down the plane, it is now known that a Soviet 
General made the decision without any prior consultation with central com-
mand. This was the turning point in the crisis, when the Soviet government 
realized the danger of the situation in Cuba. 
As Khrushchev later acknowledged, this was the moment when he got a gut 
feeling that the missiles ought to be removed with no further delay,227 and he 
decided to accept President Kennedy’s proposal of October 28.228 A number 
of IRBMs were controlled directly by Cuban commandership. Thus, the pos-
sibility of an unexpected situation was multiplied by the existence of a third 
decision-maker. Practically simultaneous with the Soviet order to ignore the 
flying planes, Castro ordered his soldiers to shoot down American reconnais-
sance planes. He believed the Northern neighbor could be influenced by noth-
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ing but power. Indeed, he was the leader of the Cuban Republic and American 
planes were flying over his territory. 
The situation in Cuba was escalating every moment. Castro was ready to 
die together with the Socialist camp. From the newly released documents 
we now know that Castro was urging Khrushchev to use missiles if Cuba 
was invaded.229 He was not aware of the overwhelmingly American-inclined 
nuclear balance and had no idea what the explosion of an atomic bomb was 
or what the consequences of a nuclear warfare would be for all the sides 
involved, irrespective of the winning and losing positions.230 He was sure that 
if the Soviet Union struck first, it would end the arrogant Northern neighbors 
and the era of freedom, welfare and economic prosperity would reign on 
Cuban soil.231
Thus, the Soviet decision to withdraw the missiles came out of the blue for 
the Cuban side. “Up to this very moment we were sure the missiles would be 
used,” stressed Castro. This was likely the rationale for Castro’s message of 
October 27, in which he suggested launching a preventive nuclear strike.232 
The Soviet government, however, decisively rejected such a scenario as 
one that had never been considered by the Soviets. “Dear comrade,” wrote 
Khrushchev, “I think your suggestion to be wrong, however, I understand your 
motivation”.233 Later on, Castro claimed his intentions were misunderstood in 
Moscow.234
However, Castro was not consulted when the final decision on missiles with-
drawal was negotiated in the Soviet echelons. On Sunday, October 28, around 
7 AM, Cuban President Osvaldo Dorticos notified the Soviet ambassador in 
Cuba, Alekseev on the official Soviet resolution. “When Dorticos said that the 
information could not have been falsified as it was coming from the Moscow 
radio, I felt myself the most unhappy person on the Earth and I could not even 
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imagine what Castro could have felt,” Alekseev wrote in his memoirs on that 
famous day.235 The following expansive cable addressed to the Cuban leader 
stressed a dangerous time shortage and informed Castro on the positive con-
sequences of the crisis settlement. According to the cable, Cuba was assured 
of at least 6 years of peace as Kennedy, who “was definitely going to be newly 
elected was not going to bridge its gentleman’s word”. 
The Cuban government, however, was dissatisfied with such a conclusion. 
The perspective of the Cuban leaders that the Soviet Union completely ignored 
Castro’s ideas on how to resolve the crisis were not only credible but bitterly 
exacerbated by the outrageous negligence of Castro’s famous 5 Points by the 
American government right before the settlement of the crisis. Castro felt he 
was used as a pawn by the two superpowers.236 This led to a decline in rela-
tions with the Soviet Union and the Cuban regime adopted a general suspi-
ciousness and insular attitude for many years to follow, irritating America and 
causing the Cuban people suffer. 
CONCLUSION
Drawing a conclusion from such a controversial and crucial period in human 
history is more than an ambitious task. However, a summary of the events 
can be given. The crisis became a turning point in the relations between the 
two superpowers. It demonstrated how dangerous the possibility of a nuclear 
showdown was and that the only rational way out in such a case would be 
through peaceful negotiations. Kennedy’s quote is an illustrative example of a 
rational attitude towards international relations “let us never negotiate out of 
fear, but let us never fear to negotiate.”
The American and Soviet leaders understood the insurmountable danger 
of another similar misunderstanding and established a hot line between the 
Kremlin and the White House. The realization of mutual vulnerability showed 
the US that the exercise of power is not limitless and the only acceptable 
way to regulate power in the nuclear age is by negotiation. The new concept 
of “peaceful coexistence” was accepted in the aftermath, which signified the 
beginning of détente and an understanding that despite a different ideology, 
the world superpowers do not have to exasperate those differences by military 
means. 
The universally accepted conclusion of the crisis is that it was a definitive vic-
tory by  the US. Due to greater access of information by American scholarship 
as well as intense propaganda techniques, the account of a wise, brave and 
victorious American leadership long dominated the general narrative. Indeed, 
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if we look at the situation from the position of public appearance and procla-
mations, there was an unambiguous American victory, but the withdrawal of 
Turkey-based Jupiters seems to invalidate such a claim. In terms of geopoli-
tics, American victory could be questioned due to the fact that a hostile politi-
cal regime acquired a strong footing in close proximity to the American border. 
The Soviets have usually cited the defense of Cuba and the prevention of a 
US-initiated nuclear war as their main rationale for the stationing of missiles. 
Clearly, these are the only explanations that could allow them to keep up ap-
pearances in the aftermath of withdrawal. Cuba indeed received the assur-
ances of non-intervention and for good or bad, the Cuban regime lasted long. 
Despite such a positive outcome for the regime, consequences for the Cuban 
people were less than satisfactory due to a persisting, destructive, economic 
embargo. As for the second reason of deterring the US from starting a nuclear 
war, Khrushchev’s strategy worked well as he got assurances of the with-
drawal of Turkish missiles and then signed a nuclear test ban treaty in 1963. 
This work examined how the differences between American, Soviet and Cu-
ban sides influenced the decisions of the participants of the conflict and how 
these variations can help explain the differences in crisis assessment. From 
the research, it becomes evident that not only can there be no universally cor-
rect account of the events, but also that the politically motivated and accept-
able national interpretations create a multitude of equally logical and explana-
tory motivations and assessments of the events. 
The main goal of a researcher is to approach all these interpretations from an 
unbiased point of view and understand the situation in its complexity. Due to 
recently released documents of the Soviet side, the account of the event became 
fuller, eliminating conventional stereotypes and a dominant American view. De-
spite the smaller influence of Cuban decision-making, a similar addition of Cuban 
sources would be of utter importance in understanding the psychology of the 
crisis and the leaders’ decisions to engage in such irreversible and risky behavior. 
Not only was this paper to show the complexities surrounding the political 
decision-making and its interpretation, but to imply we should learn from his-
tory and not commit the same mistakes if they can be avoided. As Mark Twain 
once said “History doesn’t repeat itself, but it does rhyme.“ Even though of-
ficially the Cold War is over, the tensions existing among some states continue 
to exist and heighten. And let our prudence and understanding trump over our 
ambition and self-assertion if we want to continue enjoying the world which we 
all now take for granted.
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TOP SECRET SOVIET AND HUNGARIAN PLANS 
FOR PRE-EMPTING NATO –  
USA UNEXPECTED NUCLEAR STRIKES
rItA PArOdA
In this article, I would like to focus on the lack of preparation during the Cold 
War by the countries of the Warsaw Pact (WP) for defense against a nuclear 
missile attack before the 1980s because their basic strategy was to make a pre-
emptive strike. Additionally, I will explore the possible reasons that led them to 
make defensive preparations. The secret documents of the WP from the 1970s 
and the 1980s are increasingly available for historians. By analyzing these doc-
uments, we can create a more accurate image of the function and intention of 
the WP.  From these documents, we can conclude that the point of the WP’s 
military doctrine was to take the offensive in fighting a potential World War III 
against NATO. This is clearly demonstrated in the nuclear war plans, in which 
they shifted from a defensive position to an offensive war against NATO forces.
Starting in the 1960s, the Soviets led WP nations to conduct military exer-
cises or Front Command Post exercises every year in some member states in-
volving military forces of the Soviet Union along with those of other WP mem-
ber states.  Annually, with the approval of the Hungarian political leadership, 
they formulated and modified plans for waging a possible war.237
These secret documents reveal that even in the 1980s, the Soviet Union was 
prepared for an offensive war in which they would likely use nuclear weapons. 
This is demonstrated by a Front Command Post exercise in 1980.  In this sce-
nario, “self-defense” would persist until completion of full military invasion of Ita-
ly as part of WP forces’ pre-emptive strike, in which if they encountered minimal 
resistance and did not lose any captured territory, WP forces could move from 
the Hungarian-Austrian border all the way to Trapani, Sicily. Recent research 
by military historian Miklós Horváth indicates there was no significant change 
to this strategy, even after the 1987 Berlin meeting of the WP Political Con-
sultative Committee, in which they decided to strengthen the defensive nature 
of the WP’s military doctrine. In 1987, 32 years after the formation of the WP, 
in a Front Command Post exercise, for the first time, the Unified Armed Forces 
were dealing with the challenges of preparing and waging a defensive military 
operation.238
237 Presentation of Miklós Horváth in the Terror Háza Múzeum, October 7, 2010.
238 Horváth Miklós: Új szakasz a hidegháború történetének kutatásában? - Mozaikok 
Magyarország hidegháborús történetéből, 2010, p. 8.
80 CSABA BÉKÉS – MELINDA KALMÁR: STUDENTS ON THE COLD WAR
The WP countries first began taking increased measures in the 1980s in regards 
to an unexpected nuclear attack from NATO. In 1981, KGB chairman Yuri Andropov 
announced that the Politburo decided that the KGB and GRU (the Soviet Military 
Intelligence) were to collaborate for the first time in a global intelligence operation, 
code-named RYAN (РЯН), from the acronym for Raketno-Yadernoe Napadenie, 
meaning “Nuclear Missile Attack”. The purpose of RYAN was to collect intelligence 
on the presumed, but non-existent, plans of the Reagan administration to launch a 
nuclear first strike against the Soviet Union. Operation RYAN slowed during 1984, 
though it did not end quite then.239 We still do not have enough information about 
the function and role of this intelligence operation during the early 1980s, so this 
issue needs further research. Based on the secret correspondence between the 
Soviet and the Hungarian intelligence services in 1984-1985, we know that Soviet 
officials drew alerted Hungarian political leaders to the perceived aggressive poli-
cies of the USA. Among other aspects, they indicated that 
The USA in favor of increasing its military power 
began the implementation of monumental arma-
ment programs. With the mobilization of huge 
financial and technical resources they began de-
veloping new strategic nuclear weapon systems, 
anti-missile systems, and the preparation of cos-
mic warfare... The leading circles of the USA ulti-
mately want to create an arsenal which is capable 
of making the first strike, which allows them to 
use nuclear blackmail and the unlimited instru-
ments of power politics.240
SOME KEY HISTORICAL EVENTS 
Starting in 1977, the Soviets replaced the SS-4 and SS-5 missiles with longer 
range (5000 km) SS-20 missiles, which was followed by firm reactions from the 
USA. In May 1978, NATO adopted a new armament program for the next 15 
years, including developing a neutron bomb. The armament war between the 
superpowers accelerated. A NATO meeting was held on December 12, 1978 in 
Brussels, Belgium.  They adopted the Double-Track Decision, in which NATO 
would deploy 572 American Pershing-II and Cruise Missiles into Western Eu-
rope in 1983 if the Soviets refused to disarm the SS-20 missiles.
239 Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin: The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin 
Archive and the Secret History of the KGB, 2001, pp. 213-214.
240 43 document - ÁBTL 1. 11. 4. EV/84-88/1 3-12.
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Meanwhile in 1980, the Wartime Statute of the Combined Armed Forces of 
the WP countries, drafted in 1978, was approved. In November 1981, President 
Reagan made a proposal called “Zero Option.”  If the Soviet Union disarmed all 
of their missiles in Europe and beyond the Ural Mountains, then NATO would 
stop enforcing the 1979 Double-Track Decision.  The Soviets rejected this of-
fer. By autumn of 1983, no agreement was reached and negotiations stalled. 
As a result, the USA deployed the American Pershing-II and Cruise Missiles to 
Greenham, England, Mutlangen, West Germany, and Comiso, Italy. 
These missiles only needed 5-8 minutes to reach their target. As a counter-
move, the Soviets increased the number of the SS-20 missiles in East Germa-
ny and Czechoslovakia. On November 23, 1983, American-Soviet negotiations 
broke down completely.241 In addition, we can assume that a 1983 NATO war 
plan may have played a part in the development of the defensive preparations 
of the WP. In the military exercise, code-named “Able Archer”, NATO member 
states, with the participation of the government leaders, also practiced prepa-
rations for a nuclear war. Able Archer was the final phase, the conclusion of the 
Autumn Forge 1983 exercise, and was conducted between November 7-11, in 
which the exercise shifted from conventional war to nuclear war.242
Soviet intelligence agencies kept a close watch on the maneuvers, and their 
reports led Andropov and his top aides to conclude that a nuclear attack was 
imminent. According to John Lewis Gaddis, it was probably the most danger-
ous moment since the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962.243 The events of the first 
half of the 1980s like this NATO exercise created a fear of war among the 
Soviets. According to Richard Rhodes, this “made the Soviet leadership un-
easy, so there was very little that prevented them from making the first nuclear 
strike”.244 Recently declassified secret documents also reveal that even in the 
1980s, the world was extremely close to a thermonuclear war, but this issue 
needs further research.
INSTRUCTIONS FOR DETECTION OF AND PREPARATION 
FOR NUCLEAR ATTACK
According to the Soviets, “the escalation of the tension between the opposing 
military forces increases the possibility of the unexpected nuclear strike against 
the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, and thereby the danger of 
241 Fischer Ferenc: A kétpólusú világ, 2005. 293-323.
242 The 1983 War Scare: “The Last Paroxysm” of the Cold War Part I, National Security 
Archive Electronic Briefing Book Nº 426, Edited by Nate Jones, posted in May, 2013. 
http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB426/
243 John Lewis Gaddis: The Cold War, 2005, p. 228.
244 Richard Rhodes: Az atombomba története, 2013, p.8.
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global thermonuclear war”. Consistent with propaganda materials, the West 
was the aggressor and the countries of the WP were in the peace camp, the 
approach assumed that the first nuclear strike would be carried out by the USA, 
and hence Soviet leaders thought that the Soviet and Hungarian intelligence 
services had to join forces and make necessary preparations together.
At the beginning of the war, before the first strike, we can read in the letter 
that despite all the secrecy “the enemy will be forced to make a series of ac-
tions in the political, economic, military and social spheres which would be 
directed to ensure the effectiveness of its nuclear strike and to limit the dam-
age caused by retaliatory strikes. All of this activity inevitably produces abnor-
mal movements, which could be explored with the appropriate use of the work 
tools available to national security intelligence”. They detailed the processes, 
activities and preparations for every area, political, military and economic and 
civil defense, which the initiator, the USA, would make before an unexpected 
nuclear attack.  At the end of the 1984 letter, there was a suggestion that the 
WP countries create and publish an “Action Plan” concerning “the organization 
of intelligence efforts directed toward detection of the danger of an unexpected 
nuclear attack”. This action plan was not made prior to 1985, because they sent 
the proposal for it only at the end of the previous year, proving that the Sovi-
ets did not inform their allies properly previously, and that prior to the 1980s, 
they did not prepare for defense against an unexpected nuclear missile attack, 
because, they had intended to make the pre-emptive strike at the beginning 
of the war. Vladimir Kryuchkov, Deputy Chairman of Soviet Union KGB, sent 
documents regarding this action plan to János Bogye, a deputy leader in the 
Hungarian Home Office at that time.  Their top secret correspondence reveals 
that the predicting an unexpected nuclear attack from NATO and the USA was a 
problem at this time; hence they emphasized the importance of early detection.
Kryuchkov drew up the actions and signs related to the preparations for an 
unexpected attack in the political, military and economic areas and for civil 
defense.
In the political area:
- “Unusually frequent special sessions of the political decision mak-
ing bodies and the higher level leaders of the USA and NATO member 
states”. 
- “Increased intensity of the bilateral and multilateral political-military con-
sultations between the USA and NATO allies.”
In the military area:
- “Sudden changes in the activities of the key military leaders of the USA 
and NATO member states”.
- “Enhancing the combat readiness of the major components of the USA 
strategic nuclear forces”.
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In the economic area:
- “Unusual actions for the protection of the essential industrial objects 
from the consequences of nuclear strikes”.
For civil defense:
- “Closed meetings between the civil defense leaders of USA and NATO 
member states and the political and military leadership”.
 “Building further nuclear-proof bunkers and restoring the available ones”.
At the end of the letter, Kryuchkov suggested that they would talk about the 
“clearing up of the main organizational and practical aspects of the intelligence 
work related to the unexpected nuclear missile attack and the discussion of 
the submitted documents” at the consultations to be held in Budapest.245
In his reply to this letter, Major General Bogye provided information indicat-
ing that “they had made steps to intensify the state security intelligence activi-
ties in this field, to improve the efficiency of their work. Based on the resolution 
of the meeting of the Deputy Ministers, they worked out a detailed action plan 
for organizing state security intelligence work for the detection of preparations 
for an unexpected nuclear strike”.
The next remark deserves special attention, “we are presently establishing 
the necessary organizational framework and we are working on creating the 
adequate human and material conditions”, We can also conclude from this 
that previously they had not made these peparations, because they had not 
focused on the detection of the unexpected nuclear strike, but that the WP 
would attack first, and which way, which troops and with which weapons they 
would begin the pre-emptive attack.246
CONCLUSION
These 1984-1985 documents prove that the intention of the WP since its es-
tablishment was the preparation for a war that would be started with a pre-
emptive strike against NATO and the USA, and until the 1980s, they did not put 
the emphasis on defense or on preparation of defensive plans.
The first half of the 1980s was a critical period in the relations between NATO 
and the Warsaw Pact countries, and in my opinion it needs further research. 
Additional declassified documents from recent years, such as the 1980 War-
time Statute of the WP, could help to clear up several issues and to better 
understand this period.
245 44 document -  ÁBTL 1. 11. 4. EV/84-88/II. 97-89.
246 47 document - ÁBTL 1. 11. 4. EV/84-88/II. 90-91.
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NUCLEAR MADNESS: WHAT WAS SPECIAL 
ABOUT THE BRAZIL-GERMANY NUCLEAR 
AGREEMENT OF 1975?
tHOmAS KOLLmAnn
‘Nuclear Madness’ was the title of a New York Times editorial from June 13, 1975 re-
sponding to news of the Agreement for Nuclear Co-operation (hereafter the Agree-
ment) signed in Bonn, West Germany on the 27th of June, 1975 by the Foreign 
Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany (Germany), Hans-Dietrich Genscher 
and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Brazil, Antonio Francisco Azeredo da Silveira.
Nearly two years in the making, the Agreement was an $8 billon contract 
with the German engineering consortium Kraftwerk Union (KWU) to provide 
Brazil with its own nuclear power industry over a 10-15 year period, including 
8 power stations. The Agreement appears hugely ambitious today. 
Three precedents stand out: the largest and, at the time, the most expensive pro-
posed transfer of advanced technology to a developing country; the first breach of 
the U.S. monopoly over the world export market for nuclear reactors by a non-Amer-
ican vendor and the transfer of the complete ‘cycle’ for the production of nuclear 
fuel including the capability for reprocessing and enriching nuclear fuel - the ‘sensi-
tive’ elements of the cycle in the conventional non-proliferation view - allowing for 
the production of plutonium by the recipient country.247 This last ominous feature of 
the Agreement would become a source of resentments between the United States, 
Brazil and West Germany, described by one scholar as “one of the most acrimonious 
debates of the post- World War II era.”248 The furore over the Agreement died down 
somewhat in 1976 but was soon revived by U.S. President Jimmy Carter’s diplo-
matic efforts at non-proliferation and continued throughout his tenure in office. The 
aforementioned New York Times editorial was mainly critical of Brazil and Germany 
and described the Agreement as “a reckless move that could set off a nuclear arms 
race in Latin America, triggering the arming of a half-dozen nations elsewhere, and 
endanger the security of the United States and the world as a whole.”249
Hostility to the Agreement within the U.S. was exemplified by John Pastore - Sen-
ator (D, RI) Chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. Pastore insisted on 
the Agreement’s nullification and suggested a reconsideration of the U.S.’s NATO 
247 Ronald J Bettauer, “The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978,” Law and Policy in 
International Business, 10, Nº 4 (1978), pp. 6, 54.
248 Joan Johnson-Freese, “Interpretations of the Nonproliferation Treaty: The U.S. and 
West Germany,” Journal of International Affairs, Nº 37 (1984), pp.  291.
249 New York Times, June 13, 1975.
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commitments to Germany to emphasise the U.S.’s stance on nonproliferation.250 The 
historical background of Brazil’s foreign relations in the late 1960s and early 1970s 
puts the controversy generated by the Agreement into perspective and illustrates 
how politically promiscuous nuclear commerce had become by this time.
The U.S. role as sole supplier of enriched uranium for many countries in the 
Third World ended in 1971 with the arrival of the Soviet Union in the nuclear 
marketplace. From the 1950s, the delivery of enriched uranium supplies from 
the U.S. for the operating lifetime of nuclear reactors was obtained through sev-
eral bilateral agreements. The U.S. subsidised the prices of these supplies as 
an inducement for buyers to forego alternatives. However, after raising prices 
unilaterally in 1971 and 1973, the U.S. lost its reputation as a reliable supplier.251
Journal do Brasil records that between 1969 and 1973 France, Japan, Switzer-
land, the United Kingdom, Germany and Canada all expanded their investments in 
Brazil at a faster rate than the U.S. In the year following the world recession of 1973-
1974, Brazil’s foreign debt exploded. By early 1976 the country was the world’s 
largest single debtor nation, with over $3 billion in the loan portfolios of U.S. com-
mercial banks, as well as being the principal borrower from the World Bank.252 Brazil 
imported 75% of its, mostly crude oil, making it the developing world’s leading oil 
importer. Following the October 1973 Yom Kippur War the country experienced 
severe balance-of-payments difficulties. Amongst other benefits, acquisition of the 
technology and knowledge necessary for the complete nuclear fuel cycle would 
allow Brazil to earn foreign exchange and reduce the costs of its nuclear program. 
The Agreement reflects these ambitions, specifying the development of a native 
nuclear industry to diversify Brazil’s power resources and, in the long-term, the 
export of energy and technical services.253 In addition, the capability to draw on di-
verse and copious energy sources would give it leverage in negotiations with energy 
suppliers, particularly the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).254
The U.S. had long been a dominant force in Brazil’s economy and was the 
country’s principal source of foreign investment, with $3.5bn committed by 
250 Amy Finkelstein, “Brazil, The United States and Nuclear Nonproliferation: American 
Foreign Policy at the Crossroads,” The Fletcher Forum 7, Nº 2 (1983), p. 7.
251 Hanns Maul, Europe and World Energy, London: Butterworths, 1980, p. 299.
252 Cited in Robert A. Packenham, “Trends in Brazilian National Dependency Since 
1964” in Brazil in the Seventies, edited by Riordan Roett (Washington D.C., Ameri-
can Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1976): 99; 111 and Thomas E. 
Skidmore, 33 in the same volume.
253 Robert Wesson, The United States and Brazil: Limits of Influence, New York: Praeger, 
1981, p. 79; Juan E. Guglialmelli, “The Brazilian-German Nuclear Deal: A View from 
Argentina,” Survival 4, Nº 18 1976, p.163. 
254 David J. Myers, “Brazil’s Reluctant Pursuit of the Nuclear Option,” Orbis 27, Nº 4, 
1984, pp. 902-903; Jonathan Kandell, “Brazil Bitter at U.S. Effort to Impose Nuclear 
Curb, New York Times, March 28, 1977.
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1974.255 Fortunately for the Brazilian regime, the country’s natural wealth meant 
it could provide a steady supply of iron ore, bauxite, manganese and meat to 
the U.S., as well as quartz crystals used in electronics, unavailable elsewhere.256
Brazil’s economic crises led it to solicit co-operation in nuclear science through 
diplomacy. By the early 1970s Brazil had signed co-operation accords in this field 
with France, Israel, West Germany, the U.S., Canada, Bolivia, Peru, Chile, India, 
Italy, Paraguay, Portugal and Switzerland as well as the European Atomic Energy 
Community (Euratom).257 Of relevance here is the use of the provision of enriched 
fuel services by the U.S. to exert pressure on Brazil. John Redick notes that when 
the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission Chairman (AEC), Glenn Seaborg visited Bra-
zil in 1967 he asserted that the provision of nuclear fuel enrichment services 
for Brazil from the U.S. would continue “unconditionally” even if Brazil stuck to 
plans to develop peaceful nuclear explosives. The U.S. also provided Brazil with 
research and consultation on techniques for various uses of nuclear energy in the 
early 1970s and signed a new co-operative agreement with the country in 1972.
Brazil’s agreement for nuclear co-operation with France, announced in May 
1967, less than two months prior to Seaborg’s visit to the country, included 
details for the joint development of research and power reactors and the ac-
quisition of French equipment for Brazilian nuclear centers. 
Redick suggests that Brazil may have used this agreement as a means of 
both inducing further technical assistance from the U.S. and as a reaction 
to U.S. non-proliferation initiatives. Prominent features of the French-Brazilian 
agreement were joint research on fabrication techniques of thorium fuel and 
the prospective construction of a thorium/heavy water power reactor, a more 
expensive process that results in large amounts of easily separated plutonium. 
In exchange, France lent Brazil $6 million for uranium prospecting. 
The most important precedent for the Agreement was established during the ne-
gotiations and subsequent construction of the Atucha natural uranium power plant in 
Argentina, built by the German firm Siemens AG in 1968. This involved the purchase by 
Argentina of a sensitive element of the nuclear fuel cycle, heavy water, from the AEC - 
the only U.S. sale of heavy water to a foreign power in that year. Redick notes that the 
AEC only approved the sale when Argentina threatened to find alternative sellers.258
General Ongania, the leader of Argentina, awarded the nuclear-power contract 
to Siemens, despite a lower bid by Westinghouse of the U.S. because Siemens 
255 William Perry, Contemporary Brazilian Foreign Policy: The International Strategy of 
an Emerging Power, Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1976, pp. 55, 58.
256 Marvin Howe, “Brazil, Racing for Growth, Tries to Rely Less on the U.S.,” New York 
Times, July 2, 1975.
257 Jon H. Rosenbaum, “Brazil’s Nuclear Aspirations.” In Nuclear Proliferation and the 
Near Nuclear Countries, Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing, 1975), 267.
258 John R. Redick, “Nuclear Proliferation in Latin America,” in Latin America’s New In-
ternationalism - The End of Hemispheric Isolation, New York: Praeger, 1976, p. 273.
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was prepared to supply the technology for a natural-thorium reactor, freeing 
Argentina from dependence on the U.S. monopoly over enriched uranium and 
the controls over waste that could be reprocessed into weapons-grade materi-
als. According to David J. Myers, Argentina’s supply of plutonium from Atucha 
passed beyond the critical threshold for weapons production in the late 1970s.259
As the Brazilian regime ventured further into nucleonics in 1969, it created a 
framework for the Agreement by establishing an arrangement with West Ger-
many for nuclear research. The Brazilian CNEN (National Council for Nuclear 
Energy) created a working party of West German and Brazilian technicians to 
assess a proposal for the construction of a power plant in either Rio de Janeiro 
or Sao Paulo by 1976. 
A statement by CNEN,  called “Nuclear  Plans  Based  on  Natural  Uranium 
Supply”, states that the main goal of the Brazilian nuclear program was the de-
velopment of all stages in the production of nuclear energy and the development 
of auxiliary industries - in sum the infrastructure for the “nuclearization” of Brazil.
The contract to build the first nuclear power plants in Brazil with enriched urani-
um from the United States, went to the U.S. firm Westinghouse - renewing Brazil’s 
dependence for enriched fuel on a single supplier - a restriction that continued the 
arrangement begun with Brazil’s 1956 admission to the U.S. Atoms for Peace pro-
gram under which the first research reactors in Brazil were built and maintained.260
Competition in the nuclear reactor export market during 1968 - 1975 was 
cutthroat and the Germans alleged several cases of U.S. interference in this pe-
riod. In 1973 KWU considered a sale to Yugoslavia closed when they were sud-
denly beaten to the punch by Westinghouse. This, and a similar case in Spain, 
led to speculation that U.S. firms had told Yugoslavian and Spanish authorities 
they would not receive U.S. enriched uranium if they did not buy U.S. reactors. 
There were also charges that the U.S. had threatened to withhold economic 
assistance from Argentina if it bought another German reactor, and that U.S. in-
terests had spread rumours of the liquidation of KWU just as the company was 
negotiating to sell two reactors to Iran.261 Today, the United States and Ger-
many are signatories to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the legal instrument 
setting out the terms underlying the regulation of trade in nuclear technology 
and material. The impetus that gave rise to the NPT was a renewed attempt by 
the superpowers to halt the international spread of nuclear weapons. 
The Soviet Union co-operated with the U.S. in part to prevent Germany 
from acquiring nuclear weapons through its affiliation with the North Atlantic 
259 David J. Myers, “Brazil” in Security Policies of Developing Countries, Massachu-
setts: Lexington, 1982, p. 60.
260 John R. Redick, Military Potential of Latin American Nuclear Energy Programs, Bev-
erly Hills, Sage, 1972, pp. 17-23.
261 Edward Wonder, “Nuclear Commerce and Nuclear Proliferation: Germany and Bra-
zil, 1975,” Orbis 2 (1977): 293; “Querschüsse aus den USA,” Die Zeit, 20 Juni, 1975.
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Treaty Alliance (NATO). Germany’s interpretation of Article IV of the Treaty al-
lowed for access to nuclear energy by non-nuclear weapons states for peace-
ful purposes. ‘Peaceful’ explosions such as those that could be used in the 
creation of canals were prohibited, but the transfer of all other stages of the 
fuel cycle were allowed, including systems classified as sensitive by nuclear 
weapons states.262
The German Government ratified the NPT in May 1975. William Lowerance 
reports that in a meeting that month between U.S. President Gerald Ford and 
German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt the Agreement was not discussed.263 
Former Brazilian Foreign Minister Araujo Castro, Brazil’s ambassador to the 
United Nations, described the NPT in 1971 as part of an effort by the super-
powers to “freeze” the Cold War distribution of power. This view typified the 
Brazilian attitude throughout the 1970s.264
The wording of the Agreement made it dependent on safeguards agreed 
upon with the International Atomic Energy Agency. However, as Norman Gall 
notes, the semi-official commentary published with the text in the Brazilian 
press states: “For Brazil, this does not represent a commitment to forgo nu-
clear devices in the future.”265 A New York Times article from July 1975 gave 
some further indications of the move away from the United States and towards 
European suppliers. By this time European suppliers were strongly entering 
Latin American markets due to weak domestic demand. The article reports 
that Brazil’s special military relationship with the United States ended in 1970 
when General Orlando Geisel, brother of President Ernesto Geisel and Minister 
of War, decided to nationalise the military equipment industry and buy arms 
from companies that would establish plants in Brazil because, as the Times 
reported, “what was wanted most was the technology,” the Agreement being 
a case in point, providing the technology to build additional reactors.266
These developments were likely reinforced by the imposition by the U.S. of a 
ceiling on arms sales within the continent in 1968, in addition to verbal attacks 
on the Brazilian regime’s repressive practices in Congress and the U.S. press. 
France, Britain and the Soviet Union fulfilled Brazil demands for arms unmet by 
the U.S., according to Alexandre Barros.267
262 Bertrand Goldschmidt, “The Negotiation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty,” IAEA Bul-
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By mid-1974 negotiations between Brazil and Germany to draft the Agree-
ment were underway. Several German government officials visited Brazil in the 
middle of 1974, including State Secretary of Technology Hans Hilgar Haun-
schild, former Defense Minister Franz Josef Strauss, and State Secretary of 
Foreign Affairs, Hans George Sachs. 
Following a visit by Brazilian Mines and Energy Minister Shigeaki Ueki to 
Bonn, the Brazilians made the decision to outline a nuclear program found-
ed on the scientific accord of 1969.268 The terms of the deal were agreed on 
February 12, 1975. The U.S. Ambassador in Bonn, Martin Hillenbrand, was 
informed a week later on the 19th, and details of the Agreement were first 
reported in the next day’s edition of the U.S. trade journal Nucleonics Week.269 
On April 7, Lowerance records that a four-man delegation from the State De-
partment and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) was sent to 
Bonn to discuss the Agreement, and apparently helped induce Germany to 
take a less lenient approach toward existing safeguards. On all sides decisions 
were made at the level of ministerial and industrial personnel.270
German officials rebutted critics of the Agreement by stressing that the trea-
ty’s safeguards exceeded those required by Canada for its exports of nuclear 
technology to India and that Brazil had the capability of eventually developing 
a nuclear industry without foreign assistance. If this occurred, the Germans 
contended, there would be no international controls on the Brazilian nuclear 
industry. At this point anxiety over Brazil’s rivalry with Argentina was on the rise 
with news that Argentina was planning to construct a nuclear bomb and that 
plans were afoot for France to supply Argentina with a plant to produce plu-
tonium, later denied by French sources. Furthermore, the German press had 
observed that France, which had not signed the NPT, was prepared to provide 
Brazil with a complete nuclear fuel cycle. Had Germany not agreed to assist 
Brazil, a far greater danger of nuclear proliferation would have been posed, so 
the Agreement’s German supporters argued.271
Although it steadfastly refused to yield to U.S. pressures to withdraw from 
the Agreement, the West German administration of Helmut Schmidt was con-
sistently flexible and responsive in the face of political pressure on the ques-
tion of the Agreement’s safeguards. Analysis of a question and answer session 
from a press conference at the West German government a day before the 
signing of the Agreement shows that the Chancellery solicited methods for en-
268 Ronald M. Schneider, Brazil: Foreign Policy of a Future World Power, Boulder, CO: 
Westview, 1976, p. 50.
269 Lowerance, p. 150.
270 Ibid.
271 Rosenbaum, p. 262.
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hancing IAEA controls over the transfer of nuclear knowledge and material.272 
The Chancellery also intervened to hold up the transfer of blueprints for a pilot 
enrichment facility to Brazil from October 1976 until after the inauguration of 
President Carter.273 Memoranda from the German Foreign Ministry shows that 
Germany was sensitive to the objections from the Americans and the Dutch 
government to the transfer of these blueprints. German ministerial officials also 
showed willingness to engage in intergovernmental consultations over the de-
tails to a point but were certain of the legality of their position and determined 
not to undermine their contractual obligations under the Agreement by delay-
ing the transfer any longer.274
Reviewing the U.S. record, a special National Intelligence Estimate from Sep-
tember 1974 viewed “political considerations” as the “principal determinant” 
of the spread of nuclear weapons, and foresaw the capacity and technologi-
cal competence to produce nuclear weapons becoming more widespread by 
the 1980s. The report identifies mutually reinforcing trends in the international 
environment which the Agreement reflected, namely “the policies of suppli-
ers of nuclear materials and technology and regional ambitions and tensions” 
and concludes that in the absence of successful methods of preventing pro-
liferation by the US, and USSR and others opposed to proliferation, Pakistan 
and Iran were the leading contenders in the race for the capability to produce 
nuclear weapons, with Egypt and Brazil falling into “a second category of like-
lihood.275
A U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency report on nuclear programs in Latin 
America published two months later stated that Brazil was, “seeking for-
eign cooperation in all phases of the nuclear fuel cycle including uranium 
enrichment,”276 but that the size of capital investment involved put large-scale 
uranium enrichment capability out of its near-term reach. Both Argentina and 
Brazil were noted as “deserving attention as potential proliferators in the fore-
272 “Betr. Nuklearabkommen mit Brasilien, Interviews mit Zeitungen und Zeitschriften, 
5-5, 1/HSA010630, Bonn: Archiv der sozialen Demokratie: Helmut Schmidt Archiv.
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seeable future.” However, in contrast with Argentina, an attempt at acquiring 
the technological basis for the complete fuel-cycle by Brazil was not anticipat-
ed.277 The Agency surmised that Brazil with its “modest nuclear energy pro-
gram is attempting to achieve nuclear independence as rapidly as its limited 
economic and technological base will permit.” Brazilian nuclear activities ap-
peared “to be unrelated to weapons proliferation aspirations, though weapons 
material is more easily derivable from an independent civilian nuclear energy 
power program.”278
Of the factors that may have compelled the Brazilians to turn to West Ger-
many for nuclear technology in 1973 - 1974 two stand out. The first was the 
AEC’s notification that it could not guarantee the delivery of previously prom-
ised enriched uranium. The political consequences of this were compounded 
by the U.S. refusal to sign contracts committing U.S. sources to investment in 
further enrichment capacity.279 The second was the refusal of the U.S. to permit 
Westinghouse to build enrichment and reprocessing facilities in Brazil on the 
grounds that Brazil refused to adhere to the NPT. Westinghouse had tried to 
persuade Brazil to participate in an enrichment plant to be built in the U.S. but 
Brazil insisted that the entire nuclear fuel cycle be under Brazilian control.280 
Of equal importance to Brazil in 1974-1975 was the need to expand and di-
versify its resources of oil and other raw materials. This and the soaring cost of 
Western capital goods also added to the appeal of Soviet products and in par-
ticular Soviet technology. In addition, Brazil had attempted to promote great-
er exports of its semi-manufactures, such as shoes and textiles, and import 
more specialised items including Romanian oil, Polish coal and machinery and 
electronic equipment from East Germany and Czechoslovakia.281 Additionally, 
U.S. nonproliferation efforts in the 1970s were inconsistent. For example, why, 
wonders Robert Wesson, was the U.S. so concerned with the German-Bra-
zilian Agreement when it was prepared to sell reactors to Israel and Egypt, 
neither of which - unlike Brazil - accepted international controls?282   One could 
also ask why the U.S. failed to exert equal pressure on another ally, Canada, 
over the building of a plant by Atomic Energy of Canada Lt. in Argentina, as 
the Agreement was taking effect, without any safeguards or even a contract.283
Reviewing the evidence one could answer the question posed by the sub-
title of this chapter by saying that Brazil’s moves towards national independ-
277 Ibid.
278 Ibid.
279 Gall, pp. 164, 166.
280 Wesson, p. 78.
281 Perry, pp. 71, 73; Wesson, p. 60.
282 Wesson, pp. 87-88.
283 Mark Gayn, “No Safeguards Yet, Canada Building A-Plant in Argentina,” Toronto 
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ence in the realm of nuclear self-sufficiency, backed by West Germany’s tech-
nology, and its late start in the nuclear power plant field (its first plans for a 
plant were three years behind Argentina’s)284 made that country rather than 
its regional rival Argentina the focus of anxiety over U.S. loss of influence in 
the world. Coming to fruition at an extraordinarily tense moment for the global 
economy, the Agreement represented a highly visible challenge to U.S. he-
gemony by the primus inter pares of U.S. allies in Europe and South America 
and a contraction of the U.S. superpower’s sphere of influence.
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INGREDIENTS TO THE 1983 WAR SCARE: DID 
OPERATION ABLE ARCHER 83 GET US CLOSE 
TO WORLD WAR III? 
GáBOr VÖrÖS 
INTRODUCTION
While crises are not something out of the ordinarywhen we talk about he Cold 
War, Operation Able Archer 83 and its precursors made the Soviet leaders 
feel particularly uneasy due to renewed overt antagonism between the two 
superpowers. Operation Able Archer 83 was a seemingly routine yearly mili-
tary exercise in the November of 1983 but the aforementioned convergence 
of circumstances made it a scholarly contested topic. While the existence of 
the exercise was known for a long time, and some of the American and Soviet 
reactions are documented and available to the public as well, a trove of docu-
ments – over 1000 declassified pages- was just recently released to the public 
by the National Security Archive. By navigating through the articles character-
ized by sensationalism, I will try to analyze the event and find out whether the 
claim that it was the closest moment to World War III warrants legitimacy.
The structure of the research paper is as follows: First, I will describe what the 
world looked like in the late 1970s and early 1980s to establish a clear picture of 
the events running up to the Operation Able Archer 83. It was a particularly uneasy 
period in the Cold War which signaled the end of the détente that characterized 
the period from the late 1960s up until the late 1970s. Hence events of substantial 
gravity, like the invasion of Afghanistan, the Euromissile Crisis, the downing of the 
the  Korean Air Lines Flight 007 will be analyzed. Additionally, I will take a look at 
the military-strategic landscape regarding the United States and the Soviet Union, 
as well as at the balance of power in Europe at that time. Following the back-
ground history, the intricacies of Operation Able Archer 83 will be examined. Then, 
I will try to uncover how serious the Soviet war scare was in reality. 
BACKGROUND
Operation Able Archer 83 can be interpreted as a serious event not because of 
how it played out or what the exercise was focused on but rather because of 
the political climate that surrounded it. Therefore, to have a grasp of why the 
Soviets interpreted it in the way they did, we have to take a look at the wors-
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ening US-Soviet relations and what events led to it. In the midst of the Cold 
War, it was in a time that many have thought to be some of the darkest days 
of the rivalry between the two superpowers. The détente, that is the thawing 
of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union characterizing the 
majority of the 1960s and 70s, was seen as faltering. 
After the Cuban Missile Crisis, both sides thought that the confrontational pol-
icy was counterproductive and agreed on two very important treaties, the SALT 
I and the Helsinki Accords. This is in a sharp contrast to what happened in the 
years starting with 1979. What made Operation Able Archer 83 sound so dan-
gerous to the Soviets was actually a confluence of events that led to the severe 
deterioration of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. I have 
found seven overarching developments and two unfortunately timed events that 
could have led the Soviets to a belief that an American attack was imminent.
THE SEVEN OVERARCHING DEVELOPMENTS
The first development that is said to signal the breakdown of détente, hence 
raising the suspicions of both sides in the coming years, was the Soviet inva-
sion of Afghanistan. While the intervention in itself was a surprise to the West, it 
was an accumulation of events that necessitated the foray of the Soviet Union. 
After numerous requests for help by the Socialist oriented government of the 
Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, the Soviet Politburo decided to send troops 
into Afghanistan to shore up the government of its client state. While the gains 
of the mujahideen, the local tribal fighting groups, were reversed, the situation 
went exactly the other way the Soviet leadership imagined.  They were stuck in 
a quagmire with 100,000 heavily armed troops holding territory against lightly 
armed guerrilla fighters.285 This was one of the first occasions when a modern 
major power had to fight an insurgency with a military conceived for conventional 
warfare. The Soviet military machine was caught unprepared in this kind of war-
fare and later, in 1989, it had to withdraw its troops without a lasting solution for 
the South Asian country. The United States had taken its time to respond to the 
unfolding events but covertly it armed the mujahideen from as early as 1979.286
The second factor that further deteriorated American-Soviet relations was 
actually the American reciprocation to the invasion. The official American re-
285 “Milestones: 1977–1980, The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan and the U.S. Response, 
1978–1980”, United States Department of State Office of the Historian, 31 October 
2013, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1977-1980/soviet-invasion-afghanistan
286 “Afghanistan: The Making of US Policy, 1973-1990”, Steve Galster, Volume II: Af-
ghanistan: Lessons from the Last War, The National Security Archive, George Wash-
ington University, 9 October 2011, http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB57/
essay.html
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sponse to the event was twofold. Geostrategically, the US responded with the 
Carter Doctrine which stipulated that the United States would defend the Per-
sian Gulf and use military force against any country which tries to destabilize or 
take control over the energy-rich region. The doctrine was based on American 
fears that the Soviet Union would try to dominate the Persian Gulf, with the 
invasion of Afghanistan only being a prelude.287
The other reaction was more soft power based: the boycott of the Moscow 
Summer Olympics in 1980. For the Soviet Union, the organization of the 1980 
Summer Olympics was a prestige issue since no Eastern European country had 
ever organized a Summer Olympics game before. The United States reasoned 
that the invasion of Afghanistan was against the international norms, therefore it 
would not send any athletes to the Olympic Games. The American public widely 
supported it and the United States also tried to rally other countries around its 
cause and even sent Muhammad Ali to several African nations to gather support. 
Eventually, from the Western bloc countries Canada, West Germany, Norway and 
Israel boycotted the Olympics and even though some Western states in close re-
lations with the US – like the United Kingdom, Spain, Italy and France- attended 
the Olympics, overall there were 65 abstainers.288 The boycotters included some 
Muslim countries which refused to participate due to the invasion of Afghanistan, 
a fellow Muslim nation, but did so not because of the call of the United States, 
rather because the Islamic Conference also decided on a boycott. 289
This diplomatic step really hurt the Soviets’ image and elevated the Afghani-
stan issue to worldwide media level through which many more people were 
familiarized with the events in South Asia. The United States also imposed 
a grain and high-tech embargo on the Soviets, in addition to suspending the 
SALT II ratification in the Congress and increasing the US naval presence in 
the Indian Ocean region.290 None of these measures could sway the Soviet 
Union to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan, and it maintained troops there 
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until 1989. But all of this was just the run-up to a more confrontational period 
between the Soviet Union and the United States. 
The third development has to do with individuals. The political life of the Cold 
War was heavily personalized, therefore a change in détente can also have 
been contributed to personal changes. Two such changes happened. First, in 
1979 Margaret Thatcher was elected Prime Minister in the United Kingdom. 
Her nickname, “Iron Lady”, perfectly described her governing style: strong, 
resolute, and uncompromising. 
But what really changed the political landscape of the 1980s was the elec-
tion of Ronald Reagan in the United States. He ran on an anti-communist and 
confrontational platform and won in a landslide against the then-incumbent 
Jimmy Carter. The people of the United States demanded a stronger president 
in the face of the Iranian hostage crisis and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. 
Reagan had been an actor and definitely not a technocrat, but he had a vision 
nevertheless: to roll back the Soviet Union and with it, global communism. 
This vision was based on the rollback strategy of John Foster Dulles and can 
be deemed quite aggressive in its aims.291 What was later called the Reagan 
Doctrine was actually a strategy captured in the NSC National Security Deci-
sion Directives 75. The Directive articulated: 
“To contain and over time reverse Soviet expansionism by competing effectively 
on a sustained basis with the Soviet Union in all international arenas - particularly 
in the overall military balance and in geographical regions of priority concern to the 
United States. This will remain the primary focus of U.S. policy toward the USSR.”.292
But at the same time, it also stipulated that the United States should en-
gage in negotiations with the Soviet Union and promote internal change in the 
Communist heartland. The strategy outlined that the United States should limit 
Western exposure to Soviet economic policies, better convey Western values 
to combat communism, and most importantly, modernize its conventional and 
nuclear military capabilities.293 Consequently, Reagan envisioned a 600-ship 
Navy in which the construction of the Nimitz-class aircraft carriers, Ticond-
eroga-class cruisers, and Los Angeles-class attack submarines was sped up. 
While strides have been made in this military buildup, the target was never 
reached.294 As an additional measure, the Reagan Doctrine stated that out-
reach must be made to anti-communist proxy forces, like the mujahideen in 
291 “Reagan Doctrine, 1985”, United States Department of State Archive, http://2001-
2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/rd/17741.htm 
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Afghanistan.295 The Reagan Doctrine was the single most important strategic 
feature of that period, one that contributed enormously to the way the Soviets 
later perceived Operation Able Archer 83. Had it not been for this assertive 
rollback strategy, the Soviets would not have necessarily been in a mindset 
anticipating a first-strike from the United States at any given moment. 
One major development through the Reagan presidency – and our fourth “factor - 
that made the Soviet leadership very uneasy was the announcement of the Strategic 
Defense Initiative (SDI), or as known colloquially, the “Star Wars”, in March 1983.296 It 
was a hugely comprehensive project to intercept Soviet intercontinental ballistic mis-
siles (ICBMs) in all phases of their flight: boost, midcourse and terminal. The system 
would have used then-non-existing technologies, like space-based lasers for 
exoatmospheric interception and ground-based interceptors with kill vehicles. 
The whole concept struck apprehension into the hearts and minds of Soviet 
military and political leaders as if built, the system would have broken down 
the pillars of mutually assured destruction (MAD) and opened up the possibility 
of a US first-strike without the fear of retaliation. While the breakdown of MAD 
would have been a disaster in itself for the Soviets (and in hindsight for the 
Americans as well), it also signaled a huge technological discrepancy between 
the two states and forced the Soviet Union to play catch-up. This development 
– while still relatively new at the time of Operation Archer 83- heavily influenced 
the Soviet calculus, since they weren’t sure what capabilities the United States 
already possessed from the SDI.297
The fifth development, and one of the most important ones, was the so-
called Euromissile Crisis. It was a period of tit-for-tat missile deployment in 
Europe that lasted from 1979 up until the signing of the Intermediate-Range 
Nuclear Forces Treaty in 1987. The Soviet Union began the deployment of 
SS-20, a road-mobile theater ballistic missile with multiple independently targ-
etable warheads (MIRVs). While the missile in itself was not a huge qualitative 
jump over the previously deployed SS-4s and SS-5s, the transporter-erector-
launcher (TEL) made it road-mobile whereas the previous ones had fixed posi-
tion launchers.298 In 1979, 130 SS-20s were deployed and aimed at Western 
Europe.299 NATO was forced to counter this by the so-called double-track deci-
295 Stephen S. Rosenfeld, “The Reagan Doctrine: The Guns of July”, Foreign Affairs, 
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sion. This constituted the future deployment of American Pershing II missiles 
and, at the same time, further calls for mutual arms control after the successful 
SALT I treaty.300 The Pershing II missiles did not have the range of their Soviet 
counterparts but they had one-tenth the circular error probability (CEP) of the 
SS-20s, making them ideal to strike hardened military targets.301 The planned 
deployment of these missiles in Europe raised the specter of a potential clash 
between the superpowers but not because of their strategic value rather be-
cause of the message they conveyed: détente is over. In this sense, the Eu-
romissile Crisis can be likened to the Cuban Missile Crisis. Neither did change 
the military calculus by much but it forced the parties to enter brinkmanship. 
The sixth strategic development was President Reagan’s call to initiate psy-
chological warfare operations (PSYOPs) against the USSR. These were op-
erations specifically designed to make the Soviets feel uneasy and to expose 
holes in their early warning systems. For this reason, the United States con-
ducted naval and air operations around the clock which were meant to gather 
intelligence about Soviet radar sites, early warning intelligence operations, 
troop movements and placements, but most importantly they were performed 
to strike a sense of uncertainty into the minds of the Soviets. Starting in 1981, 
US bombers conducted surprise operations directly towards the Soviets bor-
der, then veered off course, and US attack submarines practiced attacks on 
Soviet ballistic missile submarines under the North Pole, all of this irregularly 
and without any observable patterns.
Additionally, US intelligence ships snooping for data and aircraft carriers 
practicing naval air operations were stationed near the Soviet coasts.302 The 
most flagrant PSYOP was when the USS Eisenhower and 82 other vessels 
were able to traverse through the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (GIUK) 
gap completely undetected by the Soviets, only to perform attacking run 
maneuvers on refueling Soviet aircrafts.303 On the other side of the Soviet land-
mass, the US conducted the FLEETEX 83 naval exercise in the Pacific which is 
described by some as one of the most powerful gathering of naval armada in 
history. It happened few weeks after Reagan’s televised speech of the SDI and 
included 3 carrier battle groups with thousands of sailors.  The exercise was 
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aimed at antisubmarine and antiaircraft warfare, and the participating aircrafts 
deliberately forced the Soviets to turn on their search radars to have a fix on 
their positions.304 While the exercise was not unusual and uncommon in and of 
itself, the Soviets clearly could have thought that after devising a plan to coun-
ter Soviet strategic nuclear forces, the Americans were exercising the denial 
of Soviet conventional forces, in particular their air and submarine capabilities. 
Eventually, these PSYOPs borne fruit: gaping vulnerabilities were exposed in 
the naval surveillance and early warning radar systems of the USSR. 
Consequently, the Soviet Union, fearing a likely first-strike from the US, initi-
ated Operation RYaN, an unprecedented intelligence gathering operation about 
a potential surprise US attack, which is our last, seventh, development. It is de-
bated whether this was a reaction to the American PSYOPs or to the worsen-
ing strategic-political situation. Some in the White House saw a clear correlation 
between the Operation RYaN and the American PSYOPs but the US Intelligence 
Community challenged that view by citing the “absence of forcewide combat 
readiness and other war preparations in the USSR” which essentially meant that 
the Soviet Union was not actively preparing for war at the time of the inception 
of Operation RYaN.305 Operation RYAN was an intelligence gathering operation 
never seen before on this scale. It was announced by Yuri Andropov – the then – 
KGB chief – and Leonid Brezhnev – in 1981 naming the deterioration of relations 
between the two superpowers and US war preparations as a reason for it. Essen-
tially it was an intelligence alert that required each rezidentura and intelligence 
agency to swoop up as much intelligence as possible on US/NATO political and 
strategic developments, as well as on the nuclear balance and early warning of a 
surprise American first-strike.306 
While the massive intelligence collection operation was frightening in itself, 
a much more precarious – and lesser-known – supplement to Operation RYaN 
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was the development of a RYaN computer model. Starting in the 1970s, it was 
an intelligence data analysis model – a sort of precursor to today’s big data 
algorithms - that weighted around 40000 data points regarding the military, 
political and economic situation of the USSR vis-à-vis the United States.307 
The model was based on the World War II logic that if the correlation of forces 
was heavily skewed towards the United States then they would attempt a first-
strike against the Soviet Union. 
The system had to be constantly updated with new data, and the leaders of 
the project demanded huge intelligence data inflows so that the RYaN model can 
present them with an accurate picture. This picture was in the form of a score which 
was a percentage of Soviet strength compared to that of the US. If the score was 
above 70 (or even above 60, according to some officials), the Soviet Union was 
roughly on par with the United States and was considered safe from a first-strike. 
As the international situation got more precarious, the score began to diminish, and 
subsequently, the intelligence officers demanded more and more precise data. This 
only made things worse and by 1983 the score may have dipped below 45 – this would 
have meant that the Soviet Union is open to a surprise attack and has serious strate-
gic deficiencies when compared to the US.308 The watchers of the RYaN com-
puter model have actually discovered the Operation Able Archer 83 exercise 
and fed the information into the system.309 The accuracy of the model is heavily 
debated and is considered imprecise but this did not stop the Soviet leadership to 
shudder in fear as they were weekly fed with information by the program.  
The concoction of these overlapping strategic developments made this pe-
riod particularly dangerous and with the militaries on a hair trigger, the two su-
perpowers were often dead reckoning the unfolding situation. These strategic 
factors were accompanied by two unfortunately timed events. 
TWO UNFORTUNATELY TIMED EVENTS
On September 1, 1983, a Soviet Su-15 shot down the Korean Airlines Flight 007 
with 269 passengers on board. The plane had entered Soviet Airspace twice over 
the Kamchatka Peninsula in the Northern Pacific region but was shot down in inter-
national airspace. The move sparked huge international backlash with the United 
States trying to rally likeminded nations against the Soviet Union to impose com-
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mercial boycotts and the denial of landing rights of Soviet commercial planes. The 
Soviet leadership was adamant in its position that the plane was spying as part of 
a Japanese-American reconnaissance mission. After the FLEETEX 83 exercise, the 
Soviet air defenses of the region were put on alert, therefore, any overflight over So-
viet territory could have been perilous.310 This event further exacerbated the tensions 
between the two rivals and provided the rationale for both sides to criticize the other. 
The other event can be described as an exceptionally close shave. On September 
26, 1983, the newly developed Soviet early warning satellite, called Oko, provided a 
false alarm about an American ICBM launch. Around this time period, the precursor 
exercises to Operation Able Archer 83, the Atlantic Forge and Reforger were still 
ongoing. The early warning satellite reported five Minuteman II ICBM launches from 
the US homeland which it saw due to their infrared signatures.  The officer in charge, 
Lieutenant Colonel Stanislav Petrov was flabbergasted by the event but he knew 
that during a possible American first-strike the missiles would fly in droves towards 
the Soviet Motherland. As the ground-based early warning radars could not have a 
trace on any missiles, Lt. Colonel Petrov decided to act against all odds and called 
it a false alarm. Later it turned out that he probably saved the world because of his 
gut instinct.  The alleged heat signatures were actually reflections of sunlight from 
high-altitude clouds.311 An investigation into the Oko system found numerous flaws 
which were not exactly surprising since not even Lt. Colonel Petrov trusted the just 
1-year-old system.312 However, the Soviet military leaders were apprehensive be-
cause their satellite-based early warning system was not functioning properly and 
the ground-based radars could only detect ICBMs after they passed the horizon, 
thus limiting the time available for deliberating a counterstrike.313 
THE STRATEGIC-MILITARY BALANCE
On top of all of that, the Soviet leaders faced another fear. The RYaN computer 
model’s score dropped sharply in 1983 for a reason: the USSR was falling behind in 
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economic terms and the military-strategic balance was tipping towards the United 
States. Economically, the Soviet Union became stuck in a period of stagnation in 
which between 1981 and 1985 its GDP expanded only at an annualized 1,9 percent, 
while that of the United States grew by 3,4 percent in the same time period.314 315 In 
the 1980s, the oil prices also sank to their one-third which affected the USSR heavily 
due to the substantial role of oil in their economy.316 Their agricultural sector was also 
in shambles but it did not deter the Soviet Union to spend 20 percent of their GDP on 
military expenditures.317 318 Militarily, while the USSR managed to catch up to the US 
military in rough power in the 1970s, now there was an increasing gap between the 
two in technological sophistication. Both the air and naval legs of the Soviet nuclear 
triad were vulnerable. The elaborate Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS) built by the 
United States in the GIUK gap and parts of the Pacific was monitoring the movement 
of Soviet submarines, while the US Navy managed to discover the so-called “Yankee 
Patrol Boxes” near the coasts of the United States where the Soviet nuclear ballistic 
missile submarines would have likely launched their attacks.319 
The airborne forces of the Soviet Union were also in a questionable state of 
readiness, and the deployment of Tomahawk nuclear-tipped cruise missiles and 
the Pershing IIs complicated their woes even further as they would have been able 
to strike Soviet airfields in a matter of minutes. It was also assessed that the So-
viet leadership would have had 3 minutes of warning while the Pershing II would 
be able to strike in 6 minutes, potentially making a decapitation strike feasible.320 
As I alluded to it earlier, the Soviet Union had a really crude early warning 
system in the late 1970 and early 1980s. While developments were ongoing, 
it was still considered only partially reliable, something a military leader does 
not want to hear when it comes to nuclear issues. The USSR also lacked a 
“nuclear football”, a mobile nuclear control center in the form of  a briefcase 
from which a nuclear strike could be authorized.
314 “GDP growth (annual %)”, World Bank, 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?page=6
315 Leon Aron, “Everything You Think You Know About the Collapse of the Soviet Un-
ion Is Wrong”, Foreign Policy, 20 June 2011, http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/06/20/
everything-you-think-you-know-about-the-collapse-of-the-soviet-union-is-wrong/
316 Ibid.
317 Thayer Watkins, “The Economic Collapse of the Soviet Union”, San José State University 
Department of Economics, http://www.sjsu.edu/faculty/watkins/sovietcollapse.htm
318 Harry Kazianis, “One Thing China and the USSR DON’T Have in Common”, 26 
March 2013, http://thediplomat.com/2013/03/one-thing-china-and-the-ussr-dont-
have-in-common/
319 Sean Gallagher, WarGames for real: How one 1983 exercise nearly triggered 
WWIII.  Ars Technica, 25, 11, 2015. https://arstechnica.com/information-technolo-
gy/2015/11/wargames-for-real-how-one-1983-exercise-nearly-triggered-wwiii/
320 Benjamin Fischer.  The Soviet–American War Scare of the 1980s.  International Jour-
nal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 2006, 19:3, 480-518.
 INGREDIENTS TO THE 1983 WAR SCARE: DID OPERATION ABLE ARCHER 83...  105
The Soviets were also seemingly unable to keep up with the United States in 
space. A prime example of this technological discrepancy was the Columbia 
Space Shuttle which, at least in the view of the USSR, would theoretically be 
able to lob ordnance at the Soviet Union from the space. The blend of these 
seven overarching developments, the strategic inferiority of the USSR and two 
unfortunately timed events caused a sort of paranoia in the Politburo, thinking 
they were strategically insecure to an American surprise attack. 
OPERATION ABLE ARCHER 83
This was the time when a seemingly routine military exercise, Operation Able 
Archer 83, happened. There is a clash between opinions about this exercise, 
as many are saying that this was the peak of the 1983 war scare and a nuclear 
faceoff was imminent between the superpowers. Before assessing the cred-
ibility of the claims here is a short description of the exercise. Operation Able 
Archer 83 in itself was not unusual. It was an annual ten-day command post 
exercise in which NATO assessed their command, control and communica-
tions (C3) capabilities in the event of a nuclear war. It was the culmination of 
a months-long exercise series which also included the Autumn Forge and the 
Reforger 83, in which tens of thousands of NATO troops were moved through-
out Europe. In the Reforger 83,  19000 US troops were transported over the 
Atlantic in complete emission control (EMCON).321 The Operation Able Archer 
83, a nuclear release exercise, was part of the exercise series which, according 
the newly declassified papers, went like the following: 
“The war game describes a confrontation between Blue (NATO) and Orange 
(a thinly-disguised Warsaw Pact led by the USSR) beginning after a change in 
Orange leadership leads to resentment and pushback of Blue gains in the Per-
sian Gulf. Orange retaliates in the form of an invasion of Yugoslavia, Finland, 
and eventually Norway. Blue defends its allies and conventional war descends 
into chemical, and eventually nuclear war. After Orange gains further advanc-
es, ‘SACEUR requested initial first use of nuclear weapons against fixed tar-
gets in Orange satellite countries.’ However, ‘Blue’s use of nuclear weapons 
did not stop Orange’s aggression.’ Then, ‘a follow-on use of nuclear weapons 
was executed on the morning of 11 November.’’322
While this sounds like a regular wargame, it also included some non-routine 
elements, like ‘the shifting of commands from “Permanent War Headquarters 
to the Alternate War Headquarters,’ the practice of ‘new nuclear weapons re-
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lease procedures,’ including consultations with cells in Washington and Lon-
don, and the ‘sensitive, political issue’ of numerous ‘slips of the tongue’ in 
which B-52 sorties were referred to as nuclear “strikes.’’.323 
It is also important to highlight that the exercise was reduced in its scale 
because originally it would have included political figures as well, like the Sec-
retary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Supreme Commander of NATO, 
the Vice-President and President Ronald Reagan himself in addition to some 
high-level political attendees from various NATO states. 
This reduction is reportedly attributed to the US National Security Advisor Robert 
McFarlane because it would have made the exercise too high-profile.324 During the 
exercise, NATO simulated an elevation up until DEFCON 1 which would have 
meant that a nuclear war is imminent. In response to this exercise, the Soviets 
were reportedly placing their forces on high alert: they were loading bombers 
in East Germany and Poland with nuclear weapons, 70 SS-20 missiles were 
readied in Eastern Europe, ballistic missile submarines were dispersed under 
the Arctic and the intelligence operations were expanded even more.325 But, 
from the perspective of Soviets, the exercise ended somewhat abruptly on 
November 11 after reaching DEFCON 1. Then the forces on both sides were 
winding down and the chance of war dropped considerably. According to a 
former CIA officer if the exercise had continued even for 24 hours “the West 
might have unwittingly stumbled into a nuclear holocaust”.326
ASSESSMENT OF THE SOVIET WAR SCARE
But even if the Soviets were indeed alarming their forces for a possible nuclear 
exchange, some in Soviet perches say that they did not even know about the 
Able Archer 83. They did know, however, about the precursors to it, the Autumn 
Forge and Reforger, and deemed them the most dangerous military exercises.327 
But it would have been very unusual if the Soviets did not know about any NATO 
exercise since it was one of the general tenets of the Soviet doctrines to keep a 
close eye on the adversaries’ military exercises. According to the Soviets, these 
exercises were explicitly designed to habituate one’s armed forces to them so 
they would instill a “false sense of security” which one could later take advan-
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tage of and launch a nuclear strike during an exercise.328 While the Soviet lead-
ership was most probably frightened because of the military exercises, the US 
Intelligence Community and NATO were not aware or did not want to make oth-
ers aware of the gravity of the exercise in Soviet eyes at that time. An American 
intelligence assessment, the 1984 Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE), 
concluded that while in their view there was a general paranoia and war scare in 
their perks, the Soviets did not anticipate an imminent attack on their homeland. 
Additionally, the CIA also stated that the Soviets’ reactions to the exercise 
were not the result of the exercise series itself but rather they were using the 
war scare as propaganda: the Soviet regime could not manage to improve 
living standards significantly, therefore they wanted to divert the attention by 
scaremongering.329 The agitprop did work because there was an evident fear in 
the Soviet population after the shootdown of the Korean Airlines 007 flight.330 
On an added note, I also have to mention that it was true of the American 
population as well.331 No wonder that at this time came out the famous movie 
about the aftermath of a nuclear war, The Day After. Even President Reagan 
was stunned when he saw it.332
While the American intelligence services downplayed the risk of confronta-
tion, President Reagan was questioning whether the exercises could be inter-
preted wrongly by the Soviets. He even asked the later famous question from 
the US ambassador to the Soviet Union: “Do you think Soviet leaders really fear 
us, or is all the huffing and puffing just part of their propaganda?”.333 After the 
war scare subsided and an early assessment was forwarded to the President, 
he was genuinely frightened by the prospect that the exercise nearly caused a 
nuclear war. The change in his confrontational foreign policy later in the mid-
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1980s can partly be attributed to this revelation.334 In addition to the American 
President, the British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher was also stunned when 
she learned that the Soviets could misinterpret Operation Able Archer 83 and 
asked what measures could be taken to defuse the tension.335
In 1990, the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) pub-
lished a report which stated that the Soviet fears were not unfounded and the 
USSR was genuinely expecting a nuclear first-strike by the US.  It states that 
some of the Soviet military forces were “preparing to preempt or counterattack 
a NATO strike launched under cover of [sic] Able Archer”. 
The PFIAB report cites the deterioration of relations and the tilting balance of 
power in military-strategic terms as a reason for that. This very same report also 
concludes that the CIA’s 1984 SNIE report of the war scare underestimated the 
risks at the time of the exercise. Now, newly declassified documents show that 
the war scare was indeed understated by the SNIE report and it was “sanitized” 
before handing it over to other NATO members.336 But even in the wake of 
these assessments, some are questioning the severity of the situation by say-
ing that both the NATO and the USSR knew about each other’s war plans and 
could distinguish between a military exercise or actual preparations for a war.337 
While, based on this information, it does seem that the war scare was indeed 
real in the Soviet leadership and they really did take some measures to prepare 
for an imminent American first-strike, the US leadership, however, could not 
grasp the whole gravity because of two reasons. 
First, the top leadership was not provided with adequate information at the time 
of the exercise – only a year later – and second, the US intelligence services did not 
really think the Soviets were anticipating a surprise attack from the NATO/US side 
based on the assessment that they felt strategically secure. Now we know that was 
not the case and the Soviets felt that they were falling behind the United States both 
in economic and military terms. To answer the subtitle: no, it was not just Opera-
tion Able Archer 83 that brought us close to World War III. It was a combination of 
factors that made the USSR feel that an American attack might have been in the 
cards: the whole exercise series that year, that is the Autumn Forge, the Reforger 
and Operation Able Archer 83 itself with the nuclear release test and the encrypted 
communications; the worsening strategic outlook of the Soviet Union; and the pre-
cipitous deterioration of US-Soviet relations due to the events unfolding from 1979.
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There is a dispute about whether Operation Able Archer 83 itself could have 
been a catalyst for a nuclear exchange. In my opinion, Operation RyaN is the 
most responsible for the war scare. It made the USSR realize that the United 
States would have left them behind in the long-run, which made them feel 
anxious.The exercise series would have been fairly routine if it had not been 
for the damaged relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States. 
It was such a tense period because the Soviets could have thought that the 
strategic situation and the exercises themselves would have been a good ruse 
for a surprise attack. But I would raise the question: why would the US carry out 
a first-strike if they had better long-term prospects and knew that they could 
not escape a nuclear war unscathed? It would have been a really short-sighted 
way of thinking from the part of the US to use the wargames as a cover for what 
would most likely have been the destruction of the Soviet Union but with US/
NATO losses also in the millions. 
As a counterpoint one could say that, if a perceived weakness was seen in an 
adversary, it opens up the possibility for a decapitation strike. In such a situa-
tion, however, the initiator has to bear the consequences of the war and in this 
case, in my opinion, it was not worth it for the United States. 
CONCLUSION
On balance, I still have to make a disclaimer that the evidence is inconclu-
sive about the Soviet preparations for immediate nuclear war. While there are 
certain second-hand experiences in my work, these cannot be called purely 
unbiased, and the lack of true first-hand evidence (e.g.  transcripts of Politburo 
meetings in the time period of the exercises) does not make it possible to pro-
vide a real answer to this question. There are documents that assume that the 
USSR had every right to fear an imminent attack but there are others which 
challenge it by saying that the Soviets knew that this was just an exercise but 
they did take some steps to alert their troops nevertheless. 
The sheer range of different opinions on this issue keeps me from providing 
one answer to the question whether the Soviets were fearing and preparing for 
an immediate US first-strike. Therefore, the conclusion of the research paper will 
be based on my opinion on the 1983 Soviet war scare regardless of any first or 
second-hand account, and solely based on my assessment of the events leading 
up to it, as well as on the strategic-military balance between the superpowers. 
Based on this, I conclude this research paper by saying that in my view 1) the 
Soviet Union was aware of their worsening strategic balance and outlook 2) in its 
political, military and intelligence leadership there was a permeating war scare 3) 
they knew that Operation Able Archer 83 and its precursors were just exercises 4) 
but nonetheless they did anticipate an American first-strike under the guise of the 
exercises 5) there is, however, no conclusive evidence that the Soviet leadership 
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was actively preparing for a preemptive or counterstrike. Maybe if a few more 
documents will be declassified both on the American and Russian side, we can 
strengthen this conclusion or even arrive at a completely different one.
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PACIFISM AND REALITY: ARTICLE 9 OF THE 
JAPANESE CONSTITUTION
SZABÓ LEVENTE G.
INTRODUCTION
With Japan’s role rapidly changing in the 21st century, I think it is important to 
know the peculiarities of their constitution, and how it is affecting regional and 
global politics. But to understand their constitution we must understand under 
what circumstances it was written. 
My goal is to summarize the history of the constitution from the Meiji period 
(1868 – 1912) to the end of the Second World War, (1939 – 1945) with a partic-
ular focus on article 9: renouncing the right to declare war and prohibiting the 
establishment of an army. Furthermore, to see how this limitation on the army 
was slowly but surely circumvented over the years of the Cold War. Finally, 
how the constitution is moving inevitably towards complete abandonment. My 
paper will focus on the military aspects of the Japanese disarmament and the 
legality of certain weapons. 
HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION
The first Japanese constitution was the Meiji constitution enacted in 1890. 
It was based on the Prussian/German and British model because the United 
States’ was deemed too liberal and the French and Spanish were deemed too 
despotic. The constitution gave considerable power to the Emperor; however, 
in theory, the Prime minister was the actual leader of the government. In the 
context of my paper, the most important point of the constitution was Article 
11. It states that the supreme leader of the army and navy is the Emperor.  “The 
army and navy obey only the Emperor, and do not have to obey the cabinet 
and diet” (M. B. Jansen 1986).  During the waning days of World War II after 
the German surrender, the Allies met in Potsdam to discuss Japan. Truman, 
Churchill, and Chiang Kai-shek outlined the Japanese terms of surrender. They 
included the complete disarmament of all Japanese forces and a more liberal 
government. After the US dropped two atomic bombs and the Soviets invaded 
Manchuria with 1.5 million soldiers the Japanese were shocked sufficiently to 
surrender on August 15. The Allies occupied Japan, led by the Supreme Com-
mander of the Allies Forces Douglas MacArthur. He was adamant that a new 
constitution should be made with the Japanese and not forced upon them. 
The Japanese, however, were reluctant to rewrite the original Meiji constitution 
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so they just made minor adjustments. MacArthur rejected this and ordered his 
staff to write a new one from scratch. Even though the authors were not Japa-
nese they took the old constitution into account and also took the advice of 
Minister Shidehara to add an article to prevent Japan from declaring war. The 
new constitution was completed in less than a week on 13 February 1946. It 
was enacted on 3 May 1947 as a continuation of the previous constitution, not 
as a new one. The article that prevents Japan from rearming reads as follows:
Article 9. (1) Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, 
the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the 
threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.
(2) In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air 
forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency 
of the state will not be recognized.338
In effect, this article prevented Japan from raising an army, however, glo-
bal politics steered things in a different direction quite early on. 1950 saw the 
beginning of the Korean War and some of the occupying forces were rede-
ployed to Korea. This left Japan defenseless and without armed protection, 
so MacArthur ordered the creation of the National Police Reserve to maintain 
order. This is where things get complicated and controversial.
FROM THE NATIONAL POLICE RESERVE TO  
THE JAPAN SELF-DEFENSE FORCES
It started out as a force of 75,000 men armed with light infantry equipment. 
Their main job was to maintain order in post-war Japan instead of the Allied 
troops. The agreement with the US was that the NPR would tackle minor in-
ternal issues, while the US would defend Japan from external dangers. There 
was some debate whether to allow a partial remilitarization of Japan, however, 
these ideas were dismissed by MacArthur. The police reserve was structured 
as an army, so even from the beginning there were some contradictions, how-
ever, MacArthur insisted that the conflict in the neighboring country would 
resonate throughout the world so a strong police force was necessary. 
The NPR was officially formed on July 8. In November, 300,000 Chinese “volun-
teers” joined the conflict. MacArthur saw the defeat in Korea so he decided that 
the Japanese “police” would need something stronger than small arms to defeat 
the T34s. The heavy equipment ordered for Japan included more than 300 M26 
Pershing tanks. To avoid breaking the newly formed constitution they gave all 
military equipment civilian names, so tanks became special purpose vehicles etc. 
It was pretty hard to explain why a police force needed tanks (even if they were 
338 English translation from Ottawa Internet eXchange
 PACIFISM AND REALITY: ARTICLE 9 OF THE JAPANESE CONSTITUTION  115
not named tanks) so the police force was transformed into a defense force with the 
primary goal of defending Japan from a perceived invasion. As the reserve grew 
and more equipment was arriving, the need for experienced officers also grew. The 
need for heavy equipment was dire because of the heavy motorization of commu-
nist forces. There was considerable debate whether former military officers could 
be reinstated into the police force but despite some opposition, the need for a well 
trained force was greater. By the end of 1951 20% of the officers were former mili-
tary officials. As the threat grew later even colonel-level officers were reinstated.
By 1952 the size of the NPR was more than 110,000 and was renamed Nation-
al Safety Forces. The Coastal Safety Force was created as a separate branch 
of the ‘military’, as the coastguard units had  previously been within the NPR. 
In 1954 The NSF and CSF were joined under the name Japan Self-Defense 
Forces (JSDF). The ground forces became: Japan Ground Self-Defense Force 
(JGSDF), the navy became: Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) and 
the air force became: Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF). The 1954 Self-
Defense Forces Act reformed them.339 We can see that even from the beginning 
the lightly armed police force quickly became the last line of defense against 
perceived communist forces. This meant the armament and expansion of the 
reserve. Both required the expertise of former military officers, which joined the 
police and, because of the heavy weapons, the militarization also began.
ARE THE JAPAN SELF-DEFENSE FORCES (JSDF) AN ARMY?
What constitutes an army? The main goal of an army is the defense of the state 
and its citizens. Since Japan cannot have an army, the police force had to 
defend the Islands. The other definition of an army is about waging war. Since 
Japan cannot declare war it is impossible for the army to conduct it. However, 
because others can declare war on Japan, again, the emphasis is on defense. 
I will try to analyze certain aspects of the JSDF like funding, equipment, and 
personnel to determine whether it’s an army or not. 
Today the JSDF has an active personnel count of 247000 and a reserve of 56000 
the budget is fixed at only 1% of the GDP, however, the government circumvents 
this by assigning certain equipment and tasks the JSDF has and does as civilian, 
thus financing it outside of the 1% limitation. The $41 billion budget however still 
makes Japan the world’s 7th largest military spender (although we can see they ac-
tually spend more) but considering the 1% limitation, it is the 17th in the world. 
The Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force is the naval branch of the police 
force; it has a fleet of 154 ships and 346 aircraft. It is widely regarded as one 
of the world’s best anti-submarine and minesweeper fleets, however recently 
339 Frank Kowalski, An Inoffensive Rearmament: The Making of the Postwar Japanese 
Army, Naval Institute Press, 2014, p.72.
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they started to focus on antimissile warfare, (Aegis system) adapting it in 2003. 
As the threat of nuclear submarines, that dominated the Cold War, lessened, 
the threats from North Korea and China grew and Japan had to adapt to them. 
Also in 2003, a new line of ships was developed. Since the constitution pre-
vents Japan from having offensive weaponry they cannot have aircraft carriers, 
because it is the archetype offensive tool. However, they developed a “heli-
copter destroyer” class ship, the Hyūga. It has a full flight deck and is similar 
in every aspect to a traditional carrier, but it is classified on Lloyd’s Register as 
a helicopter carrier. In 2013, they launched an every larger similar “destroyer”, 
the Izumo.340 This ship has a fighter compliment of 24 jets. Which is arguably a 
lot smaller than the USS George H. W. Bush’s complement of 90 jets, however, 
it is still enough to level most countries leadership in minutes. 
The Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force is the land-based branch of the 
JSDF. The approximate size of the ground forces is 150000 active personnel 
and 30000 reserve. The ground forces are the largest component considering 
size,they have about 600 tanks and 4000 other armored vehicles.341 During the 
Cold War, the primary strategic mission of the JGSDF was to hold off a pos-
sible Soviet invasion of Hokkaido which, in recent times, changed to counter 
Chinese threats with a huge emphasis on the areas that are disputed between 
the two countries.342
In my opinion, the JSDF is an army in every way short of actually being 
named as such. While it might not have the numbers to contend with neighbor-
ing countries’ armies it is definitely an army. The organizational structure, the 
equipment, the doctrines all point toward it being an army.  
However, at this point we must also consider how Japanese people see the 
JSDF. In a 1988 survey over 74% of the people were favorably impressed by the 
JSDF and 76% of the people saw disaster relief as its primary role. While people 
are aware that the JSDF’s main task is national security they see them as the pri-
mary disaster relief, with over 3,100 operations between 1984 and 1988 (2.1 op-
erations every day); we can see why the majority of the population supports it.343
THE USAGE OF THE JAPAN SELF-DEFENSE FORCES
The primary role of the Self-Defense Force is the defense of the Japan, which 
can be interpreted in a variety of ways. 
1. First, the physical defense of the island itself, fighting anyone who wants 
to invade Japan. 
340 “Japanese Aircraft Carrier”. Global Security. 3 August 2012. Retrieved on 5 May 
2016.
341 IISS Military Balance 2008, Routledge, London, 2008, p. 384
342 Senkaku Islands (between Taiwan and the Ryukyu Islands)
343 Ronald Dolan and Robert Worden (1992). “8”. Japan: A Country Study
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2. Secondly, it can be argued that the growing force of neighboring coun-
tries poses a threat to Japan and they need to defend themselves from 
any aggression.
3. Thirdly, the imminent threat as described in international law can be used as 
a preemptive self-defense against a country posing an instant overwhelming 
threat leaving no choice of means and no moment for deliberation. 
4. Lastly, Japan’s interest in the world must be defended which in itself 
creates 2 versions. The first one being Japanese citizens anywhere in 
the world, the second one being Japan’s allies. The rhetoric behind the 
latter is that if Japan’s allies are attacked it would weaken Japan, so it 
is self-defense.
We can see that it is up to the government to interpret the law. It started out as 
1st then quickly turned into the 2nd and now with Shinzo Abe veering the country 
into a more active foreign policy, it is moving into the 4th category. The 3rd cat-
egory is obviously off limits to Japan because there is no legal way to declare war. 
As I described it before the usage of offensive weapons are strictly forbidden. 
These weapons include ICBMs, nuclear weapons, aircraft carriers and/or bomber 
fleets. I will now describe the current situation of each of these weapons in Japan. 
1. ICBM: Inter Continental Ballistic Missiles are forbidden, however, Japan 
has a very developed and active commercial space program. If the solid 
fuel rockets were converted to ballistic missiles they would be compa-
rable to the LGM-118A Peacekeeper ICBMs used by the USA
2. Nuclear Weapons: For obvious reasons Japan has renounced any in-
tention of developing nuclear weapons in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty and the Three Non-Nuclear Principles, however, experts say 
that Japan has the resources, technology, raw materials and capital to 
produce nuclear weapons in one year if necessary and many analysts 
consider Japan a de facto nuclear state. In 2012 Japan had enough plu-
tonium to produce 1000 warheads and additional plutonium in Europe 
for a further 4000. The previous point also explains that they could have 
the necessary delivery system.344
3. Carriers: I have already explained the ambiguousness of the “helicopter 
destroyers” and in my opinion, they should be considered carriers.
4. Bomber Fleets: The Air Self-Defense Force has an aircraft complement 
of 777 aircrafts, but they don’t have a designated bomber fleet. Com-
pared to the 800 aircraft of Sout Korea, 940 of North Korea and the 
3100 + aircraft of China, perhaps this is the only point of the offensive 
weapons ban that is, without a doubt, observed.
344 “Ships prepare to return 331-kg plutonium stash from Japan to U S”, The Japan 
Times. 6 March 2016. Retrieved 04 May 2016.
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Another argument for the possibility of rearmament is the phrase “war po-
tential”. Proponents of Japanese armament argue that since some neighbors 
of Japan, specifically China, has a significantly larger army in every sense, a 
major increase of Japans forces wouldn’t necessarily mean war potential be-
cause it is merely defending itself from a much larger force. This is, of course, 
pure rhetoric, however, one cannot ignore it. We can see that almost anything 
short of changing the constitution has been done to create an army. 
ARGUMENTS SURROUNDING THE CONSTITUTION PACIFISM
After the war Japan was disillusioned and humiliated, the imperial and nationalistic 
tendencies were abandoned. The new government wanted to prevent another 
disaster and adopted pacifism to prevent the country from going to war again. The 
idea of pacifism since then has become a major part of the culture and the popula-
tion widely supports pacifists and there is a considerable backlash against every 
law that would suggest a more warlike state, even though that is prohibited still. 
Some argue that the JSDF itself is a violation of the pacifist clause of the constitu-
tion. The recent bill introduced in 2014 which I will discuss later, was opposed by 
54% of the population, while only 29% supported it. This brings up the question 
whether the population truly supports pacifism or just opposes the bill since Japan 
has an already well-developed army. 
IRRELEVANCE 
We can see that the government is using every loophole it can find to expand 
the power of the army. Finding alternative ways to finance the army to com-
pensate for the 1% GDP limit, classifying carriers as “helicopter destroyers” 
and attacking the very words of the constitution are just a few examples. In-
ternational politics force countries to abandon values they might hold dear. 
We just have to think about the USA PATRIOT Act and we can clearly see 
that abandoning certain points in the constitution is hard but bending the law 
is much easier. Considering the general population’s deep-seated love and 
belief in pacifism we can see that Japan, most likely, will not abandon clause 
9, however, it will pass a series of laws that will inevitably damage the spirit of 
the clause itself.
REINTERPRETATION
In July 2014 Prime Minister Shinzo Abe decided to re-interpret article 9 to 
allow the right of “Collective Self-Defense”. This means that the JSDF would 
be able to come to the aid and defend allies in trouble, as opposed to the 
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use of strict self-defense. This was supported by the USA but South Korea 
and China both condemned it saying: “Japan should stay pacifist and avoid 
going down this dark path”. The prime minister said that this would not mean 
that Japan would be involved in any land war, but would act as a deterrent. 
Japan would be able to help the US or other allies directly (protecting ship-
ping, convoys, bases) but still without deploying troops. This reinterpretation 
uses the broadest meaning of self-defense arguing that if an ally is attacked 
Japan itself would weaken. 
CONCLUSION
We can see that a country may adopt ideals that are noble and just but the 
harsh reality of the world is that such ideas must be defended. When the idea 
of pacifism must be defended with force we inevitably get into the quagmire 
violating said pacifism. The leaders of a country must defend it from actual 
or perceived threats, the population may believe in peaceful coexistence but 
again, the reality is different. Japan was diplomatically isolated from neighbor-
ing countries since II World War; but this tendency has changed. However, we 
can see also that the threat of North Korea is looming over the whole region 
and it can explode like a powder keg.
In my opinion, it is important to understand that while voting to abandon 
article 9 and “remilitarizing” Japan will definitely change the East-Asian bal-
ance of power somewhat, we also have to understand that not being able to 
use diplomatic means that all neighboring countries can, is a severe hindrance 
for Japan. While we can argue about whether Japan has an army or not, we 
can certainly say that the abandonment of one is the special circumstance, not 
the reestablishment. If Japan chooses to create an official army again then it 
will only return to a normal state, where a country can have one, and not to a 
state of extreme militarism. The neighbors perceive that they have a strategic 
advantage over Japan, even if there is a de facto army, they can out-produce 
it anytime. If Japan increases its military spending then Korea and China will 
have to do the same even if they want to avoid it.
We can consider that Article 9 at this point is a hindrance for Japan. This 
country has already a well-developed army, global presence, and diplomatic 
weight to influence global politics. While it can be seen as a rearmament proc-
ess, we interpret it just as a technicality, especially because of the already ex-
isting navy and army. Although it is certain that the U.S. supports Japan, it will 
definitely try to convince Japan to keep its pacifist policy. In the long run, we 
can hypothesize that the restriction could be abandoned; however, its effects 
are unpredictable, especially having North Korea as a neighbor.
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THE SECOND BERLIN CRISIS:  
THE IMPORTANCE OF INTERNAL DYNAMICS IN 
THE EASTERN BLOC
dIeGO BenedettI
INTRODUCTION
The second Berlin crisis began in November 1958 and culminated with the erec-
tion of the Berlin Wall in August 1961. It was one of the most delicate situations 
of the Cold War, one in which the Cold War could have become an actual war.
When trying to interpret the crisis, historiography mainly focused on the de-
velopment of relations between the two blocs. Recently, however, it has been 
noted that, in order to fully understand the significance of the crisis, we have 
to focus on relations within the Eastern bloc. The aim of this work is, first of 
all, to investigate the main facts in the “traditional” way of conflict analysis be-
tween the two antagonist blocs. Then, and this will constitute the core part of 
the paper, I would like to analyze the internal dynamics within the Eastern bloc 
in order to show how important they were during the evolution of the crisis. In 
particular, I will explore the ambiguous relationship between the East German 
leadership and the Soviet Union leadership, which during the course of the 
crisis became at times very tense. Finally, I will assert that the construction of 
the wall - in retrospect and with the benefit of hindsight - can be seen as an 
acceptable outcome for all the parties involved in the crisis.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CRISIS: THE DYNAMICS 
BETWEEN THE BLOCS
The city of Berlin had a strategic importance during the Cold War years. As a 
Western enclave in the German Democratic Republic (GDR), Berlin symbolized two 
different and opposite contests: on the one hand it was the symbol of the division 
of Germany after the Second World War, on the other hand it represented the hope 
that Germany could be reunited. Berlin’s special status, which originated from the 
rights of allied powers, meant that the division of Germany never fully materialized. 
Because of this special status and the responsibilities of the allied powers towards 
the city, the problems connected to Berlin were never just a national question, but 
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they were always connected with East-West relations.345 That is the reason why 
Berlin is so important: the city on the Spree River was not just the symbol of the 
division of Germany but also the symbol of the division of the world.
Since the end of the Second World War, in particular since the Berlin Block-
ade (which began in June 1948 and ended in May 1949), the city represented, 
in a blunt Khrushchev’s expression, “western testicles”.346 Despite its isolation, 
Berlin was deemed instrumental by the West: the city became more and more 
a competing arena where the two opposing systems wanted to showcase their 
inspiring values. The superior appeal of Occidental democracy and of free 
market  economy became evident soon; in other words, the Western-dominat-
ed part of the city was considered the outpost of freedom and the showcase 
of the West. The cultural and ideological link with the West shaped the roots 
of its identity and was ostentatiously shown in the oriental part of the city.347
Two different and antithetical systems had to cohabit in the same city, which 
was a situation not to be found anywhere else. Such an extraordinary state of af-
fairs was a source of tension. Therefore, the crisis potential of Berlin was always 
high, even though between 1949 and 1958 the situation was relatively calm.348 
The Federal Republic of Germany was established in the zones controlled by 
the Western Powers and the German Democratic Republic was established in 
the zones controlled by the USSR (the FRG was recognized by the Soviet Union 
in 1955, while the GDR was not recognized by Western Powers until the early 
1970s). Between 1949 and 1958, the feared build-up of the Federal Republic 
and its admission into NATO, the uprisings in east Berlin in 1953, and the mas-
sive emigration of people from the Eastern sector to the western one (which 
mainly concerned the young generation, the skilled workers and the intellectuals) 
caused frustration and panic in the GDR. East Germany feared that in a not too 
far-off future the economy would collapse. The table below shows the flow of 
people that fled East Berlin from 1950 until the erection of the Berlin Wall. After a 
peak in 1953, the massive emigration gained again momentum in 1960.
345 Marie-Louise Recker, “L’inasprirsi  della  questione tedesca: la seconda crisi di Berlino” 
1958-1961, Ricerche di Storia Politica, anno XII, (Bologna: il Mulino, 2009), p. 327.
346 William R. Keylor, A World of Nations: The International Order Since 1945, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2003, 107.
347 Marie-Luise Recker, “L’inasprirsi della questione tedesca: la seconda crisi di Ber-
lino”, p. 328.
348 E. Barker, “The Berlin Crisis 1958-1962”, International Affairs, Vol. 44, 1963, p. 59. 
Probably “the relative calm is due to the fact that only in 1958 Khrushchev managed to 
fully win the battle for power began with Stalin’s death in 1953”. Moreover the launch 
of artificial satellite Sputnik in 1957 seemed to hand the Soviets a technological ad-
vantage: “Mr. Krushchev might therefore have felt in a strong enough position to risk a 
major crisis in relations with the West”. E. Barker,  “The Berlin Crisis 1958-1962”, 60.
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The long-serving Secretary of the SED (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deut-
schlands) Walter Ulbricht became increasingly concerned with the massive 
emigration of people. In late 1957, he promoted a strong campaign against the 
Republikflucht. The people who tried to escape from the GDR were threatened 
to be punished with up to three years in jail.349 In general, Berlin’s status was 
called into question: the SED argued  that Berlin was in GDR territory and, 
therefore, the Western Powers had no rights there. Even Khrushchev said that 
the situation “was not normal” and accused the Western Powers of exploiting 
West Berlin to organize subversive activities in the GDR.350 The Soviets were 
very concerned with the possible nuclear build-up of the Federal Republic. Be-
sides, the Kremlin was scared even by the will of FRG Chancellor Adenauer to 
reclaim a reunified Germany, the “old German lands annexed after the Second 
World War by the Soviet Union, Poland and Czechoslovakia”.351 Moreover, the 
isolated and delicate position of West Berlin encouraged Khrushchev to force 
the events and test the resolve of the Western alliance. In sum, both the Soviet 
Union and the German Democratic Republic were willing to change the status 
quo immediately before the crisis. Khrushchev decided that it was time to act: 
in November 1958, “his ultimatum…threatened to cut the Western powers’ ac-
cess routes to the divided city unless they agreed to sign a peace treaty with 
Germany on Soviet terms within six months”.352
349 Marie-Luise Recker, “L’inasprirsi della questione tedesca: la seconda crisi di Berlino”, 330.
350 Ibid., 331.
351 Vladislav M. Zubok,” Khrushchev and the Berlin Crisis (1958-1962)”, Working Paper 
Nº 6, Cold War International History Project, Washington D.C., 1993, pp. 7.
352 Vojtech Mastny, “Soviet Foreign policy, 1953-1962”, in The Cambridge History of the 
Cold War, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp. 327.
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Khrushchev proposed the interim solution of transforming West Berlin into a de-
militarized free city; the GDR should have guaranteed the communications and 
West Berlin authorities should not have allowed hostile  activities  in their  territo-
ry353; however, this proposal was not accepted by the Western Powers. They feared 
that, after withdrawing Western troops, West Berlin would become totally depend-
ent on, and subsequently incorporated into incorporated into, East Germany.354
This is the official communiqué of the Western Powers in response to the 
Soviet Ultimatum: 
“The Foreign Ministers of France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the 
United Kingdom and the Unites States met on December 14, 1958 in Paris to 
discuss developments in the Berlin situation during the past month, includ-
ing notes addressed to their several governments on November 27 by the 
Soviet Union….. The Foreign Ministers of France, the United Kingdom and the 
United States once more reaffirmed the determination of their governments 
to maintain their position and their rights with respect to Berlin including the 
right of free access. They found unacceptable a unilateral repudiation by the 
Soviet Government of its obligations to the Governments of France, the United 
Kingdom and the United States in relation to their presence in Berlin and the 
freedom of access to that city or the substitution of the German authorities of 
the Soviet Zone for the Soviet Government insofar as those rights are con-
cerned. After further discussion of the Soviet notes of November 27, 1958 the 
four Foreign Ministers found themselves in agreement on the basic issues to 
be dealt with in the replies to those notes.355”
In practice, the US Government coordinated a unified response from the West-
ern governments that “denied the Soviets could unilaterally divest them of their 
rights in Berlin and reaffirmed their determination not to abandon the city”.356 In 
sum, the Western Powers stood firm and tried to gain time, demanding the main-
tenance of the status quo. It must be stressed that, according to some, Khrush-
chev had begun the crisis without knowing where his bullish stance would lead 
and without clarifying which consequences a missed agreement with the Western 
Powers would have.357 In March 1959, his lack of a clear vision caused him to 
withdraw the ultimatum he had handed the Western Powers a few months prior. 
The crisis would come back on the table of negotiations at the Conference 
of Foreign Ministries in Geneva in May-August 1959. Despite some, perhaps 
a little tentative attempts to solve the question, no agreement was reached in 
353 E. Barker,  “The Berlin Crisis 1958-1962”, pp. 60
354 Marie-Luise Recker, ”L’inasprirsi della questione tedesca: la seconda crisi di Berlino”, 330.
355 Four Power Communiqué on Berlin, Paris, 14 December 1958, NSA/Berlin
356 Kori Schake, “A Broader Range of Choice? US Policy in the 1958 and 1961 Berlin 
Crises,” in  J. P. S. Gearson, K. Schake, The Berlin Wall Crisis (New York: Mac Millan, 
2002), 28.  See also the Four Power Communiqué.
357 E. Barker,  “The Berlin Crisis 1958-1962”, p. 61
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Geneva and the two opposing parties decided to try to solve the question in 
Camp David in September 1959. President Eisenhower invited Khrushchev but 
even this meeting turned out to be quite inconclusive. Nevertheless, the Soviet 
leader promised that in the future he would avoid sending ultimatums. This 
contributed, for a while, to a decrease in tensions.358
Moreover, Khrushchev and Eisenhower enjoyed a good personal relationship, 
which was however, suddenly brought to an end by the U2 incident.359  Actually, 
it is not clear if the U2 incident had genuinely contributed to the worsening of 
relations between US and the USSR or if Khrushchev, since the negotiations in 
West Berlin were not going according to his wishes, sought a pretext to start the 
crisis over again.360 Khrushchev affirmed that he did not want to negotiate with 
Eisenhower any longer. The Republican President had almost arrived at the end of 
his second term and at the beginning of 1961 was replaced by John F. Kennedy. 
The Berlin situation was discussed once again in Vienna in June 1961. The 
Soviet leader handed Kennedy a memorandum, which more or less resembled 
the 1958 ultimatum. Kennedy told Khrushchev that he would accept the USSR’s 
right to sign a separate peace with the GDR,361 but the United States did not want 
the Soviet Union to unilaterally modify West Berlin’s status. The Soviet leader, 
after the abortive invasion of Cuba by US-backed anti-communist exiles, was 
convinced that Kennedy was an inexperienced adversary, and threatened war; 
in turn, also the American President did not rule out that war was a possibility. 
For the first time since the start of the crisis the two superpowers openly 
threatened a nuclear war. The situation was especially risky because the two ri-
vals did not define the casus belli and it remained unclear for both parties what 
was negotiable and what was not negotiable, what they could concede to the 
opponent and what instead, could not be object of discussion. This is what, 
ultimately, made the Second Berlin Crisis so extraordinarily dangerous.362 
In the summer of 1961, Kennedy defined three non-negotiable principles (es-
sentials) of American policy in Berlin: 1) presence and safety of troops in West 
Berlin; 2) safety and vitality of West Berlin; 3) physical access in West Berlin. These 
referred only to West Berlin so it seemed that, for the US, the original rights in the 
whole of Berlin were no longer considered of vital interest; he was even available 
358 Marie-Luise Recker, ”L’inasprirsi della questione tedesca: la seconda crisi di Berlino”, p. 333.
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tecnologici, La politica internazionale nel XX secolo, Bari: Editori Laterza, 2002, p. 282.
360 E. Barker,  “The Berlin Crisis 1958-1962”, p. 61.
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362 Marie-Luise Recker, ”L’inasprirsi della questione tedesca: la seconda crisi di Ber-
lino”, p. 335.
128 CSABA BÉKÉS – MELINDA KALMÁR: STUDENTS ON THE COLD WAR
to negotiate with East Germany.363 The Western Powers did not form a united front: 
British Premier MacMillan would have been “available” to “get closer” to the Soviet 
Union (he feared that a military escalation could lead to a nuclear war); France’s de 
Gaulle was rather content with the American attitude, but did not want to modify 
the four powers’ presence in Berlin; in the Federal Republic, the limitation to the 
three essentials was interpreted as a clear alarm signal of a change in American at-
titude. While the two superpowers faced each other and the Soviet frustration grew 
stronger because of the impossibility to modify the status quo, the flow of East 
Germans who went to West Berlin further increased. So, it was decided in August 
1961 to isolate West Berlin with a barbed wire to prevent people from entering. 
The sealing off proceeded in stages – at the beginning “with barbed wire and only 
later by the construction of a concrete wall, all on Soviet-controlled territory. The 
procedure initially served to test the West’s reaction to the violation of the agree-
ments that allowed Berliners free movement through the whole city.”364 After that, 
measures were taken to block the allies’ right to move freely in and out of their 
sectors. “For them, however, it was the boldness of the challenge rather than its 
residual caution that mattered, all the more so since it caught them by surprise.”365
For some weeks, the situation remained very tense and the possibility of a 
Western intervention continued to be taken into account by the Soviet lead-
ership.366 However, the East German leadership was partially soothed as the 
outflow of people strongly decreased even though it did not come to a com-
plete stop. Moreover, the GDR government recognized the border between 
East and West as a state frontier between East and West Germany and so 
they abandoned the claim for the entire Berlin as part of the territory of East 
Germany.367 The GDR de facto respected the three essentials, thus military 
countermeasures were not taken into consideration.368
A few weeks after the division of Berlin over an issue affecting the freedom of 
access for the Western allies in West Berlin, Soviet and Americans troops directly 
faced each other. However, conflict did not break out.369 The barrier that was erect-
ed – which de facto prevented access to the Western sectors by East Germans, 
but allowed it to Westerners – made it possible to solve the Berlin crisis in practice. 
However, the larger German problem could be solved only at the end of the Cold 
363 Ibid., 336.
364 Vojtech Mastny, “Soviet Foreign policy, 1953-1962”, p. 329.
365 Ibid., 330.
366 Vojtech Mastny reports that a Warsaw Pact exercise, codenamed Buria (which stood 
for “Nuclear War”) was “organized in deepest secrecy at the headquartes of the So-
viet forces in Germany in the second half of September”, Ibid., p. 330.
367 E. Barker,  “The Berlin Crisis 1958-1962”, p. 61.
368 Marie-Luise Recker, ”L’inasprirsi della questione tedesca: la seconda crisi di Ber-
lino”, p. 336.
369 Ibid., p. 338
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War.370 On July 25, 1963, after negotiating a moratorium on nuclear tests, the US 
and the USSR reached a verbal agreement on the Berlin question, which, de facto, 
brought a final end to the crisis. The US would respect European borders as they 
were at the end of the Second World War and would favor the integration of the 
two Germanys in their respective blocs. The USSR made it clear that in the future 
they would recognize the status of West Berlin, including the presence of West-
ern troops and would not discuss the three essential principles.371 After reviewing 
the crisis from the traditional East-West angle, it is important to concentrate on 
what happened within the Eastern bloc. In order to fully understand Khrushchev’s 
behavior, it is essential to focus on his ambiguous relation with Ulbricht and on 
Chinese pressure.372 This will constitute the second part of this work.
THE AMBIGUOUS ULBRICHT–KHRUSHCHEV RELATIONSHIP
First of all, it must be stressed that East Germany was very important for the USSR 
in general and for Khrushchev in particular. He was convinced that if communism 
failed in East Germany, it would be bound to fail even in the USSR. In 1953 he 
accused Beria and Malenkov of wanting to betray socialism in East Germany. 
Moreover, from a strategic point of view, East Germany was the most “Western” 
of eastern countries and directly faced NATO. Ulbricht was aware of the impor-
tance of his country and cunningly used this leverage during the crisis.373
The East German leader had long pushed for the Soviet leadership to close 
the border around West Berlin. Also some Soviet representatives in the Ger-
man Democratic Republic agreed with his view. In February 1958, O. Selyani-
nov reported to the Soviet Ministry that: 
370 Vojtech Mastny, “Soviet Foreign policy, 1953-1962”, p. 331.
371 Marie-Luise Recker, “L’inasprirsi della questione tedesca: la seconda crisi di Berlino”, p. 339.
372 “East German influence on Soviet policy during the Berlin Crisis was much more im-
portant than previously believed. The evidence from the newly opened archives also 
shows that the Soviet leader, Nikita S. Khrushchev, was more interested in reaching 
a German settlement with the West and preoccupied with preventing East German 
leader Walter Ulbricht from sabotaging this process than has been recognized. In 
addition, the documents confirm the view of several scholars that Soviet fear of West 
German acquisition of nuclear weapons was an important influence on Soviet Deut-
schlandpolitik (policy on Germany) connected with the crisis. Finally, the role of the 
faltering East German economy looms much larger in the documents than previously 
known”. Cfr. H. Harrison, “Ulbricht and the concrete rose: new archival evidence 
on the dynamics of soviet-east German relations and the Berlin crisis 1958-1961”, 
Working Paper Nº 5, Cold War International History Project, 1993, p. 7.
373 Hope Harrison, “Ulbricht and the concrete rose: new archival evidence on the dy-
namics of soviet-east German relations and the Berlin crisis 1958-1961”, Working 
Paper Nº 5, Cold War International History Project,  Washington, D.C, 1993, p. 9
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“West Berlin continues to be a center of hostile activity against the GDR 
and other socialist countries, which is aggravated by the absence of closed 
sectoral borders....We must proceed from the fact that the Berlin question can 
be resolved independently from resolving the entire German problem, by the 
gradual economic and political conquest of West Berlin. Particular attention 
should be paid to strengthening political work in West Berlin and carrying out 
certain economic and cultural measures. Regarding various types of adminis-
trative measures, we should turn to these only in the extreme circumstance of 
avoiding an undesired aggravation of the situation in the city.374”
The Soviet leader resisted for a while, in order not to increase the tension against 
the Western governments. He was still looking for a broader agreement with the 
Western Powers, which would have included not only the resolution of the Berlin 
question but also a peaceful settlement of the German question as a whole.375 But 
the importance of Eastern Germany “lured” him into action. That motive should not 
be forgotten as it is as important as the other motives (the Soviet willingness to pre-
vent West Germany from building up, the attempts to break the unity of the West-
ern Powers, or Khrushchev’s determination to show his internal opposition and the 
Chinese that he was tough enough) when it comes to analyzing the causes which 
pushed Khrushchev to start the crisis.  Ulbricht wanted to revise the status quo 
as soon as possible and in the following two years pushed Khrushchev to action.
 The Soviet leadership was convinced that their combination of pressure and 
negotiation would eventually foster the desired results376 but Ulbricht, having 
first-hand experience of the drama of the massive emigration towards West Ber-
lin, felt that he could not wait any longer: in the autumn of 1960, he unilaterally 
implemented measures to attempt to obtain control at the border and at the ac-
cess points of Berlin.377 During the crisis, Khrushchev’s behavior was not always 
compatible with Ulbricht’s will and the tough posture of the German leader often 
was an obstacle for Khrushchev in his negotiations with the Western Powers.378 
The SED’s First Secretary was concerned by the fact that the Soviet Union had 
recognized West Germany in 1955, while the Western Powers refused to recog-
nize East Germany. In September 1960 “the East Germans announced […] that 
Western diplomats accredited to embassies in Bonn had to obtain permission 
from the East German Foreign Ministry to enter East Berlin”.379 
374 Ibid., 10
375 Ibid.
376 Petr Lunak, “Khrushchev and the Berlin Crisis: Soviet Brinkmanship Seen from In-
side”, Cold War History, Vol.3, Nº 2, 2003, p. 64.
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The Soviet Union thought that these provocations were useless or harm-
ful. The main problem was that there were deep differences between Soviet 
and German views.380 Ulbricht was uninterested in détente with the Western 
Powers; his main preoccupation was the annexation of West Berlin. Khrush-
chev, even if he did not accept the status quo, wanted the city to be neutral.381 
Besides, the ongoing flow of young and skilled people from East Berlin was a 
problem of vital importance for Ulbricht, whereas for Khrushchev, Berlin was 
overall a tactical weapon to use against the Western Powers.
The difference of perspectives was the reason why solutions to solve the 
Berlin crisis were so different: the Soviet Union wanted to transform Berlin into 
a demilitarized free city with a treaty, while Ulbricht’s main interest was not the 
signing of a peace treaty but to obtain as soon as possible the “control of the 
sectoral border and full control over all the GDR territory, including full control 
over the links between West Berlin and the FRG that go through the GDR”.382 
Indeed,  the SED’s First Secretary feared a Western embargo (which East Ger-
many could not afford) had East Germany and Soviet Union signed a separate 
peace treaty.383 The GDR leader was in a similar position to Chinese leader Mao, 
who, mutatis mutandis, had in Taiwan his delicate situation. Both thought that 
Khrushchev was not tough enough and pushed him to adopt a tougher pos-
ture in negotiations vis-à-vis the Western Powers. When the so-called Chinese-
Soviet schism did occur,384 Ulbricht did not hesitate to use the “Chinese card” 
380 “These differences can be boiled down to the following: Khrushchev always saw 
and used West Berlin more as a lever to compel the West to recognize really Khrush-
chev’s way of using West Berlin as a lever, since the key implication of his separate 
treaty threat was that the GDR would then have control over the access routes to 
West Berlin the post-war status quo and the existence of East Germany, and Ul-
bricht always saw West Berlin more as a prize, although he was certainly willing to 
exploit it as a lever until he got it as a prize”. H. Harrison, p. 11.
381 “[…] Khrushchev wanted to keep it a neutral territory. He needed it both as a geos-
trategic Achilles’s heel of the Western security system and a Western Hong Kong, a 
trade link between the communist East and capitalist West Germany. He was pre-
pared to negotiate with Americans, British and French over their presence in and ac-
cess to West Berlin. But the status quo was unacceptable because it was tantamount 
to the disruptive presence of rich West Germany at the heart of the weak unstable 
GDR”. Vladislav M. Zubok,” Khrushchev and the Berlin Crisis (1958-1962)”, p. 16.
382 Hope Harrison, “The German Democratic Republic, the Soviet Union and the Berlin 
Wall Crisis”, p. 110.
383 Vladislav M. Zubok,” Khrushchev and the Berlin Crisis (1958-1962)”, p. 19. 
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behavior. In general Mao thought that the Soviet leader was too soft with Western 
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to put pressure on Khrushchev and to exploit the differences between Moscow 
and Beijing in order to get advantages as far as Berlin was concerned. An East 
German delegation went to Beijing in January 1961: the Germans obtained full 
support from the Chinese for their hard stance and their claim on Berlin. 
The Soviets did not know about the trip and only found out about it later.385 
Therefore, Khrushchev was in a very uncomfortable position: on the one hand, 
he had to resist pressure from the Communist Bloc and, on the other hand, he 
had to bargain with the Western Powers. The Soviet leader managed to contain 
Ulbricht’s requests to modify the status quo only for a few months. After criticiz-
ing the Soviet posture with Mao, Ulbricht in the successive months of 1961 de-
cided to use the Chinese card in another way. In a Warsaw Pact meeting which 
took place on 3-5 August 1961, he strongly sided with the USSR against the 
Chinese and their Albanian allies to show Khrushchev that he could trust him.386
Moreover, in the case of a Western embargo, the USSR’s Eastern Europe 
satellites were not willing to help the GDR.387 The Eastern European Socialist 
leaders all emphasized that they had their own pressing economic issues and 
so they lacked the capacity to grant significant aid to the German Democratic 
Republic. Probably this was “the final straw leading Khrushchev to see that he 
had to agree to close the border around West Berlin to help the GDR”.  The 
economic situation in East Germany, strained by the massive emigration, was 
too difficult. Ulbricht sent several letters to Khrushchev, in which he empha-
sized how dramatic the economic conditions of the GDR were. Probably, one 
of the most significant ones was written just some days before the barbed wire 
went up around West Berlin:
“The entire situation, influenced by the open border, hindered us from im-
plementing adequate measures to eliminate the disproportions in the wage 
structure and to create a proper relationship between wages and performance. 
. . . Simply put, the open border forced us to raise the living standard faster 
than our economic capabilities allowed. ...Of course we had similar difficulties 
with the transition to agricultural co-operatives as in other People’s Democra-
cies. But one should not overlook the fact that some things are much more 
complicated here. . . . In all the other People’s Democracies, in the context of 
their closed borders, such political–economic issues could be tackled differ-
ently than was possible under our political circumstances.388”
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Besides, Khrushchev did care about the standard of living of the GDR, as 
he feared that if the country’s living standards fell down to the Soviet ones, the 
regime would collapse.
“If we level it [the GDR’s living standard] down to our own, consequently, the 
government and the party of the GDR will fall down tumbling, consequently 
Adenauer will step in...Even if the GDR remains closed, one cannot rely on that 
and [let living standards decline].389”
Rebus sic stantibus, the goal of surpassing West Germany’s economic per-
formance seemed now completely unachievable,390 and possibly also darkly 
ironic.  However, it is difficult to assess whether Ulbricht’s bleak portraits were 
completely accurate as he clearly intended to gain support among others War-
saw Pact states for the closure of the border.391 Anyhow, the SED first Secretary 
finally won over Khrushchev and could eventually proceed to seal off East Berlin. 
On the basis of this outcome, it is interesting to reflect on the  USSR-East 
Germany alliance by drawing from Glenn H. Snyder seminal study on the dy-
namics at work within states alliances.392 It was, indeed, in the very interest 
of the East German leadership to show that the internal situation, if the status 
quo was preserved, would not be sustainable so as to gain bargaining power 
vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. 
The bipolar international system that characterized the Cold War made 
“highly unlikely”393 that one of the superpowers abandoned a weaker ally, even 
though the posture of the client is not aligned with the superpower’s one. In 
other words, the superpower is compelled by the logic of the system to protect 
the smaller allies even if the latter have an adventurist posture. A loss for one 
side would mean a gain for the other side hence “de-alignment by the smaller 
states is ultimately illusory, since their protector will defend them”.394
In sum, on the one hand, it is therefore likely that Ulbricht exaggerated the neg-
ativity of East Germany’s economic situation. On the other hand, the open border 
“hindered the realization of many of the SED’s socio-political aims”.395 The GDR’s 
tory, Vol.39, 2004, p. 25.
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leaders were elated when they contributed to the substantial inaction of the West-
ern Powers following the construction of the Berlinermauer.396 That enthusiasm 
did not delude Khrushchev. In October he clearly stated that the USSR would not 
have supported or even tolerated any unilateral attempt of East Germany against 
West Berlin to force the new status quo.397 The tension continued until 1962 when 
a diplomatic accident between East Germany and the USSR occurred. 
In May, Ulbricht enigmatically told Soviet ambassador Pervukhin, that should 
tension rise around the wall, he would not feel responsible for further complica-
tions. The Soviet politburo ordered Pervukhin to warn Ulbricht that any action 
concerning West Berlin should have been previously decided with Moscow. Ul-
bricht wrote a letter to Khrushchev telling him that it was a misunderstanding and 
blamed the Soviet ambassador Pervukhin for the misunderstanding.398
FINAL CONSIDERATIONS
The second Berlin crisis is one of the most complicated Cold War events to 
assess. Even if the two rival parts got close to the outbreak of a war, which was 
due to the vagueness of the threats and the unclear aims of the Soviet leadership, 
none of the superpowers actually wanted to be involved in a conflict. The Soviet 
leader Khrushchev, maybe underrating Ulbricht tenacity, was in the most uncom-
fortable position during the entire crisis, having to deal with opposing pressures 
from the Western Powers and East Germany. The GDR leader, fully aware of the 
importance of East Germany for Khrushchev,399 at times exaggerated the seriou-
ness of the East German economic situation to push Khrushchev to action400, 
even though overall the negative economic conditions of the GDR were one of 
the factors that convinced the Soviet leadership to try to change the status quo.
The differences between Khrushchev and Ulbricht, which were never fully 
resolved, made the Berlin Crisis a Soviet-East German as well as an East-West 
396 Vladislav M. Zubok,” Khrushchev and the Berlin Crisis (1958-1962)”, p. 29.
397 Ibid., p. 30.
398 Ibid., p. 31.
399 These are the words that Anastas Mikoyan, one of Khrushchev closest associates, 
told the East Germans in June 1961: “If socialism does not win in the GDR, if com-
munism does not prove itself as superior and vital here, then we have not won. The 
issue is this fundamental to us. Therefore, we cannot proceed in such a way with any 
other country. And this is also the reason that the GDR occupies first place in nego-
tiations or in credits.’ ‘Anlage 2 zum [Politburo] Protokoll Nº 24 Vol. 6.6.1961. Nied-
erschrift über die wichtigsten Gedanken, die Genosse Mikojan in einem Gespräch 
mit dem Genossen Leuschner in kleinstem Kreis . . . äusserte,’ SAPMO-BArch  ZPA, 
J IV 2/2/766, p. 1–3.
400 Hope Harrison, “Ulbricht and the concrete rose: new archival evidence on the dy-
namics of Soviet-East German relations and the Berlin crisis 1958-1961”,  p. 61.
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crisis, and Ulbricht’s behavior added to the intensity of the crisis. The Soviet 
and East German leaders’ opinions differed over several issues: how and when 
to remedy the destabilizing influence on East Germany emanating from West 
Berlin; how much control the GDR should have over the access routes be-
tween East Germany and West Berlin; how to stop the East German refugee 
flow; the degree to which the Soviets and East Germans should risk a confron-
tation with the West over Berlin; whether the Soviet Union and other socialist 
countries should sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany in the event 
the Western Powers refused to sign a German peace treaty; the extent of re-
lations the socialist countries should have with West Berlin; and the manner 
and the extent to which the Western powers should be pressed to recognize 
formally the existence of the East German regime.401
Indeed, paradoxically, the closer East Germany moved to collapse, the more 
Ulbricht’s bargaining power vis-à-vis the Soviet Union increased. However, the 
construction of the Berlin Wall, a dramatic event for the German population, 
was ultimately accepted by the Western Powers but also by the Soviet Union402, 
which feared that Ulbricht would try to annex West Berlin manu militari. Moreo-
ver, the Soviets thought that the Berlin Wall was a good solution to protect 
the GDR’s weak economy, without deeply involving the Soviet Union.403 In the 
words of Khrushchev they “achieved the maximum of what was possible”.404
In retrospect, the apparently makeshift solution of erecting a wall turned 
out to be an acceptable outcome for all parties involved in the crisis.  For 
the United States the construction of the wall turned out to be a “blessing in 
disguise”,405 as it enabled the government to withdraw from a direct confronta-
tion with the USSR without denying the West its access rights to the city. For 
the USSR, also, the wall blocked the outflow of people from East Germany 
and proved to be a powerful tool not only to isolate East Berlin from Western 
interference but also to contain Ulbricht’s ambitions – namely the signing of 
a peace treaty and the seizure of West Berlin.406 By pushing through the con-
struction of the Wall, Ulbricht achieved his primary aim, but also lost his most 
powerful bargaining tool for achieving his above-mentioned goals. However, 
401 Hope Harrison,”Driving the Soviets up the Wall: Soviet-East German Relations, 
1953-1961” Princeton Studies in International History and Politics, 200, p. 141.
402 Hope Harrison, “Ulbricht and the concrete rose: new archival evidence on the dy-
namics of Soviet-East German relations and the Berlin crisis 1958-1961”, p. 61.
403 Ibid., 62.
404 D. Selvage, “The End of the Berlin Crisis, 1961–1962: New Evidence from the Polish 
and East German Archives,” CWIHPB, 11 (1998), p. 221.
405 Burton I Kaufman, “John F Kennedy as World Leader: A Perspective on the Litera-
ture”, in Michael Hogan, America in the World, The Historiography of US Foreign 
Relations Since 1941, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 328.
406 Petr Lunak, “Khrushchev and the Berlin Crisis: Soviet Brinkmanship Seen from In-
side”, p. 76.
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when the massive labor drain was eventually brought to an end, the SED could 
tighten its grip on the society and push through “harder” socialist policies as 
the SED’s intended reshuffle of the East German society was always going to 
be impaired if the possibility of “defection” existed. In other words, also for the 
GDR the wall marked the beginning of a period of greater social and economic 
stability – and of oppressive control for the East German population.
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POSSIBILITY OR NECESSITY? 
HUNGARY’S ROAD TO IMF MEMBERSHIP
áGneS remete 
INTRODUCTION
Hungary became a member of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in May 
1982, after a very fast accession procedure lasting only six months. The whole 
process, however, took much more time. The membership can be considered 
an ending point to a nearly 20 year period, during which Hungary strove to 
achieve a peaceful, potentially even fruitful relationship with the Western Bloc 
based on mutual interests. 
Since the countries of the Socialist Bloc could not conduct independent for-
eign policy, Hungary had to push through this maneuvering operation in such 
a way that the interests of the Soviet Union and the countries of the Council 
for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) would not be damaged, which was a 
quite challenging task, considering the international context of the time. Thus, 
Hungary found itself on the horns of a dilemma between the two opposing 
blocs, and it had to balance its own national interests with regard to the “Soviet 
esprit de corps”. 
In this situation, as highlighted by Csaba Békés, the only option for the 
Hungarian leadership was to exploit the available foreign political space for 
manoeuvre, always within the given framework of constraints. Moreover, 
Hungary’s foreign political manoeuvrability was not determined solely by the 
changing relations of the two opposing blocs, but by a more complex system 
of “tripartite determinism”, including the Soviet Union, the Western countries 
and the East Central European states. We can conclude that “Hungary had to 
perform a balancing act to pursue specific objectives in terms of an all-East-
Central-European lobby-contest”407, which was no simple task.
The objective of this paper is to give a short, comprehensive overview of this 
period, that is, on Hungary’s road to one of the biggest world (and importantly 
Western) financial organizations, the IMF. As mentioned above the question 
of the possible membership was first considered more seriously almost 20 
years before Hungary’s admission, already in the 1960s. Thus the essay will 
concentrate only on this short period of time, which finally led to the country’s 
accession to the IMF in 1982. Besides this, I would also like to mention some 
407 Csaba Békés.  “Hungarian foreign policy in the Soviet alliance system, 1968-1989”. 
In: Foreign Policy Review, Vol. 2, Nº 1, 2004, p. 87-127.
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basic agreements that the country managed to conclude in the first years of 
its membership that rescued the country from a state of complete insolvency. 
I would like to present the events in chronological order, concentrating only 
on the most important steps and highlighting the different character of certain 
phases influenced by partly international, partly national necessities. I do not 
intend to give an overall analysis of the broader international situation of this 
period, thus I am going to take into consideration only those factors that are rel-
evant, certainly bearing in mind the deterministic nature of the international cir-
cumstances and especially Hungary’s place in the international bipolar system.
Firstly, I would like to briefly cover the period from after the Second World 
War to 1968, with special regard to the first timid steps towards the new, 
Western-based financial organizations. Moreover, I would like to present those 
economic driving forces, or rather constraints, which pushed Hungary towards 
considering the issue of membership. I have divided the period from 1968 to 
1984 into three parts based upon the division established by one of Hungary’s 
leading financial decision-makers, János Fekete: the “golden age” (1968-73), 
the “age of illusions” (1974-78) and the “age of realism” (after 1979).408 Finally, 
I would like to give my conclusions on the issue, especially by answering the 
main research question of this paper: Was Hungary’s admission to the IMF an 
opportunity that the country could “exploit” at the right time, or was it rather 
an inevitable necessity in order for the nation to escape from its tight corner?
THE FIRST ATTEMPTS AND THE SUSPENSION OF 
NEGOTIATIONS
Hungary had already indicated its intention to join the newly established internation-
al financial and monetary organizations after the Second World War. The country’s 
economy was in such a ruined state that it would have been crucial to obtain ad-
ditional financial resources to rebuild and modernize the structure of the economy. 
In 1946, despite the unfavorable international circumstances, Hungary submitted its 
membership application to the IMF and to the World Bank, but being an ally of the 
Nazi Germany during the war was obviously not a proper reference for the country. 
Thus the application was rejected at that time and the question was not seri-
ously reconsidered until the 1960s.409 However, it would have been a logical 
step to join the Washington twins at the time Hungary joined the United Na-
tions in 1955. This was indeed discussed by the government, but the consoli-
408 Márer, Pál. “Hungary’s balance of payments crisis and response, 1978-84”. In: 
Country studies on Eastern Europe and Yugoslavia. 99th Congress 2d Session, 
1986, pp. 298-321.
409 János Honvári. Magyarország gazdaságtörténete Trianontól a rendszerváltásig. Bu-
dapest, Aula, 2005.
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dation of the power of the Stalinist Mátyás Rákosi in July 1955 and the return 
to the pre-1953 economic policies made this step untimely.410
For the Soviet Union, it was extremely important to represent the interests of 
the socialist countries with the votes of its satellite states in the UN, where real 
decisions were not made. It was unwilling, however, to join the IMF, and ex-
pressively “advised” socialist countries to stay away from the “extended arms 
of imperialism”.411 Brezhnev purposefully emphasized at the Warsaw Pact 
Political Consultative Committee meeting in 1965 that the imperialists were 
trying to extend their contacts into the socialist countries to influence their 
domestic lives and to undermine their unity by offering technical and economic 
incentives.412 However, the serious economic and financial problems faced by 
Hungary in the 1960s brought the issue of IMF membership again closer: out-
put stagnated, which was worse than depression, and Hungary experienced 
a growing current account deficit that was financed by a growing number of 
foreign loans. The real economic situation was not at all in compliance with the 
loudly preached promises of accelerating growth. In October 1964, a new re-
form committee was convened to discuss how to get out of this dead-end. The 
most radical reform variant was approved and 1968 was chosen as the year to 
implement the timid version of this reform. 1971-1972 were the targeted years 
for the introduction of the more radical market socialist variant.413
In parallel with the elaboration of the economic reform concepts, the idea of IMF 
membership also came up in the 1960s. At this time only Yugoslavia was a mem-
ber of the organization but it was not a member of the Soviet Bloc.414 Yugoslavia 
had obtained more than $2 billion in credit from the capitalist international financial 
organizations by 1968, and a total amount of $312.5 million only from the IMF, 
which was quite an attractive amount from the Hungarian point of view as well. The 
Minister of finance already indicated the possibility of applying for a total amount of 
$150-200 million in long-term credit from Western countries in 1966 and the idea of 
IMF membership was also introduced as a means to reach this goal.
410 László Csaba. “Hungary and the IMF: The experience of a cordial discord”. In: 
Schönfeld, Roland ed., The role of international financial institutions in Central and 
Eastern Europe. München: Südosteuropa-Ges., 1996, pp. 207-228.
411 László Csaba. “Változó erőtérben – változó egyensúlyozás: Adalék Magyarország 
háború utáni gazdaságtörténetéhez”. In: Competitio, Vol. 5, Nº 2, 2006, pp. 9-22.
412 Békés, Csaba. “Hungarian foreign policy in the Soviet alliance system, 1968-1989”. 
In: Foreign Policy Review, Vol. 2, Nº 1, 2004, pp. 87-127.
413 László Csaba, “Hungary and the IMF: The experience of a cordial discord”. In: 
Schönfeld, Roland ed. The role of international financial institutions in Central and 
Eastern Europe. München: Südosteuropa-Ges., 1996, p. 207-228.
414 Poland and Czechoslovakia were founding members of the IMF, but they left the 
organization in 1950 and 1954, respectively. Romania was admitted to membership 
in 1972. ‘Hungary applies to join IMF, World Bank’, Open Society Archives, 1981, 
http://www.osaarchivum.org/files/holdings/300/8/3/text/36-6-136.shtml
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The National Bank of Hungary submitted a resolution in March 1966 which 
proposed a start to negotiations with the IMF and the World Bank. Hungarian 
policymakers considered IMF membership important because of its possible 
contributions to reach the goals of the New Economic Mechanism. The initia-
tors of the proposal pointed out that it would have been preferable to obtain 
the needed credits from socialist countries instead, but it was already clear in 
the 1960s that it was an unrealistic presumption to hope for financial help from 
the CMEA countries, simply because of their similarly harsh economic situa-
tions. Thus, according to the initiators, Hungary had to turn to international 
financial institutions for help, and this was to be achieved through personal 
contacts, not at an official level. In opposition to the Hungarian Foreign Minis-
try, the National Bank regarded the consultation with all the CMEA countries 
as unimportant. However, they also highlighted the importance of informing 
the Soviet Union about the Hungarian intentions. The proposal gives an over-
view concerning the functioning and operation mechanisms of the IMF, and 
it lists the possible advantages and dangers resulting from membership. The 
proposal concludes that IMF membership would entail significant economic 
advantages for the country, and the Articles of Agreement does not contain 
any unacceptable clauses and conditions from the Hungarian point of view.415
From 1966, discreet negotiations began concerning the possibility of Hun-
gary’s IMF membership. Principally, the leaders of the National Bank, Chair-
man Andor László and Managing Director János Fekete played an outstand-
ing role in the negotiations.  At that time, Hungary was only member of one 
international financial organization, the Basel-based Bank for International 
Settlements (BIS). In June 1966, Fekete held confidential negotiations with 
the deputy governor of the institution, Jaspers Rootham, and asked him to 
intimately inquire about the Hungarian question. Fekete also had an informal 
meeting with a representative from the Bank of England who assured him that 
the Hungarian case was welcomed within British Foreign Ministry circles.416
France also supported the Hungarian case expressively and fostered the 
admission of socialist countries to the IMF and to the World Bank (WB), with 
the intention to reduce the already existing Anglo-Saxon hegemony within the 
international financial life.  However, it was obvious that the leading capitalist 
country, the United States, could not be circumvented, as it alone gave 25% 
of the total quotas of the IMF member states. Thus Fekete met with American 
politicians as well; he even had a negotiation with Brzezinski, an advisor from 
the U.S. Department of State and with Robert Roosa, former Deputy Secretary of 
Finance. It seems that Hungarian policymakers were aware of the fact that the road to 
415 János Honvári. Magyarország gazdaságtörténete Trianontól a rendszerváltásig. Bu-
dapest, Aula, 2005.
416 Csaba Nagy. Az IMF-csatlakozás elvetélt kísérletei. In: Botos, Katalin ed.: Rendsz-
erváltástól rendszerváltásig. Budapest: Tarsoly, 2007, pp. 105-188.
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the international financial institutions led through the U.S.417 Concerning Hun-
gary’s relationship with the Soviet Union, we can conclude that the Hungarian 
leadership was playing the role of the loyal, predictable and reliable ally418, regu-
larly consulting with the Soviet leadership on all key issues, including details of 
the negotiations with financial institutions. Besides Bulgaria, Hungary was the 
most loyal member of the group of “closely co-operating socialist countries” 
(all members except for Romania) being formed within the Warsaw Pact at this 
time. In exchange for its loyalty, the country could expect to maintain its relative 
internal independence, not to mention the further Soviet economic assistance 
that was extremely crucial for the country at this time.419
However, Moscow viewed the independence efforts of the satellite countries 
with growing concern: besides Hungary, Romania, Czechoslovakia, the GDR 
and Poland introduced some cautious reforms in the 1960s,420 and the pos-
sible membership of Hungary in the IMF would have probably induced a strive 
for particularism within the Soviet Bloc. The Hungarian leadership maintained 
good relations with the EEC in the 1960s, and even concluded a partial agree-
ment with the Vatican in 1964. These steps made it possible for Hungary to 
then break out from the isolation period of 1956-1962. The culmination of this 
process could have been Hungary’s membership in the IMF, but by this time the 
Soviet anti-reformist forces, led by Brezhnev and Kosygin, strongly opposed 
the idea of such a dependent relationship.421 Following the invasion of Czecho-
slovakia in August 1968, such a decision again became inappropriate.
THE “GOLDEN AGE” AND THE NEW ECONOMIC 
MECHANISM (1968-1973)
The intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968 significantly overshadowed the 
relations of the socialist countries and the international financial organizations. 
After the announcement of the Brezhnev-doctrine in 1968, personnel changes 
signaled  the shift in Soviet policy towards national reform initiatives: Ulbricht, 
Gomulka and Dubček were removed, while Živkov and Kádár remained in power 
417 János Honvári, Magyarország gazdaságtörténete Trianontól a rendszerváltásig. Bu-
dapest, Aula, 2005.
418 Békés Csaba, Hungary and the Warsaw Pact, 1954-1989: Documents on the Impact 
of a Small State within the Eastern Bloc. http://www.php.isn.ethz.ch/collections/
coll_hun/intro.cfm?navinfo=15711#10
419 Ibid.
420 László Csaba: Változó erőtérben – változó egyensúlyozás: Adalék Magyarország 
háború utáni gazdaságtörténetéhez. In: Competitio, Vol 5, Nº 2, 2006, p. 9-22.
421 Ibid.
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only by eliminating their internal reformist forces.422 After the “Prague Spring”, it 
was feared that the events in Czechoslovakia, sooner or later, would transgress 
the limits that could be tolerated by the Soviet leadership and would disqualify all 
kinds of reform in the Soviet Bloc, including the Hungarian economic reform.423 
Still, economic reform was already on its way in the form of the launched New 
Economic Mechanism, and the reform process even resulted in unexpected, 
however only initial, economic successes. The introduction of the New Econom-
ic Mechanism was followed by five golden age years: the economy was growing 
at a good pace, there was no open unemployment or inflation and the balance 
of payments was in equilibrium.424 Therefore, besides the changed international 
environment and the Soviet opposition to the Hungarian IMF related concep-
tions, the positive economic results of the NEM also contributed to the drop of 
consideration of IMF membership for a period of time. 
Historical literature attributes the failure to join the IMF at that time to the So-
viet reservations, but according to János Honvári, Hungary’s IMF membership 
was not postponed because of Soviet disapproval, but simply because of the 
fact that its economic difficulties were not severe enough to force the country 
into the arms of the IMF. He highlights that the Soviet Union did not support 
Hungary’s membership either in 1982; still it managed to join the organization. 
This could have happened because the USSR finally agreed to accept every 
step that did not entail a profound change of the socialist system. And besides 
this, for Hungary, membership was an urgent necessity rather than a matter 
of choice. For the Hungarian leadership, the main question was not the Soviet 
opinion in regard to membership, but rather the state of the national economic 
balance and other, basically economic factors. According to Honvári, it was the 
unexpected additional Soviet financial help in 1967,425 combined with the initial 
positive effects of the NEM that led to the postponement of the issue of Hun-
gary’s IMF membership, not the Soviet veto.426 On the other hand, concerning 
the New Economic Mechanism and the Hungarian reform process, László Csa-
ba argues that since the main characteristic of the Hungarian economy in the 
422 László Csaba. Változó erőtérben – változó egyensúlyozás: Adalék Magyarország 
háború utáni gazdaságtörténetéhez. In: Competitio, Vol 5, Nº 2, 2006, p. 9-22.
423 Csaba Békés. Hungary and the Warsaw Pact, 1954-1989: Documents on the Impact 
of a Small State within the Eastern Bloc.  http://www.php.isn.ethz.ch/collections/
coll_hun/intro.cfm?navinfo=15711#10
424 Pál Márer. Hungary’s balance of payments crisis and response, 1978-84. In: Country 
studies on Eastern Europe and Yugoslavia. 99th Congress 2d Session, 1986, p. 298-
321.
425 Kádár sent a letter in November 1967 to the Soviet leadership asking for additional 
financial help. The Hungarian requests surprisingly got positive reaction from the 
Soviet side and Hungary obtained concessions from the Soviet Union.
426 János Honvári. Magyarország gazdaságtörténete Trianontól a rendszerváltásig. Bu-
dapest, Aula, 2005
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1960s and 1970s was the unilateral, absolute dependence on the Soviet and in 
general on the socialist countries’ economies, which were far behind the world 
economy in the sense of modernity and effectiveness, it is quite imaginary and 
nostalgic to claim that we can talk about any real modernization and reform in 
the case of Hungary.427 Still, we must admit that the changes made to the sys-
tem of central planning contributed to the improving numbers of the Hungarian 
economy: between 1968 and 1974, the rate of the economic growth was 6-7%, 
while the amount of foreign exchange reserves started to increase.428 Anyway, 
the issue of Hungarian membership was dropped at that time.
The opinion of the Hungarian Embassy of Washington, prepared in the 
spring of 1969, unequivocally shows the changed Soviet position in regard to 
the issue: it strongly opposed Hungary’s application for membership in the IMF 
and the World Bank, because it would be an admission of the country’s eco-
nomic weaknesses and it would initiate dependence on the capitalist financial 
institutions. Besides this, it would put a limit on Hungary’s independent activi-
ties, and these institutions would have the opportunity to get an inside view 
on the country’s present economic situation, development goals, etc. In addi-
tion to this, the opinion stated that the advantages gained from membership 
were not considerable at all.429 Considering the absolutely negative approach 
towards the Hungarian intentions, it is quite surprising – as Csaba Nagy points 
it out – that the members and even the leaders of the Hungarian administra-
tion responsible for the guidelines of economic policy were not aware of the 
real profoundness of the Soviet political shift. He supports his argument by 
indicating that the question of IMF membership was put on the agenda of the 
Political Committee meeting on December 4th, 1973430 after the proposal of 
the Financial Ministry, the Foreign Trade Ministry and the National Planning 
Commission, in which they argued for Hungarian access to the IMF and World 
Bank. However, at the above-mentioned meeting of the PC, Kádár made it 
clear that without the consent of the Soviet Union, Hungary could not make 
a decision on this issue. He also pointed out that to address such a question, 
political deliberation was needed in the first place.431 Considering these cir-
cumstances, we can conclude that the decision of the Hungarian leadership 
427 László Csaba. Változó erőtérben – változó egyensúlyozás: Adalék Magyarország 
háború utáni gazdaságtörténetéhez. In: Competitio, Vol 5, Nº 2, 2006, p. 9-22.
428 Hegedűs, Babett. Adósságválság, 1982-90. Budapest: BKÁE, 2001.
429 János Honvári. Magyarország gazdaságtörténete Trianontól a rendszerváltásig. Bu-
dapest, Aula, 2005.
430 For further detailed information, see point 1. of the minutes of the HSWP PC meeting 
held on 4th December, 1973 discussing the question of the accession to the IMF and 
to the World Bank. HSWP PC minutes (288. 5/625.) http://www.digitarchiv.hu/faces/
kereso.jsp?RADT_ID=1257
431 Csaba Nagy. Az IMF-csatlakozás elvetélt kísérletei. In: Botos, Katalin ed. Rendsz-
erváltástól rendszerváltásig. Budapest: Tarsoly, 2007, pp. 105-188.
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was absolutely realistic when they suspended the negotiations with regard to 
the IMF membership.432 Nevertheless, a few years later the decision was no 
longer a question of deliberate consideration, but rather of urgent necessity. 
And the years in between these deliberations meanwhile proved to be a waste 
of time, regarding the Hungarian economic situation. 
THE “AGE OF ILLUSIONS”: IMF MEMBERSHIP AS  
A POSSIBILITY (1974–1978)
The “age of illusions” refers to the policymakers’ response to the external shocks 
Hungary suffered after the oil crisis of 1973: rising energy and raw material prices, 
large deterioration in terms of trade, and consequently the rising level of convert-
ible currency debt. Policymakers believed that the shocks were temporary and that 
the best policy response was to accelerate the rate of economic growth. For this, 
Hungary needed to purchase a rising share of energy and raw materials on the 
world market for convertible currency. The modern technology was available large-
ly in the West, again only for convertible currency. It resulted in a growing amount 
of convertible currency imports, which led to the rapid growth of the country’s level 
of debt, which was the most serious consequence of the “age of illusions”.433
As László Csaba points out, the 1970s saw the replication of the eastward-look-
ing, import-substituting industrialization endeavors of 1949-1953 and 1958-1963, 
indicating how strong an ideological bias can be against clear-cut economic re-
alities.434 Moreover, at the beginning of 1974, many of the people in leadership 
positions were replaced by anti-reformist forces, which was a crucial point since 
without them, Hungary could have elaborated a program of adaptation in response 
to the new economic environment, and it may have avoided serious indebtedness 
in the following years. Nevertheless, the fifth five-year plan did not contain any eco-
nomically rational response to the deteriorating external balance of the country.435
With regard to Hungary’s international relations, it was at this time that the 
philosophy of ranking the country’s foreign relations took shape. The most 
important partners were – not surprisingly – the socialist countries; they were 
432 László Csaba. Változó erőtérben – változó egyensúlyozás: Adalék Magyarország 
háború utáni gazdaságtörténetéhez. In: Competitio, Vol 5, Nº 2, 2006, p. 9-22.
433 Pál Márer. “Hungary’s balance of payments crisis and response, 1978-84”. In: Coun-
try studies on Eastern Europe and Yugoslavia. 99th Congress 2d Session, 1986, pp. 
298-321.
434 László Csaba. “Hungary and the IMF: The experience of a cordial discord”. In: 
Schönfeld, Roland ed. [1996]: The role of international financial institutions in Central 
and Eastern Europe. München: Südosteuropa-Ges., 1996, pp. 207-228.
435 Csaba Nagy. Az IMF-csatlakozás elvetélt kísérletei. In: Botos, Katalin ed. [2007]: 
Rendszerváltástól rendszerváltásig. Budapest: Tarsoly, 2007, pp. 105-188.
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the first contact if the country needed any kind of goods or had any problems. 
The Third World countries were regarded as the second in this rank, and the 
Western capitalist countries were regarded as “last resorts”.436 However, Hun-
gary’s economic needs dictated the continual fostering of relations with the 
West. Only a gradually growing economy could secure political stability and a 
rise in the standard of living promised by the Kádárist concept.437 The Helsinki 
Summit provided the necessary leeway for Hungary to attempt to join the IMF. 
Talks were successful, but the Hungarian leadership asked for formal approval 
from the Soviet Union. “The answer was a flat niet”. But according to the par-
ticipants in the discussions, the answer was not so clear: Kosygin stated that 
“it is your job, comrades” and then followed with a litany of complaints against 
the IMF as the “extended arm of American imperialism”.438
By 1977 it was obvious that the situation was even worse than expected (the 
net debt of the country reached $6 billion by the end of 1978), thus the Political 
Committee gave mandate to examine several comprehensive issues. However, the 
question of indebtedness was handled in top secret; even members of the Central 
Committee did not know the exact numbers concerning the country’s debt.439
In October 1977, the leadership decided to turn westward again. But before 
this, in July, the Political Committee examined the question of the country’s 
economic situation.440 The Committee concluded that Hungary was in severe 
economic trouble, and because of this, they should ask for the help of the Sovi-
et Union, in compliance with the idea of hierarchical economic relations. Prime 
Minister of Hungary György Lázár indicated, however, that another possible 
solution for overcoming the financial distress by expanding credit resources 
could be through the settlement of relations with the IMF and the World Bank. 
From that time on, the issue of IMF membership was on the agenda of Hun-
garian policymakers, even if the Prime Minister’s proposal was ultimately not 
included in the PC resolution.
Also in July 1977, Kádár met Brezhnev at the usual Crimean summer 
meeting441 and asked for Soviet financial help in order to remedy the problems 
of the Hungarian balance of payments. Surprisingly, Brezhnev was quite re-
ceptive and promised to grant financial support to Hungary.442
436 Ibid.
437 Békés. “Hungarian foreign policy in the Soviet alliance system, 1968-1989”, op. cit.
438 Csaba, Változó erőtérben – változó egyensúlyozás: Adalék Magyarország háború 
utáni gazdaságtörténetéhez, op. cit.
439 Nagy, Az IMF-csatlakozás elvetélt kísérletei, op. cit.
440 Minutes of the HSWP PC meeting (288. 5/722.) 
http://www.digitarchiv.hu/faces/kereso.jsp?RADT_ID=2237
441 For the summary of the meeting, see point 1. of the minutes of the HSWP PC meet-
ing held on 28th July, 1977. HSWP PC minutes (288. 7/723.) http://www.digitarchiv.
hu/faces/kereso.jsp?RADT_ID=2589
442 Nagy. Az IMF-csatlakozás elvetélt kísérletei, op. cit.
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In October 1977, the question was again discussed by the Central Com-
mittee443, where Rezső Nyers pointed out that it was in the crucial interest of 
Hungary to join the IMF, even if it was definitely not in the interest of the Soviet 
Union. However, he also considered it important to get the approval of the 
Soviets to start the negotiations. At this time, the proposal was again rejected 
and was not included in the final resolution.
By the beginning of 1978, the situation was so severe that the Hungarian 
leadership had to resign itself to the fact that substantial changes were needed 
in order to avoid insolvency. For this, there were two choices to be considered: 
either asking for help from the Soviets again, or turning to the IMF and World 
Bank, which would have been a more realistic solution. As for Kádár’s posi-
tion, we can deduce that he was convinced that Hungary had to examine the 
question seriously, since it was mainly and primarily a political question. Thus 
the Soviet leadership had to be consulted before any decision.444 However, a 
new element to the arguments of the Hungarian leadership by this time was the 
fact that it was stated expressly that the chance for Hungary to obtain another 
financial bailout from the Soviet Union was extremely low. Consequently, the 
question of membership was gradually evolving into a constraint for Hungary.
THE “AGE OF REALISM”: IMF MEMBERSHIP AS AN 
INESCAPABLE NECESSITY (1979–1984)
In the 1970s, the communist regime institutionalized economically unrealistic, uto-
pian ideas. Foreign credits in the period from 1974 to 1987 partially financed ex-
cess demand for public goods and personal consumption of individual products.445
After the oil crisis of 1979, Hungarian foreign debt reached 50% of the country’s 
GDP,446 thus by this time the Kádár regime could not remedy the effects of the ex-
ternal shock by growing indebtedness, as it had done after the oil crisis of 1973. In 
1979, even this possibility was unavailable, since the conditions were not given to 
obtain more credits from financial markets.447 As a result, Hungary got “caught” 
in a severe balance of payments crisis.  The Kádár leadership turned its back 
on Moscow again, but before that, a significant change happened within the 
Hungarian leadership. The Political Committee discussed the issue of IMF 
443 Minutes of the HSWP CC meeting, held on 20th October, 1977 (288. 4/151-152.) 
http://www.digitarchiv.hu/faces/kereso.jsp?RADT_ID=518
444 Nagy, Az IMF-csatlakozás elvetélt kísérletei, op. cit.
445 Béla Csikós-Nagy. “Appreciation of the IMF and World Bank activity in Hungary”. In: 
Acta Oeconomica. Vol. 42, Nº 3-4, 1990, pp. 253-265.
446 Babett Hegedűs. Adósságválság, 1982-90. Budapest: BKÁE, 2001.
447 Csaba, Változó erőtérben – változó egyensúlyozás: Adalék Magyarország háború 
utáni gazdaságtörténetéhez, op. cit.
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membership again in February 1979448. At this meeting, Kádár stood up for the 
country’s access to the IMF, arguing that the alternate, more favorable solution 
of Soviet help, did not seem to be realistic. This time Kádár’s proposal was 
included in the resolution, and it can be regarded as the first formal political 
decision in favor of Hungarian IMF membership.449 In March 1979, Kádár met 
Brezhnev again. By this time, however, the Hungarian leadership tried to play 
the card of what were later called “implicit subsidies”. They told the Soviets 
that Hungary would follow Romania, which had joined the IMF in 1972 without 
prior discussion. References were also made to Polish membership. 
The Hungarian “bargaining strategy” was based on the argument that Hun-
gary was ready to refrain from this step if the Soviet Union could find an extra 
couple million tons of crude oil to be paid for in soft currency. This strategy 
proved to be a winning one. Brezhnev began his talk with Kádár by stating that 
joining the IMF would be an infringement of socialist brotherhood and a couple 
million tons of oil would not be an issue among true allies.450
The Hungarians took Brezhnev’s words at face value and convinced Kádár that 
in this situation, it would not be appropriate to decide for the Hungarian access. 
Consequently, the Political Committee decided to postpone the question of 
membership, and again – but for the last time – the Soviet veto encumbered the 
culmination of a long process.451 This could have happened because the Hungar-
ian policymakers neglected the fact that the world had changed, and there was 
absolutely no reason to believe that the Soviets would honor their promise.
Two years later, in July 1981, Brezhnev could not bring up any new argu-
ments against Hungarian IMF membership and he implicitly accepted the idea 
as an inevitable fact.452 He simply could not do anything else, because the 
economic problems of Hungary were so severe that the situation threatened 
with the possibility of political destabilization, not only in the case of Hungary, 
but within the whole Socialist Bloc as well.
The Hungarian decision was also enhanced by the Soviet declaration of October 
1981, stating that all increments in oil supplies had to be paid for in hard curren-
cy.453 This was an extremely well-timed announcement, and after a few decades of 
flattering and opposition, personal anger was the last motive that convinced Kádár 
and the regime of neglecting the old dogma of “eternal socialist brotherhood”.454
448 Minutes of the HSWP PC meeting, held on 6th February, 1979 (288. 5/765.) 
http://www.digitarchiv.hu/faces/kereso.jsp?RADT_ID=1372
449 Nagy, Az IMF-csatlakozás elvetélt kísérletei, op. cit.
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utáni gazdaságtörténetéhez, op. cit.
 POSSIBILITY OR NECESSITY? HUNGARY’S ROAD TO IMF MEMBERSHIP 149
After the decision of the Political Committee, the Central Committee formally 
declared the access of Hungary to the IMF and the World Bank on 22 October 
1981.455 The decision was, however, not so simple and unanimous. During 
the debate, the anti-reformist forces, led by Mihály Komócsin and Gyula Dab-
rónaki presented their reservations. However, Ferenc Havasi, Rezső Nyers and 
Kádár himself stood up for access, and this was enough to convince reluctant 
members in favor of the membership.456
Just 60 minutes after the Central Committee had approved Hungary’s IMF 
access, János Fekete’s plane was taking off for Washington.457 Hungary had 
formally applied to join the International Monetary Fund and the International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) on November 4, 1981.
Since all the macroeconomic data related to the country’s economic situa-
tion were handled as top secret issues, the news of the accession arrived as 
a shock to the general public. From an economic point of view, however, it 
is unquestionable that there remained no other possibility for the Hungarian 
leadership to escape from the serious economic problems.458 Actually, this 
was a typically Hungarian rescue operation. May 1981 had been the last time 
the country could tap medium-term international funds. During that summer, 
Romania had covered its insolvency by means of dubious practices, and by 
September, Yugoslavia had to reschedule its foreign debt. Polish insolvency 
was a fact by that time. Following the imposition of martial law, a lending em-
bargo on the Soviet Bloc was declared. This prompted the de facto Soviet-run 
International Bank of Economic Cooperation and some Arab investors to with-
draw deposits of $1.5 billion from the National Bank of Hungary, to relend the 
money to Poland and to bridge Soviet cash-flow problems. This would surely 
have knocked out the Hungarian economy, had not the Bank for International 
Settlements (BIS) and Margaret Thatcher both extended their help. These ex-
ceptional forms of assistance would hardly have been conceivable had not 
the Hungarian application for IMF membership been well underway. Thanks to 
these operations, Hungary could maintain its solvency.459
Whether the timing was foresight or just plain luck is difficult for an out-
sider to judge. Hungary became a member of the IMF and the World Bank at 
record speed460 in May 1982; since then it has obtained a considerable amount 
455 Minutes of the HSWP CC meeting (288. 4/181-182.) 
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458 Csaba, “Változó erőtérben – változó egyensúlyozás: Adalék Magyarország háború 
utáni gazdaságtörténetéhez”, op. cit.
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of financial assistance from, or with the help of these institutions. Shortly af-
ter Hungary joined the IMF, it obtained temporary “bridging” credits totaling 
$510 million from the BIS. In December 1982, the IMF approved a $600 mil-
lion stand-by loan to Hungary to support its economic stabilization program. 
Upon the completion of the first program, in January 1984, Hungary obtained 
a second stand-by loan of $440 million (SDR 425 million) to support the gov-
ernment’s further economic and financial program. Thus, during its first two 
years of membership, Hungary obtained almost $1 billion in loans from the 
IMF, which it used largely to repay the BIS and for debt service payments to 
other lenders.461 Without these, Hungary could not escape from the “result” 
of the “age of illusions”, which was dominated by unrealistic economic ideas. 
CONCLUSION
The IMF membership of Hungary signaled the end of the “Soviet-first” ap-
proach that had shaped the first 25 years of Kádár’s rule. The complexity of the 
Hungarian situation is clearly outlined in the speech of Ferenc Havasi, Secre-
tary of the Central Committee in charge of the economy to Parliament in 1982:
“As you know, at the beginning of this year, Hungary has run into excep-
tional difficulties in her international financial relations. First, we were turning to 
our allies. Unfortunately, they were all preoccupied with their own headaches. 
They were not in a position to help us… Then we were turning to our Western 
partners. As the Hungarian proverb says: it is in times of difficulty when you 
find out who your real friend is. We were assisted, and I can report to the Parlia-
ment with pride: the financial crisis has been overcome.”462
Hungarian foreign policy deriving from the 1970s was built on relative autono-
my. It was based on the concept that the current Soviet standpoint should always 
be supported, or at least, steps should not be openly taken against it. However, 
this did not mean that Hungarian behavior was passive within the Warsaw Pact. 
The Hungarian leadership often took independent initiatives, but only if they 
knew that these were not contrary to Soviet intentions.463 The policy of “con-
shift from the stimulation of growth to the improvement of the external balance took place 
in Hungary’s economic policy. Second, Hungary introduced a broad market oriented reform 
since 1968. Thirdly, Hungary enjoyed the support and the confidence of the international 
financial community. For more details, see: Szombati, Bea, The IMF’s Role int he Hungarian 
Reform Process. In: Schönfeld, Roland ed., The role of international financial institutions in 
Central and Eastern Europe. München: Südosteuropa-Ges., 1996,  p.229-235.
461 Márer, op. cit.
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463 Békés, Csaba: Hungary and the Warsaw Pact, 1954-1989: Documents on the Im-
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structive loyalty”, as Csaba Békés denotes it, included conflict prevention on 
the one hand, and flexibility and adjustment to Soviet requirements, with a 
willingness to cooperate on the other. The content of this principle until 1988 
implied that “what is not forbidden is allowed”. In practice, it meant that the 
Hungarian leadership tried to influence the Soviet leadership within the frame-
work of bilateral relations, which served the concrete interests of Hungary.464 
Hungary’s joining the Fund was also a clear expression of intentions and ef-
forts, already existing in several Central and Eastern European countries since 
the middle of 1970s, to open up their economies to the West and to launch 
economic management reform.465
However, György Matolcsy criticized the activity of the IMF in Hungary 
harshly, because, according to him, the United States and Western European 
countries intended to make use of the indebtedness of the socialist countries 
in order to undermine the stability of the Soviet Empire. The Western credits 
granted to socialist countries served the same purpose; that is to make the 
Eastern Bloc dependent on Western capital as much as possible. They knew 
that beyond a certain period of time, economic reforms would implicate politi-
cal and social changes as well.466
I agree with Matolcsy on the point that it was definitely in the interest of the 
Western organizations to enhance closer relations with the socialist countries, 
even with the intention of loosening cohesion within the Soviet Bloc. It is also 
true that the BIS deliberately granted credits to Hungary in order to prevent 
the fall of the Hungarian “liberal socialism”.467
 But I assume that this relationship with Western financial organizations was 
not a unilateral interest at all; Hungary had a considerable stake in the “trans-
action” as well. Based on mutual benefits, the attempts made by the Hungar-
ian leadership to open up the country’s economy towards the West can be re-
garded as an endeavor to gradually turn away from the Soviet Bloc. Hungarian 
foreign policy, however, always remained within the framework of the “socialist 
brotherhood” and therefore it did not challenge the unity of the Bloc directly.
In conclusion, the final answer to the heading question of the paper could be 
summarized as the following. For many years, especially in the period between 
the end of the Second World War and the first oil crisis in 1973, there really was a 
possibility for Hungary to join the IMF. However, due to international circumstances 
and the deterministic nature of Soviet-Hungarian relations, Hungary was under-
standably not in the situation to act freely with regard to its international relations. 
After 1973, the question of membership was no longer a choice. It was definitely 
464 Békés, “Hungarian foreign policy in the Soviet alliance system, 1968-1989, op. cit.
465 Csaba, “Hungary and the IMF: The experience of a cordial discord”, op. cit.
466 Hegedűs, op. cit.
467 Czabán, László. “Magyarország nemzetközi pénzügyi helyzete 1982-1989 között”. 
In: Gazdaság és társadalom, Vol.1, Nº 4, 1990, p. 52-74.
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a constraint to get closer to the Western financial institutions, particularly after the 
second oil crisis of 1979, when after several years of hesitation and fence-sitting, 
Hungary’s fate was sealed; it could not choose. It had to rely on the financial help 
of the IMF, and this was an inevitable necessity for the country to survive.
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ARMED ANTI-COMMUNIST RESISTANCE IN 
SLOVENIA 1945–50
OSKAr muLeJ
This paper strives to provide an introduction to the topic of the organized 
armed resistance against the political order and authorities of the People’s 
Republic of Slovenia, as a part of the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia 
that was taking place roughly between the years 1945 and 1950. 
In contrast to the cases of armed anti-communist struggles in the Baltic coun-
tries – as well as in Ukraine or Romania for instance – the anti-communist resist-
ance in Slovenia represents a fairly understudied, rarely addressed and relatively 
unknown topic. It has not yet received much attention from the Slovene histori-
ography. Thus, it has also not become an object of public discussion, as most 
Slovenes are not even aware of its existence.  This is not only due to the important 
fact that the scale and intensity of this resistance was fairly low, but partly also due 
to the considerable difference in the public perceptions of the communist past.
Secondly – and even more importantly – the available sources on this topic are 
scarce. They mostly consist of documents created by and for the use of Yugoslav 
communist secret services and of records from court trials that took place against 
the real or alleged insurgents. A few rather short memoirs also exist, written either 
by former members of the security forces or by people who had been involved 
in organizing the anti-communist resistance, but were usually not fighting on the 
ground.  During the last decade, two monographs468 have been published that 
deal with the topic of anti-communist insurgency. Both provide an overview of 
data from the materials mentioned above, but offer different explanations for the 
principal causes behind the armed resistance. Premk’s 2005 book attributed this 
role primarily to the activities of émigré centres in conjunction with the British 
and American secret services. Mateja Čoh, on the other hand, laid more stress 
on the participants’ individual motives for rebelling against the regime – most 
importantly the discontent with regime policies among the Slovene peasantry. 
Albeit being based on the above discussed sources, my paper will leave the 
questions of principal causes and primary motives aside and shall limit itself 
468 Martin Premk, Matjaževa vojska 1945-1950 (Matthias’s Army 1945-1950) (Ljubljana: 
Društvo piscev zgodovine NOB Slovenije, 2005); Mateja Čoh, “Za svobodo, kralja 
in domovino”. Ilegalne skupine v Sloveniji med letoma 1945 in 1952 (“For Freedom, 
King and Country”. Illegal Groups in Slovenia between the Years 1945 and 1952) 
(Ljubljana: Študijski center za narodno spravo, 2010). 
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to an account of some general figures and facts that can be discerned from 
the known data. The main aim shall be to provide an overview of the forms 
and activities of the armed anti-communist groups, as well as the measures 
employed by the Yugoslav security forces for fighting them. 
THE ORIGINS OF COMMUNIST RULE IN YUGOSLAVIA
Yugoslavia, which was invaded by the Axis forces on April 6, 1941 and in turn 
carved up into annexed territories, occupation zones and puppet states, subse-
quently experienced a number of internal conflicts. In addition to the anti-Axis 
struggle, interethnic wars raged in most of the nationally and religiously mixed 
parts of the country, such as Dalmatia, Bosnia, Herzegovina and Kosovo. 
These were in most cases also intertwined with ideologically-based conflicts, 
above all between the Communist-led partisans, which were – apart from fight-
ing the occupiers – also engaging in a revolutionary struggle for power, and vari-
ous counterrevolutionary military organizations. Most notable of the latter were the 
forces under the command of General Dragoljub (Draža) Mihailović, who was acting 
as Minister of War for the Yugoslav King and the official government in London.
Competing with the official Yugoslav Army in the Fatherland (popularly called 
the Chetniks), the partisans led by Josip Broz Tito gradually gained an upper-
hand in achieving Anglo-American support. This was mostly due to pragmatic 
considerations based on intelligence data that gave the impression that the 
partisans posed a more significant and direct threat to the Axis occupation 
forces and had succeeded in gaining ground among all Yugoslav nationalities 
and in operating in almost all regions of the country. 
The constant struggles between Croat and Serb members of consequently 
unstable royal governments also contributed to the Western Allies’ decision to 
transfer their support to Tito’s Communists. After the June 1944 Allied-spon-
sored agreement between Tito and Ivan Šubašić, the Prime Minister of the 
Yugoslav government in-exile, Mihailović was deposed as War Minister and 
the partisans proclaimed the official Yugoslav army. 
In contrast to the other parts of Yugoslavia where the situation was more compli-
cated due to interethnic conflicts – and to an extent similarly as in Serbia – the in-
ternal conflict in Slovene lands was based exclusively on ideological lines. Particu-
larly the Southern part of Slovenia, originally occupied by fascist Italy, experienced 
revolutionary violence and a state of civil war between 1942 and 1945. These oc-
curred in Slovenia under foreign occupation and parallelly to the resistance against 
it. Since the latter came to be monopolized by the Communist-dominated Libera-
tion Front of the Slovene Nation (Osvobodilna fronta slovenskega naroda) and due 
to various other factors, the counter-revolution in large part came to adopt the role 
of military collaboration with first the Italian and later the German occupying forces. 
At the end of the war in May 1945, Communist rule was swiftly established. 
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During the summer of the same year, the great majority of returned or captured 
counter-revolutionaries were systematically massacred – the approximate fig-
ure of those killed (for Slovenes alone) stands at 13,500.469 The final takeover 
of power and its formalization after the federal elections in the autumn of 1945 
were thus results of a “self-made revolution”, which “started early, in special 
circumstances.”470 Being “modelled and influenced strongly by its only living 
example – the Soviet Union”, the regime “developed its main characteristics 
earlier than the rest of Eastern Europe.”471 A greater part of the anti-communist 
fighting in Slovenia therefore occurred under the circumstances of the Second 
World War and before the actual communist regime was established. Its nature 
was thus counterrevolutionary and, due to special conditions, also partly took 
the form of military collaboration with the occupying forces. During the con-
cluding phase of WWII, the two military formations fighting the Communist-
led472 partisans in Slovenia were the Home Guard (Domobranci) and the Slov-
ene section of the Yugoslav Army in the Fatherland (Slovene Chetniks). The 
former was high in numbers, reaching up to 18,000 soldiers. They were armed 
by the Germans and formally acted as an auxiliary police force under German 
command. In fact, in certain respects, the Home Guard nonetheless operated 
quite autonomously, being in addition perceived as the Slovenian army by a 
considerable part of the population in the territories where it operated. 
The “Chetniks”, on the other hand, were numerically few, at no point num-
bering more than a couple hundred soldiers. They did not stand under Ger-
man command and enjoyed secret support by some of the Home Guard units, 
whose officers were secretly members of the Chetnik movement. Among the 
more important leaders and organizers of the Yugoslav Army in the Fatherland 
in Slovenia was Major (later Lieutenant Colonel) Andrej Glušič. In June of 1944 
he was arrested by the Gestapo, sent to Dachau concentration camp, and af-
ter the war acted as one of the most important organizers of armed resistance 
against communist rule.473
469 Božo Repe, “Changes in Life Style and Social and National Structures in Slovenia 
after World War Two” in 1945 – A Break with the Past, A History of Central European 
Countries at the End of World War Two, Zdenko Čepič ed. (Ljubljana: Inštitut za 
novejšo zgodovino = Institute for Contemporary History, 2008), pp. 195-212, p. 200.
470 Jera Vodušek Starič, “The making of the communist regime in Slovenia and Yugoslavia” in 
Crimes committed by totalitarian regimes: reports and proceedings of the 8 April European 
Public Hearing on Crimes Committed by Totalitarian Regimes, Peter Jambrek ed. (Ljubljana: 
Slovenian Presidency of the Council of the European Union, 2008), pp. 25-38, p. 37.
471 Ibid.
472 Communist-led and not simply and thoroughly communist, as most of the fighters 
were not communists, even if the majority of them also supported certain forms of 
radical social change in addition to liberation from Axis occupation.
473 For more on Glušič see: Mateja Čoh, “Dosje Andreja Glušiča (Dossier Andrej Glušič),” 
Studia Historica Slovenica, nr. 2-3, vol. 11 (2011): pp. 201-224.
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ARMED RESISTANCE AGAINST THE COMMUNIST REGIME
During the first postwar years, a number of armed groupings existed throughout 
Yugoslavia with the common characteristics of illegality and hostility towards 
the existing political regime. Their origins and goals, affiliations and motives, 
however, varied highly between various parts of the country and among specific 
groups within them. In Croatia, Dalmatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, for instance, 
groups of Croatian separatists – usually also of the Ustasha background – pre-
vailed, although pro-Yugoslav, as well as Serb nationalist, “Chetnik” ones were 
also present.474 Some of them were composed of members of WWII military 
formations that had remained in Yugoslavia and were hiding from authorities, 
whereas some others were formed by discontented peasants, army deserters 
and former partisans. There were, of course, also instances of “mixed” units.
The extent and intensity of the armed anti-communist resistance in Slovenia 
(and Yugoslavia in general) never reached or even approached the state of full 
scale war. It was fairly limited in terms of the number of people involved or im-
mediately affected, and did not include larger combat actions from either of the 
sides. Nevertheless, in Slovenia alone, around 35 larger illegal armed groups 
operated between 1945 and 1950 that had emerged as a form of resistance to 
the measures of the communist authorities.475 Most of them formally adhered 
to a joint platform, acting under the banner of “Slovene Troops of the Yugoslav 
Army in the Fatherland” (Slovenske trupe Jugoslovanske vojske v domovini), also 
known as the “Matthias’s Army” (Matjaževa vojska – Matjaž being the name of 
a mythical “Slovene king”, based loosely on the memory of the Hungarian king 
Matthias Corvinus) or “Crusaders” (Križarji)476 and presented themselves as loyal 
to the Yugoslav king Peter II and his émigré government.
474 See: Zdenko Radelić, Križari: gerila u Hrvatskoj 1945-1950 (Crusaders: Guerillas in 
Croatia 1945-1950) (Zagreb: Hrvatski institute za povijest, Dom I svijet, 2002), and 
Zdenko Radelić, “Projugoslavenska protukomunistička gerila u Hrvatskoj nakon dru-
gog svjetskog rata” (Pro- Yugoslav Anticommunist Guerillas in Croatia after the Sec-
ond World War), Časopis za suvremenu povijest, Nº 2, vol. 35 (2003): pp. 463-487.
475 Mateja Čoh, “Characteristics of the judicial system in Slovenia between 1945 and 
1951,” in Crimes committed by totalitarian regimes: reports and proceedings of the 8 
April European Public Hearing on Crimes Committed by Totalitarian Regimes, Peter 
Jambrek ed. (Ljubljana: Slovenian Presidency of the Council of the European Union, 
2008), pp. 61-70, p.65.
476 Crusaders was also the name with which most of the Croatian separatist armed 
groups identified. The Slovene pro-Yugoslav and Croatian separatist Crusaders 
were however not related to each other, apart from using the name and the symbol 
of a cross in order to identify with Christendom and point out their anti-communist 
orientation (common slogan of the Croatian insurgents being Za Hrvatsku I Krista 
– Protiv Komunista – “For Croatia and Christ – Against the Communists” (Radelić, 
Projugoslavenska, 466.)
 ARMED ANTI-COMMUNIST RESISTANCE IN SLOVENIA 1945-50  157
The post-war anti-regime insurgency in Slovenia represented a distinct phe-
nomenon from the civil war that was taking place during the Axis occupation, al-
though of course not entirely disconnected from the previous events. It affected 
a major portion of Slovene territory, but was at the same time far more intense in 
the northeast, which had previously been left largely unaffected by the civil war. 
Moreover, in addition to the majority of the organizers and a considerable pro-
portion of the supporters, which had adhered to the anti-partisan camp during 
the WWII, a large share of insurgents and their supporting base came from the 
population that had sided with the partisans during the war and even included 
ex-partisans, among them a few former Communist Party members. 
In terms of periodization, three different “phases” may be discerned when 
speaking about the type and dynamics of post-WWII insurgency in Slovenia. 
This periodization corresponds roughly to the phases that were defined al-
ready in the detailed reports on insurgency written by officers of the Slovenian 
Administration for State Security (Uprava državne varnosti – UDV, colloquially 
called UDBA).477
During the first “phase”, immediately after the end of the war and the sub-
sequent establishment of communist rule, large groups of WWII counter-rev-
olutionary and collaborationist troops were still present in Slovenia, scattered 
throughout its territory. These were mainly uncoordinated groups of former 
Home Guards that were hiding from the winning side, although there were also 
some better organized Chetnik units that had most probably remained in Slov-
enia intentionally. The strength of these groups, which were usually armed with 
light automatic weapons, hand grenades and explosives, varied from less than 
10 to more than 150 soldiers in certain cases. Altogether there were around 
2000-armed men hiding in Slovenian forests in June 1945.478
These armed groups were, however, quickly diminishing in strength. This 
was in large part due to the intense pursuit campaigns conducted by the units 
of the secret police – “Department for the Protection of the People” (OZNA), 
from 1946 on “Administration for State Security” (UDBA) – together with spe-
cial military units of the “Popular Defense Corps of Yugoslavia” (KNOJ), as 
well as units of the regular army. The main goal of most of these men being to 
survive, most of them managed to escape over the Austrian or Italian border or 
turned themselves over to the authorities after general amnesty had been pro-
claimed in August 1945. At the beginning of 1946, less than 100 armed former 
counterrevolutionaries were thus still in Slovenia.479
477 “Razvojna obdobja banditizma” (Developmental Periods of Banditism), in Iz arhivov 
slovenske politične policije: UDBA, OZNA, VOS (From the Archives of the Slovenian 
Political Police: UDBA, OZNA, VOS), Jože Pučnik ed. (Ljubljana: Veda, 2002), pp. 
148-150.
478 Premk, Matjaževa, 313.
479 Cf. Ibid. 76.
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As mentioned, the majority of these men was, above all else, hiding from 
the authorities and trying to escape across the borders. Some of them though, 
also organized themselves as rebel units, conducted acts of sabotage, at-
tacked military installations and transport infrastructure and were particularly 
active in spreading anti-communist and royalist propaganda. 
The latter became especially intense during the weeks before the general 
elections in November 1945480, after which the communist-led “Popular Front” 
officially took power and the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia was pro-
claimed. These groups sometimes even organized secret political meetings in 
villages, where they agitated against the elections. 
By the time of the general elections, the establishment of an organized and 
coordinated resistance had already begun. A few of the above discussed groups 
established contacts with émigré centres in Italy and Austria, from where they 
started receiving instructions and propaganda materials. Already by the autumn 
of 1945 they were joined by new, “genuine” rebel groups, which were not com-
prised of former Home Guards in hiding, but of civilians and army deserters. These 
groups operated mostly in the northeast of Slovenia, close to the border area. 
Originally they had operated on their own, but at the same time had sought to 
establish contacts with the émigré anti-communist organizers across the border. 
The first messengers began to secretly enter Slovenia - mostly through the 
Austrian border - to gather intelligence and organize resistance.  Mainly be-
longing to the ranks of former Chetniks and Home Guards, some of these 
messengers – most notably the first leader of “Intelligence Center 400” in Graz, 
Miloš Glišić – were also trying to establish links with the Yugoslav Chetnik 
leader Draža Mihailović, who was still hiding in Bosnia with some of his remain-
ing troops. This did not succeed though, and Mihailović himself was captured 
in March 1946 and executed after a public trial.481
By the spring of 1946, most of the remaining groups of WWII fighters were 
already gone from Slovenia while, at the same time, intelligence centres had 
been established by the Yugoslav political emigrants in Austria. The “second 
phase” of illegal groups’ activity in Slovenia had commenced, distinguished 
by the highest degree of insurgency activity.482 Most importantly, coordinated 
attempts from the outside (that is from émigré centres in Austria and Italy) to 
create broad-scale armed resistance took place. Armed units, called “assault 
groups” and “assault detachments” (usually between 5 and 50 people), some 
of them trained in espionage and military tactics, were permanently present in 
Slovenia. They were making public appearances and were supposed to estab-
lish themselves as the core of the future “liberation army”.
480 Čoh, Za svobodo, 92.
481 He remained an important symbol for anti-communists, though, as his name was 
later mentioned in the official war song of Matthias’s Army. 
482 Cf. Čoh, Za svobodo, p. 93.
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Intelligence centres in Austria and Italy succeeded in establishing contacts 
with some of the already existing units and in sending groups of organizers 
across the border. The aim was to create a guerrilla force along with an organ-
ized network of supporters. Skilled propagandists and intelligence officers from 
the former Home Guard and Chetnik ranks were sent to accomplish this task. 
The units on the ground were furthermore provided with arms and logistical 
equipment. Some of them maintained radio contacts with intelligence centres 
abroad. The clandestine groups operated at night and were hiding in secret 
bunkers in forests or on desolate farms during the daytime. They perpetrated 
acts of sabotage, gathered intelligence and spread anti-communist, royalist, 
pro-Western and pro-democratic propaganda. In addition to that, a few assas-
sination attempts – some successful, some unsuccessful – took place against 
visible communists. The members of armed insurgent groups were mostly 
peasants and people in hiding483 (members of former counterrevolutionary 
units, army deserters, as well as some common criminals). Illegal groups oper-
ated in all parts of Slovenia but were most numerous, active and successful in 
the northeast, where they managed to establish a broad network of supporters. 
Most of the armed actions happened there, and the presence of guerrilla 
groups was permanent. In other parts of Slovenia, the activities of the clan-
destine groups were less overt and more sporadic, being limited mostly to 
propaganda, espionage and single acts of sabotage. Most importantly, their 
presence was not permanent.  
A major portion of the armed insurgent groups claimed to be affiliated with 
the “Slovene Troops of the Yugoslav Army” or “Matthias’s Army”. They pre-
sented themselves as anti-communist, pro-democratic and loyal to the mon-
archy – often also carrying the official royal Yugoslav insignia484 – and were, to 
some extent, coordinated from centres abroad. 
These centres stood formally under the supreme authority of Yugoslav 
King Peter II in London and the “Central National Committee of Kingdom of 
Yugoslavia” in Rome, which was led by prominent members of the pre-war 
political parties, such as Živko Topalović from the Yugoslav Socialist Party, 
Adam Pribičević from the Independent Democrat Party, Juraj Krnjević from the 
Croatian Peasant Party and Miha Krek from the Slovene People’s Party. Sev-
eral other national committees were subordinated to the central one in Rome. 
Among those there was also the “National Committee of Kingdom of Yugo-
slavia” in Salzburg led by former Chetnik officer and Serbian Radical politi-
cian Stevan Trifunac. This committee was in charge of establishing the already 
mentioned intelligence centres in Austria and Italy, which had a principal role in 
creating the strategy and directing the activities of “Matthias’s Army”.
483 Ibid., p. 89.
484 Ibid., p. 76.
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The principal intelligence centre was located in Salzburg and led by lieuten-
ant colonel Andrej Glušič, who was formally subordinated to the commander of 
“Slovene Troops of the Royal Yugoslav Army” General Ivan Prezelj, but was in 
fact himself in charge of organizing and coordinating the resistance. A number 
of other intelligence centres were subordinated to him: 
- “400” – Located in Graz and led first by Miloš Glišić – Zlatibor up  
 until his capture in January 1946, when he had tried to establish con-
 tact with general Draža Mihailović. After that, its operations were  
 headed by Karel Kornhauser up until 1948 and Avgust Kovač and  
 Lieutenant Jože Saje thereafter.
- “101/501” – Located in Klagenfurt and led by former Home Guard  
 and Chetnik officers Ivan Drčar and France Grum.
- “305” – Located in Trieste and led by Dušan Lajovic.
- “505” - located in Gorizia and led by Anton Kostnapfl.
All of these centres was supported by and cooperated with the US Army’s 
“Counter Intelligence Corps” and the British “Field Secret Service”, the extent 
and significance of this cooperation not being entirely clear. Their objectives 
included the establishment of an intelligence network in Slovenia, the organ-
ization of a network of local councils that would represent a political base 
of the resistance movement and eventually form a national government, and 
the creation of a military organization in the form of “assault groups”. These 
groups would eventually form larger units such as battalions and were given 
the name of “Matthias’s Army”, whereas the political organization was named 
“Matthias’s Movement”. Creation of an underground network of supporters 
succeeded only in parts of northeastern Slovenia, and even there only partly. 
More successful was the propaganda activity, which included dissemina-
tion of Matjažev glas (“Voice of Matthias”), a newspaper printed in Austria, 
secretly brought to Slovenia and usually distributed there by mail. It delivered 
accounts about better life in the West, the undemocratic nature of the Yugo-
slav regime and political repression.  High communist officials were slandered 
– Tito, for example, for being “a glutton, drunkard and sexual maniac”485 - and 
those assisting the secret police threatened with the names of secret police 
agents sometimes being exposed. Appeals were issued to the Slovene people 
to rebel against the regime, whereby the strength of the “Matthias’s Army” 
was often deliberately grossly overestimated. During 1947 and 1948, a radio 
program was broadcast to Slovenia from the intelligence centres in Austria.
Apart from espionage and propaganda, the insurgents also engaged in assaults 
on police (“People’s Militia”) stations, local administration offices and military in-
stallations. Since a majority of them consisted of peasants, and with collectiviza-
485 Matjažev glas, yr. 2, Nº. 4 (March 1948), quoted from: Premk, Matjaževa, 259.
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tion of agriculture being one of the most directly hated government measures, 
collective farms represented the most common targets of armed attacks. 
Local communists, public officials and supporters of the regime were threat-
ened by the insurgents; some were also killed. The latter actions were con-
ducted mostly without previous approval from abroad, as the armed groups 
acted quite independently and did not always strictly follow the instructions 
that were given to them. In addition to the “Matthias’s Army” units, entirely in-
dependent groups also existed, including the “Yugoslav Liberation Movement” 
(Jugoslovanski osvobodilni pokret - JOP), “Slovene Voluntary Army” (Slovenska 
prostovoljna armada -SPA), Slovene Anti-Communist Organization (Slovenska 
antikomunistična organizacija - SAKO) and Balkan Guard (Balkanska straža), as 
well as a few groups of common criminals. In 1949, when Yugoslavia was at 
the highest point of conflict with the USSR, one group emerged that was not 
anti-communist, but adopted a pro-Soviet position.486
The resistance was met with a swift response by the Communist Yugoslav 
security forces – primarily the secret police and special military units of KNOJ. 
These units regularly launched large-scale missions in which they examined 
large sections of terrain, thereby searching for insurgents and eliminating 
them. One of the officers taking part in these actions, who had been a partisan 
during the war, wrote in his memoirs: 
“How strangely the history repeats itself (…) they are bandits as we were for 
the Germans before. They fight and organize themselves in the same manner, 
as we did. In some areas they enjoy a considerable support from the locals, 
exactly as we did.”487
He also gave an account of one of the clashes with insurgents:
“Somewhere, we track a peasant house with Crusaders inside. Dark win-
dows. Encirclement. Shots coming from the house. Members of KNOJ return 
fire. It does not help, a KNOJ officer gets shot. We burn the house with rifle gre-
nades. No one comes out, no one surrenders. The house burns down. Soldiers 
drag out burnt corpses. A row of dead bodies is put on ground – Crusaders 
and a peasant family.”488
Another form of destroying the resistance was the use of special agents, 
acting as insurgents – usually adopting the role of messengers coming from 
Austria. Their task was to assassinate the leaders or bring the group into an 
ambush. UDBA succeeded in developing a widespread field network of in-
formants and infiltrating agents into the insurgent groups. This enabled a fairly 
successful uncovering of the groups’ operations and collection of data on their 
486 Pučnik, Iz arhivov, 416.
487 Zdenko Zavadlav, Križarji. Matjaževa vojska na Slovenskem (Crusaders. Matthias’s 
Army in the Slovene Lands) (Ljubljana: Horvat MgM, 1994), pp. 23-24.
488 Zavadlav, Križarji, p. 25.
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members.489 Furthermore, the secret police was forming whole units of fake 
insurgents to check the terrain for supporters and clues, some of these special 
groups were even staging clashes with army units.490
Heavy pressure was also put on the insurgents’ families, who were often 
arrested, forcibly resettled to desolate regions and deprived of jobs or pen-
sions (so called “economic punishment”). There were cases of UDBA arrest-
ing groups of civilians as “collectively responsible” when an act of sabotage 
happened or propaganda leaflets appeared, - basically taking hostages to put 
pressure on the insurgents to turn themselves in. Last but not least, public 
shootings of civilians accused of helping the resistance were also counted 
among possible methods.491
Captured “bandits”, as the insurgents were referred to by the regime, were tried 
in a series of large public trials.  Leaders of the groups and some of the members 
received death sentences, whereas others were sentenced to forced labour (usual-
ly 5-20 years). Alleged supporters of the illegal groups, very often family members 
as well as many Catholic priests also received punishment by forced labour, usu-
ally between 1 and 10 years. The authorities usually also confiscated their property.
UDBA noted in its reports that in 1947 “the emigration suffered a final defeat in 
the field of banditry” and that most of the armed units were destroyed.492 Neverthe-
less, anti-communist activities led by intelligence centres persisted but adopted new 
strategies. Thus, the “third phase” of anti-communist resistance between 1948 and 
1950 was distinguished by smaller units of commandos, spies and messengers. Their 
activities were mainly limited to espionage and propaganda, although they also com-
mitted acts of sabotage. Even in February 1950, 1,000 leaflets with anti-communist 
content were disseminated in the streets of the Slovenian capital Ljubljana alone.493
Moreover, in 1949 the émigré centres lost Anglo-American support as the 
Western powers began supporting Tito, after Yugoslavia came into conflict 
with the Soviet Union and its allies. In the second half of the year, the centres 
were disbanded because their activities were banned by American and British 
authorities. The last messenger tried to cross the Yugoslav border in Septem-
ber 1950. At the end of 1950, the department of secret police dealing with 
fighting against the “banditry” still recorded 23 insurgents in Slovenia.494
According to the secret police data, around 165 insurgents and supporters were 
killed in battle between 1945 and 1950. This figure does not include the remains of 
489 Čoh, Characteristics, p. 65.
490 Premk, Matjaževa, p. 311.
491 Cf. ibid., p. 245, 312. 
This extreme measure is however not known to have ever been implemented in 
Slovenia.
492 Pučnik, Iz arhivov, p. 162.
493 Ibid., p. 417.
494 Ibid., p. 417.
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counterrevolutionary forces in 1945.  Together with those it amounts to 250-300. 
Approximately 600 members of armed groups were captured (together with former 
counterrevolutionaries 3,100) and around 1,900 alleged supporters and collabora-
tors were arrested or killed.495 The number of casualties caused by insurgents is 
not known.  Judging on the basis of available data, one may conclude that the 
presence and activity of armed anti-communist groups in Slovenia was relatively 
limited and small-scale, and could therefore not have posed a serious threat to 
the regime. At the same time, however, the figures concerning killed and arrested 
fighters and supporters reveal that it was not a completely negligible force either. 
As such, it represents a topic of Slovene modern history that should certainly 
not be overlooked, as well as a small piece in the mosaic of Central and Eastern 
European Cold War history.  Many questions remain open - especially the ones 
concerning the role of the Western Allies and the exact extent of influence and 
control over the armed groups on the part of the émigré intelligence centres. The 
degree of possible involvement of the Yugoslav secret police, which might have 
used “banditry” as a precedent and an instrument for persecuting the “class en-
emy” or any other alleged opponents of the regime, remains also unclear.
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THE ARMENIAN GENOCIDE IN SOVIET 
ARMENIAN COLLECTIVE MEMORY
ÉVA merenICS 
Both the organization of the process and the consequences of the Armenian 
Genocide show similarities with later genocides of the 20th century. Moreover, 
most of the analyses of these similarities are formed in the Jewish-Armenian 
perspective. For example, in comparison to processing the trauma of the Holo-
caust, Armenian survivors and future generations also reacted to the events 
similarly, while various parallels were shown during the organization and ex-
ecution of the extermination plans.496 Viewing the consequences of the Arme-
nian genocide, both constructive and destructive responses to – processing 
strategies of or attitudes towards – the trauma are present, which may serve as 
bases to prognoses concerning the aftermath of other mass traumas – not only 
genocides, but also civil wars and international and ethnic conflicts. The cur-
rent study examines the frameworks and the processing of collective trauma 
present in the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR).
When analysing the aftermath of the Armenian genocide it can be assumed 
that all survivors and refugees experienced nearly the same traumatic events, 
the effects of which influenced all survivors psychologically - irrespective of their 
future location. Miller and Touryan-Miller experienced and described six atti-
tudes497 regarding memories of the events based on their interviews taken from 
survivors in the United States. These strategies vary in intensity and means. The 
six ideal types of reflections do not constitute a scale and are possibly present 
on the individual level in each community of survivors and their descendants. 
One of the least visible strategies is avoidance and repression. This means that 
the given survivor is not able to speak out the trauma and/or avoids events, 
which could recall the memories of the genocide. Another attitude is resignation 
and despair, which may also result in silence, albeit by a conscious refusal – in 
contrast to avoidance described above – of the events. In this case the given 
survivors “[…] seemed to lack the emotional strength to rise above their past 
[…]”498. Explanation and rationalisation are also possible strategies which mean 
that survivors attempt to find a meaning behind the events. (I.e. divine plan, des-
496 Richard G. Hovhanissian (ed.) The Armenian Genocide in Perspective (Transaction 
Publishers; New Brunswick), (London, 1991), 86, 177.
497 For descriptions of the strategies see: Donald E. Miller –Lorna Touryan Miller: Sur-
vivors. An Oral History of the Armenian Genocide. (University of California Press, 
Berkeley), (Los Angeles, London, 1999),158-159, HOVANNISIAN 1991, 191–199.
498 Ibid., p.159.
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tiny of the nation, suffering for Christian faith, etc.) Reconciliation and forgive-
ness is also present among survivor attitudes. This means recalling the events 
regularly and, on the other hand, having an optimist view of the future. 
Outrage and anger is another strategy, which involves verbal or non-physical 
violence towards the direct perpetrators and those who were responsible for the 
genocide as organizers or supporters. The last form of trauma processing is re-
venge and restitution, which means physical aggression against the above men-
tioned perpetrators or those who are symbolic targets as “followers” of the per-
petrators. In other words, against those who still deny the Armenian genocide 
and hinder its recognition. In one of their works, Miller and Touryan-Miller also 
consider symbolic revenge – e.g. when survivors assume that natural disasters 
affecting real or supposed perpetrators mean divine retribution – corresponding 
to this strategy.499 In contrast, the author of this study classifies the latter phe-
nomenon as outrage and anger because it does not result in physical violence.
Although the trauma was common for all survivors, furthermore, a periodical 
generational change in their attitudes is present, observing Armenian com-
munities’ collective reactions to the genocide shows diversity in different parts 
and countries of the world. There has usually been a given community which 
played a leading role or served as a catalyst in promoting different attitudes 
from previous ones during a given phase, while some other communities did 
not even participate in the progress of the given period and were following their 
earlier strategies.
Although most of the Armenian diaspora was silent about the trauma, Arme-
nians in Lebanon, who were recognised as a state-constituting minority, built 
a chapel in memory of the victims.500 Similarly, when public processing of the 
trauma began, Armenians in Turkey stayed silent, as the state had condemned 
Armenian genocide commemoration.501 Futhermore, the third generation ter-
rorist movement probably would not have evolved without the often tense and 
militarily active social and political environment of Armenians in Lebanon.502 
Finally, the phase usually labelled as integration by Armenian scholars was 
encouraged by Gorbachev’s reforms.  Reviving national sentiments of the lat-
ter period also contributed to the Karabakh conflict, during which Armenians 
499 Hovhanissian, p.199.
500 Armenian National Institute (ANI) 
http://www.armenian-genocide.org/Memorial.100/current_category.70/memori-
als_detail.html download: 21. 05. 2013. 14:32
501 Rubina Peroomian, And Those Who Continued Living in Turkey After 1915. The Met-
amorphosis of the Post-Genocide Armenian Identity as Reflected in Artistic Litera-
ture. (Armenian Genocide Museum-Institute, Yerevan, 2008), p. 59.
502 Michael M. Gunter, Pursuing the Just Cause of Their People. A study of contempo-
rary Armenian terrorism. (Greenwood Press, New York and Westport and London, 
1986), p. 33.
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in the Armenian SSR started to feel threatened in a manner like the Armenian 
Genocide.503 The earthquake of 1988 in Northern Armenia had a similar effect. 
504Due to these events, Armenians in the diaspora started to cooperate in sup-
porting those living in the home country, which had become independent a few 
years after the mentioned events.
In conclusion, apparently only those of the six individual trauma processing 
strategies described by Miller and Touryan-Miller have been present on the 
collective – social, political or public – level, which has been made possible by 
the given Armenian communities’ host state. Hereinafter, this hypothesis will 
be tested in the current study of the Armenian SSR.
The collective speak out of the trauma started simultaneously in the Arme-
nian SSR and the United States. Experts on the topic consider 1965, the 50th 
anniversary of the beginning of the Armenian genocide, as the initial year. Due 
to the Cold War environment, this parallel start of collective trauma processing 
most probably emerged independently in the two different locations.  In the 
Armenian SSR, Armenians constituted the major ethnic group. Therefore, it 
cannot be stated that they lived in a socio-political environment determined by 
a host state or its respective dominant ethnic group. In contrast, the Armenian 
SSR did not act independently in domestic and foreign politics; the principles 
of these areas had been determined by the actual Soviet central power in Mos-
cow. Therefore, while testing the hypothesis, instead of a host state, the term 
‘host environment’ will be used in the study. The society of the Armenian SSR 
had to adapt to the frameworks of this environment.
The examination period lasts from the beginning of Soviet rule in Armenia 
in 1920 until 1985 the beginning of the first secretary period of Gorbachev. 
The establishment of Soviet state power ensured quite different frameworks 
of genocide commemoration and reflections than the previous environment of 
the Republic of Armenia. 
In the Gorbachev era four parallel  processes – the  collapse of the USSR, 
the demand for social and political reforms, the re-evoked Armenian nation-
building process and the Karabakh conflict wit  Azerbaijan – resultedin dy-
namic changes and a diversity of collective approaches to the genocide within 
a very short period of time. An analysis of these newly emerged trends would 
exceed the scope of this study.
In testing the hypothesis, various spheres of Soviet-Armenian public will 
be examined, in which indicators of the need for speaking out the trauma 
could have appeared. The strategies of trauma processing appearing in these 
spheres affected a broader part of society. As a result of societal impacts, 
503 Levon Abrahamian, Armenian Identity in a Changing World (Mazda Publishers, Costa 
Mesa 2006), p. 262.
504 Donald E. Miller – Lorna Touryan Miller, Armenia. Portraits of Survival and Hope, 
University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles and London, 2003), p. 4.
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political actions related to the trauma could have been initiated in the areas 
of the arts, science and the activity of NGOs. All of these were controlled by 
the state during Soviet times.  The non-governmental sector was totally ab-
sent and the sectors mentioned above probably reflected what state power 
tolerated. Furthermore, changes in activities within these fields had possibly 
followed changes of the central party-state ideology; while on the other hand, 
possibly reflected some bottom-up initiations.
In the current study literature is chosen as an indicator of the arts, as the 
process of literary work, printing and publishing requires complex organization 
– in this case also authorisation – while the result may affect broad masses of 
society. In parallel, the quite narrow ways, aspects and frameworks of scien-
tific research related to the genocide will be also examined. As it has been 
mentioned, the non-governmental sector was prohibited in the Soviet Union, 
but it is possible to analyse one  certain, partly  non-governmental  movement, 
the process of “re”-settling diaspora-Armenians in the Soviet Union. 
Refugees of the genocide fled from Western Armenia – Eastern Anatolia – to 
various places where they had established their organisations and arranged 
the return of tens of thousands of Armenians in cooperation with the leader-
ship of the Armenian SSR. The local organisations of the diaspora lacked total 
control by the Soviet authorities and most of them were at least partly based 
on civic initiation. Also, political actions naturally related to the examined social 
phenomena will be examined. 
Beside these collective trends, there is a useful instrument to reconstruct 
individual responses. Ethnographer Verjiné Svazlian has collected hundreds of 
interviews from survivors. A feature of these is that due to the frequently non-
party-conformist content and the restricted ways and areas of Armenian geno-
cide research, this oral history collection was published only after the change 
of the regime. As a result, these interviews most probably offer a non-restricted 
overall picture of the reactions of Soviet-Armenian individuals.
In the initial post-genocide period most Armenian literary authors in the di-
aspora did not mention the traumatic experience in their works. They either 
reconstructed the memories of the homeland or were occupied with issues 
concerning the rebuilding of their lives.505 Until the 1930s this stillness was 
also featured in Soviet Armenia. At that time a new generation of writers was 
emerging who started to deal with questions of Armenian historical and cul-
tural heritage. These authors also recalled the memory of the genocide. Some 
of their works reflected on the events as traumatic phenomena but dealt at 
the same time with the possibilities and hope offered by the Armenian SSR. In 
some cases, these works reflected only on one aspect of the question (I.e. only 
505 Rubina Peroomian, The Armenian Genocide in Literature. Perceptions of Those Who 
Lived through the Years of Calamity. (Armenian Genocide Museum-Institute, Yer-
evan, 2012), p. 84.
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the trauma, only establishing normal life circumstances, etc.). A very plastic ex-
ample for genocide trauma processing is a short story entitled Lar Margar 506 by Axel 
Bakunts. The main character Margar had become supervisor of the irrigation canal 
in the village he settled. He had started a fresh life in a new homeland by bringing up 
his grandson and planting apricot trees. However, he constantly remembered the 
atrocities. He let go of the memory of his old home through a symbolic act, throwing 
the keys of his old house into the sea while being transported by ship away from the 
Ottoman Empire. The short story ends with an image of Margar seeing his grandson 
at the schoolyard and simultaneously viewing his growing apricot trees. This is a 
literary representation of the ideal type of reconciliation. 
Bakunts does not contradict communist ideas, such as equality, for Margar 
pays attention to providing equal quantities of water to everyone in the village. 
In addition, there is no sign in this work of an attempt to defeat communism. 
On the other hand, in this period merely mentioning the Armenian genocide 
was labelled as nationalistic. Furthermore, Bakunts used the national symbols 
of Mount Ararat and apricots in this short story.
This and similar kinds of approaches to Armenian cultural and historical her-
itage including the genocide resulted in the extermination, imprisonment and/
or Siberian exile of the writers’ generation of the 1930s. Most of them were 
imprisoned and the Union of Writers of the Armenian SSR was filled with art-
ists loyal to the regime after having silenced Bakunts, Yeghishe Charents and 
Vahan Totovents, together with other writers or poets.  The charges against 
them were nationalism and the refusal of communist principles.507
It can be assumed that until members of this generation started to raise their 
voices, silence about the genocide was spontaneous, as it was both a char-
acteristic of diaspora and Soviet-Armenian writers. On the contrary, after the 
1937-1938 extermination wave silence was not a sign of repression and avoid-
ance anymore, but a present need for dealing with the trauma of the genocide, 
which was not allowed to gain public space.
The next experiment for collective processing began in the Khrushchev era. 
Paruyr Sevak’s philosophical and epic poem, “The Unsilenceable Belfry,” which 
was written in 1957 and published in 1969, was among one of the earliest at-
tempts of this period to reflect on the genocide. The work is about Komitas, 
the Armenian clergyman, folk music collector and composer who was deported 
among the first Armenian intellectuals in 1915. The composer turned dumb be-
cause of the events of the genocide.508 Thereby, Sevak expressed a need to 
break the collective silence. Hovhannes Shiraz, another emblematic member 
506 Akszel Bakunc, “Hosszú Markar”, Belépő. Dorogi irodalmi almanach, (Dorog Város 
Barátainak Egyesülete, Dorog, 2009). (Krajcsir Piroska transl.), pp.  127–132.
507 Norajr Adaljan, “Xosch Ełiše Čareni masin” [“A Word About Yeghishe Charents”] Azg 
Armenian daily: http://www.azg.am/AM/culture/2012042804.
508 Online collection of Paruyr Sevak’s works: http://www.paruyrsevak.org/.
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of this generation, also started to publish his works on the genocide and Arme-
nian heritage in the late 1950s. His most famous genocide-related work is The 
Armenian Dante-esque calling for the establishment of a spiritual monument to 
the victims of the Armenian genocide.509
Similarly to them, Silva Kaputikyan also started to turn towards the issues 
of Armenian national identity in the same period.510 Her 1961 poem, “Midway 
Reflections”511 lists and addresses the various trauma-processing attitudes, 
including revenge and resignation. She gives an extensive explanation of the 
strategy she chooses and calls for Armenians to follow her. This approach 
asks for commemoration in a peaceful way, without the intent of blood-thirsty 
revenge, and for building the new homeland (symbolized by Yerevan) instead 
of the lost lands of the refugees (symbolized by Van). 
The main message of the poem can be determined by the following sen-
tence of the poem, “You must take revenge by living […]”512 As it is visible, this 
is again a typical representation of reconciliation by remembering the genocide 
on the one hand, and building, creating, living on the other – offering a positive 
image of the future.  Amongst authors of Armenian prose of the same period, 
Hrachya Qochar wrote his novel Nahapet in 1964.513 The main character Na-
hapet – even his name is symbolic, meaning forefather – after experiencing the 
massacre of his wife and family, decided to settle in a different country in a 
new village than he used to live, started farming and began a new family with 
a similarly widowed woman Nubar, who lost her child too. 
Beside the intent to rise from the tragedy of the Armenian genocide, the novel 
frequently indicates respect towards the Soviet ideal of life, while some episodes 
introduce the ways of interpretation of communism by average Armenians living 
at the periphery of the Soviet Empire. In addition to the demand for genocide re-
membrance and representation of the memories, the novel expresses an optimis-
tic view of the future. The political system had not silenced such opinions during 
this period; therefore, literature represented the atmosphere of a meltdown after 
the Stalin era, and the strategy to be followed became reconciliation.
This move in literature continued even after the Khrushchev-era. During the 
1970s and early 1980s many of the above mentioned works had been reprint-
509 Richard G Hovhannisian, (ed.) The Armenian Genocide: Cultural and ethical legacies 
(Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, 2007), pp. 103.
510 A. A. Ter-Minasjan “Silva Kaputikjani mtorumner čanaparhi kesin ev heto” [Silva Ka-
putikyan’s reflections at the midway and after”, Lraber Hasarakakan Gituthjunneri, 
HH GAA hratarakčuthjun, Erevan, 2001. 2001.  1, pp. 175-185, 176.
511 Silva Kaputikyan’s House-Museum:  http://kaputikyanmuseum.com/6-3-Silva%20
Kaputikyan.html.
512 For the poem in Armenian see: (Armenian) National Center of Education Technolo-
gies: http://www.ktak.am/e107_plugins/forum/forum_viewtopic.php?1453.120.
513 Hracsja Kocsar, Nahapet (Kornétás Kiadó, Budapest, 2008).
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ed514 or were adapted for motion pictures.515 Similarly, the majority of authors 
from the 1930s writers’ generation were rehabilitated by the state and their 
works became authorized for publication. The meltdown in literature had been 
an indicator and, most probably, also a catalyst for political developments 
concerning the genocide-issue. Possibly neither the political leadership of the 
Armenian SSR, nor the central power in Moscow could have predicted that 
the new approach suggested by the new writers’ generation would have led to 
spontaneously organised mass-demonstrations in 1965. Such initiations had 
been previously banned and were prohibited also after the 1965 events in the 
Soviet Union. On April 24, the 50th anniversary of the imprisonment and extermina-
tion of Constantinople’s Armenian intelligentsia and the beginning of deportations, 
demonstrations evolved in numerous Soviet Armenian cities and in the capital. As a 
result of social pressure, state permission was given in May 1965 for a public com-
petition to plan and construct a memorial for the victims of the Armenian genocide. 
A possible resistance to the Soviet central power was defeated by the efforts of the 
First Secretary of the Armenian Communist Party and other state leaders. This was 
reflected by the president of the Supreme Council of the Armenian SSR, Nagush 
Harutyunyan, who stated the following shortly after the demonstrations: 
“Yes, until World War II, the Medz Yeghern [the Armenian term used for Armeni-
ans’ extermination in the Ottoman Empire before the creation of the term genocide] 
of 1915 was unprecedented not only in the history of our people, but in the entirety 
of humankind. An entire people, an entire nation coming from the depths of millen-
nia was killed, was dying.
We condemn genocide [genotsid] or zhoghovrtasbanutiun [“folk-murder”] with all 
our heart and soul.
There is and there cannot be either juridical justification or any motion of 
prescription for genocide.
Genocide, be it the horrifying slaughter of Armenians in Der [Z]or in the 
banks of the Euphrates in 1915, or the torturing death by massacre of the 
other peoples during World War II in Majdanek and B[u]chenwald, must always 
be condemned without reservations, and its perpetrators must be condemned 
by all of humankind”516
This approach not only raises the issue of genocide commemoration to the 
state level, but a broader perspective of the speaker can be observed by as-
514 See for example Silva Kaputikyan’s House-Museum: http://kaputikyanmuseum.
com/6-3-WORKS.html.
515 Cinema of the World (A comprehensive library of Arthouse. Cult, Classic, Experi-
mental and rare movies from all over the world.) http://worldscinema.org/2013/03/
henrik-malyan-nahapet-aka-life-triumphs-1977/.
516 The Armenian Weekly: http://www.armenianweekly.com/2013/05/15/the-exact-
translation-how-medz-yeghern-means-genocide/. The location names Der Zor and 
Buchenwald were mistyped in the original text as “Der or” and “Büchenwald”.
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sociating the Armenian genocide with the Holocaust. Thereby, this is an attempt 
to prove that both events were rooted in racist ideologies. The Soviet Union con-
sidered these ideologies and their supporters as their enemies. Therefore, in this 
speech, a possible way of the genocide-issue’s integration into Soviet ideology 
is represented. The competition for the construction of the monument had also 
inaugurated a new approach [earlier approaches will be introduced later in this 
study] to diaspora Armenians as they were now given the possibility to participate. 
The construction was funded through voluntary financial or work contributions by 
the citizens of the Armenian SSR. Despite these facts, the memorial was banned 
from the city centre. Therefore, its location became Tsisternakaberd, a hill in the 
surroundings of the centre of Yerevan. By choosing this place the state willingly or 
unwillingly adapted genocide commemoration to Armenian funeral and burial tra-
ditions.517 As a result, the Armenian Genocide Memorial Complex became a sacral 
place in the officially atheist Soviet social and political environment. 
In a similar way, the eternal flame and the surrounding open circular walls of the 
monument symbolize resurrection and the eternal life of the victims’ souls, while 
the obelisk belonging to the monument represents the rise of the Armenian na-
tion. In conclusion, through the memorial complex optimism and remembrance 
were manifested in an architectural form, thereby expressing the strategy of rec-
onciliation as suggested by literary forerunners of collective trauma processing.
The monument was opened in 1967 and the inauguration ceremony was 
synchronized with the celebration of the establishment of Soviet power in Ar-
menia.518 After this, the memorial complex served yearly on April 24 as the 
place for mass-processions, which were also attended by state leaders. From 
the 1970s on, the political leadership of the country had started the official 
commemoration on the Memorial Day.519 Therefore, it is obvious that the strat-
egy of reconciliation had become internalized by the state.
As it has been expressed before, the process of Armenians’‘re’-turning from 
the diaspora was also a crucial factor in the Armenian SSR’s social and politi-
cal life. The issue of masses of Armenian refugees had become an essential 
concern for the newly established communist leadership of the 1920s. This 
had been constantly a subject for Soviet Armenian political leaders reminding 
them of the Armenian genocide. Head of the Council of People’s Commissars 
in Armenia Aleksandr Miasnikyan had written most probably the first analysis 
and determinative action plan about diaspora Armenians in the Armenian SSR. 
In his work, he strongly opposed the ruling (Dashnak) Party of the short-lived 
517 Harutyun Marutyan, Iconography of Armenian Identity. The Memory of Genocide 
and the Karabagh Movement. Volume 1. (Gitutyun Publishing House of NAS RA, 
Yerevan, 2009), p. 42.
518 Museum-Institute of the Armenian Genocide: 
http://www.genocide-museum.am/eng/Description_and_history.php.
519 Marutyan, pp. 39.
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Republic of Armenia (1918-1920). Even if he criticised the two further historical 
Armenian parties, he considered cooperation with these organisations as vital 
for the creation of a communist homeland and he projected Armenians of the 
diaspora as instruments for spreading the communist world revolution.
Finally, cooperation between Armenian organizations became broader in 
scale than a mere political step. The Armenian Assistance Commission (Hay 
Ognut’yan Komite) had been established by diaspora and Soviet Armenian 
intellectuals to achieve cooperation for the development of refugees’ social 
circumstances. A similarly broad-scale cooperation was founded for the ‘re’-
patriation of Armenian refugees in Soviet Armenia. The process involved public 
promotion of the possible return, gathering refugees willing to settle in Ar-
menia, and organization of their travel and accommodation. Cooperation and 
organizing projects in the diaspora communities were completed by the local 
Armenian National Fronts.520
The “Great Home Turn”521 of tens of thousands started in the 1930s and 
reached its peak between 1946 and 1948. In spite of widespread efforts, the 
new homeland had been lost for more than 20,000 returnees. They became 
subject to Stalinist suspects, who often assumed that they were western impe-
rialist spies and supporters of the Dashnak Party, the ruling party of the failed 
independent Republic of Armenia. The peak of this persecution was in 1949.522 
The suspicions and tense relations with the diaspora finally started to melt 
down in the 1960s, the decade in which diaspora Armenians had the possibil-
ity to study in the Armenian SSR,523 but mainly those living in “non-imperialist” 
countries.  For humanities and social sciences the Armenian genocide had 
also been a forbidden topic. Mentioning the trauma was labelled as national-
ism, in the same way as it had been also characteristic in literature. 
A forerunner in new approaches during the Khrushchev era was the aforemen-
tioned Verjiné Svazlian, who had lived in Egypt before moving to Armenia, and 
who was the daughter of Garnik Svazlian, one of the main ideologists of the “Great 
Home Turn.” Due to this past, she started to research the heritage of the Armenian 
Genocide. Her work in this field began in the mid 1950s, when she started to visit 
520 Karlen Dallachjan, Haj sphjurchi patmuthjun, (Erevan, Zangak, 1997), p. 137.
521 Armenuhi Stephanjan, XX. dari hajrenadardzuthjun hajo inchnuthjan hamakargum, 
[The XX century repatriation in the system of Armenian identity], (Erevan, HH-GAA 
<<Gituthjun>> hratarakčuthjun, 2010), p. 73.
522 Hajastani Hanrapetuthjan Sphjurchi Naxararuthjun, HH Gituthjunneri Azgajin 
Akademia, Erevani Petakan Hamalsaran, <<Noravanch>> gitachrtakan himnadram 
(eds.), 1946-48 thth. Hajrenadardzuthjun ev dra daser. Hajrenadardzuthjan him-
naxndirn ajsor: Hamahajkakan gitažołov: Zekuumneri žołovau, [Repatriation and Its 
Lessons. The Issue of Repatriation Today: Pan-Armenian Conference: Collection of 
Presentations.], (Limuš, Erevan, 2009), p. 141-142.
523 Ronald Grigor Suny, Looking toward Ararat. Armenia in Modern History. (Indiana 
University Press, Bloomington-Indianapolis, 1993), p. 228–229.
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places where immigrants from the diaspora had settled en masse. She officially 
researched their dialects, folk poetry, and traditions. Moreover, she was also hid-
ing another archive, in which she had systematized the memoirs of genocide sur-
vivors. These will be analyzed later. Presently, the further atmosphere of scientific 
work in the field is described.
According to Svazlian’s accounts, her interviewees would first – fearing re-
peated persecution – not let her into their homes, even if she asked for their 
cooperation in documenting the folk culture of these migrants. Moreover, she 
had to make even greater efforts when she asked them to share their painful 
memories with her.524 Facing these facts, it is evident that research related to 
the genocide was not supported by state power and gathering information on 
this issue was a hard task.
After the meltdown, which can be also observed in literature and politics, 
social scientists and experts in humanities received the possibility to research 
some questions related to the genocide, albeit in a restricted way. Only those 
events which had been recorded during the genocide in (written) documents 
were permitted for research. For the reason that the memory of the genocide 
has been maintained mainly by oral history, several distortions can be observed 
within the historiography of the Armenian genocide in the Soviet period. These 
still affect Armenian collective memory. 
As an example, besides the two well-documented resistance movements 
against deportations in Van and the Musa Dagh, resistance at other locations 
had not been analyzed until recent years. The existence of such Armenian 
efforts at other, little-known places has recently begun to appear; average Ar-
menians have had even more limited access to this information than historians. 
The ‘lack’ of resistance still undermines the self-esteem of many Armeni-
ans, who rely on the collective self-image suggesting that Armenians had been 
slaughtered like sheep during the genocide.525 With the intent of completing 
historical research in the examination period, Verjiné Svazlian made several 
efforts after 1965 to introduce survivors and their experiences during the geno-
cide on television thus creating public access to their memories. Her attempts 
were not supported by the state during that period.526
Remembering and commemorating the genocide therefore still remained 
within restricted frameworks.  The efforts of Soviet Armenian leaders and the 
presumable early resistance by Moscow suggests that the central power had 
tolerated, rather than supported, the political frameworks while the Soviet Ar-
menian political leadership attempted to find the balance between social pres-
sure and the central power.
Having viewed the collective responses to the genocide, in order to create a 
524 Interview: Verjiné Svazlian, 02. 06. 2011.
525 Marutyan 2009, 32-33.
526 Interview: Verjiné Svazlian, 02. 06. 2011.
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comparison to the individual strategies the latter have to be reconstructed. In 
the already mentioned collection of interviews with survivors, there are 103527 
Historical Memoir-Testimonies of Soviet-Armenian citizens recorded during the 
examination period. Two of these testimonies have been maintained as manu-
scripts from the period before Svazlian’s research. Eighteen of the interviews 
(cursive numbers in the references) only described the events experienced by 
the survivors during the genocide without mentioning their future lives or inter-
preting the genocide in any way.  A further four survivors expressed outrage 
and anger towards the perpetrators (bold numbers in the references). One of 
them stated, “[…] Let our new generation understand well what kind of hypo-
critical, bestial, criminal, plundering, ruthless, unjust, perfidious enemy we lived 
with in order to maintain our existence. […]”528.
Another one also mentioned that according to his opinion Turks are brutes. 
The third testimony in this group only states the intensive hatred the given 
survivor felt against Turks.529 The fourth such interviewee, expressing outrage 
and anger, said: “[…] The Turk’s favourite way of killing was to slaughter the 
Armenian, to dismember the Armenian’s body and to watch the blood flowing 
like a fountain. You see, he would thus go to Allah’s paradise…”530. In one case 
an earlier desire for revenge was expressed by a survivor (underlined number 
in the references). He stated that though he had planned revenge for a long 
time, he was unable to attack unarmed people, children or women.531
Ten of the interviews represent the strategy of rationalization (framed num-
bers in the references). These describe the most unique interpretations of 
the reasons for the genocide ranging from the Turks’ jealousy of Armenians’ 
wealth, their need for Armenians’ goods, to some mythical descriptions as 
Talaat pasha’s gambling with one prominent Armenian leader or Russians sell-
ing the Armenian lands to the Turks for treasures.532. In two cases, the escape 
of the certain person or of numerous survivors is rationalized. One of these 
describes the escape of the interviewee as being a result of divine wonder. In 
a further case, the survival of the participants of the Musa Dagh resistance is 
527 Verjiné Svazlian, The Armenian Genocide: Testimonies of the Eyewitness Survivors, 
(“Gitoutyoun” Publishing use of NAS RA, Yerevan, 2011), Historical Memoir-Testimo-
nies Nr. 1, 7, 25, 50, 82, 88, 101, 112, 149, 150, 153, 172, 183, 190, 274, 282, 283, 
315, 8, 18, 87, 90, 92, 94, 96, 98, 99, 105, 106, 110, 123, 124, 133, 135, 143, 148, 
155, 156, 166, 168, 172, 175, 182, 191, 199, 200, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 209, 213, 
217, 218, 222, 223, 224, 229, 230, 232, 233, 235, 236, 237, 239, 241, 248, 249, 251, 
253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 266, 269, 273, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 282, 
288, 289, 290, 293, 294, 295, 298, 300, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 313, 314, 315.
528 Ibid., 350.
529 Ibid., 431.
530 Ibid., 501.
531 Ibid., 503.
532 Ibid., Historical Memoir-Testimonies Nr. 203, 213, 230, 235, 241, 249, 276, 280.
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explained also by a miraculous apparition that stopped soldiers from further 
attacks on the mountain and its inhabitants.533
Sixty-seven interviews, a vast majority of the examined testimonies, reflect a 
positive image of the future of the refugees. They usually finish the description 
of the genocide with telling how they started a new life, began a new family, 
built their homes, started working, farming and became active members of the 
Armenian SSR’s society. The possibility of a new start, emphasized by most of 
them, was offered most probably by the ‘Soviet dream’ through the promise 
of equality, education, work, home, financial security and social welfare. Even 
if these had been limited by the totalitarian regime, Armenians had been de-
prived of these completely during the genocide. Some of these memoirs also 
reflect on the exile of ‘re’-settled Armenians to Siberia or describe temporar-
ily returning post-traumatic symptoms of the interviewees. However, the vast 
majority still remembered the genocide while reflecting positively on the future, 
thereby again the strategy of reconciliation can be observed.  These individual 
responses do not correspond to the tendencies observed on the collective 
level. For example, all but one interview reflecting on the aftermath of genocide 
recorded before the meltdown already expressed the strategy of reconciliation. 
This individual strategy was overwhelming during Soviet times irrespective 
of the philosophy emphasized by the actual state and party ideology, while 
other approaches had been also present at the individual level, albeit at a less-
er extent. However, concerning the small number of memoirs recorded before 
the mid 1950s, it cannot be stated for sure whether the official ideological prin-
ciples had caused the dominance of reconciliation, or whether these principles 
had been created and shaped by social majority.
Four trauma processing strategies were surely present at the individual level in 
Soviet Armenian society. Furthermore, the existence of the remaining two other 
approaches cannot be excluded. Three of the undoubtedly existent ones – out-
rage and anger, revenge and restitution, and finally rationalisation – had not be-
come official state strategies. It has been also mentioned that during the Stalin 
era the fourth strategy, reconciliation and forgiveness was not permitted either.
Thereby, it can be assumed that in the examination period in the Armenian 
SSR, only those genocide processing strategies appeared on the collective 
level which were permitted and/or encouraged by the Soviet member-states, 
the central power and the official ideological principles. Based on these conclu-
sions, the hypothesis is proved for the examination period in the Armenian SSR.
Beside this fact, further research and analysis are needed to prove whether 
reconciliation as a collective strategy evolved from a bottom-up initiation. This 
would have been an exceptional phenomenon in a totalitarian regime. On the 
other hand, a top-down effort for controlling the commemoration processes 
533 Ibid., Historical Memoir-Testimonies Nr. 290, 307.
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was also present after the meltdown. This is represented by the attempt of 
literary authors and political leaders who consciously and explicitly tried (had) 
to interpret the need for speaking out and commemoration within the offi-
cial ideological framework of the Soviet state. The latter phenomenon does 
not clearly suggest the direction of the process, but offers the possibility of 
a crossing point of top-down and bottom-up moves, which could have been 
also a unique phenomenon in the Soviet Union.
The appearance of reconciliation and forgiveness on the collective level is also 
worthy of further analysis, as this is the one of the few trauma processing strate-
gies described by Miller and Touryan-Miller among Armenians which shows a 
creation or recreation oriented path for survivors and their descendants, while it 
does not have a threatening impact on the descendants of perpetrators. 
In addition, this strategy keeps the memories of the past alive, thereby pos-
sibly making signs for future genocides more visible, and thereby contributes 
to genocide prevention. Finally, it also proves that a revival of a community 
after mass trauma is possible, and that trauma processing is feasible without 
self-blaming, self-destructive or revengeful actions. This has to be considered 
especially when lobbyists attempt to restrict Armenian genocide commemora-
tion for fear of the negative reactions by the victims’ community.
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BETWEEN ECONOMIC INTERESTS AND  
COLD WAR MOTIVES: GERMAN ACTIVITIES IN 
THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REGION DURING THE 
SECOND SCRAMBLE FOR AFRICA
tOrBen GÜLStOrFF
“After my Africa-trip, it is my conviction - like it is for numerous clear-headed peo-
ple in the Federal Republic – that the future of Berlin and the German East Zone 
will not be decided on the conferences of the Big Four but in Africa and Asia.” 534
The quotation above was used by the West German Elsie Kühn-Leitz in March 
1960, as an argument to draw the attention from the West German Foreign 
Minister Heinrich von Brentano on the African continent. Kühn-Leitz had been 
a founding member of the party section of the conservative political party 
Christlich Demokratische Union (CDU) in Hesse and the social organisation 
Deutsch-Französische Gesellschaft Wetzlar (DFG Wetzlar).  
As one of many West Germans who were interested in Africa and privately 
sought an increase of German-African relations, she espoused an intensifica-
tion of the commitment of the West German state on the African continent. 
Already in 1959, Kühn-Leitz had semi-privately undertaken – as she was ac-
quainted with Chancellor Adenauer – a journey to Africa. She was one of the 
first West Germans who were able to make semi-governmental contacts with 
African politicians, parties, and mass organisations.  
Early on, the Belgian Congo emerged as an emphasis of her commitment. 
Therefore, the conference Table ronde belgo-congolaise, on which the decoloni-
sation of the Belgian Congo was discussed from 20 January to 20 February 1960, 
proved to be of use. On 23 February 1960, a bus of the DFG Wetzlar crossed the 
German-Belgian border in the direction of Wetzlar on her initiative. On the bus, 
there were three party officials of the Belgian Congolese political party Mouve-
ment Nationale Congolaise - Lumumba (MNC-L): its Director of politics, Chris-
tophe Gracis, its Vice President, Victor Nendaka Bika, and its President, Patrice 
Lumumba – who just one year later would die and become noted as the martyr 
534 Kühn-Leitz to von Brentano - Minister (West German Foreign Office, 7 March 1960), 
PA AA, AA, B 34, 221 [translated by the author]. Original quotation: “Nach meiner Af-
rika-Reise habe ich die völlige Überzeugung gewonnen, - wie viele zahlreiche denk-
ende Menschen in der Bundesrepublik, - dass die Zukunft Berlins und der deutschen 
Ostzone nicht auf den Konferenzen der grossen Vier entschieden wird, sondern in 
Afrika und Asien”.
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of African liberation. Their trip initiated a new phase of West German activities 
not just in the Belgian Congo, but also in the Central African region as a whole.535 
Accordingly, their entrance to the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) was ac-
companied by difficulties, as several Belgian officials still wished to maintain a 
purely Belgian sphere of influence in the Belgian-Congo. Just one day before, 
the Belgian intelligence service Sûreté de l’État had successfully prevented their 
border crossing. But as the Belgian government was divided in this question536 
and Kühn-Leitz had several contacts within the Belgian government and intel-
ligence service at her disposal, she finally succeeded in bringing the future Prime 
Minister of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to her private mansion Haus 
Friedwart in Wetzlar. During the following two days, Lumumba and his party col-
leagues established contacts with the semi-governmental organisation Deutsche 
Afrikagesellschaft (DAG), the Press and Information Office of the Federal Govern-
ment, and several agents of the West German private economy.
The Congolese asked for permission and state support to establish a MNC-L of-
fice in the FRG537 and further support of their party – most likely for the upcoming 
election campaigns in May – by West German companies.538 As a matter of fact, 
Marcel Lengema, representative of the MNC-L in Germany and special secretary to 
Lumumba, received an office for party politics from the DAG in March. Furthermore, 
the Press and Information Office of the Federal Government was consulted to im-
prove the political staging of the party in the German media.539 Not for no reason, 
the popular West German magazine Der Spiegel published a six-page interview with 
Lumumba in June.540 It might even be that the MNC-L received two further offices 
from the company Burger-Eisenwerke, which had already operated in the East of the 
Congo for several years and since then had maintained intense contacts with the 
MNC-L and Lumumba.541 In return for this support, Lumumba bound himself and his 
party – by contract – to lead the MNC-L on a pro-western political course.542
535 Steltzer – department 307 (West German Foreign Office) to West German Foreign 
Office, (24 February 1960), PA AA, AA, B 34, 221.
536 Kühn-Leitz to von Brentano - Minister (West German Foreign Office), day and month 
unknown 1960, PA AA, AA, B 34, 221.
537 Kühn-Leitz to Steltzer – department 307 (West German Foreign Office), (1 March 
1960, PA AA, AA, B 34, 221.
538 Kühn-Leitz to West German Foreign Office, date unknown, PA AA, AA, B 34, 221.
539 Steltzer – department 307 (West German Foreign Office) to West German Foreign 
Office, (18 March 1960), PA AA, AA, B 34, 221.
540 cf. Robert Julius Greiff and Günther Steffen, “Man grüßt sich mit Uhuru: Spiegel-
Gespräch mit dem Kongo-Politiker Patrice Lumumba,” Der Spiegel, (22 June 1960), 
34-39.
541 Krämer – executive director (Afrika-Verein) to Steltzer – department 307 (West Ger-
man Foreign Office), 11 March 1960, PA AA, AA, B 34, 61.
542 Schneider (West German Foreign Office) to Kühn-Leitz, (12 December 1960), PA AA, 
AA, B 34, 221.
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Meanwhile, the German Democratic Republic (GDR) had unexpectedly es-
tablished first contacts with the future Congolese political elite too. Already two 
months earlier, on 15 December 1959, the Congolese Antoine Gizenga, leader of 
the pro-soviet political party Parti Socialiste Africain (PSA), had entered the GDR 
by crossing its border in West Berlin. Several Congolese parties – among them also 
the PSA 543 – had formed a loose political association, entitled the Cartel, to enforce 
the Congolese demands on the already mentioned Table ronde belgo-congolaise. 
On behalf of this association, Gizenga asked for permission and support to estab-
lish a Congolese information office in the GDR. Furthermore, he requested – if the 
Belgians should deny a quickly completed independence of Belgian Congo – to 
establish the office of a Congolese exile-government in East Berlin.544
The fact that these Congolese, who soon would play major roles in the develop-
ment of the DRC, had chosen Germany of all possible allies to strengthen their po-
sition in the process of decolonization had not been a coincidence. Both German 
states represented – because of their outstanding reconstruction after 1945 – an 
exemplary economic, social and political ascent for the young African political 
elites. Furthermore, the FRG and the GDR were able to manoeuvre – even though 
officially involved in the global system contradiction of Cold War – their foreign 
policy concepts between the ones of the global super powers and the ones of the 
European colonial powers. This provided the German states with a unique profile 
that many Africans perceived attractive enough to wish for a close partnership.
Though it was not just the preference of the Congolese that had led to this 
example of German-African encounter. Already a decade earlier, officials of 
both German states had realized the economic and political potential of the 
Belgian Congo in regard to the purposes of their respective states. Resources 
– mineral as well as botanical – were abundant in the Belgian colony. Further-
more, its infrastructure was highly developed by African standards. For these 
reasons, West545 and East Germany546 had established considerable trade rela-
tions with the colony already at the beginning of the 1950s. However, it was 
not just the Belgian Congo in which the West and the East German state had 
shown interest. In the wake of decolonization, a second struggle on spheres 
of influence had begun in the Belgian Congo, the Central African region, the 
African continent, and the emerging ‘Third World’ as a whole – a struggle, the 
FRG and the GDR could not afford to ignore.
543 Gizenga (PSA) to Council of Ministers of the GDR, (16 December 1959), PA AA, 
MfAA, C 799/74, 96-99.
544 Schüßler (East German Ministry for Foreign Affairs) to unknown recipient, (15 De-
cember 1959), PA AA, MfAA, C 799/74,100.
545 Torben Gülstorff, Die westdeutsche Kongopolitik, 1954-1975 (Magister’s thesis, 
Christian-Albrechts Universität zu Kiel, 2007), pp. 14-17.
546 Unknown sender to West German Foreign Office, (21 August 1951), PA AA, AA, B 60, 
1. Abg., 5.
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THE THESIS
The practical execution of this struggle by West and East Germany – their 
activities – is central in my macrohistoric and comparative thesis of which this 
paper shall give a brief insight into. In it the developments of the activities of 
governments, economies, and societies of both German states are represent-
ed and analysed by using the Central African region as a projection surface. 
In doing so not a simple case study on a single state of German interest but a 
complete region serves as a geographical frame of this German-German topic.
Prior to this paper’s completion, scholarship on German foreign relations 
had not spend much time on this region, as it lies at the periphery of all German 
interests known to the current state of research. Usually, studies regarding this 
topic focus on main areas of German interest as Western and Eastern Europe 
or North America, to draw their pictures of German foreign relations – thereby 
often trying to enlarge it to a global view. Against this, I argue in my thesis – and 
this paper – that it is reasonable to undertake research regarding this topic in 
such an area precisely because of its peripheral position. 
As main areas of interest usually form an exception – leading to an excep-
tional German behaviour – it is reasonable to focus on the much more common 
periphery, to make general statements on German foreign relations. Therefore, 
this study is not simply dedicated to an improvement of scholarship on Ger-
man activities in the Central African region and the African continent, but also 
on their global characteristics in general.
The cornerstone of my thesis is the question, in how far – for both German 
states – economic motives actually ranked behind political motives? Strictly 
speaking, was the German-German contradiction, manifested in the mutual 
maintenance of the Hallstein doctrine, actually more important than the eco-
nomic needs of the German countries?
In 1955, the West German Walter Hallstein had installed the Hallstein doc-
trine in West German foreign policy to weaken its East German counterpart 
by preventing the diplomatic relations of the latter with states of the ‘First’ 
and the ‘Third World’. It said that a diplomatic recognition of the GDR would 
implicate its recognition as ‘a’ German state and thereby undermine the West 
German claim of representing ‘the’ German state as a whole. To prevent such 
a development, the West German Foreign Office was allowed and equipped to 
initialize counter-measures coming down to a full termination of diplomatic re-
lations with each state threatening this doctrine. Since the 1950s, scholarship 
has presented this policy – and its counter policy by the GDR – as the integral 
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part of the foreign policies of the two German states. To this day, the German-
German contradiction is one of the most popular myths in German history. 
But did economic motives actually exist behind this sheer political interest? 
After all, ‘flag follows trade’ is a common saying to paraphrase the process of 
European imperialist expansion during the first scramble for Africa even today. 
So, should the saying in the case of the German expansion during the second 
scramble really have to be transformed into ‘trade follows Hallstein’?
The demystification of the Hallstein doctrine – and therefore also the Ger-
man-German contradiction – and three further paradigms in German foreign 
policies’ history – nucleate my thesis with the title Trade follows Hallstein? 
German Activities in the Central African Region During the Second Scramble. 
In it, the German activities in an area, defined by the UNO as Middle Africa,547 
but by myself as the Central African region, are examined. It contains nine 
Central African states: Chad, Cameroon, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, the Cen-
tral African Republic, the Republic of Congo, the DRC, Angola, and Sao Tome 
and Principe. In addition, a brief look is taken on the German activities on the 
African continent as a whole too. The subjects this thesis tries to outline and 
analyse – defined as German activities – involve a wide range of activities of 
the German states, economies, and societies. 
The activities of the German states include regular diplomatic activities, de-
velopment policy and aid, economic policy and aid, cultural policy and aid, 
public relations and the support of foreign media, military policy and aid, and 
finally, unconventional and intelligence policy and aid. The activities of the 
German private, semi-governmental, and state-owned economies involve ac-
tivities of manufacturing companies, trade companies, and banks as well as 
financiers. Finally, the activities of German private and semi-governmental so-
cial organisations contain activities of political parties, trade unions, and the 
catholic and protestant churches – in the case of the FRG – as well as the 
organisation Afro-Asiatisches Solidaritätskomitee – in the case of the GDR. 
Furthermore, the dealing of Central African issues within German societies and 
media will be analysed briefly too.
As this thesis attends to basic research, it is based on a wide range of sourc-
es, situated in a great number of archives. These were the Political Archive of 
the Federal Foreign Office in Berlin, the Federal Archive in Berlin, Koblenz and 
Freiburg, the Federal Archive, section movie archive, in Berlin, the Archive of 
the State Security Agency of the GDR in Berlin, the Archive of Social Democra-
cy in Bonn, the State Archive of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern in Greifswald, the 
Central Archive of the Protestant Church of Germany in Berlin, the University 
Archive of the Free University of Berlin in Berlin and the State Archive of Austria 
547 cf. Composition of Macro Geographical (Continental) Regions, Geographical Sub-
regions, and Selected Economic and Other Groupings,  
http://millenniumindicators.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49regin.htm#africa> 2013.
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in Vienna. Altogether, more than one million pages have been run through. In 
addition, some contemporary witnesses were interviewed and a wide range of 
secondary literature was consulted.
WHAT IS THE SECOND SCRAMBLE?
When the African states gained their independence around 1960, a global run 
on the African continent – a second scramble for Africa – began. It was con-
tingent on imperial, postcolonial and Cold War548 conflicts, as its catalyst – the 
contemporaneous process of decolonisation. Former scholarship has hardly 
taken this topic into account. Usually, the term ‘second scramble’ was and is 
still used as a postcolonial catchphrase – commonly, by African politicians and 
progressive authors.549 Therefore, this paper shall provide a brief insight into 
its actual meaning.
Common official justifications for the second scramble were the Cold War,550 
the development of the ‘underdeveloped’ continent on a political, economic 
and social level, and, in the cases of Germany, China, Korea – and temporarily 
also Vietnam –, the divided nation states’ desire to outperform their intranational 
counterpart. Be that as it may, the actual motives for commitment in Africa were 
closely connected with the economic and geopolitical interests of the respec-
tive states. Around 1950, according to the West German foreign office, the West 
produced 97% of its diamonds, 62% of its manganese, 55% of its gold and 
47% of its chrome on the African continent – to a large extent in the Central 
African region.551 Uranium and Cobalt were produced here as well, but in their 
cases information on their precise production quantities cannot be provided, as 
they were military relevant and therefore information on their production rates 
highly classified. Furthermore in the case of botanical resources, 81% of palm 
548 Marc Philip Bradley, “Decolonization, the Global South, and the Cold War, 1919-
1962,” in The Cambridge History of the Cold War. Vol. 1: Origins, ed. Melvyn P. Leffler 
and Odd Arne Westad (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 485. / Odd 
Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of our 
Times (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 396.
549 cf. Julius Kambarage Nyerere, “The Second Scramble,” Julius Nyerere, 
http://www.juliusnyerere.info/images/uploads/ the_second_scramble_1962.pdf. / 
Daniel Tetteth Osabu-Kle, “African Blood For Imperialist Interests: The First And 
Second Scrambles For Africa,” allAfrica, http://www2.carleton.ca/africanstudies/
ccms/wp-content/ccms-files/African-Blood-For-Imperialist-Interests.pdf.
550 Robert J. McMahon, “Heiße Kriege im Kalten Krieg,” in Heiße Kriege im Kalten Krieg, 
ed. Bernd Greiner, Christian Th. Müller and Dierk Walter (Hamburg: Hamburger Edi-
tion HIS Verlagsgesellschaft, 2006), p. 16.
551 Kordt (West German Foreign Office) to West German diplomatic missions at Great 
Britain, France, Belgium, Egypt, Spain, Portugal, Liberia, South Africa, Kenia, Na-
mibia, Mocambique, Rhodesia, 2 July 1953, PA AA, AA, B 11, 613, pp. 72-74.
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kernel, 64% of palm kernel oil, 70% of cocoa beans, 52% of sisal and 100% 
of gum Arabic were produced in Africa – to a large part to a large part also in 
the Central African region.552 In the cases of wood, fur and fruits, no indication 
on their quantity, compared to their global production rates, can be made. This 
high relevance, which Africa had not just for Western, but also for global imports 
of several vitally needed products, was also reflected in the value of African 
exports. Between 1937 and 1950, its exports increased from 4,6 billion DM to 
16,7 billion DM.553 Scholarship still underestimates the relevance of the supply 
of these resources – especially of the strategic ones – for the national markets in 
the world at that time.554
All over the globe, states entered the African stage to participate in the sec-
ond scramble. In Western Europe, the former colonial powers, France, Great 
Britain, Belgium, Portugal and Spain, but also the FRG and Italy became sig-
nificant competitors. Although the commitment of the former colonial powers, 
especially the ones of France555 and Great Britain,556 remained mainly con-
centrated on their former colonial empires. In Eastern Europe, it primarily was 
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) that participated. Additionally, 
Czechoslovakia and the GDR took part to a certain extent. To a smaller degree, 
even Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary can be mentioned. The Near and the 
Middle East were initially represented mainly by Israel. Since the end of the 
1960s, it was joined by Iraq, Iran and Saudi Arabia. In East Asia, the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) and Japan became involved primarily in the scramble, 
but also Taiwan, North and South Korea showed some interest. In North and 
Central America, the United States of America (USA), Canada and Cuba par-
ticipated, in South America, Brazil showed most notably some commitment. 
On the African continent, Algeria and Egypt – later on, Libya too – participated 
in the north, the Republic of South Africa in the south. Also regional centres of 
power, like Nigeria, Zaire (Democratic Republic of Congo since 1997), Tanza-
nia, Guinea and Ghana, can be mentioned here.
Already in the late colonial period of the 1950s, first non-colonial powers had 
started to invest bigger amounts of money in the African territories of the colo-
nial powers. Thus, they had not just done some business but also established 
and consolidated their influence in the respective regions. Nevertheless, the 
552 Ibid., pp. 75-77.
553 West German Foreign Office to West German Foreign Office, date unknown, PA 
AA, AA, B 11, 613.
554 David S. Painter, “Oil, Resources, and the Cold War, 1945–1962,” in The Cambridge 
History of the Cold War. Vol. 1: Origins, ed. Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 506.
555 Rainer Tetzlaff and Cord Jacobeit, Das nachkoloniale Afrika. Politik, Wirtschaft, Ges-
ellschaft (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2005), p. 227.
556 Ibid., p. 215.
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colonial powers could most widely retain their influence monopoly, as it was 
backed by the colonial status of these territories. 
When the Treaties of Rome were signed in 1957, the colonies became asso-
ciated with the European Economic Community (EEC), whose member states 
confirmed the influence monopoly of the colonial powers. In return, EEC mem-
ber states received additional liberties and rights for their activities in the as-
sociated territories. This provided them with several economic, political and 
diplomatic advantages against their non-European competitors.557 After de-
colonisation, this arrangement of influence distribution continued. Admittedly, 
a jurisdiction backing it no longer existed, but the actual structures, that had 
grown over the years, were sufficient. 
The networks of the former colonial powers were able to assert themselves 
against their new international competition. The EEC and its member states 
were able to achieve a similar successful economic position. Therefore, they 
concluded the development aid Treaties of Yaoundé in the 1960s which were 
followed by the Treaties of Lomé in the 1970s and 1980s and the instalment 
of the trade system Système de Stabilisation des Recettes d’Exportation (Sta-
bex), which stabilised the commerce between Europe and Africa. In doing so, 
they were able to retain the independent associated states under West Eu-
ropean influence and to interconnect their markets with the markets of the 
EEC.558 Almost exclusively super powers, like the USA, the USSR, and later 
also the PRC, could actually challenge this hegemony of the EEC and its mem-
ber states, including the former colonial powers.
The superpowers also had a stimulating effect on the involvement of the Cold 
War in the second scramble. The USA pursued a radical policy of “global trans-
formation” to establish “societies in conformity with [their] system”, and integrate 
them in the US-American sphere of influence.559 In contrast, the West as a whole 
pursued a more moderate policy. A military cordon sanitaire, reaching from Nor-
way to the Republic of South Africa, and a second one, connected with an eco-
nomic “prosperity zone” reaching from Morocco to Egypt, should secure the 
African continent against Eastern interventions.560 Furthermore, regional powers, 
557 Sven Grimm, Die Afrikapolitik der Europäischen Union. Europas außenpolitische 
Rolle in einer randständigen Region (Hamburg: Institut für Afrika-Studien, 2003), 78-
80. / Thomas Moser, Europäische Integration, Dekolonisation, Eurafrika. Eine histor-
ische Analyse über die Entstehungsbedingungen der eurafrikanischen Gemeinschaft 
von der Weltwirtschaftskrise bis zum Jaunde-Vertrag. 1929-1963 (Baden-Baden: 
Nomos-Verlagsgesellschaft, 2000), p. 503.
558 Grimm, Die Afrikapolitik der Europäischen Union, p.103.
559 Marc Frey, “Die Vereinigten Staaten und die Dritte Welt im Kalten Krieg,” in Heiße 
Kriege im Kalten Krieg, ed. Bernd Greiner, Christian Th. Müller and Dierk Walter 
(Hamburg: Hamburger Edition HIS Verlagsgesellschaft, 2006), p. 59.
560 Sanne – department 205 (West German Foreign Office) to Dg 20, department 204 
(West German Foreign Office), 11 July 1961, PA AA, AA, B 130, 2306A [translated by 
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which were powerful enough to influence the hinterland and their surrounding 
neighbour states for Western purposes, should receive an intense support ei-
ther. The primary objective of the West was to secure transportation routes with 
strategic importance, like the route around the cape – 65% of Western European 
and 28 % of US-American oil imports were transported on this route561 –, and the 
production of several strategic resources.
In contrast to the USA and the West, the USSR exercised primarily restraint. It 
seems to have expected an evolutionary transition of the African continent as well - or 
even an evolutionary transition towards socialism. Against this, the PRC,562 Cuba, and 
sometimes even individual states of the Socialist State Community (SSC) showed a 
much more radical commitment. In the case of the PRC, this contradiction even led 
to an open competition with the USSR on supremacy of the socialist movement in 
Africa. Furthermore, the European, Asian and African communist parties also showed 
a radical commitment, thereby animating the USSR and the SSC to a radicalisation 
of their Africa policies. For the execution of the latter, the socialist states operated 
primarily from bases in Egypt, Guinea, Ghana, and later also Tanzania. From these 
bases, they tried to gain influence on the African continent. Similar to the West, their 
preferred target areas were the North African states and the bigger regional powers.563
Primarily here, the conflicts of Cold War inflamed. Besides the Egyptian Suez 
Crisis, the Central African region – with its Congo Crisis and its Angola Crisis – 
became the hot spot of the Cold War in Africa between the 1950s and 1970s.564 
The much smaller conflict which appeared in Cameroon between the mid-1950s 
and the beginning of the 1960s can be put in this context as well.565 When one of 
these hot spot states was in danger of drifting on the Soviet side – for instance, 
because of the existence of a strong pro-Soviet liberation movement – firstly, 
it became isolated by the West to contain the actual and ideological centre of 
conflict and prevent a greater material aid by the SSC or the USSR. After that, 
refugee villages and fortified villages were build and a counter revolution was 
the author]. Original quotation: “Wohlstandsgürtel”.
561 William J. Foltz, “Africa in Great-Power Strategy,” in Arms and the African. Military 
Influences on Africa’s International Relations, ed. William J. Foltz and Henry S. Bi-
enen (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), p. 21.
562 cf. Sergey Radchenko, “The Sino-Soviet split.” In The Cambridge History of the Cold 
War. Vol. 1: Origins, ed. Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2010), pp. 349-372.
563 cf. Elke Tüttenberg, Der Beitrag der Staaten des Ostblocks zur Wirtschaft der Ent-
wicklungsländer Afrikas (Sankt Augustin: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 1977).
564 Tetzlaff, Das nachkoloniale Afrika, p. 210.
565 Louis George Sarris, “Soviet Military Policy and Arms Activities in Sub-Saharan Af-
rica,” in Arms and the African. Military Influences on Africa’s International Relations, 
ed. William J. Foltz and Henry S. Bienen (New Haven: Yale University Press 1985), 
p. 38.
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initiated, to strip the movement of its popular support once and for all.566 This 
strategy worked out in the Congo but failed in the Portuguese overseas territory 
Angola, where in 1975 the socialist People’s Republic of Angola was founded.
At the beginning of the 1970s, the ties between the Western and the Eastern states 
fell loose. The USA had to face a high indebtedness, because of its Vietnam War. In 
the course of its development, the dollar was released of its gold parity,567 that led 
to a financial crisis and, combined with the Oil Crisis of the 1970s, to an economic 
crisis in the West. The macroeconomic ideology of the West broke away from Keyne’s 
“global regulation”, its development ideology fell loose from a “general development 
ideology”.568 On an international level, what followed was a reinforced cooperation be-
tween states which had been separated by the global system contradiction heretofore. 
Joint projects of Western, Eastern and ‘Third World’ countries were initiated.569 In the 
East, officials even thought about further reaching political cooperation with ‘imperialist’ 
Western states against the USA. It was in this context, the East German ambassador 
Heinz Deutschland wrote to the East German Ministry for Foreign Affairs in July 1970,
“For us it is important that the line Kairo-Brazza[ville] could become a barrier 
for the further expansion of the [US-]American imperialism and its allies in the 
South of Africa to the North. Here, the thought has to be admitted in how far 
common interests could exist between the socialist camp and French imperial-
ism against US-imperialism.“570
To sum up, in comparison with the first Scramble for Africa, which had most-
ly been carried out by European powers, the Second Scramble was a global 
struggle. Besides the Cold War and besides the superpowers, even powers as 
the PRC, Japan and Brazil – and West and East Germany – got a chance and 
were able to expand their spheres of influence on the continent.
566 cf. Jürgen Horlemann, Modelle der kolonialen Konterrevolution (Frankfurt am Main: 
Suhrkamp, 1968).
567 Giovanni Arrighi, “The World Economy and the Cold War, 1970-1990,” in The Cam-
bridge history of the Cold War. Volume III: Endings, 1975-1991, ed. Melvyn P. Leffler 
and Odd Arne Westad (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 30-31.
568 Andreas Rödder, Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1969-1990 (München: Olden-
bourg Wissenschaftsverlag, 2004), 49 [translated by the author]. Original quotation: 
“Globalsteuerung” and “allgemeine Entwicklungsideologie”.
569 Patrick Gutman, “West-östliche Wirtschaftskooperationen in der Dritten Welt,” 
in Ökonomie im Kalten Krieg, ed. Bernd Greiner, Christian Th. Müller and Claudia 
Müller (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition HIS Verlagsgesellschaft, 2010), p. 409.
570 Deutschland – Ambassador (East German Embassy in the Central African Republic) 
to Weidemann (East German Ministry for Foreign Affairs), 19 July 1970, PA AA, MfAA, 
C 817/74, 78 [translated by the author]. Original quotation: “Für uns ist wichtig, daß 
die Linie Kairo-Brazza[ville] zu einer Barriere für das weitere Vordringen des ameri-
kanischen Imperialismus und seiner Bündnispartner im Süden Afrikas nach Norden 
werden könnte. Hier muß man sogar einmal den Gedanken erwägen, inwieweit es 
sogar gemeinsame Interessen des soz. Lagers und des franz. Imp. gegen den USA-
Imperialismus geben könnte”.
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THE GERMAN ROLE IN THE CENTRAL AFRICAN SECOND 
SCRAMBLE
It is difficult to figure out the concrete extent of the German participation in the 
second scramble in the Central African region. Therefore, a certain degree of 
uncertainty has to be accepted. Quality and quantity of the two German states 
varied from target area to target area and therefore make it difficult to provide 
exact information which applies to the Central African region as a whole.  The 
German commitment was notably intense in states with large strategic mineral 
and energy carrier resources and with a simultaneous high endangerment of 
security of supply. Corresponding to this, the German commitment was great-
est in the hot spots of the Cold War: in the DRC and Angola.
Here, the FRG supported primarily the moderate powers, who sought an evo-
lutionary development of their states towards the West which would ensure an 
adequate security of supply for the West German private economy. Therefore, 
in the Belgian Congo, a greater financial support for the Belgian colonial power 
was initiated already during the process of decolonisation. In 1958 and prob-
ably in 1959,571 bonds of the Belgian Congo, worth 120 million DM, were bought 
by the FRG. Furthermore, in 1960572 and 1961,573 after the decolonisation of the 
country, Belgian bonds, also worth 120 million DM, were bought, most prob-
ably as financial support for the Belgian development aid for the Congo. 
Besides, when the Congo Crisis erupted, the FRG at first supported the moder-
ate, anti-lumumbist powers, like the political party Alliance des Bakongo (Abako), 
later, after the murder of Lumumba, also partly radical pro-western powers. Fi-
nancial support counted among their efforts. For instance, trade businesses be-
tween companies in Hamburg and the Congolese cooperative Société Coopéra-
tive du Bas Congo, which maintained close ties with the Abako, were stimulated 
with trade guarantees by the West German financial institution Kreditanstalt für 
Wiederaufbau.574 In doing so, the West German state supported indirectly the 
anti-lumumbist opposition movement. Another way of intervening indirectly into 
the political development of the Congo by West Germany was its supporting the 
media. A printing office, the Imprimerie Concordia, was installed in the Congolese 
capital Léopoldville by the West German intelligence service Bundesnachrichten-
dienst (BND) for 23 million DM to raise a printing monopoly for the West (German 
571 Soehring – Ambassador (West German Embassy in Belgian Congo) to West German 
Foreign Office, (17 December,1959), PA AA, AA, B 68, 45.
572 Unknown sender to East German Ministry for Foreign Affairs, (20 September 1960), 
PA AA, MfAA, C 805/74, p. 14.
573 Unknown sender to East German Ministry for Foreign Affairs, date unknown, PA AA, 
MfAA, A 17822, p. 6.
574 Gülstorff, Die westdeutsche Kongopolitik, 41-43
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state) in the Congo and to establish a BND headquarters for the complete West 
and Central African region.575 Its revenue financed briberies of politicians, union-
ists, journalists, and editors. Furthermore, telecommunication576 and intelligence 
expert staff were sent to support the Congolese central government and its army. 
Even the renegade government Tshombé of the Katanga province received West 
German weapons and vehicles as well as mercenaries. 
As it seems, around 600 West German mercenaries fought for Katanga in 1961 
alone – managed secretly by the West German military intelligence agency Mil-
itärischer Abschirmdienst.577 In Angola the West German support was concen-
trated on moderate powers as well. During the Portuguese Colonial War, the 
FRG supported the Portuguese colonial power financially and militarily. In 1960578 
and 1961,579 the FRG assigned government credits each worth 150 million DM. 
Furthermore, Portugal received military aid and purchased a greater quantity of 
weapons and military vehicles – including even planes and ships – worth hun-
dreds of millions of DM.580 In contrast, the liberation movements only received little 
assistance, which was of nearly no consequence, by the West German churches 
and social movements – and a smaller armament supply, probably by the BND.
Meanwhile, the GDR sought to support moderate powers, which aspired to 
an evolutionary pro-soviet development of their countries, also to ensure an 
adequate security of supply for their economy. During the early Congo Cri-
sis, the government of Gizenga received an indirect support of military equip-
ment581 and financial aid582 - mainly clothes as well as cloth and yarn to pro-
duce uniforms. Later, the Comité National de Libération (CNL) was provided 
575 Grabert – Secretary of State (Federal Chancellery) to Eppler – Minister (Federal 
Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development), 13 April 1973, PA AA, AA, 
Zwischenarchiv, 103058.
576 Federal Ministry of Post and Telecommunications to Federal Ministry for Economic 
Cooperation and Development, department III B 5 (West German Foreign Office), 24 
November 1964, PA AA, AA, B 68, p. 242.
577 Hähnel – Deputy Consul and Attaché (General Consulate in Egypt) to East German 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 4 March 1961, PA AA, MfAA, A 13765.
578 Haas – department 412 (West German Foreign Office) to Harkort – Secretary of State 
(West German Foreign Office), 21 July 1961, PA AA, AA, B 34, 273.
579 West German Consulate in Angola to West German Foreign Office, (25 January 
1962), PA AA, AA, B 68, 63.
580 Helga Haftendorn, Militärhilfe und Rüstungsexporte der BRD (Düsseldorf: Bertels-
mann Universitätsverlag, 1971), 124–125.
581 Politburo of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany to Polit-
buro of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, 14 February 
1961, BArch, SAPMO, DY 30 / J IV 2/2 / 749.
582 Schüßler - Undersecretary (East German General Consulate in Egypt) to third ex-
tra-european department (East German Ministry for Foreign Affairs), Office of the 
Authorized Agent of the GDR in Egypt, 27 August 1962, BArch, SAPMO, DY 30 IV 
2/20/419, 295-297.
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with weapons training,583 military equipment and weapons. The latter included 
2,000 sub-machine guns with 60,000 bullets ammunition, 100 Panzerbüchsen 
RPG 2 (a weapon similar to a bazooka) with 2,000 grenades and five mortars 
with 360 grenades.584
In Angola, the GDR supported the liberation movement MPLA. Since the begin-
ning of the 1960s, this support contained indirect financial support and supplies 
of military equipment and since 1967 small amounts of weapons supplies.585 Not 
until some months before the outbreak of the Angola Crisis in November 1975, 
the aid was extended. Following this, greater amounts of military equipment and 
weapons were shipped from the East German international port Rostock to the 
harbour of the People’s Republic of Congo and from there flown with a socialist 
airlift to the Angolan capital Luanda. In this way, the MPLA received ten recoilless 
guns B-10 with 2,000 fragmentation grenades and 2,000 cavity grenades, 10,000 
sub-machine guns with 10 million bullets ammunition, forty pistols, and 10,000 
grenades.586 German activities played a significant role in the developments in 
these two hot spots of the Cold War. In the beginning of the Congo Crisis, the 
FRG appeared to have been one of the most important supporters of a moderate, 
pro-western development in the DRC. During the Portuguese colonial war, the 
GDR supported the pro-soviet powers in the MPLA and therefore seems to have 
had a share in its government takeover in November 1975. 
Compared on an international level, the East German commitment kept 
within limits. Be that as it may, a tighter research on the exact worth and ex-
tent of the East German investments still remains to be done. Anyway, the FRG 
seems most likely to have been one of the most important powers, operating 
at these African hot spots. But as empirical studies on the concrete activities of 
the further involved states are still limited to date, a comparison is possible, but 
should only be undertaken while being conscious of its weak empirical basis.
Contrary to these hot spots, the German commitment was low in countries 
with small strategic mineral and energy carrier resources and with a simul-
583 Scholz – Authorized Agent (Office of the Authorized Agent of the GDR in Egypt) to 
Stibi – Deputy Minister (East German Ministry for Foreign Affairs) and Kiesewetter – 
Deputy Minister (East German Ministry for Foreign Affairs), 27 January 1965, PA AA, 
MfAA, VS-65, 25.
584 Politburo of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany to Po-
litburo of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, 5 January 
1965, BArch, SAPMO, DY 30 / J IV 2/2 / 969.
585 Hans-Georg Schleicher and Ilona Schleicher,”Waffen für den Süden Afrikas. Die 
DDR und der bewaffnete Befreiungskampf,” in Die DDR und Afrika. Band 2: En-
gagiert für Afrika, ed. Ulrich van der Heyden, Ilona Schleicher and Hans-Georg Sch-
leicher (Münster and Hamburg: Lit-Verlag, 1994), 26.
586 Ilona Schleicher, Zwischen Herzenswunsch und politischem Kalkül. DDR-Solidarität 
mit dem Befreiungskampf im südlichen Afrika. Annäherung an ein Erbe (Berlin: Ges-
ellschaftswissenschaftliches Forum and Helle Panke, 1998), 49.
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taneous low endangerment of security of supply. The FRG concentrated its 
commitment in the development of its already existing economic networks by 
the extension of already existing economic structures. German projects, which 
included the development of completely new economic complexes, like the 
construction of mining and production sites, formed an exception in the Cen-
tral African region, only to be found in Angola and the DRC. 
In Angola, the West German company Krupp cooperated with the Companhia 
Mineira do Lobito (CML) and the Sociedade Mineira de Lombige to build a mining 
and production site for iron ore near Lobito. Altogether, Krupp and West German 
bank consortia587 made investments worth about 375 million DM. In exchange, 
Krupp and several West German steel companies should receive the major part 
of the Lobito iron ore production for a reduced price for several years.588 In the 
DRC, the international consortium Association Internationale de l’Industrialisation 
du Nord-Est du Zaïre (Assinez), which was led by the West German company 
Klöckner-Humboldt-Deutz, planned investments worth 2 billion DM in the North 
East of the country.589 In exchange for industrialisation of this region, the mem-
bers of Assinez should receive resources, like copper, manganese, wolframite, 
zinc, and lead, at a discount on a long-term basis.590 In contrast, the GDR ab-
stained from these activities – at least until 1975. Thus, the activities of both Ger-
man states seem to have effected and accelerated an evolutionary development 
of the Central African economies and their networking not just with the interna-
tional and the respective European, but also with the German markets.
By international comparison, it is a hard task to specify the German rank in 
the Central African second scramble. What is sure is that it was high enough to 
increase the German economic influence in the region. The share Central Africa 
had in the West and East German global commerce may have decreased finan-
cially – as secondary literature shows –, but simultaneously, it increased materi-
ally. Here, the success of the German Africa policies – fixated on trade and not 
on economic investments – becomes apparent. During the 1950s, 1960s, and 
1970s, quantity and quality of the products, which Germany imported from Af-
rica, could be raised, while the prices of the products could simultaneously be 
lowered. Therefore, the German participation in the second scramble in Central 
Africa was a success – at least from the standpoint of the two German states.
587 Eduardo de Sousa Ferreira, Strukturen der Abhängigkeit. Wirtschaftsbeziehungen 
der Bundesrepublik Deutschland zu Angola und Mozambique (Frankfurt am Main: 
Lembeck, 1975), pp. 37-42.
588 Müller-Roschach – Ambassador (West German Embassy in Portugal) to West Ger-
man Foreign Office, 21 December 1966, PA AA, AA, B 68, 452.
589 Assinez to West German Foreign Office, (3 June 1975), PA AA, AA, Zwischenarchiv, 
103051.
590 Schlegel (West German Foreign Office) to Kremer - department 403 (West German 
Foreign Office), 3 September 1975, PA AA, AA, Zwischenarchiv, 103052
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ECONOMY AND HALLSTEIN – HALLSTEIN AND ECONOMY 
In my thesis – as already mentioned – four paradigms of scholarship on West 
and East German history concerning the foreign activities of the two German 
states, are put into question. In the following, my disapproval of the most im-
portant of them – the superior relevance of the Hallstein doctrine – shall serve 
as a brief summing up of this paper.  In context of scholarship on the West and 
the East German activities in the Central African region and the African conti-
nent (as well as the world as a whole), the most common paradigm states that 
between 1955 and 1969/72 the German-German contradiction – in the form 
of a mutual maintenance of the Hallstein doctrine – has been the leitmotif for 
German Africa policies and all activities regarding it.591 Only when the German-
German basic treaty was signed in 1972, was this policy replaced by a ‘new’ 
leitmotif – the German economic interests. However, this superior relevance, 
attributed to the German-German contradiction, can be questioned. Already 
before the issuing of the Hallstein doctrine in 1955, a commitment on behalf of 
the FRG and the GDR on the African continent had existed. Moreover, the com-
mitment did not receive a boost with the implementation of the doctrine and it 
did not relapse after it had ended (neither with the instalment of the Scheel doc-
trine in 1969 nor with the signing of the German-German basic treaty in 1972).
Admittedly, the German-German contradiction became a significant argument 
in the internal discussions to handle the regulation and utilization of the available 
resources in both German states in the 1950s and 1960s. But its excessive usage 
originated primarily in the official formalities and unofficial regulations of the Ger-
man ministerial bureaucracy.  Nearly all project proposals – written to receive re-
sources from the state – forwarded to the respective ministries, were reasoned with 
the German–German contradiction. But, only a fraction of these proposals finally 
received government subsidies. Instead, economic – sometimes also geostrategic 
– arguments led much more often to a successful proposal. Actually, economic 
interests were of primary importance. Their implementation received a substantial 
amount of the economic, cultural, and military aid of the German states.
Indeed, several cases of development and intelligence aid can be made 
out as attempts to influence African decision makers – but just not in con-
591 This is a common view in historical and political scholarship. Every survey on Ger-
man history and foreign policy mentions and respects this paradigm. Therefore, it is 
impossible (and unnessecary) to give an overview on the secondary literature apply-
ing to this point. Instead, three works that focus on the phenomen Hallstein doctrine 
shall be mentioned here: Rüdiger Marco Booz, Hallsteinzeit: deutsche Außenpolitik, 
1955-1972 (Bonn: Bouvier, 1995). / Werner Kilian, Die Hallstein-Doktrin: der diploma-
tische Krieg zwischen der BRD und der DDR. 1955-1973 (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 
2001). / William Glenn Gray, Germany’s Cold War: The Global Campaign to Isolate 
East Germany, 1949-1969 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003).
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text of the Hallstein doctrine. For that, another instrument of foreign policy 
was used: briberies. For instance, the Foreign Minister of Cameroon, Okala, 
received 10,000 DM (approximately $2,500) in cash and a pre-examination 
for a liposuction at the clinical centre of Bonn Venusberg from the FRG for a 
speech he gave at the United Nations Organisation (UNO) in 1960.592 When 
Jean-Bédel Bokassa took over power in the Central African Republic in 1966, 
a West German ambassador extraordinary with a check worth 80,000 DM (ap-
proximately $20,000) was sent, to influence future votes of Bokassa’s country 
in the UNO.593 These are examples that show how the German states took 
action when the German-German contradiction was at stake. In this case, not 
millions or billions, but hundreds, thousands and ten thousands of DM were 
invested. In contrast, millions and even hundreds of millions were invested 
for economic and geostrategic reasons – e.g. in projects of development and 
military aid. Therefore, the primacy of the Hallstein doctrine has to be denied.
Certainly in the case of the GDR, parts of its commitment can also be interpret-
ed as an attempt to breach the Hallstein doctrine. After all, non-recognition made 
it difficult to conclude agreements – not least a barrier for the economic develop-
ment of the GDR. But looking at it more closely, the overtures of the GDR con-
centrated themselves mainly on some economically relevant states and therefore 
also suggests an economic background. Thus, the German-German contradiction 
cannot be referred to as the leitmotif in context of an evaluation of the West and 
East German activities. At best, the doctrine can be conceded a greater meaning 
in the field of propaganda and public relations. Instead, economic interests played 
a major role. The German-German contradiction only flanked this and other inter-
ests and masked them with its popularity in the German societies. Therefore, the 
paradigm of a primacy of the Hallstein doctrine seems to have been something 
propaganda and public relations always produce – more fiction than reality.
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“FRIENDS” WITH BENEFITS: RELATIONS 
BETWEEN HUNGARY AND COUNTRIES OF THE 
MIDDLE EAST DURING THE COLD WAR
dánIeL VÉKOnY
INTRODUCTION
This paper will focus on Hungary’s relationship with Middle Eastern countries 
in the following aspects. First, after this short introduction I would like to give 
a glance at the background of the political relationship between Hungary and 
the countries of the region, paying special attention to the role of commu-
nist parties of these countries. Second, the paper will shed some light on the 
economic aspects of the links between the states in question. Finally, I would 
like to present a short analysis of Hungary’s role in the Eastern Bloc’s policy 
regarding the Middle Eastern region.
Due to scarcity of secondary literature at the time of writing this paper, I will 
mainly lean on the relevant primary sources I collected during the above men-
tioned research process. Nevertheless, in order to put the whole subject into a 
sound context, I will use some vital secondary sources that cover the Middle 
Eastern region during the Cold War era. 
After much consideration I chose to leave out Israel from this paper. The 
reason for this is that, because of the reasonably large number of Hungarians 
with Jewish background in Hungary and likewise many Israeli citizens with 
Hungarian roots, this relationship was such a special and delicate one during 
this era that it would not be possible to fully present this relationship together 
with those Hungary had with other Middle Eastern countries in one confer-
ence paper. This is why the paper will ignore relations between Hungary and 
Israel and focus mainly on the links to other Middle Eastern countries that were 
“friendly” as far as the Eastern Bloc is concerned.
This takes us to our next question: what does the term “friendly” states mean? By 
this expression I mean those states that were part of the Soviet sphere of influence at 
a certain time during the Cold War. I put the word friendly between quotation marks 
since one of the objectives of this paper is to demonstrate that links between these 
countries and Hungary were characterised mainly by the pursuit of self-interest and 
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not by friendship rooted in ideological understanding594. I will further demonstrate this 
by presenting some examples in the domain of economic cooperation. Consequent-
ly, relations with other Middle Eastern states that decided to side with the US and 
its allies will not be covered here. The other objective of this paper is to demonstrate 
that although Hungary’s foreign policy was largely influenced by Moscow, Budapest 
was still able to play a somewhat autonomous role as part of the Soviet Bloc.
POLITICAL RELATIONS
Despite the fact that Hungary maintained centuries-long relations with the 
countries and peoples of the Middle East595, these links had atrophied to an al-
most non-existent state before and during World War II. Besides, the post-war 
Soviet occupation and the ensuing  Stalinization of the country left little room 
for manoeuvre as far as foreign policy was concerned596. 
After the take-over by the communist party in 1948, Hungary had to follow the 
foreign policy dictated by Moscow. For a number of possible reasons Stalin chose 
not to focus his attention on the Middle East. Besides the obvious fact that both 
Moscow and Washington focused their attention on Europe at this time, accord-
ing László J. Nagy, the very logic of the Zhdanov Doctrine that divided the world 
into two camps left little importance to places that were not members of either 
bloc597. Moreover, one has to keep in mind that during the late 1940s into the early 
1950s most of the Middle Eastern territories were still under the control of Euro-
pean colonial powers. As US President Harry Truman chose to leave this region to 
be dealt with by the colonial rulers598, Stalin  probably considered this region either 
as in the sphere of interest of the UK and France or did not personally feel pow-
erful enough to deal with the Middle East when there were much to worry about 
in other regions as well. Since during the last years of Stalin, Hungarian foreign 
policy was very closely aligned to that of the Soviet Union, this era is character-
594 Nevertheless, since the contemporary jargon described these states as friendly, I 
decided to go ahead and use the expression myself.
595 Before World War II Hungary had diplomatic relations with only Egypt and Iraq. For 
more information regarding the pre-1945 History of contacts between Hungary and 
the Middle East see J Nagy, László, Hungary and the Arab World – Connections, 
opinions, standpoints 1947-1975 [Magyarország és az arab térség – Kapcsolatok, 
vélemények, álláspontok 1947-1975], JATE Press, Szeged, Hungary, 2006, pp.9-22.
596 Viktor Csornoky was the first and last Hungarian envoy to Egypt before the full com-
munist takeover in 1948. Shortly afterwards he was called back to Budapest, tried 
and sentenced to death by the Rákosi leadership in 1948. Ibid. pp. 28-29.
597 Ibid., pp.23.
598 Douglas Little, The Cold War in the Middle East: Suezcrisis to Camp David Accords in: 
Melvyn P. Leffler, Odd Arne Westad, The Cambridge History of the Cold War – Volume II, 
Crises and Détente, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 2010, pp. 305-306.
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ised by very low-key connections between Hungary and the Middle East.
Relations between the Soviet Bloc and the Middle East intensified after Stalin’s 
death. This might be down to the fact that by the middle of the 1950s the US man-
aged to integrate many Middle Eastern countries bordering the Soviet Union into pacts 
linked to the Western powers, such as CENTO. I would not like to  analyze whether the 
intensification of Soviet foreign policy in the region was the cause or the result of the 
intense activity of the US administration orchestrated by Dulles at that time599. Never-
theless, what Bernard Lewis described as the Soviet Union’s “leap-frogging” into the 
region after 1955600 led to a more active Hungarian foreign policy as well.
Connections with “friendly” states such as Egypt (until the 1970s), Syria, Iraq and 
Libya lay on a double-layered foundation. On the one hand, there were the official 
channels between governments and diplomatic missions. On the other hand, how-
ever, the Hungarian government kept close working relationships with the commu-
nist parties of these countries as well. There were regular meetings of communist 
party delegations from several countries in Hungary including those from the Middle 
East601. Thus the flow of information from these “friendly” countries reached Buda-
pest from a number of resources. The above-mentioned communist parties provided 
some vital, but many times flawed, information to the Hungarian officials and through 
Foreign Ministry officials residing in these countries. Besides, the official connections 
between the states obviously provided data through the Foreign Ministry as well. 
Moreover, Moscow made sure its allies were provided with all necessary data and 
insight in order to enable them to keep to the line favoured by the Soviet Union602. 
The reconciliation of all the information from these sources meant a challenge. 
One good example is presented by László J. Nagy in connection with the 1965 
coup d’état in Algeria603. In this case, the military power-grab led by Boumedienne 
was presented in a very negative tone by the Hungarian embassy in Algiers since 
599 The creation of CENTO in 1955 is the best example for this.
600 Bernard Lewis, Rethinking the Middle East, Foreign Affairs, Volume 71, Number 4, 
CFR, New York, 1992.
601 Every year the Political Committee (PC) of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party 
(HSWP) discussed the upcoming visits for that year. For one example for a record 
preserving this information see: HSWP Central Committee (CC) Department for For-
eign Affairs, Motion fro the PC for the plan o the non-socialist inter-party relations in 
1979. (5 December 1978) [Magyar Szocialista Munkáspárt (MSZMP) Központi Bizo-
ttság (KB) Külügyi Osztály, Javaslat a Politikai Bizottságnak a nem szocialista reláció 
pártközi kapcsolatainak 1979. évi tervére] Hungarian National Archives, [Magyar 
Országos Levéltár] henceforward MOL M-KS 288. f. 5/762. ő. e. (1978.12.28.)
602 On many occasions the Soviet ambassador to Budapest briefed the Hungar-
ian Foreign Ministry officials on actualities including the Middle Eastern Affairs. 
See: Hungarian Foreign Ministry, Foreign Ministry memorandum on Soviet am-
bassador Tito’s briefing on Soviet foreign policy  (26 June 1970), MOL XIX-J-1-j-
SzU-146-00358/17/1970
603 J Nagy, László, op. cit., pp.85-86
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most of the ambassador’s information was collected from the Algerian Commu-
nist Party. Foreign Ministry officials in Budapest, however, were much more sober 
in their analysis of the same situation, and thought twice about condemning the 
coup604. This turned out to be the good decision, because the new government 
decided to keep a positive attitude towards the Eastern Bloc. In this situation, we 
can clearly see a dilemma between realpolitik and foreign policy based on ideology. 
It was not always easy to reconcile these two factors during the Cold War era 
for a member of the Soviet Bloc, but most of the time, realpolitik gained the upper 
hand.  Another good example of this is the fact that Hungary failed to condemn 
the persecution of Egyptian communists during the 1950s although an internal 
report by the Hungarian embassy in Cairo could find little difference between 
Egyptian state forces and “the Nazi regime in Germany as far as their methods 
are concerned”605. In spite of this, Hungary chose not to condemn the aggressive 
acts of the Egyptian state apparatus against the local communists. It seems the 
communist movement in Egypt was expendable in order to keep Egypt in the 
Soviet sphere of influence and to avoid damaging valuable economic ties. 
The examples mentioned above shed light on a number of things. Ideology 
played only a secondary or even less significant role in the relationship with these 
“friendly” Middle Eastern countries. In this sense, Egypt is one of the best ex-
amples as to why we need to use the term friendly with a citation mark. While it 
is true that Nasser adopted many leftist elements as far as the government was 
concerned such as nationalisation of key sectors, land reform, anti-western for-
eign policy (rooted in anti-colonialism and Arab nationalism), secular state struc-
ture, and a conscious choice of not implementing the separation of powers,606 
it did not mean that the Egyptian government was ready to go down the road 
of communism. These leaders used, and sometimes abused, the relationship 
between them and the Soviet Bloc, and within it Hungary, in order to further their 
own and their nation’s interests. In this aspect there is nothing new under the sun.
ECONOMIC RELATIONS
The economy and especially trade played a major role in the relations between Hun-
gary and the Middle Eastern countries. In a sense, both sides needed one another. 
Hungary needed markets for its goods in order to obtain hard currency, as there was 
a chronic shortage of this due to the fact that throughout the years between 1956 
and 1989 the country ran a continuous trade deficit vis-á-vis the western coun-
604 Ibid.
605 Hungarian Foreign Ministry, Annual report of the Hungarian embassy from 1958. 
MOL Küm, XIX-J-1-j, Kairó Tük, 1945-1964 13.d. 139/1959.
606 Adeed Dawisha, The second Arab awakeking, W. W. Norton & Company, New York, 
2013, pp. 69-71.
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tries607. The Middle Eastern countries’ markets presented an opportunity to market 
not only agricultural goods and products of the food industry, but those industrial 
products that were otherwise not competitive on the Western capitalist markets608.
The fact that for Hungary there were no other major countries to which the 
country could sell its industrial products for hard currency, such as US Dollars, 
in big quantities is yet another reason why realpolitik played a much greater role 
in relations between these states. This reliance on the flow of foreign currency 
meant that Budapest needed the goodwill of the partner governments. However, 
these economic relations were not without problems. Firstly, some of these coun-
tries themselves lacked the hard currency Hungary needed so badly. One way to 
remedy this situation was to enter into barter agreements. But in many cases the 
problem was that these countries did not have the kind of goods that Hungarian 
industry could absorb on a mass scale. As a Foreign Ministry report stated: “…the 
biggest problem is that the majority of these countries cannot offer goods that are 
useful for our domestic economy and could offset the value of our exports…”609
This resulted in a number of uncomfortable situations when Hungary was 
forced to re-export the goods it obtained in exchange for its own exports. By 
re-exporting vast quantities of a given good such as cotton, the result was a 
downward pressure on the price of that good in question on the world market. 
The consequent decrease of the price of the good meant huge damages for the 
country that tried to make up its accounts to Hungary.  Indeed, this paradoxical 
nature of trade relations towards some countries of the region can be best de-
scribed by the above mentioned memorandum from the Foreign Ministry in 1965, 
warning about the deteriorating foreign currency conditions of some of these 
countries, which meant Hungary needed to allocate loans to these countries in 
order to keep these relations from freezing altogether610. This is indeed a damning 
picture of the partners that were supposed to act as markets for products of the 
Hungarian industry. This difficult situation eased somewhat after the skyrocket-
ing of oil prices after 1973. Afterwards, a number of Middle Eastern countries 
boasted major income from petroleum exports, thus they found themselves in a 
much better financial position.  The result was a turn-around in the directions of 
loans. Instead of  Hungary providing loans for countries of the region, some of 
these Middle Eastern countries lent money to Hungary611. As the financial situa-
tions of countries such as Iraq and Libya further improved during the 1970s and 
607 Attila Mong, Kádár’s Credit[Kádár hitele], Libri kiadó, Budapest, Hungary, 2012.
608 For a recapitulative report on trade between the „friendly” countries of the region and 
Hungary see: Hungarian Foreign Ministry, Report on the relations between Hungary 
and the Arab states in the mid 1960s, MOL Küm, XIX-J-1-j, Arab országok Tük, 1965 
111 d. IV-14.
609 Ibid.
610 Ibid.
611 Attila Mong, Kádár’s Credit, pp.156.
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1980s,612 so did Hungary’s financial situation become increasingly worrisome. 
This issue was caused by the ever-present negative trade-balance as mentioned 
earlier. To mitigate the problem, Hungary asked these cash-rich trading partners 
to deposit large amounts of hard currency in Budapest613. Hungary’s financial 
situation underwent a liquidity crisis at the beginning of the 1980s that eventu-
ally left the government with the necessity to join the IMF and the IBRD. The fact 
that during these months the financial institutions of these Arab countries chose 
to remove deposits in question from Budapest further demonstrates the limited 
scope and trust of these “friendly” governments towards Hungary614.  
When talking about export markets for products of heavy industry, one must 
not forget the “special” trade relations with these countries. The word “special” 
obviously refers to the defence industry in the archive documents. As early as 
1947, Egyptian politicians tried to set up cooperation between Budapest and 
Cairo in this dimension as well, but it only materialised some years later in the 
1950s615. However, one has to keep in mind that Hungary never played a signifi-
cant role in providing military hardware to countries in the Middle East. In Kádár’s 
words, “the actual suppliers were two socialist countries”616. It is more than likely 
that the two countries in question were the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia. 
The intention of importing civilian and military products from non-western coun-
tries was part of a wider attempt by the governments of the Middle East to break ties 
once and for all between them and their former colonial masters. The determination 
to develop an industrial sector that was not dependent upon the post-colonial econ-
omies of Western Europe naturally pushed these countries towards the Eastern Bloc. 
Hungary managed to profit in two further aspects from the development of 
economic cooperation in the “special,” military field between the Middle East-
ern governments and the Soviet Bloc. On the one hand, the military cooperation 
inevitably had some spill-over effects into the civilian sectors of the economy. 
This was the sector from which Hungary could profit the most. For instance, the 
deepening “special” ties between Egypt and the Soviet Bloc that meant inter-
est for other products of the Hungarian heavy industry, such as diesel engines, 
bridges, etc.,617 increased significantly from the 1950s onwards. 
612 However, the conflict between Iran and Iraq meant increasing difficulties for Iraq 
from the beginning of the 1980s.
613 op. cit., pp. 200-202.
614 Ibid.
615 J Nagy, László, op. cit., pp.34-37.
616 See: Hungarian Socialist Workers Party, Political Committee, János Kádár’s com-
ment at a HSWP Political Committee meeting on military support for “friendly” Arab 
countries in 1967 (18 July 1967), MOL M-KS 288. f. 5/430. ő. e. (1967.07.18.)
617 J Nagy, László, op. cit., pp.37.
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In addition, the increased demand for military hardware from these govern-
ments sometimes led to shortages in the Soviet stockpiles618. This resulted in 
Hungary’s offering of some hardware (such as radars) from its own stocks. This 
led to the development of some sectors of the Hungarian defense industry as 
well in order to enable the Soviet Bloc to match the increased demand from 
its Middle Eastern “friends”619. So, in some instances, the very shortages that 
strained the relations between the Soviet Union and some countries of the 
Middle East could have positive effects on the Hungarian defense industry.
HUNGARY’S ROLE AS A MEMBER OF THE SOVIET BLOC
It is true that Hungary played a secondary role in foreign policy between the Soviet 
Bloc and the countries of the Middle East. But this does not mean its role was not 
significant in some cases. As a member of the Warsaw Pact, the country needed to 
align itself to the policies dictated by Moscow but there was always some limited 
room for maneuver. After all, the national interest of Hungary sometimes differed 
from those of other Eastern Bloc countries. A good example for this is the official 
visit of a high-profile Hungarian delegation to Syria in 1972. At the end of the visit, 
the two sides failed to issue a joint statement, which would have been a sign of 
political understanding. The Syrian government and the Hungarian delegation failed 
to agree on main ideological principles, such as condemning the anti-communist 
sentiment in the region620. However, a Czechoslovak delegation visiting about the 
same time did not have such a problem621. These events demonstrate that the for-
eign policy of the Eastern Bloc countries was not hand-controlled from Moscow.
Hungary’s role in respect to negotiations with Iran further supports this idea. 
In 1981 the relationship between Tehran and Moscow was very frosty. Thus, 
the Soviets asked the Hungarian government to act as a mediator between the 
two sides622. This request further demonstrates that Moscow did not shy away 
from using the diplomatic services of its allies when there was a problem in a 
bilateral relationship with a given country. Besides, this further increased the 
significance of the autonomous role the countries of the Eastern Bloc could 
play in foreign policy during the years of Soviet dominance.
618 Hungarian Socialist Workers Party, Political Committee, Report for the Politburo on 
weapons exports to the UAR and Syria by Minister of Defense Lajos Czinege (21 
October 1969) MOL M-KS 288. F. 5/501 ő. E (1969.10.21.)
619 Ibid.
620 Hungarian Socialist Workers Party, Political Committee, Minutes of the PC’s session 
(3 May 1972), MOL M-KS 288. f. 5/580 ő. e. (1972.05.03)
621 László J Nagy, op. cit., pp. 125-126.
622 Hungarian Socialist Workers Party, Central Committee, Information by the Soviet 
Ambassador in Budapest on the situation in Iran (4 July 1983), MOL, M-KS-288 f. 
11./4415.ő.e.
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CONCLUSION
This paper presented a quick glance into the complex relationship between 
Hungary and the countries of the Middle East. While pursuing its own self-
interest Budapest needed to keep a delicate balance in regards to the reali-
ties of the Soviet Bloc. As far as the “friendly” states of the Middle East are 
concerned, this “friendly” attitude was a result of domestic and historic ne-
cessities. The anti-colonialist ideology paired up with a left-leaning nationalist 
agenda made the Eastern Bloc a convenient “friend” to these regimes. How-
ever, the “friendliness” of these governments had their clear-cut limits. The 
way these states treated their own communist parties is very telling alone. But 
the fact that the persecution of Middle Eastern communist activists never re-
ally jeopardized the relations between the Soviet Bloc and these governments 
sheds light on the fact that political and economic interests were always above 
ideology as far as these relationships are concerned.
The effects of the closer than average relations between these countries 
and Hungary can still be felt today. Hungary is still well-known by many in the 
region. In the framework of economic and political cooperation, there were 
many students from these countries who studied in several Hungarian Univer-
sities during these decades. Some of these students returned to their home-
lands, but many remained, creating a small, but rather well-educated, Muslim 
population in Hungary623. The current government’s new foreign policy agenda, 
the so-called Opening to the East, also aims to warm up these relations be-
tween the Middle Eastern countries and Hungary. Relations that were friendly 
at times, but never lacked the clear aim of maximizing benefits, even if it meant 
sacrificing ideology.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Csicsmann, László, Vékony, Dániel Muslims In Hungary: A Bridge Between East 
and West? in: Jaroslav Bureš (ed.) Muslims in Visegrad, Institute of Interna-
tional Relations, Prague, Checz Republic, 2011
Dawisha, Adeed, The second Arab awakening, W. W. Norton & Company, New 
York, 2013.
Lewis, Bernard. Rethinking the Middle East, Foreign Affairs, Volume 71, Number 
4,, CFR, New York, 1992.
623 For more insight into this question see: Sulok, Sultan, Muslim Minority in Hungary, in: 
Jaroslav Bureš (ed.) Muslims in Visegrad, Institute of International Relations, Prague, 
Czech Republic, 2011 and Csicsmann, László, Vékony, Dániel Muslims In Hungary: 
A Bridge Between East and West? in: Jaroslav Bureš (ed.) Muslims in Visegrad, Insti-
tute of International Relations, Prague, Checz Republic, 2011.
 „FRIENDS” WITH BENEFITS: RELATIONS BETWEEN HUNGARY...  209
Little, Douglas. The Cold War in the Middle East: Suez crisis to Camp David 
Accords in: Melvyn P. Leffler, Odd Arne Westad, The Cambridge History of 
the Cold War – Volume II, Crises and Détente, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, UK, 2010.
Mong, Attila. Kádár’s Credit[Kádár hitele], Libri kiadó, Budapest, Hungary, 2012.
Nagy, J László, Hungary and the Arab World – Connections, opinions, 
standpoints 1947-1975 [Magyarország és az arab térség – Kapcsolatok, 
vélemények, álláspontok 1947-1975], JATE Press, Szeged, Hungary, 2006.
Sulok, Sultan, Muslim Minority in Hungary, in: Jaroslav Bureš (ed.) Muslims in 
Visegrad, Institute of International Relations, Prague, Checz Republic, 2011
Primary sources:
Hungarian Socialist Workers Party, Central Committee, Department for For-
eign Affairs, Motion from the PC for the plan o the non-socialist inter-
party relations in 1979. (5 December 1978), Hungarian National Archives, 
[Magyar Országos Levéltár] henceforward MOL M-KS 288. f. 5/762. ő. e. 
(1978.12.28.)
Hungarian Socialist Workers Party, Central Committee, Information by the So-
viet Ambassador in Budapest on the situation in Iran (4 July 1983), MOL, 
M-KS-288 f. 11./4415.ő.e.
Hungarian Foreign Ministry, Annual report of the Hungarian embassy from 
1958. MOL Küm, XIX-J-1-j, Kairó Tük, 1945-1964 13.d. 139/1959
Hungarian Foreign Ministry, Foreign Ministry memorandum on Soviet ambas-
sador Titov’s briefing on Soviet foreign policy  (26 June 1970), MOL XIX-J-
1-j-SzU-146-00358/17/1970
Hungarian Foreign Ministry, Report on the relations between Hungary and the 
Arab states in the mid 1960s, MOL Küm, XIX-J-1-j, Arab országok Tük, 
1965 111 d. IV-14.
Hungarian Socialist Workers Party, Political Committee, János Kádár’s comment 
at a HSWP Political Committee meeting on military support for “friendly” Arab 
countries in 1967 (18 July 1967), MOL M-KS 288. f. 5/430. ő. e. (1967.07.18.)
Hungarian Socialist Workers Party, Political Committee, Report for the Polit-
buro on weapons exports to the UAR and Syria by Minister of Defense La-
jos Czinege (21 October 1969) MOL M-KS 288. F. 5/501 ő. E (1969.10.21.)
Hungarian Socialist Workers Party, Political Committee,  Minutes of the PC’s 
session (3 May 1972), MOL M-KS 288. f. 5/580 ő. e. (1972.05.03)
210 CSABA BÉKÉS – MELINDA KALMÁR: STUDENTS ON THE COLD WAR
BROADENING THE LIMITS:  
AUSTRIAN FOREIGN POLICY UNDER FOUR 
POWER OCCUPATION
dórA HOrVátH
Following the Second World War, the situation of Austria was special. On the 
one hand, the country was occupied by both Eastern and Western powers, just 
like as in Germany. On the other hand, there was no coherent verdict about the 
role of Austria in the War. According to the Moscow Declaration, Austria was 
the first free country to fall victim to Adolf Hitler’s aggression. 
However, Austria was also deemed responsible by the Declaration for its 
participation on Nazi Germany’s side. Due to this paradox, the legal form of the 
post-war treaty raised some questions. Austrian politicians highlighted the vic-
tim-role of their country. They wanted to sign a state treaty because this would 
have meant the re-establishment of an independent and democratic Austria 
following the occupation by the German troops. Austrian politicians wanted 
to avoid signing a peace-treaty which the Allies used with defeated countries.
While Austria was trying to run away from its past troubled by the Anschluss, 
it found itself exposed to a cross-fire between the East and West. Its future was 
determined by the course of the Cold War. The young republic had to learn 
how to balance between the East and West in order to achieve sovereignty. 
In this paper I would like to investigate the question whether Austria could have an 
influence on the treaty with the Allied powers and on its own future, or its destiny was 
at the mercy of the Cold War. I would like to prove that Austrian leading politicians 
and diplomats could affect the decisions of the four occupying powers on the Austrian 
treaty, even though Austria had a narrow room for maneuver as I will demonstrate later. 
BETWEEN WEST AND EAST 
The idea of the state treaty suited the strategy of the U.S. reflecting the tension be-
tween the U.S. and the USSR. The sovereignty of Austria promised both economic 
and political advantages to the U.S. in this region and could impede the long-term 
occupation of the Eastern Zone by the Soviets.624 However, such a treaty did not 
materialize because of the opposition of the USSR which wanted to economically 
624 Eva-Marie Csáky, Der Weg zu Freiheit und Neutralität. Dokumentation zur österrei-
chischen Aussenpolitik. 1945-1955. p. 2.
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exploit the Austrian Soviet Zone. The occupation was also important for the Sovi-
ets as a pretext for stationing the Soviet Army in Hungary and Romania.625
The four occupying powers signed the First Control Agreement on July 4, 1945. 
This was meant as a short term solution for the period up to the establishment of 
a freely elected Austrian government recognized by the four powers. The Allied 
Control Commission for Austria was established. It had two suborganizations: 
the Allied Council which consisted of the supreme commanders of the troops 
of the four occupying countries and exercised the supreme authority and the 
Executive Committee made up by the senior military officers of the occupiers.626
Failing to reach consensus on Austria’s future, the Allies signed the Second Con-
trol Agreement on June 28, 1946 and established a special committee of foreign 
policy experts from the occupying countries. The Austrian Treaty Commission had 
to create a preparatory form for the Austrian treaty. It became clear that the proc-
ess of drawing up a treaty for Austria would take more time and would be strongly 
influenced by the relationship between the occupying powers. The Second Control 
Agreement gave certain rights to the Austrian government. The government had a 
certain degree of maneuvering in foreign policy decisions as well; however, any in-
ternational agreement required a notice to the four powers. Any agreement could be 
considered as accepted if it was not appealed within 31 days by the Allied Council.627
There were two basic factors influencing the course of the Austrian treaty on 
the international stage. One was the economic interests of the main occupying 
powers, perceptible especially during the first part of the negotiation process. 
The other was their international political strategies during the Cold War.
ECONOMIC STRATEGY OF THE U.S.
U.S. leaders after World War II were aware that the wartime economic boom 
would soon be over and that the international economy would need new stimula-
tion to grow. American economists were convinced that only a liberal world trade 
environment could sustain demand.628 In the American strategy after 1947, the 
economic factor gained an especially important role. The U.S. wanted to focus 
on economic initiatives rather than military rearmament because they saw the 
Soviet threat in this first period of the Cold War primarily as political and psycho-
logical, not a military one. They wanted to answer to the Soviet challenge with 
economic strength and with a network of economically strong, self-supporting 
625 Zoltán Maruzsa: Az osztrák külpolitika a szövetséges megszállástól az európai inte-
grációig (1945-1995). p. 39.
626 Op. cit., p. 19.
627 Gerald Stourzh: Um Einheit und Freiheit. p. 48
628 Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad: The Cambridge History of the Cold War. I. 
Volume. p. 68.
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European and Asian power centers which stayed outside the Soviet orbit. There-
fore, Western Europe and Japan had to be revived economically.629
To achieve the above mentioned aim in Europe, the U.S. government was ready 
to provide substantial assistance in the frame of the European Recovery Program 
(ERP). The so-called Marshall Plan was essential to the postwar European economy 
because it successfully addressed the continent’s serious dollar shortfall and there-
by enabled its economic recovery. It became possible for the beneficiary states to 
put in place costly welfare systems which also defined their political choices.630 Be-
side the economic importance of the Marshall Plan, its political and cultural impact 
on the beneficiary states was enormous as well.631 The ERP unified the beneficiary 
states and the U.S. by economic links as well as ideological and security ties.632
During the course of the negotiations of an Austrian treaty, the U.S. European strat-
egy and Austria’s joining of the ERP were important for two reasons. First, the Mar-
shall Plan made up 14%633 of Austria’s GNP which was the highest figure among the 
beneficiaries. Therefore, the ERP was especially important both for Austria’s economy 
and for the political and cultural attitude of the country. For the U.S. it was essential to 
strengthen the Austrian economy so that the country surrounded by several states of 
the Soviet sphere of influence could resist the pressure of the USSR.
Secondly, Austria was the only Soviet-occupied country to join the ERP, the So-
viets having refused the Marshall Plan. The idea of the ERP marked “the Rubicon” 
with no return in the course of the Cold War.634 To accept the aid meant also a choice 
between the West and East. Therefore, the fact that the divided Austria joined the pro-
gram enhanced tensions and slowed down the negotiation process. Smart diplomacy 
on Austria’s side was needed to avoid a more serious crisis with the Soviet Union.
ECONOMIC STRATEGY OF THE USSR
After having lost at least 27 million people and about a quarter of its reproducible 
wealth635 as a result of the war, the USSR’s main economic interest was the acquisition 
of as many assets as possible in the occupied territories. According to Austrian sta-
tistics, the Soviets took around 60-70% of Austrian oil production, most of which was 
in their zone, during their occupation of the country.636 They acquired the whole oil in-
dustry of the Eastern Zone and the facilities of the Danube Steam Shipping Company. 
629 Ibid., p. 77.
630 Ibid., p. 164-165.
631 Ibid., p. 165.
632 Ibid., p. 154.
633 Ibid., p. 178.
634 Ibid., p. 167.
635 Melvyn P Leffler and Odd Arne Westad: The Cambridge History of the Cold War. I. 
Volume. p. 90.
636 Bader, William: Austria between East and West, 1945–1955, p. 121.
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Around 63,000 people worked in the so-called USIA-factories owned by the 
USSR in Austria. Because of this confiscation, the relationship between the Aus-
trian government and the occupying Soviets became strained at an early stage. 
The USSR claimed a significant share in the most important strategic industrial 
branches referring to the Potsdam Agreement concerning the so called “Ger-
man Assets”, properties which previously belonged to the Germans in Austria. 
First, Austria tried to curb Soviet ambitions with an act of nationalization, later 
tried to rebuy the German Assets from the Soviets, but all attempts failed.637
CONFRONTATION OF THE SUPERPOWERS’ FOREIGN 
POLICIES OVER AUSTRIA
The other important factor which determined the process of preparing the Aus-
trian treaty was the political relationship between the U.S. and the USSR. The 
tension and rivalry between the two superpowers started to grow immediately 
following the end of the World War. Their strategies and actions were deter-
mined by their fears and beliefs concerning the aims of the other. In the years 
I am examining, their strategies changed according to the current international 
situation which of course had an effect on the fate of the Austrian treaty. The 
tension between them was growing constantly until the death of Stalin. There 
were some international cases during the Cold War which had a particularly 
strong effect on the Austrian story; such as the deterioration of the relationship 
between the USSR and Yugoslavia, the proclamation of the ERP, the commu-
nist takeover in Czechoslovakia and the negotiations on Germany.
Stalin spoke in February 1946 in which he called capitalism the main source 
of wars and a threat to Soviet security. This speech was understood by the 
West as a call for ideological struggle and Soviet expansion.638 The West’s 
answer was the demand that the Soviets leave Iran and the famous speech of 
Winston Churchill about the Iron Curtain in Fulton in March 1946. The relation-
ship between the Western powers and the USSR began to deteriorate even 
further at this time. The creation of the Austrian treaty was stymied during the 
first committee meeting in 1947. Besides the problem of how to define the 
German assets, the Yugoslavian territorial and material claims also caused dif-
ficulties because they were accepted by the USSR but refused by the Western 
powers and Austria. Yugoslavia, as a socialist country, was supported by the 
Soviet Union, despite the fact that it was not a Soviet bloc country, but not by 
the Western countries. 
637 Eva-Marie Csáky. Der Weg zu Freiheit und Neutralität. Dokumentation zur österrei-
chischen Aussenpolitik. 1945-1955. p. 10.
638 Leffler, op. cit., p. 100.
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In the spring of 1947, the Austrian Treaty Commission worked out the so-called 
Cherriére Plan regarding the German Assets. The Plan639 proposed the Austrian pur-
chase of German Assets using government credits and envisaged to supply differ-
ent commodities to Great Britain and France and oil to the USSR for five years. This 
plan could have been a good basis for the negotiations.640 However, at this time the 
Cold War powers did not want to negotiate any longer. On March 12th 1947, two 
days after opening the conference in Moscow about the Austrian treaty, the Ameri-
can President, Harry Truman, proclaimed his doctrine against Soviet expansion. 
Moreover, international tensions increased in June when the ERP was proclaimed.
A modified form of the Cherriére Plan came again into play at the London 
conference between 25th of November and 15th of December 1947641. This plan 
would have given the Soviets a significant influence on the Austrian economy. 
The USSR would have gained control of 58% of Austrian oil production for thirty 
years, certain equipment of the Danube Steam Shipping Company would have 
remained in Soviet possession and Austria would have supplied commodities 
to the value of one hundred million dollar within seven years.642 The USSR was 
open to negotiate the details with greater demand. However, the Western Allies 
did not want to give up their position. Austria was an important strategic point 
between north and south, between the western zone of Germany and Italy.643
In 1948 the negotiations on the treaty continued, but soon stopped, as the news 
of the communist takeover in Czechoslovakia spread. This shocked the Western 
powers and Austria because Czechoslovakia appeared to be successful in balanc-
ing between the East and West and because there was not even one Soviet soldier 
in this country. This issue changed the strategy of the occupying powers. The USSR 
became more flexible about the content of the treaty; the Western powers were 
rather uncertain. The situation became more difficult as the USSR withdrew from the 
German Allied Commission in March 1948. The tension further rose as the USSR set 
up a blockade around West-Berlin, following currency reform in Western Germany. 
The breakdown in relations between Tito and Stalin created a good opportunity for 
the Austrian treaty. On Austrian initiative the occupying powers sat down again. The 
Yugoslavian claims were reduced significantly. But now, the parties could not agree 
on the German Assets. However, the real reason behind the failure of the meeting 
had more to do once again with the current international situation. 
The USSR succeeded in detonating its atom bomb so the U.S. no longer 
possessed a monopoly on nuclear weapons. This increased American concerns 
regarding the Soviet intentions; this also slowed down the negotiations between 
639 J. I. Szirtes,: Austrian Foreign Policy 1945-1985. p. 25.
640 Eva-Marie Csáky, Der Weg zu Freiheit und Neutralität. Dokumentation zur österrei-
chischen Aussenpolitik. 1945-1955. p. 10.
641 Szirtes, op. cit. 26;  Gruber, p. 184.-185.
642 Ibid., p. 26.
643 Csáky, op. cit.,  p. 11.
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the two countries. Tension between them was growing intense. In May 1949, 
the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) was established in the West, while in 
October the German Democratic Republic (GDR) was proclaimed in the East. 
German unity obviously failed which was especially relevant regarding Austria. 
The two cases were often mentioned together on international negotiations. 
Both countries were occupied by Western and Eastern powers and they both 
needed an agreement between the Eastern and Western occupiers in order to 
be independent and unified. This objective had now failed in case of Germany.
Besides all of these international happenings which resulted in a deep gap be-
tween the West and East, even the American policy was divided on the issue of 
Austria. The State Department hoped that the occupying powers would agree. 
However, the U.S. Department of Defense did not want an agreement.644 As the 
European strategy of the U.S. changed in the 1950s,645 the latter got a larger role 
in American politics. They wanted to strengthen their European presence not only 
economically, but also militarily as underlined by the establishment of NATO in 
1949. As a result, the U.S. did not want to pull out of Austria.  The negotiations 
continued to the end of 1949. At the beginning of the 1950s, only five uncertain 
points remained in regards to the treaty. However, it was during this time that the 
Cold War reached its zenith. During the Korean War both powers tried to reinforce 
their European foundations.646 The time was not apt for them to agree on the Aus-
trian issue. Negotiations broke down again. Both the U.S. and the USSR offered 
options for agreement which the other side could simply not accept. For example, 
the Soviets linked the Austrian issue with the situation in Trieste.647 They impugned 
the Austrian measures against former Nazis and the remilitarization of Austria by 
the Western powers. They wanted Austria to reimburse the aid they gave after the 
World War. Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, representing the USSR, created the 
solution for Germany with a precondition for the reduction of the occupying troops 
644 Csáky, op. cit., p. 13.
645 Ibid., p. 13.
646 Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad: The Cambridge History of the Cold War. I. 
Volume. p. 295.
647 Trieste is a city and a seaport in northeastern Italy. The city was a strategically im-
portant port hence both Italy and Yugoslavia wanted to acquire the territory after the 
World War II. In 1947, Trieste was declared an independent city state under the pro-
tection of the UN as the Free Territory of Trieste. The city and its surroundings were 
divided into two zones. The Zone A was governed by the U.S. and Great Britain. The 
Zone B was under Yugoslavian administration. In 1954, in accordance with the Memo-
randum of London the vast majority of Zone A was given to Italian civil administration, 
while the Zone B to Yugoslavian civil administration along with four villages from Zone 
A. The final border line with Yugoslavia and the status of the ethnic minorities in the 
area were only settled in 1975. More about the case of Trieste see in Leffler, Westad.
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from Austria.648 The Western powers also had enough fantasy; they created a draft 
for a short treaty, which did not even mention the case of the German assets.
It became clear that none of the Cold War powers wanted an agreement on 
the Austrian question. As a result, Austria tried to bring its case to the forum of 
the United Nations.649 However, the competence of the UN was also bounded 
by the Cold War. The Security Council of the UN could make binding decisions, 
but both the U.S. and the USSR held veto power in the Council. Only consen-
sus between the U.S. and the USSR could have offered a solution. The oppor-
tunity for an agreement came in the year of 1953. Stalin died and Julius Raab 
became Austria Chancellor. These two events fundamentally changed the re-
lationship between the Soviet Union and Austria. Both governments started to 
make concessions. The USSR took over the costs of the maintenance of the 
Soviet occupation. Austria was willing to withdraw the plan of the short treaty. 
In 1953, a marked-change of tone between the two countries gradually took 
place.650 In February 1954, at the Berlin Conference of Foreign Ministers, Molo-
tov proposed an addition to the treaty.651 It would forbid Austria any involve-
ment in coalitions or military alliances and the establishment of foreign military 
bases on Austrian territory. Molotov also proposed that the occupying powers 
would defer the deduction of their troops from Austria until the conclusion of 
the peace treaty with Germany. This last point was unacceptable for Austria, 
but also for the U.S.. Foreign Minister J.F. Dulles Molotov’s whole proposal was 
intolerable. According to Dulles, only an independent state could decide not to 
join any alliances. This idea played an important role later when it was agreed 
that Austria would declare neutrality as an independent state.652
In early 1955, Molotov became more flexible about the connection of the 
German and Austrian cases. He was willing to drop this point if Austria could 
guarantee that Anschluss would not occur anymore.653 He mentioned the need 
for bipolar reconciliation between the USSR and Austria in order to reach 
an agreement. The Austrian government responded that it was glad that the 
USSR was open to settle the unresolved issues; however, all occupying pow-
ers should be involved.654 Furthermore, the Austrian government agreed to 
648 Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad: The Cambridge History of the Cold War. I. 
Volume. p. 315.
649 Heinrich Siegler, Österreichisches Weg zur Souverentität, Neutralität, Prosperität. 
1945-1959. p. 30.
650 Heinrich Siegler. Österreichisches Weg zur Souverentität, Neutralität, Prosperität. 
1945-1959. p. 35.-45.
651 Report of the Austrian Federal Government on the Berlin Conference of Foreign 
Ministers. Sten. Prot. NR. VII. GP., 33. session, 24. Ferb. 1954. Quoted by Felix Er-
macora
652 Felix Ermacora: 20 Jahre Österreichische Neutralität. p. 33 - 34.
653 Ibid., p. 36.
654 Wiener Zeitung, Nr. 63. 17. 03. 1955. Quoted by Felix Ermacora.
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make sure an Anschluss would not occur again. The government wanted to 
understand how they should guarantee that Anschluss would not occur any-
more. The USSR promised to investigate the question of the guarantee against 
the Anschluss and agreed that all powers would have to be involved in the 
developments.655 The above presented exchange of notes was a prelude for 
an invitation of Austrian statesmen to a Moscow bipolar meeting.  An Austrian 
government delegation visited Moscow in April 1955. The parties agreed on 
the redemption of the German assets by Austria for a much lower price than 
stated in the earlier plans. Molotov made it clear that it would not be enough 
to make a simple declaration about Austria’s intention to avoid military alli-
ances and establish foreign military bases in its territory, the Austrian delega-
tion promised a declaration of neutrality.656 At a commemorative meeting of 
the National Council and the Federal Council, Chancellor Raab highlighted in a 
speech on April 27th 1955 that the neutrality declaration can only be adopted 
after the State Treaty has been signed because such a declaration would make 
only sense if it was adopted by a full sovereign state.657
ROLE OF AUSTRIA IN THE BIRTH OF THE STATE TREATY
The influence of the Cold War on the arrangement of the Austrian State Treaty 
is obvious. However, Austrian policy played a significant role in the birth of this 
treaty as well. This was not an easy role considering that Austria did not have the 
needed sovereignty to follow its own ways in political decision making. Because 
of this, Austrian political leaders had to find unconventional ways to enforce the 
country’s interests. I would like to present some resources of Austrian politics 
and diplomacy which helped Austria to drive the occupying countries towards 
an agreement. Austria was able to exploit its narrow room for maneuver; first, 
because its political elite succeeded in joining forces for concrete state interests 
like independence or international acceptance of the “victim role”. 
Secondly, its diplomacy was able to pursue a flexible foreign policy. This aimed 
at gaining tangible advantages (like joining the Marshall Plan), while also avoid-
ing unilateral constraints by continuously maintaining good relations with both 
sides.658 The unified strategy of the Austrian foreign policy after the Second World 
War pointed to a policy of balance. Austria tried to build good relations with both 
of the Cold War superpowers without any commitment;659 just as Switzerland 
655 Wiener Zeitung, Nr. 70. 25. 03. 1955. Quoted by Felix Ermacora.
656 Walter Kindermann, Flug nach Moskau. Ermacora, Felix: 20 Jahre Österreichische 
Neutralität, p. 45.-46.
657 Felix Ermacora: 20 Jahre Österreichische Neutralität. p.48.
658 Peter Filzmaier and Anton Pelinka: Außenpolitik und Neutralität, p. 5.
659 Csáky, op. cit., p. 16.
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did.660 This strategy also fell in after 1955 with the Austrian neutrality.  The main 
goal of the political leaders was to obtain the sovereignty of the country. That was 
a big difference compared to the interwar period. After 1945, the Austrian people, 
the political elite at least, believed in the viability and the future of their country, 
which was not the case in 1918.  It did matter for the negotiations to be success-
ful that the Austrian political parties were able to cooperate with each other. This 
was already noticeable right after the war. The first important step was the meet-
ing of the Austrian regions from the Western zones in 1945.661 They accepted the 
Renner government which was established in the Soviet zone instead of making 
a counter-government. They urged for the expansion of its competence to the 
whole of Austria. They did so even though the Renner government was estab-
lished in the communist zone with some communist ministers. 
One of the main perspectives of Austrian politicians was that they wanted to 
forestall the partition of the country. It also helped to forward the Austrian inter-
est that - in contrast to the interwar period - both political sides now paid at-
tention to the stability of their internal affairs. Although there were occasionally 
tensions and disputes between the two main political parties (ÖVP and SPÖ) 
concerning some concrete decisions, on the general line and the main orienta-
tion of the foreign policy there was a consensus between the two parties.662
The political elite exploited everything for the aim of independence. This be-
havior occasionally resulted in opportunistic attitude.663 Austrian leaders agreed 
that it would only serve the country’s swift independence and its future in the 
international community if Austria would be seen as a victim of the German ag-
gression rather than an ally of the Nazi Germany. Hence they wanted to avoid 
bearing any responsibility for the crimes of National Socialism. For this reason 
the Austrian government and the state authorities were not open for discussion 
on questions such as reparations for Jewish victims or the facilitation of the 
return of Austrian emigrants. Moreover, because of this aspiration, no real con-
frontation and discussion could emerge about Austria’s recent past and the role 
of Austrian National Socialism.664 The Austrian strategy aimed first of all at ex-
panding the rights of the Austrian government in foreign policy decisions.665 This 
was followed by the Second Control Agreement in June 1946 which regulated 
the Austrian government’s sphere of influence and the functions of the Allied 
660 Helmut Kramer, Struckturentwicklung der Außenpolitik (1945-2005). p. 809. Presi-
dent Theodor Körner in February 1952, quoted by Stourzh, Gerald: Der österreich-
ische Staatsvertrag und die Voraussetzungen seines Zustandekommens, p. 74.
661 Heinrich Siegler, Österreichisches Weg zur Souverentität, Neutralität, Prosperität. 
1945-1959. p. 12.
662 Kramer, op. cit., p. 132-136.
663 Ibid., p. 810.
664 Ibid., p. 810.
665 Ibid., p. 809.
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authorities and armed forces. In foreign policy issues Austria could take deci-
sions except in certain fields. The occupied country was allowed to establish 
diplomatic relations with other governments for example. However, any interna-
tional agreement required a notice to the Allied powers and could be considered 
as accepted only if it was not appealed within 31 days by the Allied Council.666
The structure of foreign policy had to be organized as well. Actually, this began 
before the provisional government was established. On April 16th 1945 a fruitful, ef-
ficient meeting of the former employees of the foreign affairs institution took place, 
where they negotiated about reorganizing.667 Senior Nazi Party members were asked 
to leave, but nobody left. In this first established institution of foreign affairs, onetime 
Christian Socials predominated.668 In the developing state framework foreign affairs 
belonged to the Chancellor’s Office and this remained until 1959. Guidelines were 
published aiming at the unified action of the Foreign Service, keeping in mind the in-
terests of the state. These guides were among others about topics such as Austria’s 
victim role or the viability of the country. For the control of the country’s international 
image the Foreign Service sent delegates to the Austrian News Agency.669
Having established the internal organization of Foreign Service, Austria started 
to build up relations abroad. However, the country was dependent upon the per-
mission of the occupying powers. First, Austria could only establish represen-
tations in the capitals of the occupying countries. Upon the request of Foreign 
Service leader Karl Gruber, the Allied Council allowed the Austrian government to 
set up political representations in states which acknowledged Austria – except for 
Japan and Germany.670 After the Second Control Agreement Austria could com-
mence diplomatic relations with member states of the UN without the special 
permission of the Allied Council. Under Karl Gruber’s administration (1945-53) 
mainly experienced professionals were selected to represent Austria abroad, in-
stead of pure politicians.671 Despite the modest financial and human possibilities, 
the Austrian Foreign Service under Karl Gruber’s management made a big effort 
to expand the network of representations all over the world. 
In 1949 there were already twenty embassies, four political representation 
and twelve consulates.672 Austria also built up relations as soon as possible 
666 Stourzh, Gerald: Um Einheit und Freiheit.  p. 48
667 Zoltán Maruzsa: Az osztrák külpolitika a szövetséges megszállástól az európai inte-
grációig (1945-1995). p. 26.
668 Ibid., p 26.
669 Ibid., p. 27.-28.
670 Ibid., p. 30.
671 Beer, Siegfried and Gémes, Andreas and Göderle, Wolfgang and Muigg, Mario: In-
stitutional Change in Austrian Foreign Policy and Security Structures in the 20th 
Century, p. 184-185.
672 Zoltán Maruzsa: Az osztrák külpolitika a szövetséges megszállástól az európai inte-
grációig (1945-1995), p. 30 -31.
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with international institutions;673 it joined the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) by 1948 and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) in 1951.  Even though Austria had not yet joined the UN, the Austrian 
League for the United Nations was established in 1946 which aimed at spread-
ing the objectives of the UN and at raising awareness on the need for Austria’s 
integration into the international community of states.674
The Austrian government exploited every auditing opportunity at the nego-
tiations to bring its conception closer to the occupying powers.675 Austrian di-
plomacy even confronted Washington after 1949 when the U.S. was reluctant 
to restart the negotiations. Politicians of both big parties tried to exploit their 
party-relations as well for the aim of speeding up treaty negotiations.676 In 1947, 
Figl, then Austrian chancellor, turned to the French president, Léon Blum with 
his claims about the treaty. Until 1955 the whole infrastructure of the Foreign 
Service was working for a swift contract with the occupiers.677
AUSTRIA’S CASE AND THE UN
After the failure of negotiations in 1952, Austria sent a memorandum to all 
members of the UN concerning its case. The memorandum highlighted that 
Austria was actually a liberated country and if the occupying powers could not 
reach an agreement, Austria would turn to the UN General Assembly. How-
ever, Austrian politicians were of the opinion that Austria could not be effective 
if it would turn to the General Assembly alone, as a non-member state. 
This initiative would be only effective if a member state of the UN would bring the 
case in front of the Assembly. They planned to start negotiations with a state which 
was a member of the UN, but was not a member of the NATO so that Austria could 
avoid that the initiative looks as a unilateral action.678 In the end, Austrian leaders de-
cided to make contact with Brazil for this aim. According to Gruber’s explanation679. 
Brazil would be a suitable partner as it was a UN member, but non-member of the 
NATO; it was an important country and quite independent from the two superpowers. 
Gruber writes that the government was choosing between Brazil and India. 
673 Peter Filzmaier and Anton Pelinka: Außenpolitik und Neutralität. p. 5.
674 Robert Karl Albrecht: Der UN-Standort Österreich und der außenpolitische Status 
Österreichs nach 1945, p. 20.
675 Csáky, op. cit., .p. 8.
676 Ibid., p. 8.
677 Zoltán Maruzsa: Az osztrák külpolitika a szövetséges megszállástól az európai inte-
grációig (1945-1995). p. 31.
678 Karl Gruber: Zwischen Befreiung und Freiheit. Der Sonderfall Österreich. p. 280.
679 Ibid., p. 280.-281.
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They found that India represented neutrality too strongly to come up with 
this initiative in front of the Assembly which was sensitive and did not affect 
the Indian sphere of interest.680 Austria started negotiations with Brazil681. As 
a result Brazil urged the General Assembly of the UN to make a statement 
to the four powers insisting on their responsibility for reorganizing a free and 
independent Austria.682 In December 1952, Gruber  gave a speech in front of 
the UN General Assembly.683 He explained the country’s situation, highlighted 
Austria’s merits and stressed the need for an early agreement.684 All of these 
efforts resulted in an appeal of the General Assembly on December 20,1952 to 
the signing powers of the 1943 Moscow Declaration for the fulfillment of their 
pledges towards Austria.685 The General Assembly noted with concern that the 
negotiations since 1947 had failed to bring real result and called upon the oc-
cupying powers “to compose their difficulties and establish a lasting peace.”686 
The appeal notes that the Austrian people have made “successful efforts to-
wards the restoration and democratic reconstruction of their country.”687 The 
appeal highlights that the solution of the Austrian case would be an important 
step in elimination of other disagreements of the great powers as well and this 
way it would be a big step towards the world peace. The Austrian treaty would 
contribute to international peace, security and to friendly relations among 
states of the UN. The General Assembly addressed an “earnest appeal”688 to 
the governments concerned to reach an agreement and sign an Austrian treaty 
“with a view to an early termination of the occupation of Austria and full exer-
cise by Austria of the powers inherent in its sovereignty”689.
680 Karl Gruber: Zwischen Befreiung und Freiheit. Der Sonderfall Österreich. p. 281.
681 For details, see Karl Gruber: Zwischen Befreiung und Freiheit. Der Sonderfall Öster-
reich. p. 283.-289.
682 Heinrich Siegler: Österreichisches Weg zur Souverentität, Neutralität, Prosperität. 
1945-1959. p. 30.
683 Karl Gruber: Zwischen Befreiung und Freiheit. Der Sonderfall Österreich. p. 295.
684 Robert Karl Albrecht: „Der UN-Standort Österreich und der außenpolitische Status 
Österreichs nach 1945. p. 23.
685 Resolutions of the UN General Assembly, 409th plenary meeting, 20th December 
1952. http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/613(VII)&Lan
g=E&Area=RESOLUTION
686 Ibid., p.5.
687 Ibid., p. 5.
688 Ibid., p. 6.
689 Ibid., p. 6.
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THE AUSTRIAN STATE TREATY – 1955
Despite earlier Austrian struggles, the foreign policy of the Austrian government 
became very determined after 1953, under the government of Julius Raab. He 
succeeded in reaching an agreement with the USSR, with whom Austria had 
had the most conflicts. It was a big step because the USSR gave up most of 
its claims and its significant impact on the strategic industrial branches of Aus-
tria. However, we have to bear in mind that at this time the USSR also wanted 
the quick realization of the treaty because they hoped it would set a good 
precedent for the question of the German case to prevent West-Germany from 
joining NATO.690 After a process lasting ten years, on May 14, 1955, the occu-
pying powers met in Vienna to sign the Austrian State Treaty. Figl, as Minister 
of Foreign Affairs, succeeded in the last minute in removing the clause about 
the responsibility of Austria for participation in the war on the side of Nazi Ger-
many.691 It is also important for Austria that the Treaty restored the independ-
ent state not established it.692 This expression also confirmed that Germany 
had occupied the sovereign state before. Austria also achieved that neutrality 
wasn’t part of the State Treaty but the Austrian Parliament could take decision 
on it.693 On May 15, the State Treaty was signed by the ministers for foreign 
affairs of the occupying powers, ensuring sovereignty and freedom for Austria 
during the thick of the Cold War. Later other twelve countries joined the treaty 
acknowledging Austria as a sovereign, independent and democratic state and 
pledged to respect Austria’s independence and territorial inviolability.694 
Since the process of the Austrian treaty negotiations took place during the 
Cold  War, which created a very tense international environment, the destiny of 
the treaty and of Austria depended highly upon the  relationship between the 
two blocks. On the one hand, I wanted to demonstrate how the history of the 
Cold War period and the international environment affected the arrangement 
of the treaty. On the other hand, I wanted to prove that Austrian politicians and 
diplomats did still have an impact on the decisions of the four occupying pow-
ers. They could speed up the negotiations and influence the final decision, even 
though they had only a narrow room for maneuver.
690 Zoltán Maruzsa, Az osztrák külpolitika a szövetséges megszállástól az európai inte-
grációig (1945-1995). p. 48.
691 Csáky, op. cit., p. 19.
692 Manfred Rotter: Der Staatsvertrag. p. 123.
693 Ibid., pp. 122-123.
694 Ibid., p. 123.
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FAtImA dAr
INTRODUCTION
The term “war” is associated with images of organized violence, strategic bomb-
ing and physical combat between rival combatants. War operates as an ex-
plicit mechanism aimed at either annihilating the enemy or forcing surrender by 
completely damaging the enemy’s capability for resistance. While extermination 
could be the most direct and physical means to facilitate disarmament from an 
enemy force, the concept of war also entails various non lethal activities, targeted 
at the minds of enemies instead of their bodies. These activities aim to assault 
not just enemy combatants, but also the entire political body of the enemy. 
The term “psychological warfare” has been used to represent these activi-
ties that target minds in order to destroy the morale of the enemy, enhance the 
morale of friendly forces and allies and to win support from neutral audiences. 
This shift toward unorthodox methods of warfare, however, has changed the 
dynamics of how strategic warfare in the battlefield is understood. This article 
intends to explore the relationship between psychological warfare and soft 
power in context of the Cold War. In doing so, this article aims to argue that 
when psychological warfare interacts with soft power, it civilianizes the bat-
tlefield, creating a perpetual state of total war.
THE COLD WAR PROPAGANDA MACHINE
The Cold War propaganda machine is a profound case study that demon-
strates sophisticated frameworks that shaped the totality of war beyond a nu-
clear battlefield that never materialized between the United States and the 
Soviet Union. The lack of physical confrontation needed to civilianize the con-
flict between the two powers. Thus, psychological warfare695 and soft power696 
became crucial tools to facilitate this purpose. Nearly every aspect of civilian 
life was weaponized with psychwar and viewed as a potential battlefield for the 
695 Joseph S. Nye Jr., Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: 
Public Affairs 2004), p. 5.
696 Ibid., p. 7.
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“hearts and minds”697 of the population. Soft power tactics and propaganda 
interacted with dynamics of civilian culture, media, radio and social capital 
to broaden and modify the understanding of  unconventional warfare for the 
fulfillment of strategic aims of the Cold War rivals. 
The enhanced role of the intelligence and military community within the dis-
tinctly civilian consciousness of the body politic played a pivotal role in blurring 
the identity of combatants and non-combatants. Even though intelligence and 
military are understood to be central to the conventional operations of armed 
warfare, interaction between psychological warfare and soft power reshaped 
this understanding during the Cold War. Public communications and informa-
tion dissemination were viewed as part of the war strategy. Consequently, in-
telligence and military became more pertinent to civilian spheres. 
This production of a civilianised battlefield of psychological warfare and tac-
tics of soft power that were employed does not follow the hard power dynamic 
of two or more well-identified rivals. Instead, the identity of the perpetrators 
and planners of propaganda in many cases was purposefully obscured, while 
inherently combatant bodies of the war machine, such as the intelligence com-
munity and army found enhanced roles in non-combatant civilian parts of the 
body politic. The consequence of this perpetual state of war was an appear-
ance of a mainstream American culture of conformity that relied heavily on 
propagation rather than substantial realizations of material life. Disillusionment 
with this propagation gave birth to the counterculture movement as a backlash 
to the state of total war and culture of conformity.
USE OF RADIO AS A PROPAGANDA TOOL
The use of media as an instrument by the American intelligence community 
to expand the Cold War’s cultural reach was extensive. Radio was one of the 
most profound mechanisms in which the battlefield infiltrated civilian life and 
attempted to include non-combatants into the variables of war. The biography 
of C.D. Jackson, authored by John Allen Stern, quotes the example of Radio 
Free Europe (RFE), an American radio station used as a pivotal instrument 
of propaganda to exercise American soft power and psychological warfare in 
countries behind the Iron Curtain698. RFE gave voice to the European political 
exiles with a strategic ambition to empower internal opposition to Communism 
in Eastern Europe. As a result, RFE exploited a wide range of elements of civil-
697 Ross Johnson, Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty: The CIA Years and Beyond 
(Washington, D.C. : Woodrow Wilson Center Press ; Stanford, Calif. : Stanford Uni-
versity Press, 2010), p. 8.
698 John Allen Stern,  C.D. Jackson: Cold War Propagandist for Democracy and Glo-
balism (New York: University of America, 2012), p. 60.
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ian life including news, music and culture to operationalize the battlefield of 
psychological warfare, thereby facilitating the creation of total war. 
Stern emphasized that the identity of the perpetrators behind RFE propa-
ganda was kept a mystery for strategic reasons and the Central Intelligence 
Agency’s (CIA) relationship with RFE was not disclosed.699 Thus, only the soft 
power dimension of this form of warfare allowed for such obscurement of the 
identities of the perpetrators of psychological warfare tactics, and the example 
of RFE reinforces this. The relationship between soft power and psychological 
warfare also civilianized the identities of combatant intelligence outfits such as 
the CIA, which furthered the formation of total war. RFE was a significant pub-
lic communications project that emerged out of the interaction between soft 
power and psychological warfare that transformed the role of the intelligence 
community away from the combat zone and into civilian life. 
IMPORTANCE OF CREDIBILITY
As revealed by the relationship between the CIA and RFE, the intelligence com-
munity not only became increasingly relevant to the civilianized battlefield that 
it facilitated, but it also went to the farthest extent possible to remain credible 
within this civilian sphere. Author Frances Stoner Saunders in the Cultural Cold 
War: The CIA and the World of Arts and Letters discussed the relationship be-
tween the CIA and National Committee for a Free Europe and calls the National 
Committee one of the CIA’s “most ambitious fronts”700 disguised as a group 
of private American citizens. Great emphasis was placed on establishing and 
maintaining the identity of RFE as private. Saunders explains different methods 
and mechanisms that were employed to disguise the secret financial relation-
ship between the radio station and the CIA. One method that was adopted was 
the use of philanthropic foundations because it was “the most convenient way 
to pass large sums of money… without alerting the recipients to their source”.701
However, the nature of this mechanism was only a guise and the actual 
relationship was much different than a typical private organization. This is be-
cause, as Saunders mentioned in a quote from the 1952 Congress Committee, 
the power of the relationship was unchecked by the stockholders which made 
the relationship starkly different from a typical public corporate structure.702 
This led to the question of the strategic necessity behind this effort of maintain-
ing a private identity, especially in ensuring that the monetary relationship with 
699 Ibid., p. 66.
700 Frances Stonor Saunders, The Cultural Cold War: The CIA and the World of Arts and 
Letters. (New York: New Press, 2000), p. 45.
701 Ibid., p. 49.
702 Saunders, The Cultural Cold War, p. 64.
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the CIA remained a well kept secret. The answer to this question can be found 
in the dynamics of the civilianized battlefield and total war. 
Creators of RFE understood that when civilians were viewed as variables 
of war, credibility was an important weapon to achieve victory in the battle of 
ideas and information. They acknowledged the noncombatant nature of their 
target audience. Consequently, the necessary goal to accomplish credibility 
among civilians could not be achieved if ties with the CIA were exposed be-
cause civilian views of intelligence community were largely associated with de-
ception. Author Cord Meyer in “The CIA and Radio Free Europe” agreed with 
this assertion when he wrote that the later decision to make news reports as 
accurate and as objective as possible was crucial to the RFE operation, a func-
tion not assumed by Voice of America and BBC because they were known as 
government-supported entities. Establishing a high quality of credibility among 
listeners was the driving force behind this emphasis on neutrality and objectiv-
ity in broadcasts.703 From this understanding, it can be deduced that exposing 
the CIA’s relationship with the Committee and the radio stations would have 
worked against the interest in establishing credibility. Hence, great caution was 
adopted in ensuring that the relationship remained a secret. 
CIVILIAN ROLE OF THE AMERICAN MILITARY
Along with the intelligence community, the military also facilitated the creation of 
total war by civilianizing the battlefield. The American military entered the civilian 
sphere when it assumed responsibility for cultural dissemination, which included 
activities that were inherently non-combatant and non-violent in nature. The mili-
tary attempted to use soft power to introduce American way of life to civilian 
populations particularly in Germany. It conducted psychological warfare by us-
ing artistic and cultural expression to shape opinions and control information. 
For example, music served as a compelling soft power instrument in post-
war Germany as noted by Amy C. Beal. She traces the connection between 
U.S. military ensembles and post-war music in Germany as an integral part of 
the reeducation program designed by the Information Control Division (ICD) 
under the supervision of the U.S. Military Government in Germany (OMGUS). 
Even though OMGUS was a strictly military organization, it facilitated the ICD 
in conducting cultural renewal within civilian spheres of Germany. 
Officers of the military government undertook tasks of popularizing American 
classical music and diversifying German views of Western music. The military spon-
sored musical tours of performers from the West and also established an internation-
al musical library called the Inter Allied Music Lending Library, which was “lending 
703 Cord Meyer, “The CIA and RFE,” Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, 1.1 
(Winter/Spring 2000), p. 127-130.
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scores and parts to individuals and orchestras throughout occupied Germany”.704 
Thus, the heightened role of the military in designing public information and cultural 
policy in civilian spheres worked to augment the state of total war by blurring the 
dynamics of conventional warfare. The Cold War policies that civilianized the bat-
tlefield and created a state of total war had consequences that impacted social and 
cultural dynamics of civilian lifestyle, as discussed in the next section. 
CONFORMITY CULTURE AND  
THE GLOBAL COUNTER-CULTURE MOVEMENT 
A mainstream American culture of conformity emerged as the most ardent con-
sequence of state of total war in the 1950s. As the state of total war deepened, it 
impacted cultural aspects of an increasingly weaponized civilian life and created 
a lifestyle of conformity. The overarching societal impetus was to conform to the 
Cold War narrative and to live a life consistent with that narrative in every aspect 
of behavioral expectations. The culture was based on an American way of life 
that upheld ideals of freedom and prosperity that allegedly depicted the American 
ideology of democracy as opposed to the communist tyranny of the Soviet Union. 
This culture operated through massive levels of consumption and the free 
market economy. Hence, it created a culture of conformity to a way of life that 
reflected an ideal living standard of the American middle class. Ownership of 
comfortable homes in growing urban areas along with an income that allowed 
purchasing of consumable goods became central to the projected culture of 
ideal American life rooted in conformity. 
Jeremi Suri in “Counter-Cultures: The Rebellions Against the Cold War Order, 
1965-1975” argued that the state of total war created a need to project a certain 
image of American prosperity asserted as the core of good and democratic 
American life in order to confront the image of communist Soviet Union705. Be-
cause the battlefield entered civilian lives, there was a strong pressure to con-
form as American civilians had to fall in line with the anti-communist expecta-
tions of the American way life. The fear of communist infiltration propagated 
due to the state of total war made conformity the expectation and reality of 
civilian life. However, this culture that emerged out of a civilianized battlefield 
was based largely on propagated ideas instead of substantial realizations of 
material life. Heavy dependence on propagation caused overarching disillu-
704 Amy C. Beal, “The Army, the Airwaves, and the Avant-Garde: American Classical 
Music in Postwar Germany,” American music 21, Nº 4, Winter, 2003.
705 Jeremi Suri, “Counter-Cultures: The Rebellions Against the Cold War Order, 1965-
1975,” The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Volume II: Crises and Détente, ed. 
Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2010), p. 460.
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sionment in the American people706. This disillusionment was created by what 
was perceived to be an empty ideology, and it gave rise to the counter-culture 
movement as a backlash to state of total war and culture of conformity.
The counter-culture movement was not confined to America, but was global. 
The frustration with the dominant Cold War culture “gave voice to criticisms of 
the basic social assumption”707 regarding political status quo of the era. Coun-
terculture was a unique rebellion that took shape differently from previous forms 
of resistance to dominant Cold War ideas and policies. This rebellion originated 
not externally, but within “the universities, the literary circles and even bed-
rooms of mainstream society”708. Counter-culture posed challenges not only to 
the authority but also to the very basic ideas about  the good life and underlying 
notions of social life. Thus, counter-culture can be viewed as the unintended 
consequence of Cold War policies meant to resist social change. 
These policies unintentionally established and encouraged the social change 
that they were intended to prevent. Leaders of states introduced policies of re-
search, development, education and innovation to initiate strong competition 
against global adversaries. However, these policies equipped citizens with in-
tellectual and ideological tools to rebel against social norms that emerged from 
the policies of Cold War. Particularly, the younger generation in many countries 
“now had the means and motivation to challenge their leaders for failing to 
meet their stated goals”709.Citizens began to question not just the credentials 
of their leaders, but also their values. Consequently, the United States, West 
Germany and even the Soviet Bloc witnessed youth movements that protested 
the state of total war created by the Cold War narrative. 
Both progressive as well as conservative movements arose out of the coun-
ter-culture revolution as a consequence of the civilianized battlefield produced 
by the dominant Cold War culture. In the United States, the Civil Rights move-
ment, which protested racism in a society propagated as epitome of equality, 
freedom and liberty emerged as a subgenre of the counter-culture movement. 
The environmental movement, anti-war movement and feminist movement also 
surfaced as progressive subgenres of the counter-culture movement. However, 
along with these progressive movements, backlash to civilianization of battle-
field also took the shape of domestic terrorism and violence. As Jeremi Suri 
argued, right-wing conservative groups “mixed counter-culture politics with 
paramilitary behavior,”710 which gave rise to politics of “law and order”711 in the 
early 1970s. Leaders were determined to “restore rationality, reasonableness, 
706 Ibid., p. 476.
707 Suri, “Counter-Cultures,” p. 480.
708 Ibid.
709 Ibid., p. 481.
710 Suri, “Counter-Cultures,” p. 479.
711 Ibid.
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and domestic peace”712. Consequently, mainstream politics moved away from 
the revolutionary sentiment of counter-culture because of its violent streak. 
Media served as the impetus to internationalize the counter-culture sentiments that 
arose as a backlash to the state of total war. The growth of media acted as a mecha-
nism to increase exposure to international events that embodied frustration with the 
dominant Cold War culture. Media gave voice to the sentiments of revolution and be-
came a platform for civilians to project disillusionment with the Cold War narrative that 
civilianized the battlefield. Both television and film played a pivotal role in spreading 
the disillusionment with the state of total war created by Cold War politics. 
The Vietnam War in particular was the first armed conflict to be televised all 
over the world. With the help of television, American citizens in particular were 
subjected to first hand accounts of  the devastation of war for the first time in 
history, which strengthened the anti-war sentiment within the counter-culture 
revolution. Hollywood films, as a part of counter-culture revolution, shaped 
the views of Soviet civilians about their own leaders while Soviet films shaped 
American views. As argued by Shaw and Youngblood in Cinematic Cold War, 
foreign influences through films and the growing reach of media international-
ized the scope of the counter-culture revolution713. In the Soviet Union, Ameri-
can movies made by filmmakers who enjoyed freedom from bureaucratic and 
governmental influences, infiltrated the cinematic world and reinforced the su-
periority of American ideals and values. Soviet civilians experienced a social 
irony in which there “was the coexistence of the very brutal and aggressive 
anti-American propaganda in all mass media with an obvious predominance of 
US movies on Soviet screens.”714 American films eventually caused withering 
Soviet patriotism and civilians began to show frustration with  hypocritical Cold 
War policies based on criticism of the West rather than the realities of Soviet ci-
vilian life. Thus, the media and the interplay of American and Soviet films served 
as platforms for civilian discontent created by the total state of Cold War.
CONCLUSION
The perpetual state of war of ideas and information targeted minds of whole 
populations for political support. Hence, as a result of Cold War policies, the 
battlefield entered the civilian world and civilians became decisive factors in de-
termining victory or defeat. Both the United States and the Soviet Union waged 
712 Ibid.
713 Tony Shaw and Denise J. Youngblood, Cinematic Cold War: The American and Soviet 
Struggle for Hearts and Minds (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2010), p. 59.
714 Sergei Zhuk, «Hollywood’s insidious charms: the impact of American cinema and 
television on the Soviet Union during the Cold War», Cold War History, Volume 14, 
Issue 4, 2014.
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propaganda wars to win the ideological war between the capitalist West and 
communist USSR. Military and intelligence communities became more pertinent 
to civilian life. Rather than indulging in conventional warfare, they employed poli-
cies of culture and media as a tool to bring the combat zone into civilian life. This 
civilianization of the combat zone created a total state of war which perpetuated 
a culture of conformity in American life. However, this culture eventually faced 
backlash as sentiment of counter-revolution exhibiting disillusionment with the 
total war narrative of the Cold War gained momentum globally.
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COLD WAR PROPAGANDA:  
THE CASE OF THE ITALIAN COMMUNIST PARTY 
IN THE 1956 HUNGARIAN CRISIS
AnIeLLO Verde
In postwar Italy, US-friendly coalitions of centrist parties were keeping the Ital-
ian Communist Party (PCI – Partito Comunista Italiano) at the margins of the po-
litical power. Though a minority, the communist constituencies were still large 
and influential in both political and social aspects. The legacy of the anti-fascist 
struggle was not the only factor for such a large political consent. Particularly in 
the Cold War context, the prestige socialism and the Soviet Union had gained 
- as a model of society and a progressive alternative to the Western type one - 
were an important pillar of the communist political strength. The events of 1956, 
and particularly the outbreak of the 1956 Hungarian crisis, were the first serious 
challenges to the very ideology of the PCI.715 That situation urged the commu-
nists to react to the crisis and to produce their own narrative on the Hungarian 
crisis through propaganda means. With a focus on the 1956 Hungarian crisis 
as a case study, the aim of this paper is to analyze the evolution of the Italian 
CP’s propaganda and to highlight political and strategic factors that influenced 
its decision-making during the Hungarian crisis, and contributed to shaping the 
elements of the communist political discourse on Hungary 1956.
THE ITALIAN COMUNIST PARTY’S STRATEGIC THINKING 
AND THE ROLE OF PROPAGANDA
Although the coalition game permanently located the PCI in the opposition in 
the Parliament, the communists tried to pursue a strategy to leapfrog the so-
called conventio ad excludendum.716 Basic elements of this strategy were what 
historiography has often called “permanent interests” (interessi permanenti.)717 
The first and probably most important strategy was the political and symbolic 
715 Lucio Magri, The tailor of Ulm: Communism in the Twentieth century, New York: 
Verso, 2011, p. 128.
716 By conventio ad excludendum is meant the coalition agreement among Christian-
democrats, republicans, liberals and social-democrats to join their political forces 
and de facto exclude the Left from the power.
717 Sidney Tarrow and Donald L. M. Blackmer (ed.), Communism in Italy and France, 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975.
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linkage between the Italian CP and the Soviet Union, not only as an interna-
tional agent, but as a bearer of an alternative political model and allegedly 
more moral than the Western-type democracy and capitalism – of which the 
centrist government coalition was a valiant defender. As a result of this politi-
cal-symbolic linkage, the public prestige of the Italian CP became dependent 
on the international prestige of the USSR itself and of its political model.
Secondly, by the mid-1950s, the Direzione – the leading organ of the Italian 
CP – was trying to restore the unity of the Leftist front, in the firm belief that a 
united Left could challenge more effectively the predominance of the centrist 
political forces in the domestic scenario.718 However, the Italian Socialist Party 
(PSI for its acronym in Italian) and its influential leader, Pietro Nenni, had tradi-
tionally been quite reluctant to put up with the communists’ uncritical attitude 
towards the Soviet Union. In the context of the Hungarian crisis, the PSI-PCI 
rapprochement was at stake again: the submission of the communists to the 
Soviets could discourage the socialists and have a negative impact on the Ital-
ian CP’s alliance strategy.
Thirdly, one of Togliatti’s major achievements had been the creation of a new 
party model (partito nuovo), embodied by a mass-party organization relying 
on democratic centralism. But the outbreak of the Hungarian crisis might have 
paved the way to the emergence of “non-muscovite” voices within the party, 
and the leadership perceived the risk of potential alternative currents within 
the party itself.719 In other words, the communist establishment was concerned 
about potential disintegrative effects of the Hungarian crisis.
All these strategic interests had a common denominator: political and mor-
al elements were inherently combined in sustaining the public prestige of the 
leadership and the very strategy of the party. Therefore, in the attempt to pursue 
its strategic interests, the PCI had to appear as a trustworthy political agent to 
the left-friendly public opinion and to its political interlocutors. One implication 
was that public opinion and political discourse were crucial in this strategy. In 
order to defend its strategic interests from the impact of the crisis, the PCI in-
deed mobilized its propaganda means to construct a communist-friendly politi-
cal discourse diametrically opposed to that of centrist parties.  The communists 
tried to create and disseminate a narrative of the Hungarian crisis that was 
seemingly coherent with their party’s vision of domestic and international poli-
tics. Additionally, the analysis of the PCI’s strategic thinking in constructing its 
political discourse and in defining the characters of its propaganda cannot fail 
to take into account that the decision-making of Botteghe Oscure – the Rome-
based headquarters of the PCI – was connected to multiple centers.
718 Francesco Malgeri, La stagione del centrismo: politica e società nell’Italia del sec-
ondo dopoguerra (Soveria Manelli, Rubbettino, 2002), p. 244.
719 Mario Einaudi, Jean-Marie Domenach, Aldo Garosci, Communism in Western Eu-
rope, Hamden: Archon Books, 1971, pp. 193-195.
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The first was surely Moscow as a center of final political decisions that the PCI 
cared about never contradicting. This implied that the exchanges of views be-
tween the Italian and the Soviet party had a clear influence on the Italian party’s 
political discourse and on its propaganda. The second center of influence was 
in Budapest. Italian communists, in fact, were concerned about the changing 
position of the Hungarian Workers’ Party (HWP) during the crisis, and they were 
hoping and expecting the new leaders to regain control of the uprising – at least 
as long as the Soviets also did so. These considerations imply that the evolution 
of the PCI’s political discourse must be understood in the context of a strategy 
whose centers of decision-making were not all located in Italy only but are nec-
essarily connected to and influenced by the international actors involved. 
24 OCTOBER - 29 OCTOBER: SHOCK AND DEFENSE
On 23 October 1956, L’Unità – the press organ of the Italian CP – had just 
put aside its ambivalent assessment of the Polish situation and celebrated 
Gomułka’s accession to power as a further step towards the “construction of 
socialism” – wrote Pietro Ingrao.720 Yet, Botteghe Oscure had no time for relief. 
By that night the demonstration of solidarity with Poland taking place in Bu-
dapest, in the afternoon had already turned into an uprising whose outcomes 
were as dangerous as they were unpredictable. The deployment of Soviet 
troops that followed the riot caused further embarrassment to the Italian CP 
since it exposed the real face of the Soviet domination over the so-called “sat-
ellites.” In this context, the very first reaction of the Italian communist estab-
lishment was characterized by a state of shock and astonishment combined 
with a growing anxiety for the unpredictable outcome of the events in Hungary.
The lack of a clear Soviet strategy to face and overcome the crisis contrib-
uted to this perception. The Kremlin, indeed, moved troops into Hungary but 
it still remained in a waiting position basically. The Soviets in fact “tolerated” 
the dismissal of the ruling group (Ernő Gerő as First Secretary of the Hungarian 
Workers Party and András Hegedűs as Prime Minister) and the appointment of 
Imre Nagy – the leader of the “new course” of 1953-55 – as Prime Minister and 
of the home-communist János Kádár as leader of the party. This move had the 
twofold purpose to consolidate the control of the communists and to isolate 
radical elements and the insurgency. However, in the very first stages of the 
crisis, neither the new Hungarian leaders nor the Soviets managed to keep the 
escalation under control. The intervention of the Soviet Army, in fact, provoked 
a radicalization of the confrontation and an escalation of the guerrilla fight.721
720 Pietro Ingrao, “Gli avvenimenti polacchi”, L’Unità, 23 October 1956, p. 1.
721 Johanna C. Granville, The first domino. International decision-making during the Hun-
garian crisis of 1956 (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2004), pp. 65-66.
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As of 24 October, the political position of the Italian CP on the Hungarian events 
mirrored the Soviet one. In the communist political discourse a strong criticism 
of the upheaval itself coexisted with an attempt to provide an endorsement. In 
fact, L’Unità maintained a form of situational prudence in constructing its narra-
tive of what was happening in Hungary: the exposure of an alleged “reactionary 
coup” – described by the correspondent Adriana Castellani on 24 October – was 
dissociated from the celebration of the “patriotic and socialist” mass-movement, 
claiming for new ways of socialism but surely not engaged in a fight with the 
ruling-party.722 From this viewpoint, the mass-movement was still considered to 
be a genuine expression of the blossoming spirit of the Hungarian socialist de-
mocracy, attempting at an actual correction of Stalin-era “mistakes” as well as 
at a removal of Stalinist leaders. The very first interpretation of the crisis found 
its theoretical foundations on a distortive syllogism that qualified the masses as 
“democratic” because of their “socialist” connotation. One implication of this 
was that, though paradoxical, the communists depicted the tension between the 
HWP and the masses as an ideological victory for the world workers’ movement.
Such a positive assessment of the mass-movement extended to the new 
leaders who were trying to restore the authority of the HWP. Imre Nagy was 
described as an enlightened figure whose “brave opposition to the crimes of 
Stalin and Rákosi [was] well-known all around the country” – wrote Orfeo Van-
gelista, correspondent from Prague, on 25 October.723
Another significant implication of this interpretative pattern was the definition 
of the enemy. Since the mass-movement was socialist and democratic alike, 
such a movement could not be the origin of the uprising whose character was 
surely “fascist” because it was “anti-socialist.” Therefore, the origin of the tur-
moil had to be actually found in the traditional external enemy, the West, and in 
its internal agents, alleged “fascists landowners” preventing Hungarian people 
“[from] seek[ing] their way, the least painful, to socialism” – wrote Ingrao in 
his leading article titled “What would they want to restore?” (Cosa vorrebbero 
restaurare?) on 25 October.724 This line of thinking can be also retraced in a 
letter Palmiro Togliatti addressed to Paolo Spriano, an influential communist 
intellectual who expressed his doubts on the PCI’s position on Hungary: “the 
use of armed violence … is not admissible in all countries. … If mass-protest, 
in a non-capitalist country, goes beyond the boundaries and turns into an in-
surrectional attempt, we have the right to consider that to be the outcome of 
the contribution of the enemy, either from the beginning or at any time later.”725 
722 Adriana Castellani, “Scontri nelle vie di Budapest provocati da gruppi armati di con-
tro-rivoluzionari”, L’Unità, 24 October 1956, p. 1.
723 Orfeo Vangelista, “Chi sono i membri del nuovo governo?”, L’Unità, p. 1.
724 P. Ingrao, “Cosa vorrebbero restaurare?”, L’Unità, p. 1.
725 Archivio Fondazione Antonio Gramsci (Rome), fond: Palmiro Togliatti; serie 3: Carte 
Ferri-Amadesi; subserie 14: 1956 – 5. corrispondenza; archival unit Nº 24: 22 Febru-
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In this first phase of the crisis, the political discourse of the PCI was centered on 
the dichotomy between socialism as real democracy and fascism as a simmering 
tendency of any form of anti-socialism. In the midst of confusing news coming to 
Italy from Hungary, this propaganda was persuasive in the eyes of the commu-
nist-friendly public opinion, but the Italian CP’s response to the outbreak of the 
crisis jeopardized the chances of the party to continue the dialogue with their 
potential allies – the socialists.  At the very beginning of the upheaval the socialist 
press organ Avanti! did not, in fact, position itself in clear ideological contrast with 
the communists: Italian socialists, like the communists, were concerned about 
the potential contribution of fascist-type and reactionary elements in the riots.726
Yet, the close-minded attitude of the communists, so much involved in a 
dogmatic defense of the USSR, contributed to enlarge the distance about the 
two leftist parties. On 26 October, Pietro Nenni himself spoke out from the 
pages of the party’s newspaper and his words sounded like a criticism of the 
PCI-line. In his article, metaphorically titled “The pure water-stream and the 
dirty lather” (La corrente pura e la sporca schiuma), Nenni claimed that the 
socialist revolutions needed to be defended, but “the defense of the working-
class revolution either relied on the shields and the hearths of the workers or 
it [was] impossible.”727 As a result of the communists’ uncritical alignment to 
the Soviet position, the alliance strategy of the PCI failed and the communists 
ended up to be basically isolated from the other parties of the left.
But further problems for the PCI might originate within the party itself. In-
terestingly, one day later (27 October) after the publication of Nenni’s article, 
Giuseppe Di Vittorio, leader of the CGIL (the communist-dominated and largest 
labor union in Italy) and influential member of the PCI, stated a position, which 
showed views quite close to Nenni’s – and in contrast to Togliatti’s. Even though 
Di Vittorio maintained the point that uprisings against communist-led power 
are uprisings, he pinpointed that “social progress and the edification of a soci-
ety with no capitalist exploitation of labor are possible as long as the working 
class actively takes part [in this process] as a grantor of freedom and national 
independence.”728 Although Di Vittorio soon clarified that he did not mean to 
criticize the Togliatti-line, his statement was perceived as a signal of dissent 
which could possibly endanger the unity and internal cohesion of the party.729
In conclusion, the very first interpretation of the crisis in the PCI’s propaganda 
recalled an old and very established topos in the communist political discourse: 
ary 1956-30 November 1956. See also: archivionline.senato.it.
726 Tullio Vecchietti, “Il dramma di Budapest”, Avanti!, 25 October, 1956, p. 1.
727 Pietro Nenni, “La corrente pura e la sporca acqua”, Avanti!, 28 October 1956, p. 1.
728 “Presa di posizione della CGIL sugli avvenimenti di Ungheria”, L’Unità, 28 October 
1956, p. 1.
729 Michele Pistillo, “Togliatti e Di Vittorio. Dissensi e convergenze sui fatti d’Ungheria”, 
Critica Marxista (Bari: Edizioni Dedalo, 2007), pp. 79-80.
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the move forward of socialism violently challenged by reactionary forces. Yet, 
the reports of Soviet troops shooting on factory workers were sharply in contra-
diction with the communist statements, and this factor impacted negatively on 
the relations between the PCI and the socialists and the unions alike.
29 OCTOBER – 31 OCTOBER: STALEMATE AND 
RADICALIZATION
The events of 28-29 October had changed the political situation in Hungary: 
the Soviet Army started – at least apparently – withdrawing from Budapest. 
However, they continued concentration of troops on the Hungarian-Soviet 
border, and Moscow de facto accepted to negotiate a permanent withdrawal 
of the troops, and to grant some concessions to the reform-oriented wings 
within the HWP. Yet, the extent of a reform process was still unpredictable 
because Nagy and Kádár were still experiencing relevant troubles in taking full 
control of the internal situation. Therefore, in this stage, any political calcula-
tion of the Soviets was difficult and any strategy was tentative.730
In the eyes of the Italian communist establishment, the Soviet decision to 
placate the riot with negotiations rather than with stronger military involve-
ment was a factor of confusion leading to an ambivalent reaction: the more the 
events became uncertain, the more the Italian CP radicalized and expected the 
Soviets to end the Hungarian reform course.
This reaction was quite understandable because Botteghe Oscure perceived 
the Soviet withdrawal as a move that contradicted what the Kremlin had done 
earlier, and the stalemate in Hungary increased the uncertainty about the out-
comes of the crisis as well as the contradictions in the PCI’s position.  In these 
circumstances, the Italian communists were concerned about how their popular 
base would react in learning that the Soviet Union, arguably seen as a myth for 
its uncompromised fight against imperialism and fascism, was negotiating with 
the “counter-revolution.” A dangerous contradiction lied on this terrain: what was 
true? The leftist base could believe either that the insurgents were fascists or that 
the USSR and the HWP would come to terms with them, but not the two together.
Furthermore, this perception of uncertainty combined with an ideological radicali-
zation was also a reaction to the “bourgeois” press celebrating the Hungarian free-
dom regained and comparing the Soviet domination to the fascist rule in Europe. 
Togliatti, in fact, was nervous about the latest Soviet moves and urged the Kremlin 
to reconsider their choices. Aware of the inherent risk in compromising with the the 
counter-revolution, Togliatti sought to break the stalemate and to  stimulate the Sovi-
ets to take a clearer stance about what to do with the Hungarian case. 
730 J. C. Granville, p. 68.
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On 30 October, the Italian leader sent a telegram to the Soviet Central Com-
mittee with a warning about the reactionary tendencies in the Hungarian gov-
ernment and pinpointed the contradictions in the Soviet moves. “In the very 
moment when we defined the riot as a counter-revolution, our position was 
different from the HWP’s one, and it is now the Hungarian government itself 
to glorify the uprising.”731 This document is very informative about Togliatti’s 
perception of the impact of the crisis on the unity of the party apparatus and 
on its alliance strategy.
After informing the Soviets about the troubles in the communist-socialist 
dialogue, Togliatti expressed his concerns about the loss of confidence in the 
Direzione and the emergence of groups – allegedly gathering around Di Vit-
torio – aiming to take control of the party and to abandon a Moscow-friendly 
view on the Hungarian crisis.732 Even if the party had reached a deadlock, the 
PCI had to reshape its political discourse by mixing an uncompromising con-
demnation of the counter-revolution with a sort of prudent approach to any 
outcome of the crisis. Togliatti’s article in the communist review Rinascita (30 
October) exemplifies this attitude: the communist leader strongly defended the 
prestige of the USSR by warning Italian communists about “the reactionary, 
anti-communist, anti-socialist, anti-Soviet wave trying to exploit the midst of 
the events in order to deceive public opinion.”733
The idea that “the popular and socialist regimes can be compared to fas-
cism, and the Soviet Union to an imperialist country” was “grotesque” – wrote 
Togliatti.734 Yet, the General Secretary of the PCI admitted that “non counter-
revolutionary workers joined the riot” but he still blamed the Western promises 
for “liberation from socialism” for that.735
A turning-point occurred on 31 October, when the Soviets responded to 
Togliatti: “In your evaluation of the situation in Hungary and of the Hungarian 
government’s tendencies to move in a reactionary direction, we are in agree-
ment with you. According to our information, Nagy is occupying a two-faced 
position and is increasingly falling under the influence of reactionary forces. For 
the time being we are not speaking out openly against Nagy, but we will rec-
oncile ourselves with the turn of the events toward a reactionary debauch.”736 
731 The text of the telegram is available in: Federigo Argentieri, Ungheria 1956. La 
rivoluzione calunniata Venice: Marsilio, 2006, pp. 135-136.
732 F. Argentieri, p. 136.
733 Palmiro Togliatti, “Sui fatti d’Ungheria”, Rinascita, October 1956, pp. 492 (in the col-
lection of the issues of the newspaper in the National Library of Rome.)
734 P. Togliatti, p. 493.
735 P. Togliatti, p. 493.
736 Johanna C. Granville, “Soviet documents on the Hungarian Revolution, 24 October 
– 4 November 1956”, Cold War International History Project [CWIHP] Bullettin, Nº 5 
(Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars, Spring 1995), 
p. 33.
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The Soviet Central Committee, in fact, already deliberated for a new military 
intervention on 31 October. As Suslov and Mikoyan suggested on 29 October, the 
Kremlin kept on gathering troops at the Hungarian-Soviet border while withdraw-
ing the units deployed in Hungary as a tactical move.737 These words clarified 
that the Soviets would not tolerate the latest developments in Hungary (i.e. the 
abolition of the one-party system) and they gave Togliatti the reliable expectation 
of a strong reaction against Nagy. This new perspective allowed the Italian CP to 
redefine its propaganda and to inject new elements in its political discourse. 
1 NOVEMBER – 5 NOVEMBER: THE COMMUNIST 
COUNTER-OFFENSIVE
By 31 October the situational perspective of the Italian CP had changed sig-
nificantly, and the PCI was finally able to go from a defensive to an offensive 
position. Such change was possible due to a number of external factors that 
did not occur before 31 October – 1 November.
The first factor was not dependent on any of the political actors involved, but 
rather a matter of organization and timing. Most of the Western press – corres-
pondents, photographers, journalists – had been just unable to enter Hungary 
before the Soviet withdrawal and many journalists arrived in Budapest on the 
very last days of October – as the Italian press did.738 Therefore, as soon as 
they were actually able to report the events from Budapest, they witnessed 
directly or indirectly, episodes of mob-violence at their highest peak. Such 
a factor influenced the perception of some events: the famous massacre of 
Köztársáság tér (30 October), for instance, was accidentally among the first 
happenings the Italian press documented in loco and it appeared, in the eyes 
of the public opinion, as a piece of evidence in support of the interpretation of 
the crisis the communist had been disseminating.
The second factor was a result of Soviet diplomacy: between 30 October 
and 2 November Khrushchev found a widespread consensus among socialist 
countries – from China to Yugoslavia and Poland – to repress the Hungarian 
deviationism. Therefore, the world workers’ movement agreed on one point: the 
Hungarian uprising was a counter-revolution and repression, even a violent one, 
was justified.739 This view sounded like Togliatti’s telegram basically. Finally, the 
parallels between the Soviet withdrawal from Hungary and the British-French 
attack on Egypt provided the communist propaganda with further argumenta-
737 J. C. Granville, CWIHP Bullettin, Nº 5, Spring 1995, p. 32
738 On the Italian press in Hungary during the uprising, see: Indro Montanelli, La sublime 
pazzia della rivolta. L’insurrezione ungherese del 1956, Milan: Rizzoli, 2006.
739 J. C. Granville, CWIHP Bulletin, Nº 5, Spring 1995, pp. 95-97, and footnote Nº 42, p. 
217.
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tions to blame “Western imperialism” and to praise the positive function of the 
USSR as a guarantor of world peace. In this new context, two new features 
characterized the political discourse of the Italian CP. One of them was the rise 
of the scale of verbal violence and of confrontation. From the viewpoint of the 
Italian communists, a violent counter-propaganda could succeed in regaining 
the confidence of the popular base after the embarrassment of the last days.
Aiming at that objective, the communist press employed the category of “white 
terror” to construct in the mindset of the readers a sort of horror-like scene, with im-
ages that continuously recalled bodies hanged in the streets and illegal executions 
of party-members.740 Illustrative examples of this rhetoric constructions can be found 
basically everywhere in L’Unità issues from 1 and 2 November: e.g. Orfeo Vangelista 
reported the mass-killing of 130 communists before the Party House (1 November), 
which truly happened, but the number of the victims was significantly smaller.741
The second feature of the political discourse in this new phase of the Hungar-
ian crisis was the employment of “Italian categories” to describe the evolution 
of the events. What is meant by “Italian categories” is that L’Unità over-stressed 
certain aspects of the Hungarian crisis that might arguably recall in the eyes of 
the leftist public opinion images and characters of the political confrontation 
between leftist-democratic and rightist-reactionary forces. A significant example 
of that was the exaggeration of the role of the Church – and of Cardinal Mind-
szenty–, a concept that Italian communists had learnt from their own experi-
ence within the domestic context.742 Yet, such distortions were “logical” in the 
communist strategy and they sounded “logical” to the readers: the propaganda 
needed to relate the Hungarian tragedy by speaking the language of class strug-
gle in Italy. In this way, the communist discourse intended to create a sort of 
theoretical connection between the communists’ struggle in Italy and in Hunga-
ry. The reported news and the writing style was intended to “translate” the Hun-
garian crisis in the same terms political confrontation and class struggle were 
related in Italy. The result of this construction was intended to evoke empathy 
between the Italian communist base and the victims of the uprising in Budapest.
This political discourse became even more trustworthy in the eyes of the 
communist-friendly public opinion after the Hungarian declaration of neutrality 
(1 November.) In fact, the chronological sequence of the events was misleading. 
Correspondents in Budapest truly thought that the Soviet attack (4 November) 
740 Some examples are the following: “Farkas, both father and son, had been executed 
in jail” (29 October, p. 7); “Ernő Gerő executed by a group of counter-revolutionar-
ies!” (25 October, p. 1); and again, “Ernő Gerő killed by the counter-revolutionaries”, 
5 November, p. 1.)
741 O. Vangelista, “I controrivoluzionari impiccano centotrenta comunisti che avevano 
difeso fino all’ultimo la sede del partito”, L’Unità, 1 November 1956, p. 1.
742 O. Vangelista, “Il cardinale Mindszenty vuol fondare un partito. Imre Nagy ha denun-
ciato il Patto di Varsavia”, L’Unità, 2 November 1956, p. 8.
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was a consequence of the declaration of 1 November.743 This understanding of 
the historical events gave communists a further pretext to depict the Hungarian 
government as a reactionary faction within the HWP. However, historians now 
know that the Hungarian government chose to declare neutrality because the 
Soviet troops were already maneuvering into Hungarian territory as early as 31 
October. After a meeting with Andropov, the Soviet ambassador in Hungary, 
who was unable to provide sufficient justification for the troop movements, the 
Nagy cabinet sought political support from abroad by declaring neutrality.744
In the political discourse of the PCI, the construction of the category of white 
terror during the days preceding 4 November served the purpose of providing the 
prospective military intervention with a preventive moral justification: the invasion 
of Hungary, as well as its human cost, were morally acceptable for a good commu-
nist because the Soviet Union had the moral obligation to “end the chaos and the 
white terror” – explicitly wrote Vangelista on 5 November.745 As a result of this prop-
aganda, as soon as the Soviet intervention was announced, the communist-friend-
ly public opinion was already expecting that Moscow would intervene to rescue 
Hungary from an alleged fascist outburst. Although paradoxical, this interpretation 
of the second Soviet invasion as a humanitarian intervention was coherent with the 
international climate following the outbreak of the Suez crisis. L’Unità launched, in 
fact, a “call for peace” and blamed on the Western imperialist tendencies the suf-
fering for the Cold War crises, both in Hungary or Egypt. As the document of the 
Direzione stated: “every move back of the socialist camp, every action against the 
Soviet Union weakens the forces of peace, [and] increases the risk of war.”746
The conceptual association between “peace” and enhancement of the “so-
cialist camp” entered the communist political discourse in the last stage of the 
crisis and served a strategic purpose: the PCI tried to “reverse” the effects of 
the crisis, that is to move the moral burden of the turmoil in Hungary from the 
shoulders of the communists to those of their opponents – the West and their 
Italian allies, the non-communist parties.
Yet, such a violent propaganda provoked some reactions. A number of cases 
of dissent are quite famous. The most relevant is the so-called “Manifesto dei 
Centouno” – a document of dissent signed by one hundred-one communist 
intellectuals in the last days of October. Other signs of dissent emerged within 
743 F. Argentieri, p. 50.
744 Csaba Békés, János Rainer, Malcom Byrne (edt.), The 1956 Hungarian Revolution. 
A history in documents (Budapest and New York: CEU Press, 2002), document Nº 
53 (Working notes of the CPSU CC Presidium meeting, October 31st); Nº 65 (Report 
by Yurii Andropov to the CPSU CC Presidium, November 1st); Nº 66 (Telegram from 
Nagy declaring neutrality), pp. 307-311 and, pp. 330-334.
745 O. Vangelista, “Le truppe sovietiche intervengono in Ungheria per porre fine al caos 
e al terrore bianco”, L’Unità, 5 November 1956, p. 1.
746 “L’Unità”, 1 November 1956, Communiqué of the PCI Direzione.
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the CP’s Cultural Commission: the intellectual Gastone Manacorda questioned 
a dogmatic application of democratic centralism and denounced the “ortho-
dox attitude” of the party cadres.747 He gave also a definition of what he called 
“orthodoxy”: the attitude to think that “the party-élite is the depository of the 
truth”.748 Another voice of opposition  arose from the high-ranks of the PCI dur-
ing the VIII Congress (Rome, December 1956) – even some influential comrades 
of old militancy (e.g. Antonio Giolitti) casted doubts on the conduct of the PCI. 
Yet, unlike some party members and a few intellectuals, the communist political 
base reacted to the crisis alongside with the party, and accepted the party-line be-
cause the followers and the party actually shared the same vision of the world. Paolo 
Spriano, a critical voice among the communist intellectuals, lamented that there was 
a tendency “to forget that unforgettable year, and the base of the party, its popular 
base, reacted in a way diametrically opposed to that of the intellectuals.”749 As Miklós 
Vásárhelyi explained it, it was after all, easy for the communist base to accept the 
“slanderous” – as Argentieri named it – interpretation of the Hungarian crisis because 
they were never willing to reconsider their own vision of the world, that is everything 
they had thought about communism and about the Soviet Union.750
CONCLUSION
Palmiro Togliatti was so impressed by the impact of the Hungarian crisis on the 
Italian public opinion and on his party that, in 1958 when the general elections 
was imminent, he urged Khrushchev to intercede with the Hungarian govern-
ment for the Italian comrades to postpone the execution of Imre Nagy. In this 
way, Togliatti intended to save the party from a potential loss of votes. The 
electoral performance of the PCI was in fact positive, with a slight increase in 
spite of a loss of members at the end of 1956. This observation demonstrates 
that the Italian CP managed to respond to the impact of the Hungarian cri-
sis, whose dangerous potential consequences it never disregarded. Through 
a considerate usage of propaganda the Italian communists were able to keep 
and to consolidate the symbolic-political linkage between the party and the 
USSR as well as the ideology-centered empathy with the communist-friendly 
public opinion. Nonetheless, the consequences of the Italian CP’s position on 
Hungary 1956 had a very negative impact on the alliance strategy resulting in 
a political isolation of the communists.
747 Albertina Vittoria, “La commissione culturale del PCI dal 1948 al 1956”, Studi Storici, 
Nº 1 (Rome: January 1990), p. 159.
748 A. Vittoria, p. 159.
749 Enrico Carnevali, “I fatti d’Ungheria e il dissenso degli intellettuali di sinistra. Storia 
del Manifesto dei 101”, MicroMega, Nº 9,  2006.
750 F. Argentieri, pp. 104-105.
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BURSTING THE SAVIOR MYTH: INTELLECTUAL 
BACKLASH AGAINST RADIO FREE EUROPE
AdrIAnA POPA
INTRODUCTION: RADIO FREE EUROPE (RFE)  
IN THE CONTEXT OF COLD WAR PROPAGANDA
RFE was a vital part of America’s “battle for hearts and minds” in the Cold 
War. While both sides brought radio into the field as a powerful weapon of 
propaganda, the West eventually triumphed. But was its victory inevitable? 
Was RFE the universally loved, unquestioned beacon of hope and democ-
racy that its reputation points to? Or did it struggle with contestation, distrust 
and dismissal, just like its adversaries, the national radio stations behind the 
Iron Curtain? The focus of this paper is intellectual opposition/counteraction 
against the RFE. Beyond technical maneuvers of backlash (such as signal jam-
ming), meant to stop or limit its influence, RFE had to fight intellectual backlash 
(ordered or not), such as disparaging or invalidating commentary. The radio 
had to contend with its share of criticism, both from its listeners and from its 
supporters back in the US, and its brand of broadcasting was not universally 
convincing, as it is often believed. 
This area of RFE’s history is rarely mentioned, and a limited body of research 
exists regarding it. Reading critical letters from listeners seems all the more sur-
prising given the impression of almost non-existent contestation and religious 
following RFE seems to have had in formerly communist Eastern European 
countries. Ross Johnson/Eugene Parta751 write that, since the end of the Cold 
War and the shattering of the Iron Curtain, the effectiveness of Radio Free Eu-
rope broadcasts has never been questioned. Testimony on the impact of RFE’s 
work has come from leaders, as well as citizens in Eastern Europe. As a re-
sult, “what could almost be termed a mythology has developed about RFE’s 
effectiveness.”752 Beloved as the RFE might have been, it had its share of critics, 
and its victory should not be taken for granted. This is especially relevant in 
today’s age, when the US is once again facing at least one great ideological foe 
(extremism), and where radio remains an important instrument in the battle for 
hearts and minds. Perhaps the West’s biggest vulnerability would be reliance on 
what is believed to be the universal appeal of its values, message, and way of 
751 Ross A Johnson, Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty: The CIA Years and Beyond, 
Stanford, Stanford University Press, California, 2010.
752 Ibid., p. 1.
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life. This appeal wasn’t guaranteed in the Cold War, when dealing with popula-
tions much more similar culturally and historically, and it is not guaranteed now, 
in a world brought together by globalization, but still marked by profound rifts.
RFE’S INTELLECTUAL/STRATEGIC VALUE:  
A MOUTHPIECE FOR TRUTH AND FOR AN ÉMIGRÉ 
COMMUNITY
American Cold War radios, RFE in particular, brought accurate, timely infor-
mation to the people behind the Iron Curtain, information often obtained and 
broadcast by its workers, émigrés from communist countries. RFE and RL (Ra-
dio Liberty) became “full-service substitute national broadcasters, surrogate 
broadcasters”753 for the people behind the Iron Curtain. RFE was essentially “an 
anti-communist émigré propaganda network”754 that symbolized “the culmina-
tion of efforts in the 40s and 50s to harness the talents of recent émigrés from 
the Soviet Union and Soviet-controlled Eastern Europe to promote the US’s na-
tional interests.”755 The essential purpose of RFE propaganda was to “contribute 
to the liberation of the nations imprisoned behind the Iron Curtain by maintaining 
their morale and stimulating in them a spirit of non-cooperation with the Soviet-
dominated regimes.”756 Programming refrained from “directly addressing under-
ground resistance groups, and avoided political subjects”757 and “broadcasters 
constantly emphasized their common national identity with the listeners.”758
At least in one way, RFE was both a very pragmatic American weapon in the 
war against the Soviet Union and communism and an effort aimed at enlight-
enment, freedom and empowerment, universal values. As John Allen Stern 
explains in his chapter on C. D. Jackson, CIA funding gave RFE considerable 
freedom and flexibility, and the programming echoed the funding’s “combina-
tion of idealism and deceit.”759 The project “intended to undermine commu-
nism by sowing uncertainty and distrust among people living under communist 
753 Ibid., p. 2.
754 Walter Hixson, Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture and the Cold War, Palgrave 
Macmillan, 1998, p. 60.
755 Ross Johnson, A. Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty: The CIA Years and Beyond, 
Stanford, Stanford University Press, California, 2010, p. 7.
756 Walter Hixson, Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture and the Cold War, Palgrave 
Macmillan, 1998, p. 61.
757 Ibid
758 Ibid
759 John Allen Stern, C.D. Jackson: Cold War Propagandist for Democracy and Glo-
balism, University Press of America, New York, 2012, p. 16.
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dictatorships.”760 The US State Department “defined RFE’s aims as keeping 
alive (among captive) peoples their sense of connection with the West and 
with Free World ideals.”761 RFE was characterized as having “extraordinary im-
portance for US policy, with its unique ability to counter phony Russian propa-
ganda in Eastern Europe.”762 RFE’s ultimate objective was “the ultimate libera-
tion of the enslaved nations.”763 In support of this mission, RFE’s founders, 
especially C. D. Jackson, “advocated a course of action that would employ the 
services of the Eastern European exiles: the recruitment of the ever-growing 
population of Iron Curtain escapees into an exile army.”764
RFE aimed at accuracy and objectivity, which it perceived as being the most 
effective in its crusade, especially when compared to national media in com-
munist countries and communist propaganda bodies. For the most part, the 
strategy of RFE was “not to allow Western broadcasts to sound like crude at-
tacks on communist adversaries – it tried to be objective and factual, there-
fore more credible.”765 The aim was that RFE’s programming would be “wholly 
devoid of vitriol, but still effective.”766 The message for the people behind the 
Iron Curtain was “liberation and democracy over enslavement and totalitarian 
communism.”767 Stern quotes C. D. Jackson himself as saying that the “product 
we (RFE) are selling is freedom – keeping alive the hope for freedom and main-
taining the will for resistance.”768 The émigrés recruited by RFE supported its 
strategy – “news had to be useful – real news. The exiles understood that and 
knew their former countrymen. Propaganda had to appear informative, and un-
tainted by political ideology.”769 The unique contribution of exile workers proved 
its value, because RFE’s work was “painstaking in its detail and analysis”770 and 
because RFE has to “understand the psyche of its listeners.”  771For both aims, 
émigrés were vital. RFE programming focused on “the essential freedoms that 
came with the struggle against Russian oppressors”772, and RFE (together with 
VOA – Voice of America – and RL) could be employed “both tactically and stra-
tegically to highlight the differences between East and West.”773 
760 Ibid., p. 18.
761 Ibid
762 Ibid., p. 90.
763 Ibid., p. 20.
764 Ibid.
765 Ibid., p. 31.
766 Ibid.
767 Ibid.
768 Ibid.
769 Ibid., p. 38.
770 Ibid.
771 Ibid.
772 Ibid., p. 66
773 Ibid.
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TRUTH OR SELECTIVE PRESENTATION?
For all of their insistence on truth and accuracy, and the reputation that they 
achieved for adhering to these, all US radios during the Cold War presented US 
history and culture in somewhat romantic terms, glossing over negative episodes 
such as race relations or Native American treatment. While the image they suc-
ceeded in portraying of the free, prosperous, exuberant West was certainly a de-
cisive victory against Soviet propaganda, it also contradicts (at least partially) the 
moral high ground upon which the US pronounced and believed itself to be on. 
The people behind the Iron Curtain could not have verified the reality of life across 
the ocean – the only reality they knew was that of their own countries, which in-
deed did not match what communist authorities tried to portray. Perhaps knowing 
this, Soviet authorities focused on dismantling the image of American life por-
trayed by the radios more than on countering the images they were presenting of 
Soviet life, as Walter Hixson774 explains. But for all of America’s insistence (espe-
cially through RFE) that they were presenting “the truth” to those captives behind 
the Curtain, US propaganda, like Soviet propaganda, minimized negatives to the 
point of complete omission. Perhaps it was America’s understanding that the goal 
justifies the means, or perhaps the people in the US at that time truly believed their 
propaganda was (more) morally meritorious than that of their enemy. 
Indeed, not only the public but crucially, those involved in the propaganda 
efforts seemed to truly believe that the truth was a distinct American monop-
oly. Edward Barrett maintained that “in the contest for men’s minds, truth can 
be peculiarly the American weapon”775, and that organizations like RFE and 
VOA delivered “not opinion, nor conjecture, but facts.”776 Despite the superior-
ity of American propaganda, given that it was presumably the mouthpiece of 
the truth, its success was not guaranteed – it was “powerful only when linked 
with concrete actions and policies.”777 Tailored, contextualized propaganda 
was needed, because, unless it “chooses terms that are meaningful and per-
suasive to that particular audience”778, “what sells soap in Indiana can unsell 
democracy in India.”779 Most importantly, American propaganda was tasked 
with delivering “news without the slightest trace of color or bias”780, because 
its effectiveness depended on the “bad being told with the good, failures ad-
774 Hixson, op. cit.
775 Edward Barrett, Truth Is Our Weapon, Funk and Wagnalls, New York, 1953, p. ix
776 Creel, George, How We Advertised America, Harper & Brothers Publishers, New 
York, 1920/Forgotten Books, 2012, pg. 71
777 Barrett, op. cit., p. ix
778 Ibid., p. 140
779 Ibid., p. x.
780 George Creel, How We Advertised America, Harper & Brothers Publishers, New 
York, 1920/Forgotten Books, 2012, pg. 73
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mitted alongside successes.”781 Truth being the foundation of American propa-
ganda did not stem simply from moral belief, but from confidence in its practi-
cal application - “we are convinced that truth offers not only the moral, ethical 
course, but the cold, practical, effective.”782 History has proven this belief to 
be accurate. With all of its limitations and the difficulties it posed for waging a 
war against an unscrupulous enemy whose weapon was the manipulation of 
information, the truth was placed at the forefront of the American strategy. This 
was rooted in the confidence that it, if anything, would help win the war - “truth 
may be a straight-jacket, but at least, it is a jacket that wears well.”783
INTELLECTUAL BACKLASH AGAINST RADIO FREE EUROPE
US Cold War international information programs, of which RFE was a part, were 
meant to export democracy and freedom. Through the “dissemination abroad of 
stories, news, interpretation, and commentary, it sought to counter Communist 
propaganda through the international propagation of the democratic creed, a 
Marshall plan in the field of ideas.”784 For RFE and its cousin, Radio Liberty (RL), 
if their stated goal of “broadcasting freedom”785 was to succeed, their message 
had to be “fact-based, balanced and credible to an often skeptical audience.”786 
As a result, “great care was taken to assure objectivity and to avoid any at-
tempted news manipulation for propaganda purposes.”787
RFE is perhaps best remembered for “providing listeners with an intellectual 
bridge to Western Europe and the United States”788, and system of reference, 
informed by timely facts, which could help “preserve the independent think-
ing that the controlled domestic media sought to control or suppress.”789 The 
premise that supporting this independent thinking would “prevent the authoritar-
ian governments in the Soviet sphere from fully consolidating their power over 
the societies they ruled”790 would be proven correct by historical developments.
781 Ibid.
782 Barrett, op.cit., p. 131
783 Ibid., p. 132
784 Ross Johnson A. Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty: The CIA Years and Beyond, 
Stanford, Stanford University Press, California, 2010, p. 4
785 Ibid.
786 Ibid.
787 Cord Meyer, The CIA and Radio Free Europe, Georgetown Journal of International 
Affairs, Vol. 1, Nº1 (Winter/Spring 2000), Georgetown University Press, p. 129, ac-
cessed 5.4.2016.
788 Johnson, op. cit., p. 6.
789 Ibid.
790 Ibid., p. 6.
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Some of the intellectual backlashes RFE had to contend with were false or “or-
dered”, such as attempts at infiltration/misrepresentation authored by Soviet and 
Eastern European communist authorities. For example, “the Soviets routinely in-
filtrated the staffs and controlled double agents, who would pretend to defect 
with loud accusations that they had been hired as CIA spies while working for the 
stations.”791 On one occasion, “the Russians tried to smuggle a doctored tape 
into the RFE library in West Germany to convince the West German government 
that an anti-German policy was being pursued.”792 In addition, letters written by 
party members/sympathizers behind the Iron Curtain, posing as ordinary citizens, 
or by citizens obligated to write such letters, sought to disparage the authenticity, 
relevance, and effectiveness of RFE programming. These attempts mostly failed, 
but RFE still had to contend with criticism on both sides of the Atlantic. 
US NAY-SAYERS/CONTESTATION FROM THE WEST
The intellectual backlash against not so much RFE’s mission, but the form its 
activity took, marked its very beginnings in its country of origin. Frank Altschul, 
secretary of the Council on Foreign Relations and one of the founders of the 
Free Europe Committee (FEC), from which RFE was born, asked in 1950 “to 
what extent is RFE the voice of the émigré groups, rather than the voice of 
American citizens using émigré groups to the maximum advantage?”793 This 
suggested a potentially Machiavellian use by Americans, RFE’s creators, of 
its non-American staff, for their own national security objectives. The State 
Department defended RFE, answering that “it was the voice of émigrés them-
selves, as represented by the national councils supported by the FEC.”794
Moreover, a conflict erupted in 1951 with VOA (Voice of America), one of 
the other American radios tasked with spreading the gospel of freedom and 
democracy. The accusation was that RFE, rather than complementing VOA’s 
work, and adhering to its different mandate, was “duplicating the work of VOA’s 
own Munich Programming Center, and VOA’s programs in the Baltic states.”795 
The conflict was partially resolved in November 1951, at a State Department-
CIA summit, which resulted in the postponing of RFE broadcasts launch in the 
Baltic States, and the reduction of the Crusade for Freedom’s focus on RFE. 
For some in the US, the government should not have pursued the path of prop-
791 Cord Meyer, The CIA and Radio Free Europe, Georgetown Journal of International 
Affairs, Vol. 1, Nº1 (Winter/Spring 2000), Georgetown University Press, p. 129, ac-
cessed 5.4.2016
792 Ibid.
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aganda that RFE was associated with - “many on the left thought the govern-
ment ought not to be in the “dirty” business of promoting propaganda at home or 
abroad; to many intellectuals, the creation of bodies designed specifically to spew 
out what they saw as the “party line” was a disquieting notion for a liberal democ-
racy – it was better left to totalitarian societies, even in the midst of a Cold War.”796
Added to this were the problematic accusations of “duplicity”797 of RFE and 
its counterparts collecting intelligence under the guise of gathering information. 
RFE’s now legendary accuracy and objective reporting was not its hallmark from 
the beginning. In fact, early criticism of RFE by BBC’s Central European Serv-
ice visiting Munich just after the start of RFE operations, referred to its “mixing 
opinion with fact in newscasts, denouncing Communist collaborators with little 
evidence, and ignoring policy restrains on content and tone of presentation.”798
As a result of these initial findings, the BBC decided to keep its distance 
from RFE, limiting itself to offering it technical assistance and avoiding public 
association. RFE and RL also had to contend with contestation and accusa-
tions in the 1970s, a “perfect storm”799 that almost saw them closed in 1971. 
This domestic backlash emerged from the public disclosure of CIA funding, 
coupled with “personal hostility from the powerful chairman of the Senate For-
eign Relations Committee, and congressional insistence on ending all funding 
for the Radios from the intelligence budget.”800 However, the reputation of their 
broadcasting and research saved the radios, contributing to congressional, 
media and public support (as well as the support of the foreign affairs estab-
lishment) for their continued existence in the 70s, 80s and beyond. 
IRON CURTAIN CONTESTATION/BACKLASH FROM THE EAST
RFE also faced criticism and accusations from its target audience, the people 
behind the Iron Curtain, the very people it sought to help. One of the darkest 
episodes in the history of RFE relates to its role during the 1956 Hungarian 
revolution. RFE was accused of having induced listeners into believing that 
Western military support for their revolt would come, and therefore was directly 
responsible for the chaos and violence that occurred in Hungary in 1956. 
Hungarian escapees, while agreeing that “Western propaganda did not cause 
rebellion, declared they had been led to expect support from the West.”801  How-
ever, the CIA concluded that “no RFE broadcast (…) could be considered as incit-
796 Stern, op. cit., p. 99.
797 Johnson, op. cit., p. 235.
798 Ibid., p. 41.
799 Ibid., p. 202.
800 Ibid.
801 Hixson, op. cit., p. 63.
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ing an armed revolt, and no broadcast implied promises of US or NATO interven-
tion, with occasional straying from authorized factual broadcasting to offer tactical 
advice.” RFE was found not guilty of inciting the Hungarian revolution, “which 
was instead the resolute of ten years of Soviet repression.”802 Similar accusations 
surround RFE’s role in the East German and Polish uprisings. As Walter Hixson 
explains, RFE and the peoples of the countries in question likely bear a shared 
responsibility, and “the important propaganda fact is not what people hear, but 
rather what they think they hear.”803 However, these events served as a lesson 
for the US, and led to the toning down of the psychological warfare the radios, 
especially RFE, were in charge of, and also to a stricter supervision of broadcasts. 
Direct contestation from listeners from behind the Iron Curtain also came di-
rectly, in the form of letters addressed to RFE, or phone calls during RFE’s pro-
grams and outside of them. It is difficult to establish which of these negative 
responses, if any, were “commanded” by communist authorities, either imper-
sonating listeners or directing them to challenge RFE. However, it would not be 
a stretch to imagine that at least some of them were. Even so, these accounts 
provide an original and valuable view of the types of contestations ordinary lis-
teners could have plausibly made. My research on this body of evidence is still 
advancing, and these pieces are often not easy to find, but for the purpose of 
this paper, the below examples are illustrative. In 1956 Polish citizen Czeslaw 
Morwaski sent a letter to RFE, which was published in the communist magazine 
Chlopska Droga and was signed “Communist Sympathizer”. The letter describes 
opposition to the “reality” of kolkhoz (collective farm) life in Poland presented in 
one of RFE’s programs. He denies that peasants and farm workers live in “pov-
erty and slavery”804, and denounces RFE/its staff as a “filthy yapper that barks in 
the service of traitors, industrialists and landowners”805, commenting that, contra-
ry to RFE’s message, life for the Polish peasant was far worse before Soviet rule. 
Morawski states that “what Free Europe is saying is nonsense that dis-
gusts every normally thinking peasant, just mocking the nation and its 
achievements.”806 He refers to the “siren song of RFE”807, meant to sow discord 
among the Polish people and make them hostile towards the Soviet Union. Ac-
cording to Morawski, “this station (…) wishes to set our people against each 
other, to weaken our country, to disarm it, so that the capitalists and landown-
ers may loot it.”808
802 Ibid
803 Ibid.
804 Czeslaw Morawski, How I Became a Correspondent of Free Europe, Chlopska Dro-
ga, 1956, Item Nº 7911/56, Open Society Archives, Budapest.
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An article published in Rude Pravo (the official newspaper of the Commu-
nist Party of Czechoslovakia), in 1967, discusses three Czechoslovak citizens 
who “have become the victims of the untrue and distorted information spread 
of Radio Free Europe.”809 The RFE broadcast apparently sought to spread 
misinformation by broadcasting that the three citizens were members of the 
Czechoslovak handball team that had participated in the world championship 
in Sweden, and they had sought political asylum there. However, according 
to the article, the three citizens gave a press conference in Prague upon their 
return, stating that RFE had broadcast completely false information, as they 
had returned to the country and had not sought asylum. This is, according 
to the article, an example of the “incorrect and unfair manner in which RFE 
reports about Czechoslovakia, and its misuse of broadcasting for ideological 
diversion.”810 Finally, a letter sent from the Union of Slovaks Imprisoned and 
Persecuted by Communists in 1953 to C. D. Jackson complains about the 
misrepresentation of facts in RFE programming. The letter refers specifically to 
“the celebration of the Communist revolt in the summer of 1944, which left the 
most horrible recollection in the memory of the Slovak people.”811 According to 
the letter, on several occasions, “RFE lent itself to the celebration of this revo-
lution, which offended not only the anti-communist political prisoners (…) but 
also the Slovak people who have not forgotten the terrible Communist cruel-
ties of that time.”812 In addition to exposing “this abuse by the radio station”813, 
the letter asks “the leadership of the Slovak broadcasting of RFE be entrusted 
to persons who are politically unprejudiced.”814
RADIO FREE EUROPE’S LEGACY
The impact RFE and its sister stations have had, in Eastern Europe in particular, 
is significant, and it has been underlined in numerous bodies of work, as well 
as in testimonies of leaders and ordinary citizens from the region. RFE, together 
with RL, has been “widely praised in both the East and the West as contributing 
809 Ibid.
810 Defectors Who Did Not Defect, Or the Wishful Thinking of Radio Free Europe, Rude 
Pravo, 1967, Open Society Archives, Budapest.
811 Ibid.
812 Letter to C. D. Jackson, Union of Slovaks Imprisoned and Persecuted by Commu-
nists, 1953, OR 263 – Free Europe Committee/Radio Free Europe (I), White House 
Central Files, Office File 1953 – 1961, Box # 755, Eisenhower Presidential Library 
and National Archives, Abilene, Kansas, US.
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to the end of communism in Europe and Eurasia.”815 A number of documen-
taries showing the efforts of the radios have been produced in several East-
ern European, formerly communist countries: “Voice of Hope” (Poland), “Cold 
Waves” (Romania), Waves of Liberty (Spain), “To Russia with Love” (Germany). 
Today, the efforts of RFE and its counterparts are brought into discussion for 
the US’s “soft power campaign aimed at winning hearts and minds in the Mus-
lim world and elsewhere.”816 The US campaign of disseminating information be-
hind the Iron Curtain, of which RFE was a vital part, “the truth, skillfully told, (…) 
was central to the triumph of American propaganda.”817 RFE and its leaders, 
through their vision, developed “a common bond with the exiles of the five radio 
stations and galvanized much of the energy of the exile population.”818  RFE’s 
efforts and success also contributed to the elevation of the status of radio - “the 
radio, through RFE, became a symbol of liberation behind the Iron Curtain.”819 
Asked in 1990 if RFE had contributed to the triumph of Solidarity in Poland, 
“Lech Walesa responded rhetorically: “Is the Sun important for the Earth?”820
CONCLUSION
RFE and the campaign it was part of remain relevant today, when the US “faces 
many of the same challenges that it did during the Cold War, only the names 
of the enemies have changed.”821 Cord Meyer explains that even in Eastern Eu-
rope, RFE continues to influence political and civic development, supporting the 
emergence of civil societies in formerly authoritarian countries – “many demo-
cratic leaders in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union rely on Radio Free 
Europe and Radio Liberty to support the development of political pluralism, mar-
ket economies, and an independent media.”822 In assisting Eastern European 
democracy mature, watching out for human rights, creating an example for the 
post-communist media, and keeping the East connected to the West, RFE and 
its sister stations “continue to play a unique and vital role in America’s ongoing 
struggle to bring freedom to the world.”823 While in the Cold War, RFE, together 
815 Ross A Johnson,.Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty: The CIA Years and Beyond. 
Stanford, Stanford University Press, California, 2010, p. 1.
816 Ibid.
817 Stern, op. cit., p. 80.
818 Ibid., p. 100.
819 Ibid.
820 Johnson, op. cit., p. 1.
821 Stern, op. cit., p. 108.
822 Cord Meyer, The CIA and Radio Free Europe, Georgetown Journal of International 
Affairs, Vol. 1,  Nº 1 (Winter/Spring 2000), Georgetown University Press, p. 130, ac-
cessed 5.4.2016.
823 Ibid.
258 CSABA BÉKÉS – MELINDA KALMÁR: STUDENTS ON THE COLD WAR
with the other American radio stations, “helped keep hope for liberation and 
freedom alive in the satellite countries”824, it continues to support the US’s vision 
in and of the world. And “because threats to American hegemony remain, C. D. 
Jackson’s legacy is permanent”825, and, as that of its creators, so is RFE’s. 
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A PENNY FOR EVERY WORD: RADIO FREE 
EUROPE’S CALL FOR “TRUTH DOLLARS”
mOnIque KIL
INTRODUCTION
Anxieties over a breakdown in social order characterized the early years of the 
Cold War. The Second World War had disrupted formerly entrenched social pat-
terns of class, race, gender and religion. The national draft had lumped men of 
diverse backgrounds together in the army. While these men were shipped off 
to Europe to join the war effort, women, African-Americans, and other groups 
previously excluded from the workforce enjoyed unprecedented opportunities. 
However, when the soldiers returned home, many of them advocated for the 
status quo ante. This caused frictions, which in turn increased the concerns 
over social unrest. On top of this, the “postwar demobilization would unleash 
some eleven million veterans onto the American economy, and many experts 
believed that postwar cutbacks in federal defense spending would trigger an 
economic downturn, if not a full-blown depression.”826
With the elimination of the common wartime goal, both public and private institu-
tions sought to unite America in new ways, in order to prevent a state of national 
turmoil, as well as to halt the spread of state-socialism.827 The Advertising Council (Ad 
Council) was paramount in this effort. Previously an instrument of the American gov-
ernment, it reorganized in 1945 “as a private nonprofit foundation dedicated to ‘public 
service’ advertising.”828 It engaged in a variety of projects to create domestic consen-
sus on the nation’s core values or, in other words, on the “American Way.” Among 
these core values were American-style capitalism and American freedom.829 The Ad 
826 Wendy L. Wall, Inventing the “American Way:” The Politics of Consensus: From the 
New Deal to the Civil Rights Movement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 168; 
For other causes for social unrest in postwar America, see for instance Campbell 
Craig & Frederik Logevall, America’s Cold War: The Politics of Insecurity (Cambridge: 
Belknap Press, 2009); Elaine Tyler May, Homeward Bound: American Families in the 
Cold War Era. (New York City: Perseus Books Group), 2008.
827 Ibid. 169-170.
828 Ibid. 173. Wall notes that the Ad Council justified its decision to cut its ties with the 
government by claiming that centralized federal control was at odds with the princi-
ples of a democracy.
829 Ibid. 178; For specific literature on the Ad Council, see for instance Daniel L. Lykins, 
From Total War to Total Diplomacy: The Advertising Council and the Construction of 
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Council was the creator of the “Crusade for Freedom” advertisements and the inven-
tor of “Truth Dollars,” a concept used in these advertisements. The Crusade for Free-
dom was a domestic fund-raising campaign for Radio Free Europe. Through visuals 
and rhetoric, three advertisements created for the “Truth Dollars” campaign exemplify 
the manner in which they promoted the ‘’American Way,’’ often setting it in opposition 
to the Soviet Union. These advertisements were classic Cold War propaganda. An 
analysis of the very concept of “Truth Dollars” demonstrates its association with the 
Cold War American ideology. Truth became a commodity, and the Ad Council used 
the same strategy for selling it as it would have used for any other consumer item.
RADIO FREE EUROPE
Radio Free Europe (RFE) is an American broadcasting organization founded in 
1949 under the auspices of the National Committee for a Free Europe (NCFE).830 
RFE operated in Eastern Europe during the Cold War where it, according to its 
official mission statement, intended “to transmit uncensored news and informa-
tion to audiences behind the Iron Curtain.”831 However, scholars have consid-
ered this objective ambiguous and have interpreted RFE’s intentions differently. 
Historian Walter L. Hixson described RFE as: “An anti-communist émigré propa-
ganda network” that fostered “the illusion of being a genuine private station.”832 
RFE indeed claimed to be a nongovernmental organization. It declared to oper-
ate as the voice of private American citizens, in contrast to the Voice of America, 
another broadcasting organization that was seen as the official spokesman for 
the United States. In reality, RFE was heavily subsidized and influenced by the 
CIA.833 In addition, the public-private relationship of a number of directors and 
board members of the overarching NCFE was blurred. Examples include future 
CIA director Allen Dulles and future president Dwight D. Eisenhower.834
the Cold War Consensus (Santa Barbara: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2003); Rob-
ert Griffith, “The Selling of America: The Advertising Council and American Politics, 
1942,1960,” The Business History Review 57, Nº 3 (1983): 388-412.
830 Richard H. Cummings, Radio Free Europe’s “Crusade for Freedom:” Rallying Ameri-
cans Behind Cold War Broadcasting, 1950-1960 (Jefferson: McFarland, 2010), 9. 
RFE broadcasted its first program on July 4, 1950 (Ibid. 24).
831 “Then And Now: Free Media In Unfree Societies,” last modified December 2008, 
http://www.rferl.org/info/history/133.html
832 Walter L. Hixson, Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture, and the Cold War. (New 
York: St. Martin’s Griffin, 1997), 59.
833 Ibid. 59-60; Arch Puddington, Broadcasting Freedom: The Cold War Triumph of Ra-
dio Free Europe and Radio Liberty (Kentucky, University Press of Kentucky, 2015): 
23; John Allen Stern, C.D. Jackson: Cold War Propagandist for Democracy and Glo-
balism (Maryland: University Press of America, 2012), p.19.
834 Cummings, Radio Free Europe’s, 9. Some of the organizations with whom RFE/
NCFE collaborated were similarly ambiguous in their private-public relationships. 
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CRUSADE FOR FREEDOM
To maintain the illusion of RFE being a privately financed organization, parent 
organization NCFE initiated a domestic fundraising campaign in 1950.835 They 
called it the “Crusade for Freedom” (CFF) and highly publicized it during the 
early years. The Freedom Bell, modeled after the iconic Liberty Bell, became the 
symbol of the fundraising campaign and of RFE in general.836 General Dwight D. 
Eisenhower officially opened the campaign on Labor Day, September 4, 1950. 
In a nation-wide radio broadcast, he introduced the CFF to the American citi-
zens and urged every individual to support the campaign by signing a “Freedom 
Scroll.”837 In doing so, they would not only donate money to the cause, but also 
show their moral support. Indeed, mobilizing the support of American citizens 
was one of the prime objectives of the campaign.838 Interestingly, this “enrol-
ment” in the CFF bears resemblance to a military enrolment: symbolic soldiers 
were assembled to fight this symbolic war; a war that was “cold” and not “hot.” 
Besides the salience of the Freedom Bell and the Freedom Scrolls, many activi-
ties were carried out to gain publicity for the CFF and prominent individuals like 
Eleanor Roosevelt and Ronald Reagan openly endorsed the campaign.839 Ad-
vertisements created and dispersed for the cause were another key component.
START OF THE ADVERTISING CAMPAIGN
In June 1949, before the CFF had officially started, the NCFE had formed an 
advertising committee. This committee contracted the public relations firm 
John Price Jones Company, who suggested in their Analysis and Plan of 
Fund Raising report that the advertisements should make a threefold appeal: 
to emotion, reason and action. As quoted in Richard H. Cummings’ Radio 
For instance, the Ad Council had previously been a government organization and 
many of its board members had been directly involved in federal business
835 Hixson, Parting the Curtain, 59; Michael Nelson, War of the Black Heavens: The Bat-
tles of Western Broadcasting in the Cold War (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 
1997), 47-48; Puddington, Broadcasting Freedom, p. 22.
836 Ibid.; Scott Lucas, Freedom’s War: The U.S. Crusade Against the Soviet Union, 
1945-1956 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999), 101-102; Puddington, 
Broadcasting Freedom, 20; Cummings, Radio Free Europe’s “Crusade for Free-
dom,” p. 17, 21.
837 Ibid. 30-31. Nelson, War of the Black Heavens, 47-48; For an analysis of Eisenhow-
er’s speech see: Martin J. Medhurst, “Eisenhower and the Crusade for Freedom: The 
Rhetorical Origins of a Cold War Campaign,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 27, Nº 4 
(1997), p. 646-661.
838 Puddington, Broadcasting Freedom, p. 22
839 Cummings, Radio Free Europe’s, p. 39-43, 82-83.
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Free Europe’s “Crusade for Freedom,” one of the aims should be to “capi-
talize on the public’s anti-communist sentiment, beat the drum of immediate 
danger, and paint a bold picture of the personal loss that is bound to follow 
Communism.”840 The NCFE took this advice to heart and enlisted the help of 
the Ad Council to design such advertisements.841
The NCFE and the Ad Council devised a different slogan for each campaign 
year.842 The incentive of the advertisements of the first years was in line with the 
larger goal of the Crusade: to both expand the operations of RFE and to gain 
publicity and moral support.843 To that end, the advertisements were propa-
gandistic in nature. Historian Walter L. Hixson has defined propaganda as “the 
attempt to influence behavior by shaping the attitudes of masses of people.”844 
“By appealing to people’s emotions” could be added to this definition.845 One of 
the earlier advertisements dates back to 1951 and uses the theme of a religious 
crusade. The headline reads: “Give us this day… Our daily truth.” This sentence 
must have sounded familiar to people, except that the Christian Pater Noster 
prayer talks about “bread,” not “truth.” Right under the headline is a picture of 
a Czechoslovakian family gathered around the radio listening intensely to - pre-
sumably - RFE. The women have their hands folded in praying gestures. On top 
of the radio is a print that reads in the Czech language: “Where there is love, 
there is God’s blessing.” The religious connotations continue in the text under 
the image. The phrase in the headline is referred to as “the whispered prayer of 
millions behind the Iron Curtain.” RFE is said to fill their hearts with hope, and 
their language is reminiscent of the way in which a Reverend would preach in 
a church service: “Hour after hour, day after day, Radio Free Europe speaks 
to them. Words they can believe… words of news, words of encouragement, 
words of warning (…)846 The Czechoslovakian family, representing all Eastern 
Europeans, is not just hungry for food, but hungry for “truth,” which the adver-
tisement refers to as “the greatest hunger of all.”
840 Ibid., p. 13-15.
841 The Ad Council helped to create other promotional material as well, such as films, 
window stickers and leaflets, Ibid. p. 51-52.
842 Ibid., p. vii; Puddington, Broadcasting Freedom, p. 23.
843 Cummings, Radio Free Europe’s, p.14.
844 Hixson, Parting the Curtain, p.1.
845 Propaganda is one of the psychological warfare techniques used during the Cold 
War. Soft power is another one. The main difference between propaganda and soft 
power is that the latter uses more subtle and less overt messages to “shape the 
preferences of others’’ through appeal and attraction. Joseph S. Nye, Soft Power: 
The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), p. 5.
846 Frank Altschul Papers, 1884-1986: Series VIII: Organizations, 1908-1980, Box 161, 
Folder 449
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SHIFT TO ‘’TRUTH DOLLAR’’ ADVERTISEMENTS
The concept of “Truth Dollars” was first introduced in the 1953-1954 campaign. It was 
the focus of most advertisements produced up to 1956. After 1956, “Truth Dollars” were 
still mentioned, but they were no longer the focus of the advertisements. They seemed 
to have become an integrated concept, mentioned matter-of-factly in a small-sized line 
at the bottom. Consequently, three advertisements from the 1953-1956 period, when 
the concept of “Truth Dollars” was most pronounced, were most important.847
During this period, the propaganda became more coercive in nature when com-
pared to the advertisements from 1950-1952. Whereas the earlier dated advertise-
ments were quite placid, they bordered on aggressive from 1953 onwards. The pre-
viously discussed “Give us this day…” advertisement can serve as an illustration 
here, when contrasted with the later “Truth Dollars” advertisements. In the former, 
the headline above the picture is in a bigger font than the rest of the text and the 
word “truth” is underlined. While it grabs your attention, it is not dramatically present. 
This is different from the advertisements centering on “Truth Dollars,” in which the 
headlines stand out. For instance, in one advertisement, “World War III” is written at 
the top in bold, capitalized, large-sized letters, threatening with war if “truth” would 
not be broadcasted. There is also an increased emphasis on certain words, these 
being either in italics, underlined or in bold. Besides the assertive typography, the 
printed images are more violent too. The “Give us this Day…” advertisement de-
picts the harmonious scene of a Czechoslovakian family at home, while the “Truth 
Dollars” advertisements feature, among others, a raised fist and a battleground with 
armed soldiers. In addition, the earlier advertisement quoted and portrayed others 
(the family from Czechoslovakia), whereas the later ones more directly address - 
and in some cases even represent - you: the viewer and American citizen.
The CFF advertisements likely used more forceful propaganda from 1953 on-
wards because by that time RFE and its fund-raising campaign had become 
known at the grassroots level. Among its targets had been campus newspapers 
and Boy Scouts. Local communities had set up their own activities in support of 
the campaign, ranging from the lighting of “Freedom Fires” to the performance of 
special “Crusade for Freedom” dances.848 Due to all these promotional efforts, the 
objectives of the Crusade could shift away from pure publicity and focus directly 
on gaining moral support, as well as financial contributions. The messages could 
be more coercive. The very idea of “Truth Dollars” – raising  money,  raising dollars, 
raising Truth dollars – obviously fit well with this undertaking.
847 In the following sections, references are made to these three advertisements. All quotes, 
unless otherwise specified, have been taken from them. The advertisements have been 
included in the Appendix (fig 1-3), which can also be consulted for their original location.
848 Cummings, Radio Free Europe’s, 35, 42-43, 110-111; Puddington, Broadcasting 
Freedom, p. 23.
264 CSABA BÉKÉS – MELINDA KALMÁR: STUDENTS ON THE COLD WAR
WORLD WAR III: HOW $1,00 FROM YOU CAN HELP END IT 
BEFORE IT STARTS
This 1952-1953 advertisement opens with the line “World War III,” which is with-
out doubt the focal point with its large-sized, capitalized, bold letters. It lived 
up to one of the aims of the advertising campaign, as put forward in the earlier 
mentioned John Price Jones Company report: “to beat the drum of immediate 
danger.”849 The idea of a Third World War played into the fears of American citi-
zens. It should be viewed in light of the historical circumstances, when the nu-
clear arms race had heightened the anxieties about the Cold War turning into a 
hot war, leading to global destruction. Yet the advertisement alludes to a remedy: 
“How $1,00 from you can help end it before it starts.” The last three words of this 
sentence are underlined to give them more emphasis. They stress that the view-
ers must act now, “before it starts,” and should not wait until it is too late. The 
audience of this advertisement must have felt relief in learning that such a simple 
act as donating one dollar could help prevent a worldwide catastrophe. They are 
ensured in the first paragraph that they would benefit the organization “which is 
concentrated on the single most important job in the world (…) helping to keep 
World War III from happening.” Yet while the viewers might have been convinced 
of the significance of donating dollars, they must have been curious about the 
ways in which their dollars would be able to make a difference.
The answer is already hinted at the bottom of the page, where the viewers’ 
attention is drawn to next. The large-sized, bold word between inverted com-
mas, “Truth-Dollars,” signifies that these dollars are not just ordinary dollars, 
but that they carry a special meaning. The final paragraph of the text, under the 
subheading “What you get for your dollar” explains it further:
“One dollar from you pays for 100 words or more of hope and information 
to waiting millions behind the Iron Curtain. Your dollar may be the one that 
exposes a Soviet informer in Cracow, gives the lie to a Communist broadcast 
in Prague, saves the life of a patriot in Budapest. These are working dollars. 
These are Truth Dollars!”
“(…) One dollar from you can help build the extra transmitters we need, send 
more messages instead of less, defeat the Kremlin in this battle for free men’s souls.
Here is one battle that can be won by dollars. Dollars that may well be the 
salvation of us all. Could any dollar buy more? Send yours today – the Big Dol-
lar to fight the Big Red Lie!” This narrative asserts that dollars can buy hope, 
information and the truth. Dollars are viewed as active contributors in the fight 
against communism (“These are working dollars”). In one sentence they are 
even given active agency (“Your dollar may be the one that (…)”). A few vivid 
examples are given as to what a donated dollar could achieve. 
849 See footnote 15.
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The text starts by mentioning a potentially minor accomplishment (“Your 
dollar may be the one that exposes a Soviet informer in Cracow”) and ends 
with its attainability to crush an entire ideology (“One dollar from you (…) can 
defeat the Kremlin in this battle for free men’s souls”). Indeed, dollars can be 
the decisive factor in winning the Cold War (“Here is one battle that can be 
won by dollars”). They can be the “salvation” (from the evil of communism), a 
religious connotation similar to the ones in the earlier published advertisement. 
The rhetorical question near the end, “could any dollar buy more?” once more 
underscores the priority for American citizens to counter communism and to 
support “the people of the six captive countries.” 
Their dollar could buy nothing more important.  Besides the text in the main 
body, the advertisement depicts two boxed images with each an accompanying 
narrative. The bigger one to the right gives the viewer insight into “the Battleground 
for Peace.” It explains and illustrates which nations lay beyond the Iron Curtain. 
The image shows two microphones (i.e. broadcasting organizations) transmit-
ting messages to Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria. The 
microphone positioned at the western side of the Iron Curtain has “truth” written 
on it, while the microphone drawn on the eastern side has “lies” inscribed in it. 
It is not hard to infer that the “truth” microphone represents the United States, 
more specifically RFE, whereas the “lies” microphone denotes the Soviet Union. 
Two armed soldiers are also drawn on the eastern side, highlighting the captivity 
of the people behind the Iron Curtain, as opposed to the freedom these people 
would enjoy in the west. To this end, these people are referred to as “captive” 
and “freedom-loving.” The suggestion that they are longing for the freedom of 
the west is embodied by the depiction of a woman holding the hands of her two 
children: trapped behind the Iron Curtain, she faces west and presumably at-
tempts to move to that side. At the very least she seems more inclined to listen 
to the “truth,” having her back turned to the Soviet “lies.”
The advertisement’s other boxed image, the one to the left, is claimed to con-
tain the following communist lie: “The American cannibals… want to exterminate 
whole human races, particularly those belonging to the Far East or South East 
Asian peoples…” This lie is ascribed to a Hungarian writer and was supposedly 
published in a Hungarian daily newspaper. Its message is enforced by a cartoon 
of Uncle Sam, who casually sits in a chair, and, with a grin on his face, watches a 
number of people being boiled to death in a big cooking pot. The advertisement 
urges the readers of this lie to get a $1 bill out of their pocket and to physically 
cover it. As is noted: “This Communist lie is the actual size of a U.S. dollar bill.” 
The text then dictates the reader to “tuck [the dollar] into an envelope with your 
name and address and send it to ‘Crusade for Freedom.’” This little activity pro-
vided meaning to the concept of “Truth Dollars,” by making a literal association 
between dollars and their ability to cover up lies. Donating dollars would support 
RFE in its efforts to broadcast the truth: “The truth about what is happening in a 
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nearby village. The truth about their own townspeople. Truth which puts the fin-
ger on an informer. Truth behind Soviet lies. Truth about their own country–one 
thing their Soviet conquerors fear above all.” The advertisement analyzed next 
employed the concept of “Truth Dollars” in similar manners.
SURE I WANT TO FIGHT COMMUNISM–BUT HOW?
In the top-half of this advertisement, dating to 1954-1955, a white, middle-
aged man is depicted. He does not look into the camera directly, but seems 
to be contemplating: the hand under his chin, his slightly open mouth, and the 
wrinkles in his forehead highlight this. The viewer can discern that he is pon-
dering the question written next to him. On the black background, the white 
letters stand out and grab the viewer’s attention immediately: “Sure I want 
to fight Communism–but how?” The latter two words are printed in a larger 
font, giving more emphasis to these. It appears as if the man in the picture is 
responding to someone else’s question (“Do you not want to fight Commu-
nism?”). We can infer from the way the man’s answer is phrased that he is giv-
ing the only acceptable answer (“Sure I want to fight Communism”). One could 
imagine adding the words “who would not?” The man, who looks like an or-
dinary American citizen, arguably represented the views of his fellow country-
men: everyone wanted to join the anti-communist effort and wished to fight the 
national enemy. This was particularly true in light of the ever-increasing threat 
of communist conspiracies within the US, an anxiety fueled by McCarthyism. 
The second part of the man’s response (“but how?”) likewise expressed com-
mon sentiments among the American population. As patriotic citizens, they 
wished to combat communism and assert their commitment to the nation, but 
they were unsure how to go about this.
RFE provides the answer in the bottom-half of the advertisement: “With 
‘Truth Dollars’–that’s how!” “Truth Dollars” is between quotation marks, in cap-
ital letters and in a larger font than the rest of the sentence. Thus, this is the 
most important part of the answer; or in fact, this is the answer. “That’s how!” is 
in italics and with an exclamation mark at the end, highlighting its unequivocal 
response to the man’s question. The two sentences that follow directly under-
neath the main answer provide the essence of the advertisement: urging the 
reader to give “Truth Dollars” to fight communism. The text speaks directly to 
the reader (“Your ‘Truth Dollars’”), communicating the idea that every individual 
can make a useful contribution to the fight against communism.850 Indeed, 
every American has dollars: in the capitalist system, citizens have the freedom 
to make these dollars by working. Thus, the fruits of their labor can buy them 
“the truth.” This idea is returned to in the final section.
850 Emphasis added by author.
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A short text consisting of five paragraphs follows, providing an explanation 
on the workings of “Truth Dollars.” The rhetoric is explicitly propagandistic and 
plays into the assumed responsibilities of American citizens, calling upon their 
patriotism. The whole family is urged to join the effort (“Send as many ‘Truth 
Dollars’ as you can (if possible, a dollar for each member of the family)”). The il-
lustration to the right, of a raised fist clasping a (Truth) dollar, reiterates that com-
munism can be fought with “Truth Dollars.” In this case, fighting is not perceived 
in the conventional sense of man-to-man combat, but as a battle between ide-
ologies, with the dollar as the choice of weapon in the west. Interestingly, this 
image of a raised fist is an appropriated communist symbol, implying that RFE 
and the US can defeat communism on their own terms, with “Truth Dollars.”
YOU MEAN I CAN FIGHT COMMUNISM?
This advertisement was the female counterpart of the advertisement just 
discussed, also dating to 1954-1955. In the top-half of the advertisement, a 
white, middle-aged woman is depicted. She looks into the camera directly, 
with a surprised expression on her face. Her frowned eyebrows and somewhat 
dropped jaw bear testimony to her surprise. This emotion seems to be a reac-
tion to the question written next to her. Similar to the previous advertisement, 
the white letters on the black background stand out and instantly draw the 
attention of the viewers to the headline: “You mean I can fight Communism?” 
“I” is printed in a larger font, underlined and in bold. Following up on the argu-
ment that the man represented the views of his fellow countrymen, the woman 
seemed to serve as the spokesperson for fellow American women. Like men, 
women wished to contribute to the fight against communism, but they did not 
realize they could provide any substantial help. This reflected the gender roles 
of the 1950s patriarchic society, in which women were commonly identified 
solely as housewives and mothers. The “fighting” was left to the men. Yet the 
Cold War was not an orthodox fight, as mentioned before: it was a symbolic 
fight and the advertisement conveys that women could join it as well.
The answer to the woman’s question in the bottom-half of the advertisement is 
straightforward: “Yes–for just one dollar…” “Yes” is in capital letters and in a larger 
font than the rest of the sentence, leaving no doubts about whether women could 
fight communism. “For just one dollar” is in italics and followed by an ellipsis. This 
highlights that supporting the campaign, and with it anti-communism, required a 
minor commitment. Women, generally seen as the ones making the purchasing 
decisions in the 1950s consumer society, would not need to alter their budget 
drastically. Each dollar, just “one for every member of your family,” would help 
fight communism. This reflected the incentive of the CFF, above all concerned 
with gaining moral support and less worried about the actual fund-raising, “even 
if each [Truth dollar] would be found upon analysis to cost us [the NCFE] more 
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than one dollar.”851 The rhetoric in the five short paragraphs, which constitute the 
main body of text in the advertisement, is nearly identical to its male counterpart. 
Likewise, it is propagandistic and appeals to the viewer’s patriotism.
RECURRING ELEMENTS
The “Truth Dollars” advertisements share recurring elements. First, the dichoto-
mies between the United States and the Soviet Union are striking. The US has 
the “truth,” the USSR has “lies;” the US is “good,” the USSR is “evil;” the US 
is the “free world,” the USSR is the “conquerors.” In much the same vein, the 
USSR is referred to as “The Communists,” “The Reds,” “The Kremlin,” and 
“Moscow.” The fight is always against one of these abstract entities: no mention 
is made of human beings. This objectification of the Soviet Union strengthened 
the Crusade’s efforts, as the American people felt greater justification for their 
fight against this grand system of oppression, rather than a direct fight against 
fellow human beings, who are being depicted as victims in the advertisements.
The idea of freedom is another prevalent theme in these advertisements and 
links in to the US-USSR dichotomy. The people living behind the Iron Curtain 
are referred to as “freedom-loving,” while in the current Soviet sphere of influ-
ence they are “captive,” “enslaved,” and “embattled.” The choice of words 
implies that all “70 million” Eastern Europeans are longing for (American) free-
dom. Freedom was one of the democratic core principles championed by the 
US. Of course, the very name of the campaign underscored its importance.
A second commonality between the advertisements is the focus on the Ameri-
can individual. Either the words “you,” “you, personally,” or “I” are emphasized. 
This fit in with the broader historical context, more elaborately outlined in the first 
section. Starting in the late 1940s, both governmental institutions and private or-
ganizations had tried to “enlist civil society (…) in a defense of the American Way 
overseas.”852 However, this American Way required a domestic consensus first, 
for which the support of every American citizen was desired. This attempt to mo-
bilize the US citizen was also one of the key goals of the Crusade. Their advertise-
ments claim that one person can make a difference to 70 million people. In fact, 
“You run Radio Free Europe.” It is emphasized that “RFE is a public American 
enterprise” and that it is “supported by voluntary, cooperative action of millions of 
Americans.” This assurance must have appealed to those feeling impotent to alle-
viate the Cold War threats: they were now entrusted with the power for change.853
851 NCFE director Clinton DeWitt Poole wrote this in a letter to Allen Dulles on November 
16, 1949. As quoted in Cummings, Radio Free Europe’s, p. 14.
852 Wall, Inventing the “American Way,” p. 242.
853 Other initiatives that were part of the Crusade for Freedom campaign centered 
around the individual in similar ways. For instance, the Freedom Scroll that each 
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A third element shared by the three advertisements is their insistence on act-
ing immediately. Short sentences dictate to “send yours [Truth Dollars] today” 
and to “take a $1 bill out of your pocket right now.” The urgency of donating 
“Truth Dollars” is made explicit: “the need is now” and “do it now.”854 The view-
ers are warned that communism needs to be fought right away, before matters 
get out of hand. The 1952-1953 advertisement is most explicit in sketching the 
ensuing doom scenario if nothing is done: WWIII. All advertisements play into 
the constant anxiety of American citizens over the Cold War turning into a hot 
war in the blink of an eye. Caution was always warranted in light of the ever-
lurking communist threat.
At the same time, the viewers are rest assured that RFE is being successful 
in its efforts to combat communism–a fourth and final aspect each advertise-
ment touches upon. In one of them, RFE attributes the following description to 
itself: “(…) the most successful project yet devised by western man to fan the 
flames of liberty and keep hope and courage strong in the captive countries.” 
A few lines later, it refers to itself as the “pipeline of freedom.” Clearly, RFE’s 
mission was in line with the national endeavor to spread American ideals. The 
advertisements proudly share the practices of RFE: broadcasting “day and 
night, seven days a week,” “more than 2,000 hours a week,” reaching “Poles, 
Czechoslovakians, Hungarians, Romanians and Bulgarians.” What is more, by 
italicizing certain words, RFE stresses that it is fighting communism behind the 
Iron Curtain, “right on its own battleground,” “in its own backyard,” and “on its 
own home grounds.”855 By donating money, the reader would be able to strike 
the enemy right at its heart. It is further noted that the Soviet Union has at-
tempted to “jam” programs broadcasted by RFE, yet “so far without success.” 
It assures the superiority of RFE, of the United States, and of their American 
“truth” over the USSR and its lies.
CONCLUSION
Although the CFF was officially a fund-raising campaign, this was never its 
sole purpose. In the disrupted postwar society, its main objective was to mo-
bilize American citizens in support of a domestic consensus on America’s core 
person could sign to express personal support.
854 Emphases added by author.
855 As was already pointed out, the visuals of the advertisements in fig 2-3 reflected 1950s 
gender roles. It could be further suggested that the rhetoric in these advertisements 
exaggerated these gender roles. For instance, the advertisement with the man makes 
mention of a “backyard,” while the advertisement with the woman refers to “home 
grounds.” These symbolize the traditional inside/outside dichotomy, with the backyard 
being a distinctly male space and the home being a distinctly female space. Yet caution 
is warranted, as the female advertisement, at the end, also mentions “backyard”.
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values. In other words, it “hoped to solidify the allegiance of these thirty-five 
million Americans to a particular vision of the American Way.”856 The US and 
RFE also attempted to carry their ideals abroad, especially to the countries 
behind the Iron Curtain. The CFF set out to enroll symbolic soldiers for this 
cause and to, during its 1953-1956 “Truth Dollars” campaigns, directly fight 
the communist threat with the weapon of capitalism. Interestingly, in opting 
for this focus on capitalism, the Ad Council championed both American-style 
capitalism and individualism, which they and the government had considered 
threatening in the late 1930s under liberal New Deal policies.857
The epitome of capitalism, the dollar, was linked to “truth,” which tied in with 
the American core values of democracy and freedom. The “Truth Dollars” ad-
vertisements, in both visuals and rhetoric, portrayed RFE and the US as the 
ones who had the true, objective story. Indeed, transmitting the truth was equal 
to transmitting information. As Joseph S. Nye wrote about Cold War politics: 
“there was a thin line between information and propaganda.”858 During the Cold 
War, in the increasingly growing consumer society, it now seemed possible to 
buy information; to buy words of truth. However, these could only be bought 
by those who had dollars, thus by those who partook in capitalism. Being part 
of the capitalist system allowed one access to the truth, while being part of the 
communist, totalitarian system only exposed one to lies. Dollars were literally 
needed to cover up the lies, as one of the advertisements advocated for. This 
idea that the truth could be bought becomes all the more evident when we con-
sider that the CIA covertly funded RFE. The CIA determined what truths were 
broadcasted, while trying to maintain the “illusion of objectivity.”859
In conclusion, the ‘’Truth Dollars’’ advertisements appealed to the civic 
responsibilities of American citizens to fight communism with the capitalist 
system in which they themselves were immersed. The power of capitalism, 
with the dollar as its symbol, would lead one to the truth. The truth, in turn, 
would combat communism. Both in their visuals and rhetoric, the advertise-
ments conveyed the message that the American truth was the only truth, and 
a commodity readily available for purchase. These advertisements are prime 
examples of classic Cold War propaganda. They did not leave any room for 
misunderstandings: donating “Truth Dollars” was the indisputable answer to 
how each individual, and the American family in its entirety, could fight com-
munism with capitalism.
856 Wall, Inventing the “American Way,”p. 243.
857 Griffith, “The Selling of America, p. 388.
858 Nye, Soft Power, p. 103.
859 Ibid.
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THE 1957 MOSCOW YOUTH FESTIVAL AND THE 
HUNGARIAN DELEGATION:  
PROPAGANDA, YOUTH ORGANIZATIONS AND 
THE CULTURAL COLD WAR
OrSOLYA PóSFAI
In the summer of 1957, the Sixth World Festival for Youth and Students was held in 
Moscow. In itself, the Festival did not hold much political or historical significance; 
however, it was a singular phenomenon during the Cold War: for a few days, the 
Iron Curtain separating East from West was lifted, and young people from around 
the world could catch a glimpse of what life was like on the other side.
The Cold War that erupted after the Second World War between the United 
States and the Soviet Union was not only a political and military confrontation 
– a cultural cold war unprecedented in history also developed between the two 
superpowers. Never before had cultural events been so important: concerts, 
literary events, exhibitions, scientific conferences and youth movements car-
ried almost as much weight in the war as military operations. Both the US and 
the Soviet Union strived to propagate their own world view through culture, 
trying to convince the world of the superiority of one set of values. The arma-
ment race came hand in hand with a cultural race.860
After Stalin’s death a period of reform called the ‘thaw’ (ottepel’) began, trig-
gered by Khrushchev’s infamous Secret Speech, in which he denounced the 
cult of personality and the crimes committed by Stalin. This period of thaw 
allowed the Sixth World Youth Festival to be held in Moscow in 1957. The or-
ganization of the festival in Moscow was impossible until Stalin’s death, when 
inviting tens of thousands of foreigners behind the iron curtain was unimagina-
ble. However, after Stalin’s death, Khrushchev was eager to establish friendlier 
ties with the West, and the Youth Festival presented itself as the perfect oppor-
tunity to prove the Soviet Union’s peaceful intentions toward the West and to 
further build “peaceful coexistence”. Even the festival’s slogan was more neu-
tral than previous festivals’ had been: “For peace and friendship”. There were 
no pictures of political leaders at the festival either (in previous years, pictures 
of Lenin, Stalin and local communist leaders could be seen everywhere).861 
860 David Caute, The Dancer Defects: The Struggle for Cultural Supremacy during the 
Cold War. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2005.
861 Pia Koivunen. “The 1957 Moscow Youth Festival: propagating a new, peaceful im-
age of the Soviet Union.” In Soviet State and Society under Nikita Khrushchev, 46-
65. Edited by Melanie Ilic and Jeremy Smith. New York: Routledge, 2009.
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The events of 1956, however, raised questions about the sincerity of these 
peaceful intentions in the eyes of the West as well as in some Communist coun-
tries. In June, 1956, workers in Poznan demanded an end to the Soviet dom-
ination of Poland, which resulted in relative success: Vladislav Gomulka, the 
new leader of the country, who came into power during the Polish October, 
promised that Poland would remain a loyal member of the Warsaw Pact and in 
return, greater freedom of action in Polish domestic affairs was guaranteed by 
Khrushchev. The Polish uprising was followed by the Hungarian revolution in 
October, which resulted in international outrage directed at the Soviet Union. 
These events occurred at a time when it was already too late to cancel the fes-
tival, and resulted in a frostier international climate and therefore had a negative 
impact on the festival itself. Despite these difficulties, the festival was held from 
the 28th of July till the 12th of August in Moscow with 34 000 participants from 
131 countries, the largest festival in the history of the World Youth Festivals. 
The World Youth Festivals had been an effective tool of propaganda for Soviet 
culture since 1947, when the first festival was held in Prague with approximately 
20 000 participants from Communist and non-Communist countries alike. The 
second festival was held in Budapest in 1949, the third in East Berlin in 1951, the 
fourth in Bucharest in 1953 and the fifth in Warsaw in 1955.862
THE FESTIVAL PREPARATIONS
The final decision to hold the festival in Moscow came in 1954, when the Kom-
somol (the Soviet Communist Youth Association) General Secretary, Aleksandr 
Shelepin sent a letter to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) Central 
Committee, suggesting that Moscow should host the next festival. His proposal 
wasn’t accepted immediately, and the fifth World Youth Festival was held in 
Warsaw in 1955. It was decided that the sixth festival would be held in Moscow, 
and in October 1955, a Soviet preparatory committee was set up.863 The festival 
itself was preceded by an extensive cleansing of Moscow; many buildings were 
renovated and new ones were built.  Additionally, people who were found unde-
sirable to the aesthetic of the city were relocated. Around 16 000 people were 
removed from Moscow and its surroundings: “Moscow city and its surrounding 
regions were cleared of hooligans, gypsies, prostitutes, waifs and thieves.”864
War was waged against the so-called “stiliaga” as well. The stiliagi were 
young people, who dressed fashionably, listened to jazz and rock and roll, 
862 “The Vienna Youth Festival”, Open Society Archives: Foreign Relations Series: East 
West, 2. http://fa.osaarchivum.org/background-reports?col=8&id=42475.
863 Koivunen, The 1957 Moscow Youth Festival.
864 Ibid., p. 53.
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and gave each other American nicknames.865 Kristin Roth-Ey, in her article 
Loose Girls on the Loose, states that in the months preceding the festival, 
“civic police groups were mobilized to conduct anti-stilyaga dance raids and 
to rid Moscow of ‘criminal elements’ and’ loose women’.”866  During the fes-
tival, Moscow transformed to welcome its guests and donned a holiday ap-
pearance: “The streets of Moscow were for the first time decked out in multi-
colored flags rather than the customary red one, and Pablo Picasso’s doves 
of peace replaced the customary hammer and sickle as the symbol of the 
festival.”867 Extensive propaganda preceded the festival, both in Soviet and 
Western media. After 1956, the Soviet Union viewed the festival as an oppor-
tunity to give Westerners the “correct” answers to their questions regarding 
Communist ideology, the freedom of the Soviet people and the intervention in 
Hungary. Before the festival Soviet youth were trained on how to answer these 
questions and how to be “ambassadors of Soviet culture”.868 Western media 
was more concerned with whether or not their youth should be attending the 
festival at all. The US State Department’s official view for instance, was that no 
official American delegation should attend the festival. A group of about 160 
Americans still attended the festival, although not in an official capacity.869 In a 
series of letters to the editor of The Times, published between 1956 October 
26th and November 1st, several readers stated their opinions on the question 
of whether an official delegation should represent Britain at the festival or not. 
The readers arguing against attending had reasons such as: 
“It is the young people from developing countries who are the targets [of the 
festival] - and the task of persuading them that they are attending not a Communist 
propaganda exercise, but a representative international gathering is aided consider-
ably if there are non-Communists from such countries as our own present870 [and] 
What we really want is freedom of travel for young people, so that they can make 
their own choice of where to go, whom to meet, or what to see. In present circum-
865 For ’stiliaga’, see: H. Ragsdale and E. Zubkova, Russia after the War: Hopes, Illusions 
and Disappointments, 1945-1957. (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1998); H. Pilkington, 
Russia’s Youth and Its Culture: A Nation’s Constructors and Constructed. (New York: 
Routledge, 1994); G. Sherman, “Soviet Youth: Myth and Reality.” Daedalus, 91.1 
(1962):  216-237, and K. Weaver, Bushels of Rubles: Soviet Youth in Transition. West-
port, CT: Praeger, 1992.
866 Kristin Roth-Ey, “Loose Girls On The Loose: Sex, Propaganda and the 1957 Moscow 
Youth Festival.” In Women In The Khrushchev Era, 75-95. Edited by Melanie Ilic, 
Susan E. Reid and Lynne Atwood. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan Ltd, 2004), p. 83.
867 Hugh Ragsdale and Elena Zubkova, Russia after the War: Hopes, Illusions, and Dis-
appointments, 1945-1957. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1998, p. 200.
868 Koivunen, The 1957 Moscow Youth Festival, p. 48.
869 Ibid., and Frederick C. Barghoorn, “Soviet Cultural Diplomacy since Stalin.” Russian 
Review, 17.1 (1958), p. 41-55, 54-55.
870 “World Festival of Youth.” Times, November 1, 1956,  p.11.
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stances, under whatever auspices a youth festival is held, those attending from 
Communist countries will be those told, or authorized to do so: that is to say, at the 
worst they will be trained propagandists and at best those who are thought to be 
impermeable to western influences. There is in fact little point in meeting them.”871
Positive opinions featured arguments such as: “It would be a pity if a large 
British delegation were to meet many Soviet citizens informally for the first time, 
and not be more effectively represented”872 and described personal experiences: 
“At all events I suffered no ill effects from last year’s visit to Warsaw [the Fifth 
World Youth Festival]. No attempt was made to change my political views. 
Then, as now, I supported Soviet policy when I thought it right. Then, as now, 
I condemned it when I thought it wrong. What I failed to find among my hosts 
was a Communist who was as horrified of the idea of a festival organized by 
Christians as Mr. Mayhew is on learning of one organized by Communists.”873 
From North America 337 people attended the festival, from Europe, a total of 
25808874, among them 1600 British.875 76% of the festival’s attendants were European. 
THE SOCIALIST YOUTH MOVEMENT AND ITS IMPACT ON 
THE WORLD YOUTH FESTIVALS
The World Youth Festivals were organized by the World Federation of Demo-
cratic Youth and the International Union of Students, both communist youth 
organizations, with help from the host country’s youth organization. The festi-
vals were among the most important propaganda events of the Soviet Union 
and its allies, meant to demonstrate the Soviet lifestyle and superior Soviet 
ideology to westerners. Their first and foremost purpose however, was to edu-
cate all socialist youth in Communist and Soviet ideology. In an article pub-
lished in Komsomolskaya Pravda, on 14 August 1958, N. Mesyatsev wrote: 
“The international festivals have become a remarkable tradition in the interna-
tional youth movement. These meetings contribute to the consolidation of demo-
cratic forces of youth in capitalist and dependent colonial countries and to con-
vince them that only by joint struggle is it possible to preserve peace on earth and 
to guarantee a better future for youth. With each new festival fresh millions of young 
men and women from all the continents of the globe flow into the ranks of the 
World Federation of Democratic Youth and the International Union of Students.”876
871 “World Festival of Youth.” Times, October 29, 1956, p. 9.
872 “World Festival of Youth.” Times, November 1, 1956, p. 11.
873 “World Festival of Youth.” Times, October 26, 1956, p. 11.
874 Koivunen, The 1957 Moscow Youth Festival, p. 51
875 “Varied Reactions to Moscow Wooing of World Youth.” Times, September 9, 1957, 
p. 9.
876 “The Vienna Youth Festival.”
 THE 1957 MOSCOW YOUTH FESTIVAL AND THE HUNGARIAN DELEGATION...  279
Youth issues and education were a central part of communist ideology since 
its inception. As the ultimate goal of the world revolution was to establish a 
new, socialist society, providing youth with a socialist education – which would 
train them to become good socialists – was of utmost importance. Lenin him-
self said on the question of youth organizations: 
“Organizations of youth […] which openly declare that they are still learn-
ing, that their main task is to train party workers for the socialist parties […] 
must be given every assistance. We must be patient with their faults and strive 
to correct them gradually, mainly by persuasion, and not by fighting them. 
The middle-aged and the aged do not know how to approach the youth, for 
the youth must of necessity advance to socialism in a different way, by other 
paths, in other forms, in other circumstances than their fathers.”877
The long and rich history of youth movements started at the end of the 19th 
century, mainly among socialist youth. Karl Liebknecht was among the first to real-
ize the power that could be wielded through youth. He elaborated his views on the 
subject in his pamphlet “Militarism and Anti-Militarism”. Liebknecht recognized that 
“in order to combat bourgeois influences over the youth, it was necessary to organ-
ize independent youth organizations. One could not simply urge the youth to vote 
for the Party and join it. One must allow the socialist youth to form their own organi-
zations which they would run for themselves.”878 Liebknecht organized the South 
German youth, who in turn called an international conference in Stuttgart in 1907, 
in order to unite the many separate national youth organizations. The conference’s 
main accomplishment was establishing the International Union of Socialist Youth.
In 1915, an international conference was held in Bern. The conference sharply 
condemned the war, characterizing it as “one of banditry and the result of capitalist 
politics”879. A new International Bureau was organized, with Willi Munzenburg as its Sec-
retary. During the First World War, communication between the IUSY’s separate frac-
tions was broken and the union seemingly disintegrated under the pressure of war and 
radically differing opinions among its members. In November 1917, Willi Munzenburg 
was arrested.  After Munzenburg was arrested, Trostel was elected as Secretary, and 
the German, Hungarian and Russian sectors of the International Union reestablished 
relations with each other. In August 1919, a new international conference was called in 
Vienna, where the Provisional Committee called a world conference, which was held on 
November 20, 1919, in Berlin. This conference was later called the first congress of the 
Young Communist International, where the Young Communist League was organized.
877 Leo Goretti and Matthew Worley, “Introduction: communist youth, communist gen-
erations: a reappraisal.” Twentieth Century Communism 4 (2012): 5-13, 5.  http://
www.lwbooks.co.uk/journals/twentiethcenturycommunism/pdfs/4goretti_worley.
pdf.
878 Shirley Waller, “History of the International Socialist Youth Movement to 1929.” The 
Young Socialist. (New York, 1959), p. 3.
879 Ibid., p. 9.
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From its inception, the socialist youth movement had struggled with leftist 
parties for their independence, since the official political parties had a tendency 
of trying to control them from the top. At the second congress of the YCI in 1921 
in Jena, Germany, this struggle was ultimately lost, since the Young Commu-
nist League officially subordinated itself to the Communist Party. After the third 
Congress, held in 1922 in Moscow, the YCL began its degeneration, as it slowly 
became a factional pawn in the power conflicts of the Communist Party and lost 
all independence. However, the Communist Youth International remained active 
until 1943, alongside the Communist International (Comintern).880
In November, 1945, the World Federation of Democratic Youth was founded 
in London at a world youth congress as a general, worldwide youth organiza-
tion. In August 1946, the International Union of Students (IUS) was founded 
in Prague at a world student congress. Strictly speaking, both organizations 
were left-wing establishments, but “attracted considerable non-Communist 
membership”881 in the beginning. These members soon left the groups, as 
Communist influence and agenda became more and more apparent. In 1948, 
the IUS “espoused the Communist cause and made no protest against victimi-
zation of non-Communist students in the ensuing period.”882
After both the WFDY and the IUS expelled Yugoslav members in 1950, 
most non-Communist members left the organizations and joined the World 
Assembly of Youth (WAY) and the Coordinating Secretariat of National Unions 
of Students (COSEC). After Stalin’s death in 1953, the WFDY and the IUS sof-
tened some of their anti-Western rhetoric and showed some effort in neutral-
izing relations with non-Communist youth organizations. However, when the 
1956 October revolution broke out in Budapest, where the headquarters of 
the WFDY were stationed, the Federation’s officers fled the city to Prague and 
remained silent on the question of the Soviet intervention.883
THE KOMSOMOL
The Soviet youth organization, the Komsomol (Komunisticheski Soiuz Molo-
dezhi), played a significant part in organizing the Moscow Youth Festival. 
Vladimir Semichastniy, a prominent member of the Komsomol, who later be-
came its General Secretary, wrote about the challenges of organizing the festi-
val in his biography. He emphasized the importance of the organization’s role, 
stating 
880 Goretti and Worley, Introduction: communist youth, communist generations, p. 5.
881 The Vienna Youth Festival, 17.
882 Ibid. 18.
883 Ibid. 17.
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“the Komsomol’s independence and high responsi-
bility really showed during the organization of the Fes-
tival of Students and Youth in Moscow in 1957. No 
governmental commissions for organizing the festival 
were formed – everything was decided by the Kom-
somol Central Committee. There was only the organ-
izing committee headed by A. N. Shelepin, and all of 
the ministries we needed were at our disposal.”884
In Russia, the socialist youth movement started as early as the end of the 19th 
century – the beginning of the 20th century. During the revolutionary events of 
1905-1907 and 1917, the youth movement played a significant part, but it wasn’t 
institutionalized until October, 1918, when the Komsomol was founded. At this 
time, the organization had a strong political character supporting the Bolsheviks, 
even though its founding charter stated “the Union, as a spontaneous manifesta-
tion of youth, is a completely independent organization.”885 Kitty Weaver summariz-
es the main task of the Komsomol in Bushels of Rubles: Soviet Youth in Transition: 
“What were the tasks of this youth league? Lenin himself gave the answer at 
the Third Congress of the Komsomol, in Moscow on October 2, 1920. The older 
generation, he said, had been brought up in a capitalist society and at most could 
only destroy the foundations of the old capitalist way of life. It was up to the youth 
to create a communist society. The task of the Komsomol could be summed up 
in a single word - learn. Learn what? How to teach communism.” 886
After its establishment, the Komsomol continued its work aiding the Party, par-
ticipating in nationwide educational and economic reforms (such as organizing the 
collectivization process and the prosecution of kulaks). After Lenin died in 1924, they 
changed their official name to the Russian Leninist Communist Youth League (Ros-
siyski Leninski Kommunisticheski Soyuz Molodezhi) and then in 1926 changed it to 
the All Union Leninist Communist Youth League (Vsesoyuzni Leninski Kommunis-
ticheski Soyuz Molodezhi). The Komsomol was immensely popular; in 1925 alone, 
769 000 young people joined its ranks.887  Its popularity and influence didn’t serve it 
well during the Stalinist period, since Stalin persecuted many prominent members of 
the youth organization, accusing them of treason and obstruction of socialism. The 
trials against them were part of Stalin’s radical “purges” or “cleansing” (in Russian 
“chistka”) in the thirties. Most of the persecuted were eventually executed, among 
884 Vladimir Semichastnyi, Bespokoinoye Serdtse. (Moscow: Vagrius, 2002), p. 67.
885 V. K. Krivoruchenko and L. S. Tsbetlyuk, “Yunosheskoe dvizhenii Rossii.” http://
www.zpu-journal.ru/e-zpu/2011/3/Krivoruchenko-Tsvetliuk_Juvenile-Movement/.
886 Kitty Weaver, Bushels of Rubles: Soviet Youth in Transition. Westport, CT: Praeger, 
1992, p. 32.
887 Ibid., p. 43.
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them the Komsomol First Secretary, Aleksandr Kosarev.888 Despite the wave of terror 
directed at the Komsomol, its popularity didn’t waver, and in 1957, the number of its 
members was a total of 38 347 499.889 It should be pointed out however, that even 
though joining the Komsomol was voluntary, those who did not join lost access to of-
ficially sponsored holidays and experienced difficulties in pursuing higher education.
THE HUNGARIAN COMMUNIST YOUTH ASSOCIATION (KISZ)
Among the most widely discussed topics before and during the Moscow Youth 
Festival was the question of the Hungarian revolution/counter-revolution. The 
Soviet intervention in November 1956 caused some Westerners to boycott 
the festival or to start intense debates on the matter at the festival. Even some 
Soviet youth were directly affected by the revolution, as evidenced by the remi-
niscences of Leonid Dobrokhotov, a participant of the festival: 
“We didn’t dare to be attached to the official del-
egation of Sverdlovsk. Our university bore on itself 
the mark of Cain following the ‘rebellious’ events of 
November 1956; while Soviet tanks roared in Bu-
dapest, we had a Komsomol meeting that lasted 
almost three days (sleep was evaded well into the 
night). Our senior colleagues in the fourth year de-
manded to be ‘given freedom to think’ and argued 
that the Komsomol was becoming obsolete and 
that wind no longer blew in the sails of the youth ini-
tiative, only ‘weak vents at the top of the sails’. In the 
end, the most passionate lovers of free thinking had 
to pursue it outside the walls of the university.”890
Members of the Hungarian delegation sent to the Moscow Youth Festival 
were selected by the Organizing Committee of the Communist Youth Asso-
ciation (KISZ). The KISZ was a relatively new organization, founded on March 
11th, 1957, after the previous youth organizations were disbanded following 
their involvement in the October revolution. 
After the Second World War, Hungarian youth was eager to establish a new, 
democratic youth organization, and in 1944, the Hungarian Democratic Youth 
888 Ibid., p. 49-50.
889 “Komsomol Statistics.” Open Society Archives, http://fa.osaarchivum.org/back-
ground-reports?col=8&id=57287.
890 Leonid Dobrokhotov and Aleksandr Kozlov, “Deti festivalya.” Ogonek. http://www.
ogoniok.com/archive/1997/4510/27-12-19/.
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Organization was founded, mainly by students. The organization wasn’t very 
successful, partly because the country wasn’t used to the new system yet, but 
also because its leaders were not adequately prepared.891
On November 12th, 1945, a Student Parliament was organized in Balaton-
lelle, where the Association of Hungarian University and College Organizations 
(MEFESZ) was founded. The MEFESZ was more successful than its predeces-
sor, but it was still only an organization for students. In March, 1946, the Na-
tional Council of Hungarian Youth (MIOT) was established, which unified five 
different youth organizations, one of which was the MEFESZ. The five member 
organizations retained their organizational independence.892
In 1949-1950, the MIOT member organizations gradually lost their independ-
ence, until in June, 1950, a new, completely unified youth organization was es-
tablished. The new organization was called the Association of Working Youth 
(DISZ), and followed the example of the new communist party, MDP and the 
Soviet youth organization, the Komsomol, in establishing a single party struc-
ture. By establishing a unified youth organization, a transmission was created 
between the Party and the Hungarian youth, and anyone who didn’t support 
the Hungarian Worker’s Party (MDP), was automatically excluded from the the 
organization. Any political activity on their part was prevented as well.893 
After Stalin’s death, political discourse was renewed in Hungary, which was 
joined enthusiastically by Hungarian youth. So called professional debate cir-
cles sprung up among students, one of which was the Petőfi Circle, which was 
founded during the fall of 1955. Within these circles it was customary to dis-
cuss contemporary political problems and offer up ideas on possible reforms. 
The ever more lively political discourse among Hungarian youth eventually led 
to students of the university in Szeged reestablishing the disbanded MEFESZ on 
October 16th, 1956. They issued a list of requests to the state on 21 October to 
which several other universities joined and finally the demands were turned into 
16 point at a big rally at the Technical University in Budapest on October 22. 
They demanded that Soviet-Hungarian relations become more balanced 
and be reduced to economic relations; they demanded that the current Hun-
garian leaders be replaced by others (Imre Nagy, János Kádár, Géza Loson-
czy, György Lukács); they demanded that national traditions be respected and 
asked for greater freedom in Hungary. There were also a few points concerning 
the problems of higher education. These requests were published and distrib-
uted as pamphlets, and on 23 October, a peaceful demonstration started in 
Budapest, which eventually erupted as a nationwide revolt.894
891 Magdolna Micheller, Egyetemisták és a hatalom. A magyar egyetemi hallgatók és a 
hatalom viszonya 1945-1957. Szeged:  JATEPress, 1992.
892 Ibid.
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During the revolution, the DISZ gradually fell apart, and many of its former 
leaders joined the Soviet army upon their return to the city on 4 November. 
Many of the prominent representatives of the Petőfi Circle left the country, 
while others were captured and eventually faced trials. The MEFESZ continued 
its activity after the revolution, although in a reduced capacity, while several 
other youth organizations were established to fill the temporary void, such as 
the National Association of Unified Peasant Youth (EPOSZ).895
The KISZ was founded by the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party (MSZMP) 
and its members were carefully selected. Some of its leaders were former 
members of previous youth organizations, people who had already proved 
their loyalty to the Party. Zoltán Komócsin was appointed chairman of the 
KISZ National Executive Committee. Komócsin was an alternate member of 
the Party’s Political Committee and had been a party member since 1945.896
The official statement on the involvement of the Hungarian youth in the 
“counter-revolution” was that they had been misled by fake patriotic and so-
cialist slogans, and that their only mistake was to have listened to the reaction-
aries and imperialists. They established the Communist Youth Association in 
the hopes that “it would learn from the mistakes of the Worker’s Youth Asso-
ciation and that it would serve the construction of socialist society and would 
fight for the goals of the Party among the youth and raise them in a Communist 
spirit”.897
After its formation it was more than a month before KISZ started its activ-
ity and, even then, the activities lacked a political character. The resistance 
among Hungarian youth to join the organization was obvious and according 
to a report on the situation, “young people only attend the dancing parties but 
avoid any meeting with a political character”.898 At the end of March KISZ had 
30 000 members, at the end of June it had 120 000 members. The growth in 
numbers is impressive (before its disbandment, DISZ had 800 000 members), 
however, the recruitment of new members still proved difficult for quite some 
time.899
895 Ibid
896 “The Hungarian Delegation and the Moscow Festival”, Open Society Archives: 
Foreign Relations Series: East West, 1. http://fa.osaarchivum.org/background-
reports?col=8&id=42401.
897 Sándor Balogh, Magdolna Baráth and István Feitl, eds.  Az MSZMP ideiglenes 
vezető testületeinek jegyzőkönyvei III. kötet, 1957. április 5. - 1957. május 17. (Buda-
pest: Intera Rt, 1993), p. 56.
898 “Youth Organizations in Hungary”, Open Society Archives: Country Series: Hungary, 
1. http://fa.osaarchivum.org/background-reports?col=8&id=52903.
899 Ibid., p. 7.
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THE HUNGARIAN DELEGATION AND THE MOSCOW FESTIVAL
The members of the delegation were carefully selected by the Executive Com-
mittee of the Communist Youth Association, headed by Zoltán Komócsin. 
Organizational and financial questions concerning the Festival were raised 
at several of the MSZMP’s (Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party) Provisional 
Central Committee meetings in 1957. At first there was a possibility that the 
Komsomol would pay the registration fee for the Hungarian delegation, taking 
into consideration the bad financial situation Hungary was in after the revo-
lution.900 However, this was not agreed upon in the end, and according to an 
interview conducted with Komócsin on July 9 in Népszabadság, the delegation 
was eventually financed mainly by contributions from society: from civil organi-
zations and workers’ unions.901 The presidency of the Hungarian National Free 
Unions’ Association provided 2 million Forints to cover the costs of sending a 
delegation to the festival.902
Before the delegation left for Moscow, a storm of propaganda filled Hungarian 
newspapers, mostly attacking the “counter-revolution” and viciously criticizing West-
ern perceptions of the country. The intense propaganda was most likely the product 
of two distinct issues: the prospect of facing thousands of westerners at the festival, 
and the publication of the UN special committee’s evaluation on the Hungarian revo-
lution in June. The evaluation was based on more than a hundred interviews with 
Hungarians who had fled the country and stated that “what took place in Hungary 
in October and November 1956 was a spontaneous national uprising, due to long 
standing grievances which had caused resentment among the people”.903 This state-
ment was obviously very different than the official Party statement, which was: 
“the Hungarian uprising was provoked by reactionary circles using the le-
gitimate grievances of the Hungarian people to mislead them and secure their 
support for the return of capitalism to power. […] reactionaries in Hungary were 
powerfully assisted by Western propaganda, agents and arms and by return-
ing officers of the Horthy Army and Hungarian capitalist exiles.”904
Several articles were published throughout June and July 1957 attacking 
western propaganda. One of these articles was published in Népszabadság on 
July 12, titled: “The Boomerang of a Radio in Rome” The article stated that a a 
900 Balogh, Barát, Feitl, eds., Az MSZMP ideiglenes vezető testületeinek jegyzőkönyvei, 268.
901 “A moszkvai találkozó nemcsak méreteiben, hanem bizonyos fokig tartalmában 
is különbözik az eddigi fesztiváloktól. Komócsin Zoltán nyilatkozata a Világifjúsági 
Találkozóról”, Népszabadság, July 9, 1957.
902 Balogh, Barát, Feitl, eds., Az MSZMP ideiglenes vezető testületeinek jegyzőkönyvei, p. 267.
903 “Report of the Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary.” Open Society Ar-
chives, 4. http://osaarchivum.org/images/stories/pdfs/hedervary/background/un_
hung_res_summary.pdf
904 Ibid.
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radio station in Rome had announced that the KISZ only had about 2000 mem-
bers, whereas the youth organization before the revolution, the DISZ, had 600 
000 members. The author of the article ridiculed this statement, saying that the 
KISZ has around 123 000 members, and will soon have even more. The article 
also discusses the possible reasoning behind the radio’s lie: 
“I wonder why they happened to publish this sadly completely false story 
right before the World Youth Festival? Let’s try to unravel the logic of the ra-
dio in Rome and the inspiration behind it: they are trying to make it seem like 
the Hungarian delegation does not represent the entire Hungarian youth, only 
2000 young Communists, and as if what they say is not what the Hungarian 
youth thinks, only what those 2000 think.”905
A similar article was published on July 27th, also in Népszabadság, titled: 
“Conspirators Wanted.” According to the article, a broadcaster of the Radio 
Free Europe expressed his thoughts about the festival thus: 
“I have a strong feeling that many students in Moscow are eagerly awaiting 
the arrival of the Hungarian delegation and will ask Hungarian youth in a con-
spiring tone between themselves, huddled in secret corners: Tell us, what does 
freedom feel like, even if it only lasts for a short time?”
The writer of the article in Népszabadság answered this quote in a scathing 
manner, ridiculing the very notion of conspiring Hungarian youth: 
“The Radio Free Europe is searching in vain for conspirators among the Hun-
garian youth currently in Moscow. However badly this may make the Radio 
Free Europe feel, we ‘regret’ to inform them that there isn’t a single capitalist or 
kulak offspring amongst the World Youth Festival delegates (to whom capital-
ism really would have meant freedom).”906
As was previously discussed, the most important goal of the World Youth Fes-
tivals was to show Westerners and youth from colonial countries how wonderful 
Soviet life was. At the Sixth Festival, this goal was doubly important for the Hun-
garian delegation; it was absolutely necessary that Hungarians show the outside 
world that the counter-revolution had ended, and that their only aim was peace 
and friendship with foreigners. In his interview in Népszabadság, Komócsin stated: 
“Besides having fun and establishing deeper ties of friendship, the delega-
tion of Hungarian youth will also face important political tasks [at the festival]. 
The socialist camp, but especially western capitalist countries and colonial 
and semi-colonial countries are very interested in the Hungarian situation, the 
Communist Youth Association and the Hungarian youth. Our delegation has to 
convey the opinion and will of the majority of Hungary’s youth to our foreign 
friends, that our youth supports the cause of socialism and that we wish for 
peace and friendship with every nation’s workers and young people.”907
905 “A római rádió bumerángja”, Népszabadság, July 26, 1957.
906 “Cinkosok kerestetnek.” Népszabadság, July 27, 1957.
907 „Komócsin Zoltán nyilatkozata a Világifjúsági Találkozóról.”  Népszabadság.
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In another article, Komócsin writes: 
“Members of our delegation will have to answer the many questions which 
the different countries’ youth will undoubtedly pose us.  The Hungarian young 
people will have to answer these questions, relying only upon the truth and their 
own, personal experiences and memories of what happened during the days 
of the counter-revolution. We have to solemnly face the very real fact that there 
will be young people who will be completely under the influence of imperial-
ist propaganda, even amongst our friends. These people will have completely 
or partially false knowledge of these events. The Hungarian youth will have to 
stand their ground calmly and with patience, in the full knowledge of our truth. 
We have to accept the fact that sometimes, arguments will be unavoidable.”908
The Hungarian delegation had 1100 members: 211 were members of the cul-
ture group, 190 were professional sportsmen and women, 60 members were 
young worker and peasant sportsmen, 300 were workers, 100 peasants, and 55 
were students and intellectuals. One fourth of the delegation was female. They 
left Budapest on July 23, after participating in an official ceremony, where György 
Marosán, the Administrative Secretary of the Central Committee held a speech, 
emphasizing the political importance of the Hungarian delegation and youth.909
The delegation carried with it extensive propaganda material, including three 
documents, titled: “Hungary after the Counter-Revolution” (on the consolidation 
of the Kádár regime), “Truth About Hungary in Pictures” (to prove the counter-
revolutionary character of the October events), “Help Them to Return Home” (on 
the propagation of the repatriation of young Hungarians escaped to the West.)910, 
and a handbook, titled “Let’s go to Moscow!” The handbook had chapters on 
the history of the Soviet Union and the World Youth Festivals, information on the 
nationalities participating in the festival, a Russian phrasebook, and a 50 page 
chapter titled: “What we need to say about October 23d and its antecedents”. The 
chapter describes precisely what the delegates were supposed to say about the 
counter-revolution and the treason of the ex-Prime Minister, Imre Nagy.911
The delegation arrived in Moscow on July 25, and was greeted by a crowd 
of enthusiastic Muscovites. A Hungarian journalist reported from the scene in 
a slightly euphoric manner:  
“The Kiev Station in Moscow is crowded, people are pushing to be the very 
first to shake the hands of an unknown young Hungarian or bestow flowers 
or a friendly embrace upon them. A forest of arms reaches towards the slow, 
908 Zoltán Komócsin, “Ifjúsági Világtalálkozó.” Népszabadság, July 21, 1957.
909 “Ünnepélyesen búcsúztatták a Nyugati pályaudvaron a VIT-re induló magyar 
küldöttséget.” Népszabadság, July 24, 1957.
910 “The Hungarian Delegation and the Moscow Festival”, 1. http://fa.osaarchivum.org/
background-reports?col=8&id=42401.
911 Pál Csillag and István Endrődi, eds. Irány Moszkva! VIT küldöttek zsebkönyve. Buda-
pest: Móra Ferenc Könyvkiadó, 1957.
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tired passengers on the train as they are practically lifted to the ground. Come 
quickly lads, we have been waiting for you for days… Boys and girls, girls and 
boys place their arms around each other.”912
The Hungarian delegation was very busy throughout the festival and attract-
ed a large amount of interest – they even attended meetings they were not 
originally supposed to attend in order to ensure that the events of October 1956 
were related properly. According to reports, the delegation was greeted by the 
second loudest ovation at the opening ceremony, bested only by the Egyp-
tian delegation’s greeting.913 The Hungarians met with 30 nations’ delegations, 
among them the Chinese, Danish, Korean, Swiss, Soviet, German, French, Syr-
ian, Egyptian, Canadian, Italian, Polish, British delegations, and delegations 
from Luxembourg and the USA.914 Most of these meetings were amiable with 
nothing out of the ordinary. The most frequent questions were on the topic of 
the revolution. An article published in Magyar Ifjúság on August 7, stated: 
“Naturally the most frequently debated questions were on the counter-revo-
lutionary events, but we can honestly say that on the whole we succeeded in 
clarifying them correctly… Western delegations put the questions in good faith 
but learn with the greatest consternation that the facts are flatly opposed to 
their information. They often said during the course of these debates that their 
lack of information is great and that their press is misleading them.”915
However, the meetings with the Polish and American youth were somewhat 
more chaotic than the others, especially with the Americans. According to a radio 
broadcast, which aired on the Hungarian national radio (Szülőföldünk) on August 
7, 1957, the meeting between the American and the Hungarian delegations was 
surprisingly hostile compared to the overall amiable atmosphere of the festival.916 
The meeting began with the two delegations agreeing on a question and answer 
format, with the Americans posing the first questions. The very first question was 
about the revolution, to which the answer was that it was not a revolution, but 
a counter-revolution. Then, New York University professor Howard Trustmann, 
asked about the UNO committee report, and how it could “possibly be so wrong 
about the Hungarian events”.917  To which a Hungarian delegate replied that “this 
was simply because the UN didn’t represent the Hungarian people.”918
The report stated that this response was greeted with laughter from the Hun-
garians. After about one and a half hours of questioning, it was the Hungarian 
912 “Megérkezett Moszkvába VIT küldöttségünk.” Népszabadság, July 26, 1957.
913 “The Hungarian Delegation and the Moscow Festival”, 1.
914 Ibid.
915 Ibid., p. 2.
916 “Mai híradónkban beszámolunk az amerikai és magyar fiatalok találkozójáról.” 
Szülőföldünk Radio, August 7, 1957.
917 Ibid.
918 Ibid.
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delegation’s turn to question the Americans. They started by asking why the 
American government didn’t let those Hungarians who wanted to come home 
leave the US. The Americans replied that they weren’t detaining anyone from 
leaving the country. The next question was whether there were any workers 
in the American government, to which the answer was no. This question was 
followed up by whether there were any African American representatives in 
the government, to which the answer was also no (the Americans expressed 
shame over this). The Americans retaliated by saying that in the USA, nobody 
could be thrown into prison for political activity. The Hungarians, almost in 
unison, asked: what about the Communist leaders?919  The report said that the 
argument between the two delegations was long and heated. Although by the 
end of the discussion the delegates agreed that an honest dialogue can serve 
friendship well, they probably didn’t part on the friendliest of terms.920
The radio broadcast cited above is most likely an official interpretation of the 
events (since it aired on national radio) therefore, it is probably not a completely 
accurate account and should be read with some reservation. However, there 
are other, perhaps less biased accounts of the Hungarians’ altercation with the 
American delegation, as well as of similar discussions with the British and Polish 
delegations.921 The Polish delegation would not accept the position the Hungar-
ians took in saying that the October events were the actions of reactionaries and 
capitalists, and shouted at the Hungarians that it had been a revolution.922
It is interesting to note how differently the Polish delegation behaved at the 
festival after having experienced a similar situation the previous year as the Hun-
garians had. The Polish youth argued with many delegations who spouted Soviet 
propaganda, and according to Radio Warsaw, the “original ideological” approach 
of the Polish youth delegation to “certain questions” was “opening the eyes” of 
other delegations from the socialist camp.923 Of course, a main difference be-
tween the Polish and Hungarian delegation could have been the fact that revo-
lutionary youth in Hungary had either left the country or had been imprisoned or 
executed, or had simply not been chosen to participate in the festival, whereas 
Polish youth had not been similarly prosecuted after the uprising of 1956.
All in all, judging by archival records and news articles of the time, the anticipa-
tion and interest in the Hungarian delegation was far greater than the actual effect 
the Hungarian youth had on the festival. The communist propaganda surrounding 
the delegation seemed effective at the festival; however, the “imperialist” version 
919 Ibid.
920 Ibid.
921 Koivunen, The 1957 Moscow Youth Festival, and Paul Collins, “Polish Youth’s Mag-
netism in Moscow.” Open Society Archives. http://fa.osaarchivum.org/background-
reports?col=8&id=54364.
922 Koivunen, The 1957 Moscow Youth Festival, p. 59.
923 Paul Collins, “Polish Youth’s Magnetism in Moscow.” Open Society Archives, p. 3.
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of events obviously had a much stronger hold on Western youth: in a report on 
the World Youth Festival held in 1959 in Vienna, a quote from an Icelandic student 
about the Moscow Festival stated: 
“From the Russian point of view I am not sure the Festival was so great a suc-
cess. The purpose of the festival had been first of all to give Russian youth the 
impression that Western youth stood by their side. Few things were discussed 
more than Hungary and the Russians were often able to hear versions other than 
they had read in their papers – which had stated that the inhabitants of Budapest 
had wept with gratitude for the intervention of the Red Army. For example, I was 
traveling in a railway car filled with English and Russians, and the English gave the 
Russians a complete account of the underlying causes of the Hungarian Revolu-
tion and its terrible conclusion. The Russians were obviously in an awkward posi-
tion and did not even attempt to defend their government.”924
THE FESTIVAL’S EFFECT
Judging by the accounts of participants of the festival, it seems that meeting West-
erners for the first time in an informal setting had a much larger impact on Soviet 
youth, than meeting Soviets for the first time was for Westerners. In Moscow, the 
festival is still remembered today, and its fiftieth anniversary was officially celebrated.
There are several accounts of Soviet youth being amazed by how different 
Western youth were as opposed to what they had been told about the “impe-
rialists”. Aleksandr Kozlov writes: 
“For the citizens of Moscow, the real shock, in terms 
of what surprised them the most was what they saw 
and felt. It is now impossible to try to explain to the 
newer generations what the word foreigner meant at 
that time. The constant propaganda aimed at cultivat-
ing hate towards all things foreign led to the Soviet citi-
zen feeling a mixture of fear and admiration upon hear-
ing the word foreign. Tourists and businessmen had not 
yet come to the country, and diplomats and journal-
ists seldom just appeared on the streets. So when we 
suddenly saw thousands of foreigners on the streets 
of Moscow, with whom we could talk, a feeling close 
to euphoria possessed us. The foreigners weren’t like 
what we had expected. They were young people, and 
the strange thing was that they weren’t like the usual 
924 “The Vienna Youth Festival”, p. 3.
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caricaturist stereotype painted of them by politicians.
[…] At the festival, we were introduced to an un-
complicated sporty-playboy youth fashion and with 
it to the idea of the existence of a new independent 
class in society - youth and teenagers. This West-
ern influence that came to us caused great damage 
to the whole system of communist education and 
made Komsomol ideologues start to reconsider their 
methods of work with young people.”925
The festival was also considered by some a “sexual revolution”926. The most long-
standing myth of the 1957 Youth Festival is that of the “deti festivalya”, or the “chil-
dren of the festival”. According to this myth, nine months after the festival, a slew of 
biracial babies was born.927 Local youth and foreigners didn’t have a lot of opportunity 
to discuss serious topics with each other outside of the official programs. The Times 
reported that contacts with foreigners were strictly controlled by the government: 
“The visitors themselves, while much occupied by the program, were allowed to move 
freely about Moscow, although some who tried to travel outside were stopped. Accord-
ing to persistent reports during the festival, instructions were issued to householders not 
to invite visitors into their homes but this [demand] was frequently ignored. The visitors 
therefore had many opportunities to meet non-Communist members of the public, but a 
number of them were affronted by the clarity efforts of the authorities to prevent this. In-
terpreters would prevent young Soviet citizens from getting into contact, and there were 
constant reports of police questioning persons who had spoken to visitors.”928
Despite these accounts, according to Kozlov, the festival’s participants still 
managed to establish contacts: 
“Late in the evenings and at night, free communication began. Naturally, the au-
thorities tried to establish control over contacts made, but controlling every contact 
was impossible. The weather was great and the crowds literally flooded main streets. 
[…] Disputes arose at every turn and on any topic, except, perhaps politics. Peo-
ple didn’t discuss politics first of all because they were afraid, but most importantly 
because in its purest form it did not interest them. But every dispute had a political 
character, be it literature, painting, fashion, not to mention music, especially jazz.”929
The festival was the first time that Soviet youth had the opportunity to ex-
perience new music, fashion and art, and it had a profound effect on many of 
them. Elena Zubkova writes that: 
925 Leonid Dobrokhotov and Aleksandr Kozlov. “Deti festivalya.” Ogonek. http://www.
ogoniok.com/archive/1997/4510/27-12-19/.
926 Ibid.
927 Roth-Ey, Loose Girls On The Loose.
928 “Varied Reactions to Moscow Wooing of World Youth.” Times.
929 Dobrokhotov and Kozlov, Deti festivalya.
292 CSABA BÉKÉS – MELINDA KALMÁR: STUDENTS ON THE COLD WAR
“Many participants in those events later assessed the 
Moscow festival as a kind of turning point in the devel-
opment of their own view of the world. The contact with 
another culture, the very idea of a multiplicity of mod-
els of the world reflected in a variety of artistic styles, 
contrasted sharply with the customary monocultural 
thought and the oppressive monotony of official Soviet 
art. And if the political significance of the festival soon 
became the property of propaganda, the spirit of the 
occasion was long remembered, at least in Moscow.”930
The effects of the 1957 Moscow Youth Festival were obviously very personal 
and subjective, and it had a profound effect on many young people, both Soviets 
and Westerners. The event later became symbolic of the cultural and political 
shift that occurred after Stalin’s death in the USSR; however, it was only one 
event amongst the many that served the purpose of creating friendlier ties with 
the West and possibly ending the Cold War. As we now know, Khrushchev’s 
thaw did not bring about the end of the Cold War, and the cultural events of the 
time were later relegated to personal memories and recollections. In one of those 
recollections, Leonid Dobrokhotov writes of the 1957 Moscow Youth Festival: 
“We got lost in the sea of European jackets, Indian saris, Japanese kimonos, 
Mexican sombreros, Indonesian velvet caps, and the oddest of them all - Scot-
tish kilts, baring the hairy legs of the descendants of Robin Hood. It seemed 
incredible that Moscow could accommodate so many people and emotions. 
[…] We experienced a diverse, multilingual world for the first time, and it held 
out its hand to us.”931
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THE SOVIET WESTERN, 1964 –1982: SOVIETISING 
HOLLYWOOD
CHrIStIAn AmOS
INTRODUCTION
“I saw the movie ‘The Magnificent Seven’. The artists involved in it acted well”, 
so said Nikita Khrushchev in an interview with an American journalist in July 
1962.932 Khrushchev allowed the showing of the Magnificent Seven in that 
same year. It was among the best-selling movies of that year, spawning a popu-
lar fascination for the Western genre of cinema in the Soviet Union.933 However, 
the license for showing the movie was rescinded in 1963, 10 months before it 
was due to expire, despite its immense viewership of 63.7 million people, and 
without any explanation given.934 In the years that followed, Soviet filmmakers 
produced their own films to appeal to the popular fascination with the Western 
film. These films have been coined as ‘isterns’, Westerns set in a Soviet context 
– usually during the Russian Civil war, in the theatres of war in Ukraine or cen-
tral Asia. These are ‘Westerns’ transplanted and adapted into a Soviet context. 
The features of the Western are evident in these movies: the arid landscape, 
the strong and silent hero, a juxtaposition between good and evil, the horses, 
and many other stylistic features frequent in Westerns. Yet, there is a clear ideo-
logical problem with the American Western, which established the American 
national myth of the rugged individualist. How could the Soviets deal with this 
problem, while maintaining this appealing Hollywood genre? This paper will 
examine this example of cultural adaptation, an example of how the Soviets 
succeeded in absorbing a powerful Hollywood culture while ensuring it was 
ideologically acceptable. Throughout the 1970s, the Soviet take on the Western 
became a part of popular cinema. As Sergei Zhuk puts it, “Soviet ideologists 
considered these Russian films to be an antidote to ‘the cowboy film mania’ 
among Soviet youth.”935 The Soviet Western, as a popular and ‘foreign’ genre, 
raises questions about the gap between cultural and political elites and viewers. 
932	 Я	смотрел	картину	“Великолепная	семерка”.	Артисты,	занятые	в	ней,	прекрасно		
 играют”	A. Kukarkin, ‘Iunost’ I Driakhlost’ Vesterna’, Iskusstvo Kino, 10 (1962), p. 140.
933 S. Zhuk, ‘Hollywood’s Insidious Charms: The Impact of American Cinema and Tel-
evision on the Soviet Union during the Cold War’, Cold War History, 14/4 (2014), pp. 
593–617.
934 F. Razzakov, Gibel’ sovetskogo kino (Moscow, 2008), p. 160.
935 Zhuk, ‘Hollywood’s Insidious Charms’, p. 605.
296 CSABA BÉKÉS – MELINDA KALMÁR: STUDENTS ON THE COLD WAR
In the 1970s, adventure, comedy, and musical films, outgrossed serious mov-
ies with contemporary settings by over 200 percent.936 The Soviet government 
viewed these films, overwhelmingly imported, as a way of compensating for a 
deficit in entertainment at the movies, but also simultaneously “represent a mass 
culture that, by Soviet standards, is far from ideal or not even quite healthy”.937 
The influence of the Magnificent Seven was such that people began to learn by 
heart key phrases from the film, exchanged between Steve McQueen and Yul 
Brynner.938  An article in the August 1962 edition of the mass-produced popular 
glossy film magazine, Sovetskyi Ekran, condemned the violence of The Magnifi-
cent Seven, arguing that if we consider the educational role of a given film, in this 
instance “ молодежи	он	может	принести	больше	вреда,	чем	пользы.”	939
The 1970s saw the growth of ‘American studies’ as a field of academic inter-
est in the USSR. Interest even went as far as the publication of a comparative 
review, for Iskusstvo Kino in 1977, of the works of different Soviet ‘Ameri-
canists’. The writers exercise caution in talking about American culture, and 
two reasons are given for why studying and engaging with Hollywood is not 
inconsistent with Soviet values: “сегодня	сфера	кино	-	это	одновременно	и	арена	
неослабевающей	идеологической	борьбы,	и	область	расширяющихся	культурных	
контактов.”940 It is this uneasy relationship between an “arena of unrelenting 
ideological battle” and a “site of expanding cultural contacts” that nicely sum-
marises the state of the cultural and political elite’s attitude towards American 
cinema in the 1970s. The popular appeal and success of these Soviet West-
erns led to sections of the intelligentsia to rally against the influence of an alien, 
capitalist, American, genre on Soviet viewers. There have been some analyses 
that touch on the Soviet Western, but they have tended to either be descriptive 
or, if argument driven, then they have been selective in their treatment of the 
Western, only discussing the genre in passing or in reference to a single film. In 
grouping these films together, I am not suggesting that they are a clearly cohe-
sive set without variation between them. Instead, the term ‘Soviet Western’ is 
used as a useful term for understanding the way in which the Hollywood genre 
of the Western and its stylistic and artistic components were adapted in the 
USSR. In this sense, this paper does not claim to be comprehensive in its cov-
erage of Soviet Westerns, but instead takes an analytical approach – studying 
936 Ellen Propper Mickiewicz, Media and the Russian Public (1981), p. 74.
937 Ibid., p. 76.
938 R. Fedor, Dos’e na zvezd: pravda, domysly, sensatsii. Kumiry vsekh pokoleniy (Mos-
cow, 1998), p. 582.
939 “then it can do more harm than good for young people” Yelena Kartseva, ‘Mushke-
tery S Kol’tami Za Poyasom’, Sovetskyi Ekran, 15 (1962.), p. 6.
940 “The realm of cinema today – it is simultaneously both an arena of unrelenting ideo-
logical battle, and a site of expanding cultural contacts” L Mel’vil’, ‘Amerikanskoe 
Kino - S Trekh Tochek Zreniia’, Iskusstvo Kino, 12 (1977), p. 75.
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certain critical examples as a way of studying films as cultural artefacts, evi-
dence of contemporary social values and political anxieties. 
There has been one work published that directly focuses on the Soviet Western, 
a Russian book called Krasnyi Vestern by Sergei Lavrentiev, and there has been 
no English language attempt to tackle the Soviet Western as a collection of films or 
as a genre. Lavrentiev’s book is broadly descriptive and non-analytical, providing 
an importantly detailed look at Soviet Westerns, but not offering argumentation or 
linking in with broader historical and historiographical themes. Beumers, Mickie-
wicz, Zorkaya, among others, have looked at the role of film within Soviet soci-
ety in the 1970s, and have also alluded to Soviet Westerns. Analytical works that 
have looked at the Soviet Western have done so in passing, embedded briefly in 
broader analyses of American influence in Soviet Society (Kirstin Roth-Ey, Sergei 
Zhuk). Film historians such as Elena Prokurovka and David Bohllinger have made 
analytical contributions to the historiography by looking at individual films.
Yet, no one has produced an analysis that looks at the grouping of these vari-
ous films as ‘Soviet Westerns’, and addressed the glaring contradiction in the term 
‘Soviet Western’. How could a genre, known for its pursuit of the individualist hero 
and its deep roots in American history and identity, be adapted to Soviet ideological 
norms? Moreover, how was the popular appeal of this American genre balanced 
with the party’s ideological concerns? Much work has been done in recent years 
on viewing the Western in an international context, showing how the Western has 
been successfully adapted in different parts of the world. Bemünden and Seán Allan 
and John Sandford, Hans-Michael Bock have explored the East German Western, 
or Indianerfilme, an interpretation of the Western genre which spun Native Ameri-
can tribes as heroic in their struggle against the oppressive colonising onslaught of 
westward American expansion and extermination. These films were screened in the 
Soviet Union, but were not as popular as their Soviet or American counterparts.941 
Anikó Imre has looked at Central and Eastern European Western films on television 
and in cinemas, and drawn some conclusions about the influence of American cul-
ture on the Eastern Bloc, but without looking at the Soviet Union.
Katerina Clark’s work on the Soviet novel will also be incorporated as a way 
of understanding models of heroism in these films. Furthermore, the invalu-
able studies of J. Kitses, Robert Warshow, David Cook, Mary Hall, and Martin 
Winkler on Hollywood and on the Western, are crucial to grounding any valu-
able study of the Soviet Western in its American scholarly origins. In particular 
Cook has written in detail on the ‘modernist’ or ‘anti-Western’, terms used to 
describe a variety of films from the 1960s to 1970s which implicitly critique tra-
ditional views on race and gender, as well as critique contemporary American 
politics and the conduct of Nixon in Vietnam and Watergate. 942
941 S. Lavrentiev, Krasnyi Vestern (Moscow, 2009), p. 235.
942 D. A. Cook, Lost Illusions: American Cinema in the Shadow of Watergate and Viet-
nam, 1970-1979, History of the American Cinema ; v. 9 (Berkeley; London, 2002), 
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Despite being overwhelmingly American in its setting and origin and cultural 
significance, the Western could be a powerful vehicle for the specific concerns 
and themes of different countries.943 The adaptation of the Western into a So-
viet context, its ‘sovietisation’ , and subsequent popularity, will be addressed 
by exploring a number of themes which maintained the features of Hollywood 
while introducing Soviet elements: models of heroism, nostalgia and the frontier 
myth, and ethnicity and race. It will be argued that while the Soviets encoun-
tered problems in adaptation, and there were tensions between genre and ide-
ology, these films were remarkably successful in their viewership. The tension 
between Hollywood power (Golivudskaya vlast’) and Soviet power (sovetskaya 
vlast’) in the 1970s found a surprising coexistence in these films. The surprising 
adaptability of this American genre, the jewel of popular Hollywood cinema, to 
the context of a cultural and political rival, perhaps suggests something of the 
similarity between American and Soviet histories and values.
This will contribute to emerging literature on complex cultural exchange be-
tween East and West in the Cold War. Rana Mitter and Patrick Major edited 
an important set of essays on the cultural contacts across the Iron Curtain, 
stressing the need to look towards the peripheries and to de-Americanise the 
focus of cultural historical studies. They point to the relatively paucity of work 
written on post-war Soviet culture, and that frequently it appears “at best as 
an epilogue to high Stalinism”944. Their desire to see Cold War studies diversify, 
and for the distance of post-1989 to result in the de-centring of diplomacy and 
high-politics, is supported by this thesis. 
Most of the materials used in this study are films. A selection of ‘core’ So-
viet Westerns have been identified for study: The Elusive Avengers (Неуловимые	
Мстителы	1966), The White Sun of the Desert (Beloe solntse pustyni, 1970), The 
Seventh Bullet (Sed’maya pulya, 1972), At Home Among Strangers (1974), Tach-
anka from the South (Tachanka s yuga, 1977), and The Bodyguard (Telokhranitel’, 
1979). These films have been chosen because they reflect popular tastes and 
because they collectively cover the broad period of 1966-1979, the overwhelm-
ing majority of what has been termed the Era of Stagnation (1964-1982). Some of 
them are important by virtue of their popularity, such as The Elusive Avengers or 
The White Sun of the Desert, and have had a cultural legacy throughout the Soviet 
Union and even in Russia today. Works such as The Bodyguard and The Seventh 
Bullet, Central Asian Soviet Westerns, show how the Western genre was adapted 
by Soviet filmmakers to appeal to Central Asian audiences. All of these films were, 
pp. 176-182.
943 E. Buscombe, ‘Is the Western about American History?’, in T. Klein, I. Ritzer, and 
P. W. Schulze (eds.), Crossing Frontiers: Intercultural Perspectives on the Western 
(2012), pp. 13–25.
944 P. Major and R. Mitter, Across the Blocs: Exploring Comparative Cold War Cultural 
and Social History (2004), pp. 1-23.
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however, produced among a tightly-knit group of people trained in Moscow who 
went on to work for the various production companies of Mosfil’m, Leninfil’m, 
Uzbekfil’m, and others. The American influences of films such as Magnificent Sev-
en (1960) A Fistful of Dollars (1966), and Stagecoach (1938) will also be addressed, 
but only as a means of explaining their Soviet counterparts. In addition to films, I 
have used Iskusstvo Kino, which as the main intellectual film journal in the Soviet 
Union, offers the historian an insight into specific perceptions of Soviet Western 
films, and more generally to allusions to the Western made by Soviet film critics. 
Sovetsky Ekran was more directly concerned with influencing the interpretations 
of the general Soviet reader, and was a popular glossy bimonthly magazine. Both 
film publications offer us some insight into the tensions between popular and elite 
interpretations of film, especially over the role of Hollywood films. Additional in-
sights into these films and American cultural influence have been found in Pravda 
and Krokodil (the long-running satirical magazine in the Soviet Union).
MODELS FOR HEROISM: CHAPAEV AND FORD
One of the principal questions in both the Western and the Soviet interpretation 
of the Western, is the nature of protagonist  – of the hero. The hero is central 
to the action and meaning of cinema, and protagonists are by their very nature 
at the forefront of the audience’s attention. Given the importance of the hero 
to the adventure film more broadly, in the context of which the Western can 
be understood, it is important that we attempt to understand how heroes and 
heroism are constructed within these Soviet Westerns. An outline will be made 
of the models of heroism, Soviet and Hollywoodian, followed by an exploration 
of the evidence and applicability of those models within the Soviet Western. 
Rugged individualism with frontier mentality are key to Hollywood models of 
heroism. The hero in the western is a stoic silent type, and a vigilante on the 
outside of the law and state.945 Stoicism, strength, and vigilantism are three of 
the most crucial aspects to the Western hero. Despite some debate over the 
nature of the centrality of the hero in the Western, the importance of the hero 
protagonist is undeniable.946 Robert Warshow, in his seminal essay on the hero 
in the Western, argued that the hero of the Western was melancholic, stoic, and 
reposed, because he realised the hardships of life but also acknowledged that 
being resolute and calm was the best way of dealing with it.947 One way of look-
945 R. B. Pippin, ‘What Is a Western? Politics and Self-Knowledge in John Ford’s The 
Searchers’, Critical Inquiry, 35/2 (2009), pp. 223–53.
946 J. Kitses, Horizons West: Directing the Western from John Ford to Clint Eastwood, 
New ed. (London, 2004).
947 R. Warshow, J. Kitses and G. Rickman, ‘The Westerner’, in The Western Reader 
(New York, 1998), 35–47.
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ing at the importance of the hero is as the focal point of frontier oppositions, 
articulating a space between Law and the Other, the natural landscape and 
the community, and the body of the hero at its centre.948 The hero has a central 
visual and ideological place in the context of the Wild West, a strong vigilante 
hero imprinting order and justice over the lawless and impoverished natural 
landscape and community.949 Westerns, from Ford to Eastwood, frequently fea-
ture heroes with near superhuman abilities.950 For example, in the final gunfight 
in Stagecoach (1939); a hero can be accurate with a pistol (at a full gallop) at 
two hundred yards.951 Hollywood’s Western hero embodies an American model 
of masculinity, imbued with male emotional repression and feats of physical 
strength.952 The heroism of the Western culminates in the imposition of order and 
vigilante justice on the ‘Wild West’ in all its perceived disorder and lawlessness.
The ideal hero for Soviet cinema was one who exhibited the traits of the ideal 
socialist, skilled and self-equipped for his mission and morally and politically de-
voted to Soviet values and loyalty to Soviet power (Sovetskaya vlast’). The heroic 
devotion to Soviet values was a legacy of socialist realist influence. Socialist Re-
alism refers to an idealised form of realism, a depiction not just of life as it is, but 
life as it should be. It focuses primarily on workers, farmers, class-conflict, and 
the realisation of class-consciousness and the victory of the proletariat. Ideol-
ogy (ideynost’) and party mindedness (partiinost’) are at the heart of socialist 
realism, a glorification of communist values through realistic imagery. In cinema, 
Chapaev (1934) featured the ideal socialist realist hero, whose movement from 
unconscious spontaneity, acting like a socialist without realising it, to full Soviet 
consciousness, served as a rallying point for Soviet filmmakers in later years who 
bemoaned the loss of the ideal hero in Soviet film.953 In the early 1930s, in Soviet 
literature, there was a move towards a romanticised hero, with the rise of the 
bogatyr.954 The bogatyr referred to the mythical knight of the Russian oral epic. 
Clark writes that these heroes started to feature prominently in socialist realist 
prose at the time, and embodied qualities of “struggle, vigilance, heroic achieve-
ment, energy, and another cluster of qualities rather like the “true grit” of the 
American frontier”955. Furthermore, the notion of vigilantism or solitary action that 
is so associated with the American hero, can also be found in the manifestation 
of the bogatyr. These bogatyry were essentially ‘rebels’, directing their efforts 
948 Kitses, Horizons West, p. 17-19.
949 Ibid, p. 18.
950 Pippin, ‘What Is a Western?’, p. 223.
951 Ibid., p. 226.
952 Dimitris Eleftheriotis, ‘Questioning Totalities: Constructions of Masculinity in the 
Popular Greek Cinema of the 1960s’, Screen, 36/3 (1995), pp. 233–242.
953 M. Vlasov, ‘Geroi’, Kotorogo Trebuyet Vremya’, Iskusstvo Kino, 9 (1974), p. 10.
954 K. Clark, The Soviet Novel: History as Ritual (Chicago, 1981), p. 72.
955 Ibid., p. 73.
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against bureaucratic obstacles to the heroic physical achievements of the hero 
in service of their prince, Stalin.956 Furthermore, the hero’s innate mastery of the 
horse, Clark argues, was symbolic of his initial ‘spontaneity’ before realising how 
he could direct his natural skill and rebelliousness in the service of state (achiev-
ing consciousness). She suggests that the irony of the ‘freedom-loving’ and ‘dar-
ing’ hero-bogatyr and the authoritarian dogmatic society in which he operates is 
reconciled by his ritual role as the model son in service of the ‘father’, or Stalin.957
The Soviet Westerns of the 1960s and 1970s do not reveal a bogatyr-orien-
tated concern with presenting the transformation from natural freedom-loving, 
rebellious spontaneity into skills in the service of the state. Film, as well as liter-
ature, after 1956 and beyond reflected more and more emotional development 
and humanisation of character.958 Soviet filmmakers still wanted to glorify the 
heroism of Soviet power, but were “no longer prepared to romanticise war and 
the suffering it brought.”959 There is no transformation or taming of the hero’s 
natural spontaneity and their skills. The hero’s rebelliousness is not a notable 
feature (as it is for the 1930s era bogatyr), his vigilantism and solitariness are 
always grounded in the knowledge that he serves Soviet power, which is made 
evidently clear. A lack of concern for the transformation of spontaneity to con-
sciousness not only reflects the changing structures of socialist realism after 
1953, but also reflects the impact of American models – whereby the hero’s 
status is constant, without a pivotal realisation of ideological reasoning.960 The 
individual is implicitly in service of the state, rather than explicitly achieving 
‘consciousness’ in the style of the 1930s, in a way comparable to the absence 
of the hand of the state in the Western – where the Wild West manifests itself 
in the individual hero taking on the responsibilities of the state.
The role of the state is a way and its relationship with vigilante justice is a strik-
ing way in which a Hollywood model of individual heroism is ‘sovietised’. These 
films feature the hero as a dispenser of justice within an uncertain and lawless 
time and place. The heroes utilise their personal resourcefulness and skill to rec-
tify the moral injustices of gold being stolen (At Home), enemies escaping (White 
Sun), or bandits exploiting villagers (Elusive Avengers). The relationship between 
the state and the hero differs in Hollywood and Socialist realist models. The 
socialist realist model of the 1930s involved the hero acting unconsciously with 
socialist principles, before realising ideology and achieving consciousness.961 In 
956 Ibid., pp. 138-139.
957 Ibid., p. 140.
958 A. Karaganov, Sovetskoe Kino: Problemy I Poiski (Moscow, 1977), p. 65.
959 G. Roberts, ‘From Comrade to Comatose: Men and Masculinity in Soviet Cinema’, Cin-
ema and Ideology: Strathclyde Modern Language Studies, New Series, 1 (1996), p. 75.
960 C. M. Cook, ‘The Hero and Villain Binary in the Western Film Genre’ (MA. thesis in 
Media Studies, Massey University, 2012), p. 70.
961 K. Clark, The Soviet Novel, p. 86.
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contrast, this idea of character development is absent from the Soviet Western 
films of the 1960s and 1970s. In these films service to the state is an implicit part 
of heroism (as opposed to a heroic realisation of consciousness which we might 
expect) similar to the Hollywood Western’s hero and his mission of helping bring 
about the imposition of the American state ‘out West’.
The hero in the Soviet Western undergoes a journey or task in order to help 
defeat the enemy of Soviet power, summoning remarkable emotional strength 
and tactical thinking from a profound ideological belief in the righteousness 
of the Marxist-Leninist mission in service of the state. Yet this is not following 
realisation after a period of ‘spontaneity’ but a driving constant. In Tachanka 
from the South, the Red Army Officer Bardin and his assistant Shura are driven 
by a mission to infiltrate a White Army gang to help win the Civil War for the 
Bolsheviks. Bardin, a middle-aged man, and Shura, a young boy, represent a 
broad social backing to the Reds in the civil war and the inclusiveness of their 
cause; ideological conviction reaches the young and the old.
Shilov in At Home Among Strangers is one such hero whose allegiance to 
the party and the ideology of the state is implicitly constant rather than real-
ised after a period of spontaneity. The state stands behind Shilov’s heroism, 
because he is an employee of the state as a member of the Cheka, but it is 
not the state which principally motivates his heroic actions. He must prove his 
innocence by recapturing the gold that has been stolen by a gang of bandits, 
acting out of a personal desire to redeem himself in the eyes of his friends. 
Shilov is reminiscent of the Western hero as in service of American values 
and westward expansion. In the classical Hollywood Western, the hero has 
no realisation of American values or initial stage of spontaneity that one could 
compare with the character development outlined in socialist realist novels, 
but is instead heroic partially because of his consistency.962 In some respects, 
Shilov’s conception of the ‘state’ itself is that of his friends in the Cheka – a 
personal motivation and connection. Personal moral decisions also shape the 
American state -building orientated westward expansion through the West-
ern’s hero, who seeks to use his immutable skill and sense of justice, as an 
individual, to help create America in the Wild West. In The Elusive Avengers, 
the main hero of the gang, the ‘avengers’ (mstiteli), Danka, acts in service of 
the Bolshevik state, but principally infiltrates the group of bandits because of 
a personal vendetta. His father – a Red agent – was tortured and executed by 
the warlord Lyuty. Personal vendetta, as well as the mutual bonds of friendship 
between the avengers, means this film presents a version of socialist heroism 
that allows for ‘spontaneity-to-consciousness’ to be superseded by a con-
stant, personal commitment in the interests of the state for the hero. In an 
unexpected scene the film ends on a strongly rhetorical note – with the entry 
962 C. M. Cook, ‘The Hero and Villain Binary’, p. 70
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of the children, the ‘avengers’, into the Red Army. In a modification to the 
socialist realist formula of achieving consciousness, the ‘avengers’ are always 
conscious of their ideology, but are in this instance rewarded by the Red Army 
for how their small efforts contribute to the consolidation of state power.
In White Sun, the film is interspersed with Sukhov’s flashbacks to images of his 
wife surrounded by the greenery of his hometown. From the start of the film this 
image is displayed, as a way of grounding Sukhov’s mission in the personal desire 
to see his wife. Furthermore, the film was to include more scenes flashing back 
to Sukhov’s wife, including nudity, but the censors forced Motyl to cut them.963 
In the same way as Hollywood’s depiction of heroic expansion westwards did 
not involve any sudden epiphany of the hero, Sukhov in White Sun serves the 
interests of the state but undergoes no character development in the way that 
Chapaev does, who undergoes the epiphany of attaining consciousness.
The relationship between gender relations and heroes in Soviet Westerns re-
veals how, although American and Soviet society in the 1960s and 1970s differed 
in the official values ascribed for gender relations, the forces of male patronisation 
were strikingly similar. In the USSR there was an official enunciation of the virtues 
of equality enshrined in the revolution, that women had equal rights to men and 
that the revolution had liberated women by providing them with equal pay, abor-
tion rights, and legal protection. In spite of repressive measures introduced in the 
1930s under Stalin, improvements were made in the 1960s. There were measures 
which provided surprising legal recourse for women, with new laws in 1965 and 
1968 which kept the Soviet Union at the forefront of divorce rights for women.964 
In the USA, equality for women was also something constitutionally enshrined and 
socially popular, but with a greater emphasis on traditional family roles. Yet, while 
these values underpinning notions of gender relations may differ, the fact of patri-
archy did not. Hollywood and Soviet cinema both adopted a paternalistic attitude 
in their presentation of women and their relationship to male heroes.
In John Ford’s The Searchers (1956), the heroes Ethan and Martin go on a hunt 
to find Ethan’s niece, Debbie, who’s been abducted by a gang of Comanche 
native Americans. Finding Debbie, Ethan tries to kill her after she says that she 
would rather stay with the Comanche. In a similar way, the hero of White Sun, 
Sukhov, rescues the veiled multiple wives of Abdullah. Yet, adapting the rescue 
motif to a Soviet context, the hero in this instance explains to the wives the ideo-
logical and social revolution at hand: “Товарищи	женщины.	Революция	освободила	
вас.	У	вас	не	теперь	хозяина,	не	господина”.965 In Ford’s example, the underlying 
963 L. Menashe, Moscow Believes in Tears: Russians and Their Movies (Washington, DC, 
2010), p. 75.
964 B. E. Clements, A History of Women in Russia (Bloomington, 2012), pp. 258-61.
965 Beloe Solntse Pustyni, dir. Vladimir Motyl (Film, 1970, DVD, 2003), 27:02-27:10. 
“Comrade women. The revolution has liberated you. Now you have no owner, no 
master.”
304 CSABA BÉKÉS – MELINDA KALMÁR: STUDENTS ON THE COLD WAR
motivation for Ethan’s actions is one of ethnic and familial pride, a concern for 
white America; in Motyl’s example, Sukhov is acting out of an ideological support 
for women’s equality. Yet both have the same underlying male patronisation of 
women, who are deprived of the choice of their own actions, so as to serve the 
social-political values motivating male heroic missions. In The Elusive Avengers, 
one of the gang of protagonists is a young girl Ksanka. She is characterised as 
meek and traditional, even when around the other avengers. Ksanka actively use 
her own meekness and innocence to spring a trap on the bandits at a tavern. 
While on some level the message is that Bolshevik heroes can utilise existing 
gender roles in heroic ways, the very use of the conservative gender role sug-
gests that the female heroes were still limited in their agency. Keosayan did not 
write a character who radically fought on the same terms as men as a Bolshevik 
revolutionary, subverting gender roles, but one who found her traditional gender 
role to be a revolutionary asset in and of itself. The agency of women is an as-
pect of the Hollywood Western which was hardly challenged by several so-called 
‘anti-Westerns’ of the late 1960s and 1970s which had heterodox approaches 
to race and violence to the traditional classic Westerns of John Ford and his 
contemporaries.966 The Western heroes on the screen for American and Soviet 
viewers in the 1960s and 1970 were, in both cases, supportive of traditional gen-
der roles which had women as governed by paternalistic heroism, and which 
restricted the idea that women could have agency unless acting with the humility, 
modesty, and deference of traditional gender relations (such as Ksanka).
A common feature of the Western is that of the hero as the conqueror of nature. 
Stagecoach is a classic example of the journey made through harsh conditions 
to an ultimate destination which resolves the action of the film.967 This journey 
is in many respects a taming of nature, the physical victory over the harsh en-
vironment in which the quest is situated. These themes are deployed by Soviet 
filmmakers in their own Westerns; such actions are framed partly in the context 
of their conquering of nature. The journey across the landscape is not just a prag-
matic one, it is the crucial way in which the hero achieves conquest “by labor, 
persistence, violence, and technology of an extraordinarily hostile, inhospitable 
natural world”.968 In At Home Among Strangers, Shilov has to undergo an ardu-
ous journey from Moscow to the distant steppe and forests of Siberia to try and 
retrieve the stolen gold. He travels on horseback into the wilderness to pursue 
on foot the thieves of the gold. The film features a chase along river rapids, in a 
culmination of the journey into the wilderness. Shilov’s success is shown by abil-
ity to defeat Brylov and Sarychev, but also his ability to transverse the rapids and 
966 D. Graham, ‘The Women of “High Noon”: A Revisionist View’, Rocky Mountain Re-
view of Language and Literature, 34/4 (1980), p. 243.
967 M. M. Winkler, ‘Classical Mythology and the Western Film’, Comparative Literature 
Studies, 22/4 (1985), p. 524.
968 Pippin, ‘What Is a Western?’, p. 228.
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rocks that stand as nature’s obstacle against him. Similarly, Sukhov in White Sun 
defines his heroism through battling against the hostility of his environment. In 
the opening titles sequence, the camera pans multiple shots of Sukhov walking 
across the desert at different angles and distances, accompanied by a tentative 
marching-style timpani beat. Sukhov has to travel over sand and sea in order to 
capture the rebel warlord, Abdullah. In the films Dzhura (1964) and The Body-
guard, the films centre around the heroes conquering the elements and travel-
ling across the mountains of central Asia, protecting certain individuals, and only 
achieving their goals thanks to a mixture of their heroic sherpa-like skills and 
their ideological strength and commitment to Soviet power (Sovetskaya vlast’). 
The hero’s success, framed by harsh landscapes, is a crucial way in which the 
hardiness of the Western hero was incorporated into the territorial and physical 
mission of the Soviet hero in the Civil War era and early 1920s in these films.
The cowboy hero was a powerful symbol of the American other – a visual 
reminder of difference in values and cultural practice. In 1968, the Soviet satiri-
cal magazine, Krokodil, published a piece on how the actor Ronald Reagan had 
just become Governor of California. The writer used a metaphor of ‘cowboy 
Reagan’ riding off into the distance to cynically characterise the blurred line 
between a career in Hollywood and politics as a continuation of cronyism and 
lawlessness, “Наконец,	 Рейган	—	 ковбой	 в	 политике.”969 Despite the potency 
of this metaphor and the significance of the ‘American cowboy’ as part of the 
lawlessness and chaos of American politics, Soviet filmmakers adapted these 
Hollywood heroes into a new context. The bogatyr hero of the 1920s to 1940s 
offered a domestic Soviet model for which the Hollywood hero could be adapt-
ed to, but yet it was not. The bogatyr as a hero involved a focus on the taming 
of youthful rebellion and achievement of consciousness, but no such transfor-
mation occurs in the Soviet Western. The influence of the Western in Soviet cin-
ema’s heroes, on a basic level, was the influence of a genre and set of images 
and themes from Hollywood. On top of that, Soviet models framed the hero’s 
interactions with: gender roles, the state, and nature. What is revealing is that 
the Western, for heroes, could be interpreted and adapted into a Soviet context 
because it ultimately had much in common with Soviet values of heroism.
NOSTALGIA AND MEMORY: THE FRONTIER
The utilisation of nostalgia under Brezhnev acted as a counterpoint to the poli-
cies of Brezhnev’s government in the Era of Stagnation.970 The clampdowns 
and censorship of the 1960s gave way in the 1970s to exile and house-arrests, 
969 “Finally, Reagan is a cowboy in politics.” V. Seregin, ‘Roni Strelyaet S Bedra’, 
Krokodil, 14 (1968), p. 4.
970 Roberts, ‘From Comrade to Comatose’, p. 77.
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with prominent writers Solzhenitsyn, Brodsky, and other intellectuals, being 
forced to leave the USSR. Samizdat, underground illegal writings became 
more commonplace. As Beumers writes, “feelings of despair often charater-
ize the films of the 1970s.”971 Films on contemporary themes in the 1970s 
frequently explored themes of disillusionment, social inertia, corruption, and 
stifling bureaucracy.972 In America too, film historians have pointed to the rise 
of ‘anti-Westerns’ in retaliation to the conservative backlash of Richard Nixon’s 
government following the radicalism of 1968, with prolonged conduct in the 
Vietnam War, the May 1970 Kent Shootings, and the Watergate Scandal in 
1972: all contributed to an atmosphere of distrust and disconnection.973 The 
films revealed an underlying parallel between the horrors of the past in the 
Wild West and of state mandated violence and war in the early 1970s. A criti-
cal part of the Hollywood Western as a genre is its setting, the late nineteenth 
century American west, the ‘Wild West’. Corkin suggests that “the western 
has the mythic power to define the past not simply as a body of material and 
ideological events that are recognizable and subject to analysis but as a tri-
umphal moment when a compendium of quintessentially American traditions 
took hold”974. The Wild West is a frontier, on the very brink of American territo-
rial control, but one representing a better future for those who seek it. In this 
sense, the Wild West is as much a temporal frontier, of a bygone era, as it is 
a geographical one. This notion of the temporal frontier, the cusp of historical 
development, can be applied to the Soviet Western. Most of these films are set 
in the Russian Civil War, the defining moment for the birth of the Soviet Union. 
The glorification of America’s past was, at the same time, critiqued and compli-
cated by several aforementioned ‘anti-Westerns’ whereby a “historically realistic 
depiction of the harshness of Western life” was depicted – in films such as Monte 
Walsh (1970), Zandy’s Bride (1974), and The Outlaw – Josey Wales (1976).975 This 
is not to say that the classic Western glorification of the frontier and westward ex-
pansion was not present in 1970s Hollywood; John Wayne’s own production com-
pany, Ratjac, created four such films for Warner Brothers, among many others.976 
Soviet Westerns could have used these new anti-Western models which demysti-
fied the past and showed the reality of historic suffering and harshness, but instead 
focused on traditional nostalgic Western representations of the frontier past.977
971 B. Beumers, ‘The Stagnation: Mainstream and Auteur Cinema (1967-1982)’, in A 
History of Russian Cinema, (Oxford ; New York, 2009), p. 149.
972 Ibid., pp. 146-150.
973 Cook, Lost Illusions, p. 177.
974 S. Corkin, Cowboys As Cold Warriors: The Western And US History (Philadelphia, 
2004), p. 21.
975 Cook, Lost Illusions, p. 178.
976 Ibid., p. 179.
977 Ibid.
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By the 1960s and 1970s the struggles for the development of communism’s 
future were happening in the corridors of power in Moscow. Filmmakers reflect 
on a heroic past space, lost to urbanisation and bureaucratisation. The focus 
on nostalgia in cinema is evidenced from movie attendance and sales; Soviet 
films that dealt with contemporary themes were the most highly recommended 
by the authorities and the most frequently produced, but also among the least 
profitable films. These films averaged a mere 9.5 and 12 million viewers.978 To 
put this into context, The Elusive Avengers drew in a staggering 54.5 million 
viewers, White Sun 34.5 million viewers, and At Home Among Strangers saw 
23.7 million.979 Films of any historical theme made up on average 53% (1967-
1969).980 Katerina Clark and Kathleen Parthé have both looked at the advent of 
Village Prose literature in the 1960s and ‘70s, which drew on a nostalgia for a 
village culture lost to industrial development. 
The Civil War landscape of the Soviet Western reflected a nostalgia for the 
loss of daring and heroism in the wilderness. Landscape is crucial to the West-
ern in terms of its articulation of ‘the frontier’, the frontier between the past and 
present, between civilisation and wilderness, between stability and disorder.981 
The battle for communism was no longer one of bureaucracy not train rob-
beries, horses, and guns, and Soviet filmmakers wanted to use the Western 
to recapture that exciting and revolutionary stage of the battle. The American 
Western is used as a vehicle for nostalgia by Soviet filmmakers because the 
backdrop of wilderness and the fact of being set in a ‘bygone era’, allow these 
films to utilise long standing narratives of heroism and Soviet glory though the 
lens of adventure and fantastical action.
In White Sun, the barren desert of central Asia is used to create a environment 
distinctly alien to the majority of Soviet viewers. The desert, a near ubiquitous 
setting for Hollywood Westerns, is here consciously employed to draw a paral-
lel for a Soviet context.982 The cinematography uses the sparsity of the desert 
background to draw the viewer’s eye towards the foreground, with the frequent 
recurrence of the protagonists, and their horses, as the centre of the camera’s 
attention. The old clay-bricked buildings, the inhabitants of the desert in tradi-
tional dress, and the half-a-century old Civil War uniforms, evoke a bygone era 
situated in the desert. Motyl constructs a place of mission and destiny, in which 
the future of Soviet society is the sole concern in the bleak context of the desert. 
978 Mickiewicz, Media and the Russian Public, p. 74.
979 S. Zemlianukhin and M. Segida, Domashnyaya sinemateka: otechestvennoe kino 
1918-1996 (Moscow, 1996), p. 283, p. 34, p. 395.
980 Mickiewicz, Media and the Russian Public, pp. 75-76.
981 J. Kitses, Horizons West, p. 18.
982 V. Bohlinger, ‘“The East Is a Delicate Matter” White Sun Of the Desert and the Soviet 
Western’, in Cynthia J. Miller and A. Bowdoin Van Riper (eds), International West-
erns : Re-Locating the Frontier (Lanham, 2014), pp. 381-382.
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The only purpose for Sukhov’s mission in the desert, to fight for the survival of 
the new Bolshevik state, is emphasised by nostalgic glimpses into Sukhov’s 
lusciously green hometown – with his wife at the centre of his flashbacks. These 
flashbacks further emphasise the distance between the desert of central Asia, 
as the place for the chapter of the Civil War in Soviet history, and the greenery 
of European Russia which both precedes and follows the Civil War desert in 
Sukhov’s life. Sukhov cannot return to his beautiful and fertile home until his mis-
sion in the barren and alien desert of the Civil War is finished.
The wilderness is used to great effect in At Home Among Strangers. The film 
is set in the Siberian forests and steppe, which are used to create a sense of dis-
tance and particularity from the urban political elites in Moscow. Shilov’s mission 
is one which requires him to go beyond the bounds of city life, and to pursue the 
danger and adventure of fighting by himself in the ‘wild east’ of immediate post 
Civil War era Siberia. The start of the film is a sequence in which an old carriage 
is loaded up and sent down a hill crashing into the distance by a group of the 
future Chekists, including Shilov, in their youth. This black-and-white sequence, 
accompanied by a mournful ballad composed by Eduard Artemyev, consciously 
symbolises the destruction of the past and joint creation of the future by the com-
bined act of pushing the carriage down the hill.983 The opening sequence’s song 
is interspersed with the cry of ‘ravenstvo’ (equality), ‘bratstvo’ (brotherhood), ‘mir, 
mir’ (peace, peace), and ‘pobeda’ (victory). Revolutionary cries to action are used 
to further embed the film in a sentimental and emotionally charged interpretation 
of the past. Furthermore, contemporaries of Mikhalkov recognised the use of 
nostalgia, with E. Stishova writing in 1977 that the carriage is first and foremost 
a deliberate echo of John Ford’s Stagecoach.984 He argues that Mikhalkov’s film 
is an experiment with the classic Western, a genre which “еще	слишком	хорошо	
помнит	свое	прошлое”, so that the film is able to talk about “нашем	прошлом,	
которое	мы	тоже	не	забываем.”985 In another scene, Shilov looks on through a win-
dow at a motorcar, and it brings back memories of his youth and the same barn 
where he and his friends destroyed the carriage, and the flashback ends with a 
sustained picture of the rolling hills. The bureaucracy of the office of the Cheka is 
tragically distant from the romanticised revolutionary-era activity.986 The motorcar 
983 E. Prokhorova, ‘Svoi Sredi Chuzhikh, Chuzhoi Sredi Svoikh / At Home among Stran-
gers, a Stranger at Home’, in B. Beumers (ed), The Cinema of Russia and the Former 
Soviet Union (London, 2007), p. 175.
984 E Stishova, ‘Snimaetsia Kino’, Iskusstvo Kino, 3 (1977), p. 100.
985	 Эксперимент	Н.	Михалкова	с	классическим	вестерном	показал,	что	этот	жанр	
	 еще	слишком	хорошо	помнит	свое	прошлое,	чтобы	по-новому	рассказать	о	
	 нашем	прошлом,	которое	мы	тоже	не	забываем.”	
	 “N.	Mikhalkov’s	experiment	with	the	classic	Western	has	shown	that	this	genre	still	
	 remembers	its	past	all	too	well,	so	as	to	tell	afresh	our	own	past	–	which	we	also	
	 have	not	forgotten.”	Ibid.,	p.	101.
986 E. Prokhorova, ‘Svoi Sredi Chuzhikh’, p. 177.
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symbolises that move from the Civil War era of personal courage and physical 
exertion in the establishment of Soviet power, to the comfortable but unromantic 
time of the post Civil War maintenance of Soviet power. While commenting on 
the post Civil War era, Mikhalkov’s film, At Home Among Strangers, also makes 
sense within the context of the Brezhnevian era of stagnation’s refocus on the 
past in public discourse, on an ‘ominous present’.987 “The Revolutionary dream 
is thus future-in-the-past, to which characters have access only through their 
memory.”988 Moreover, The Elusive Avengers was directly influenced by Holly-
wood in its use of the wildness and its relation to a nostalgic view of past ad-
venture. The film romanticises the wide open steppe, and draws on the youth 
and vitality of the burgeoning Soviet state during the civil war with its young dar-
ing protagonists (the avengers) moving across that steppe, in ways that echo 
the Western. A common feature of the Western, notably in Stagecoach (1939) 
and My Darling Clementine (1946), is the wide angle shot of the hero riding off 
into the sunset. The Elusive Avengers opens with the striking silhouettes of the 
four avengers on horseback, riding towards the viewer, against a backdrop of 
an enormous glowing red sunset. The image clearly situates the film within the 
nostalgia of the Western genre. Furthermore, the rousing folk music in place of 
dialogue as well as the visually striking contrast between the red sunset and 
black characters in silhouette is strongly evocative of Sergio Leone’s Fistful of 
Dollars (1964), released two years before The Elusive Avengers.989 
              
Figure 1. [title sequences – top: Fistful of Dollars; bottom: The Elusive Avengers]
Although Leone’s film was not publicly screened in the Soviet Union until the 
1980s, directors and studios had access to foreign films for private screenings for the 
purposes of studying American culture and significant works of cinema from around 
987 Ibid., p. 178.
988 Ibid., p. 179.
989 [Figure 1.]
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the world.990 By consciously borrowing from the Western genre, situating the heroes, 
the avengers, within this stark wilderness nostalgically draws the entire focus of the 
viewer on the simplicity and concentration on the glory of the Civil War age.
Although mostly achieved visually, nostalgia also is present in the music 
of these films through the use of ballads. In White Sun, Motyl uses a ballad 
written by the famous artist, Bulat Okudzhav. The ballad, “Vashe blagorodie, 
gospozha razluka”, is sung by Pasha Vereshchagin, a former Russian customs 
officer lamenting the home and life that he used to know before the chaos 
of war and revolution. Vereshchagin’s homesickness is transferred to Sukhov 
who is sitting outside the house, listening.991
Sukhov’s nostalgic longing for his home and his wife is linked to the Veresh-
chagin’s longing for a lost world and his long-suffering wife through the open-
ing lines of both verses. The first verse’s “госпожа	Разлука” (Lady Separation), 
referring to Sukhov’s situation, is linked to the next verse’s “госпожа	Удача” 
(Lady Happy Fortune), referring to Vereshchagin’s.992 Bulat Okudzhava, who 
provided the lyrics and music for White Sun, also did so for Belorusskiy Vokzal 
(Belorussian Station, 1970), a film about the disillusionment of veterans twenty 
five years after the end of the war.993 The ballad in White Sun is used to rouse 
feelings of nostalgia for a time long past by 1970.
While the nostalgia elicited in White Sun is a private one, shared between 
Vereshchagin and Sukhov, the nostalgia of the ballad in The Elusive Avengers 
is a public affair. A travelling opera company perform for the last time to the 
village, they perform a song about tragedy and romance, ‘The Romance of 
Belorussian Dzhosi’. The song evokes a fleeting romance, with the repetition 
of ‘ноч	прошла,	ночь	прошла’ to emphasise how time has past.994 The dancing 
villagers and the spectacle of performance evoke nostalgia for the past but 
in a way that evokes the loss of the traditional Russian village in the push for 
industrialisation and collectivisation. The late 1960s and 1970s saw increasing 
popularity of Village Prose, reflecting a keen self-awareness of the loss of pas-
toral settings and lifestyles and a nostalgia for what had been lost.995
In contrast, At Home Among Strangers and Tachanka from the South, nos-
talgic ballads reflect the loss of a mythic revolutionary zeal of the Civil War. In 
At Home the opening montage sequence is accompanied by a soulful ballad 
990 D. C. Gillespie, ‘“The Italians Are Coming!” Italy and the “Other” in Soviet Cinema’, in 
S. C. Hutchings (ed), Russia and Its Other(s) on Film: Screening Intercultural Dialogue 
(Basingstoke; New York, 2008), p. 50.
991 D. C. Gillespie, ‘The Sounds of Music: Soundtrack and Song in Soviet Film’, Slavic 
Review, 62/3 (2003), p. 477.
992 Ibid.
993 Ibid., p. 478.
994 Neulovimiye Mstiteli, dir. Edmond Keosayan (Film, 1966), 15:29-15:34
995 K. F. Parthé, Russian Village Prose: The Radiant Past (1992).
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written by Mikhalkov’s mother. The song links memory of the past with aspi-
ration for the future. This scene conveys the lost optimism and vitality of the 
Revolutionary era:
В	грядущий	мир
Он	придёт,
Придёт	для	всех	людей!996
The “грядущий	мир” was never realised; the following scene shows how the 
romantic fervour of the revolution turned into a less youthful and more serious 
situation, with the authoritative sounding of a grandfather clock in an office 
environment abruptly coming after the end of the song. Similarly, in Tachanka 
from the South, central ballad song is repeated throughout the film, culminat-
ing in a final shoot-out accompanied by the song before the credits role. The 
words of the song evoke the nostalgic passing of time “Летела	в	седле	молодая	
эпоха”, but particularly the line “Дожить	 до	 бессмертья	 недаром	 мечталось”, 
which imbues the song with the importance of dreaming for a better revolu-
tionary future and the heroic sacrifice.997 If the Western locates the Wild West 
within a visual and auditory landscape of old-world charm and excitement, 
then the Soviet Western seeks to achieve the same things but in the context of 
the Civil War. The use of the ballad is poignant in these films for trying to evoke 
a bygone era of past nostalgia and glory.
The success of the Western genre in the Soviet context related to the ways in 
which the genre could use the past. In the Soviet Union the very use of a genre 
that utilised the past facilitated the implicit criticism of the present, whereas in 
America the development of the ‘anti-Western’ involved the use of the Western 
genre’s past-setting to make modern-day criticisms of Nixon’s government 
and political conspiracy in the wake of Watergate.998 Soviet filmmakers could 
shape the Western’s use of nostalgia to fit with a state endorsed emphasis on 
past Soviet victories. Sovietisation could, if not override Americanness, at least 
contribute alternate currents of thought for viewers of these films. Drawing on 
the past may have demonstrated correct Soviet values to viewers, and even 
roused party and ideological pride, but it ultimately did so using history. 
996 Svoi Sredi Chuzhikh, Chuzhoi Sredi Svoikh, dir. Nikita Mikhalkov (Film, 1974, DVD, 
2011), 04:09-04:21. 
“In the world which is to comeIt will arrive,It will arrive for all the people!”
997 “A young (new) epoch has flown into the saddle [It was] dreamed to live as long 
as eternity [lit. ‘immortality’], not in vain.” ‘Tachanka — Tachanka. Pesnya iz fil’ma 
“Tachanka s yuga”’ https://www.pesni-film.ru/muzyka/tachanka-tachanka-pesnya-
iz-filma-tachanka-s-yuga.html (13 January 2017)
998 Cook, Lost Illusions, p. 177-8.
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ETHNICITY AND IDEOLOGY “ALLAH SENT ME A FRIEND, AND I 
WANTED TO KILL HIM!”
Soviet authorities’ tolerance for the Western genre can partly be explained as 
an attempt to condemn American values through depicting the wild west as a 
scene of colonial, racist atrocity.999 When John Ford’s Stagecoach (1939) was 
released in the Soviet Union as a ‘trophy-film’ after 1945, it was prefaced with a 
warning to audiences that it was “an epic about the struggle of Indians against 
White imperialists on the American frontier”: a concern with race was a tradi-
tional part of anti-American propaganda in the Soviet Union.1000 East German 
osterns portrayed the Native Americans as the positive protagonists, the ‘good 
guys’, and the American colonisers as the evil invaders.1001 Moreover, Soviet 
film critics were keen to point out Hollywood’s failings in the representation of 
race.1002 To understand the role of ethnicity in Soviet Westerns, a brief explana-
tion will be made of the Hollywood and Soviet views on ethnic difference.
Soviet ideas of ethnicity underwent significant change. In the 1920s, a mul-
ti-ethnic project was envisioned in the creation of the Soviet Union – that na-
tionalisms were secondary to the creation of a communist utopia, before which 
bourgeois nationalism would dissipate. In the 1930s, however, Stalin initiated 
a programme, which actively sought to minimise the role of national identities 
within a broader Soviet identity. Terry Martin has argued that, for the cultures and 
peoples of the constituent republics (e.g. Uzbek, Ukrainian, Armenian, etc.), there 
was minimal threat of forced assimilation, but instead that the Soviet state valued 
the voluntary absorption of Russian culture and language by these constituent 
identities.1003 Soviet ideas of ethnicity rested around an official rejection of nation-
alism as a dangerous and bourgeois concept, while promoting an ideologically 
based Soviet identity – which rested on political and social convictions rather 
than blood or language. Francine Hirsch rejects comparisons between Nazi and 
999 S. Lavrentiev, Krasnyi Vestern (Moscow, 2009), p. 81.
1000 Zhuk, ‘Hollywood’s Insidious Charms, p. 595.
1001 G. Gemünden, ‘Between Karl May and Karl Marx: The DEFA Indianerfilme (1965-
1983)’, New German Critique, 82 (2001), pp. 25–38.
1002 Однако	создается	впечатление,	будто	все	это	тщательно	просеивается	
Голливудом	сквозь	некое	идеологическое	“сито”,	а	на	экранах	Голливуда	
негритянская	проблема	по-прежнему	выдерживается	в	более	или	менее	
“легальных”	тонах.	 
“However,	the	impression	is	created,	as	though	everything	is	carefully	screened	out	by	Hol-
lywood	through	some	sort	of	ideological	“sieve”,	while	on	the	screens	of	Hollywood	the	
negro	problem	as	usual	is	dealt	with	in	more	or	less	“legal”	tones”		L.	Mel’vil’,	‘Amerikan-
skoe	Kino	-	S	Trekh	Tochek	Zreniia’,	Iskusstvo Kino,	12	(1977),	p.	79.
1003 T. D. Martin, The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet 
Union, 1923-1939 (2001), pp. 460-462.
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Soviet ethnic and racial policies, claiming that the Soviet nationalities policy in 
the 1930s was one principally invested in protecting against perceived ‘enemy 
nations’ rather than ‘enemy races’.1004 Soviet political theory held that Russians 
were the most developed, and they would lead other peoples, with their own 
special but compatible cultures, along the path of development so they ultimately 
would be as modern as the Russian people. While not explicitly to do with ethnic 
difference, but rather cultural difference, in practice it meant the encouragement 
of the adoption of the Russian language and Russian culture as an enhance-
ment to native cultures. Furthermore, the relationship between national difference 
within the USSR and levels of development led to the thinking that the peoples of 
central Asia were less politically and culturally developed than those of the west-
ern USSR. In this thinking, the potential arose in Soviet film and television for the 
characterisation of ethnic and cultural difference as under-development, even as 
far as permitting racist depictions of difference that dehumanised Central Asians.
In the Hollywood Western, a central theme is that of ‘degenerate barbarism’ as 
the enemy of rising civilisation out in the West, and that the ultimate exemplifica-
tion of that barbarism is the non-white Native-American tribalism – the personifi-
cation of unmastered nature.1005 Sturges’ presentation in The Magnificent Seven 
is a development of this, imposing the superiority of the white man as coloniser 
and civiliser. His picture presents enlightened white men carrying out their duty 
to bury the dead: the white saviour complex. Produced during the height of the 
Civil Rights movement, in 1960, the film starts with a scene in which the white 
protagonists (Steve McQueen and Yul Brynner) take up the task of burying a 
native American whom the latino townspeople refuse to bury on racial grounds. 
As an important founding film for the birth of the Soviet Western, The Magnifi-
cent Seven’s attempt at dealing with racial equality made it less of a target for 
derision by Soviet authorities seeking to bolster anti-American propaganda, and 
was even viewed in a positive light. A reviewer in 1962 in Iskusstvo Kino writes 
that “срывает	покровы	идеалиации	и	ложной	романтики,	которыми	десятилетиями	
прикрывалась	идейная	порочность	традиционного	для	Голливуда	вестерна.”1006 The 
Magnificent Seven was admired by Soviet critics for its honesty, partially in terms 
of its depiction of American race relations. In this sense, Sturges’ work offered a 
positive encouragement, through exploring racial politics, for Soviet filmmakers 
to incorporate the themes and tropes of the genre into their work without ap-
pearing overtly American. Race in the Western genre had typically been a way in 
which the mastery of nature extended to the ‘civilising’ of other peoples. In the 
1004 F. Hirsch, ‘Race without the Practice of Racial Politics’, Slavic Review, 61/1 (2002), 
pp. 30–43.
1005 Pippin, ‘What Is a Western?’, pp. 227.
1006 “It tears down the facade of idealisation and false romanticism, with which the ideal-
ised depravity of the traditional Hollywood Western was covered up with for decades” 
Kukarkin, ‘Iunost’ I Driakhlost’ Vesterna’, p. 140.
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late 1960s and 1970s, the so-called Revisionist Western “elicits a response in the 
shape of generic interventions that seek to interrogate and critically to re- shape 
the Western in new directions.”1007 Tell Them Willie Boy Is Here (1969), Little Big 
Man (1970), Soldier Blue (1970), are three such films which sympathetically por-
tray Native Americans as victims.1008 Each generation of Western films produced 
claims to have successfully addressed issues of race and produced a new pro-
gressive type of Western.1009 Yet these films still patronise and ‘whitewash’ the is-
sues of representation of race, the crucial point being that of the ‘white-saviour’ – 
that the “Indian depends for authoritative representation on white discourse.”1010
This issue of dependence on the ‘white saviour’ and white discourse is present in 
the Soviet Western, but within the context of ‘levels of development’ – which is how 
Soviet officials viewed ethnicity, as a hierarchy of nations, with political conscious-
ness being linked to cultural practices and language.1011 Edmond Keosayan’s The 
Elusive Avengers features Yasha, a character of Roma ethnicity. Yasha is, on one 
level, emblematic of racial equality – a token minority within an all white case of he-
roes. Yet his ethnicity is presented as an impediment to his heroic Soviet credentials. 
When at the end of the film, the ‘avengers’ are rewarded by a Red Army general and 
given positions in the red army, Yasha is given a new Soviet name as ‘Yakov Tsi-
gankov’ (Tsigankov derived from the Russian word for gypsy). His Roma identity, as 
just ‘Yasha’, is insufficient for the Red Army – and part of his commitment towards 
the revolutionary cause is the Russification of his name. In the original Little Red 
Devils (Krasnyie d’yavolyata, 1923), which was remade into The Elusive Avengers, 
the character of Yasha was a black circus performer called Tom. The replacement 
of a black character with a gypsy one is emblematic of how ethnicity is important 
to Soviet filmmakers and studios primarily within a Soviet context. Tom, as a black 
character, demonstrates the way in which soviet filmmakers in the 1920s were in-
terested in presenting examples of ethnic difference from throughout the world, not 
just the Soviet Union, reflective of the international focus of Soviet politics before 
the change to Socialism in One Country in 1924. The issue of ethnicity in 1966 was 
not one of showing an international egalitarianism of different peoples, but rather to 
show the multiplicity of equal races within the Soviet Union – with the use of a Roma 
boy.1012 The white-saviour complex, so frequent in the depictions of race or ethnicity 
in Hollywood Westerns, is clearly also seen in the racist notion that Roma need to 
be Russified to achieve higher levels of development.
1007 B. Langford, ‘Revisiting the“ Revisionist” Western’, Film & History: An Interdiscipli-
nary Journal of Film and Television Studies, 33/2 (2003), pp. 28.
1008 Ibid., p. 33.
1009 M. K. Hall, ‘Now You Are a Killer of White Men: J. Jarmusch’s Dead Man and Tradi-
tions of Revisionism in the Western’, Journal of Film and Video (2001), p. 3.
1010 Ibid.
1011 Martin, The Affirmative Action Empire, p. 20, p. 84, p. 125.
1012 Lavrentiev, Krasnyi Vestern, p. 109-10.
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In At Home, ethnicity also relates to Soviet ideas of levels of development, 
although in this instance the white saviour complex manifests itself in visually 
shocking racism towards the ‘uncivilised’ Asian Tartar man. In the film, the Muslim 
Tartar bandit, Kayum, is discovered by Shilov to have stolen the gold which was 
destined for the new revolutionary government in Moscow. Kayum is presented 
as an unintelligent, childlike, treacherous, and at times even animalistic – speaking 
with agitated frenzy and moving with bent back and limbs. Kayum has to be ‘edu-
cated’ by Shilov about the values of communism. Rather than being presented as 
willfully ignorant and evil, Kayum is presented as simply too uneducated and per-
haps unintelligent to comprehend Marxist-Leninist logic. Soviet ideology argued 
that ethnic difference was important insofar as it related to how developed, politi-
cally, different narodi (nations) were. This presentation of the non-white character 
of Kayum is as physically different, sub-human, and in need of the white Bolshevik 
man to educate him. The notion that ‘cultural backwardness’ can be remedied by 
a Russian speaking Soviet officer’s rhetoric is connected to the legacy of Russifi-
cation of the 1930s.1013  The notion of ‘Russianness’, as opposed to Tartar or any 
non-white and non Russian speaking identity, is connected to forces of civilisation 
in the character of Kayum – whose poor Russian is linked to cultural backward-
ness. In a scene in the corn-fields, Shilov transfixes Kayum with a simple magic 
trick. Kayum is held in rapture by superstition and an ‘uncivilised’ belief in magic, 
contrasting with the hard realism and pragmatism of the Cheka officer Shilov. The 
white saviour complex is given a patriarchal dimension in White Sun of the Desert. 
The hero, Sukhov, presents his mission as not just of the immediate liberation of 
the wives of Abdullah – but the general liberation of all women from traditional 
moral conservatism and restrictive religious practice. The women are presented as 
a naive and even idiotic, when in one scene to avoid being seen without wearing 
the traditional hijab and violating their modesty, they frantically pull their garments 
up over their heads – ironically revealing their underwear in the process.1014 
Figure 2. [Abdullah’s wives pull their garments over their faces], White Sun of the Desert
1013 Martin, The Affirmative Action Empire.
1014 [Figure 2.]
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Cultural differences are seen by Sukhov not as a permanent difference be-
tween Russian Bolsheviks and Central Asian Muslims, but as a challenge to be 
overcome, which he, as the culturally and politically enlightened white Soviet 
man, is bound to achieve.
In this sense, all these Soviet films claim to present an enlightened view of 
revolutionary values regarding race and gender and difference in a way that is 
similar to the Western, with a white saviour ‘liberating’ what are perceived as 
backward and morally inferior cultures. The Soviet emancipatory project, while 
arguing that ethnic difference is not important, in the notion of levels of develop-
ment, ultimately argued for the voluntary sovietisation of different groups. This 
involved more than the absorption of political ideology, but the assimilation of 
cultural and religious practice in an attempt to imitate the white man from Mos-
cow. In the vein of classic Hollywood Westerns, and even ‘Anti-Westerns’, the 
Soviet presentation of ethnicity in their Westerns was inherently a patronising 
one. These films reflect an imbedded hypocrisy on the part of Soviet filmmakers 
and authorities, who sought to criticise the racism of American society, while im-
plicitly constructing Soviet ideals out of ethnically and culturally Russian models. 
Soviet Westerns made and set in Central Asia demonstrate how Central 
Asian filmmakers absorbed the hierarchies of development which valued Rus-
sianness as a core component of a Soviet identity superior to ethnic identities 
of being Uzbek, Kazakh, Kyrgyz, etc. This is not to say that Soviet identity was 
a form of Russian nationalism – Soviet leaders were fearful of the threat from 
Russian nationalism as a reactionary ideology – but that within a Soviet identity 
the Russian language and cultural attributes were desired. The connection is 
made in these films between cultural and ethnic pride and a lack of develop-
ment among Soviet nations. The principal Central Asian Soviet film studios, 
Uzbekfil’m, Kazakhfil’m, Kyrgzfil’m, and Tajikfil’m, all produced an array of Civil 
War era adventure movies in the 1970s,1015 which Birgit Beumers directly at-
tributes to the popularity of White Sun, released in 1970.1016 Critically, these 
films differ from the films produced by Mosfil’m and other Russian-based stu-
dios in their portrayal of non-Russians; the ‘unruly natives’ were telling stories 
about their own revolutionary past.1017 They present anti-Soviet nationalists as 
unheroic and bad role models, too connected to tradition and religion.
In line with Soviet hierarchies of development, a positive-Bolshevik model for 
the Central Asian man forms a contrast to a negative model of ethnic and cul-
tural pride embodied by the nationalists or Basmachi separatists. Such a con-
trast is perhaps best viewed through the lens of Franz Fanon’s Black Skin, White 
Masks, wherein Fanon argued that colonised peoples self-colonised with the 
1015 M. Rouland, G. Abikeyeva and B. Beumers, eds., Cinema in Central Asia: Rewriting 
Cultural Histories (London; New York, 2011), pp. 18-21.
1016 Ibid., p. 20.
1017 Ibid.
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whiteness of their coloniser and denied their own ethnic and cultural heritage.1018 
It is this internalisation of the Soviet idea of hierarchies of development among 
different Soviet nations, and the rejection of ethnic and cultural identity in favour 
of a Soviet one (albeit one that incorporates selective elements of Central Asian 
culture), that is central to these films. Two films will be looked at as case-studies, 
emblematic of wider trends within Central Asian cinema: The Seventh Bullet 
(1972), and The Bodyguard (1979). Both films are from Uzbekfil’m and directed 
by the acclaimed Ali Khamraev. Studying the films of Khamraev is significant to 
the study of Central Asian cinema, by virtue of his sheer popularity and influence 
throughout the region.1019 In the interests of widening scope, examples will also 
be drawn in from other Central Asian Soviet Westerns.
In The Seventh Bullet, the hero, Maksumov, is presented as the same sort of 
‘civilising force’ that we find in the Western – the hero imbued with a foreign ide-
ology conquering the wildness and unruliness of natives in distant desert lands. 
Although he is ethnically Uzbek he exhibits no signs of being Uzbek other than 
his skin, and fully inhabits the role of an officer in the Red Army – on a civilising 
mission to subdue his own, less politically and culturally developed, people. His 
mission is to go on a journey across the desert and try to win back his men, who 
have switched allegiance to the anti-Bolshevik Basmachi warlord, Khairulla. The 
enemy, Khairulla, is portrayed as a backward embodiment of Uzbek identity; 
undoubtedly connected to the ethnic and cultural roots of the nation, but mor-
ally and politically bankrupt because of it, attempting to flee to Britain with his 
two wives at the last moment rather than fight. The hero, Maksumov, serves as 
a positive Soviet role model of Central Asian identity as a counterpoint to the 
failings of the traditionalist and ethnically and culturally arrogant Khairulla. He 
manages to persuade his men that their futures are better under his personal 
command and in the service of the Soviet state. As a group of 20 or so Uzbek 
men, their anxieties over who to fight for are representative of the wider anxieties 
of Uzbek society during the Civil War – whether to fight for the communist forces 
or the islamist, nationalist Basmachi forces. Ultimately, Maksumov’s victory in 
managing to persuade his men to recommit themselves to the communist cause 
under his leadership is a way of showing to audiences the positive role that non-
white Soviet citizens could have within the Soviet state. 
Khamraev dismisses an ethnic or cultural conception of Uzbek identity in his 
presentation of the native villagers he encounters on his journey. Ismail almost 
kills Maksumov in a rage, before realising Maksumov was not the person who 
stole his horse and killed his brother. Discovering that it was actually the Bamachi 
warlord, Khairulla, who killed his brother, positions Ismail as a friend and ally of 
Maksumov. The next morning Ismail laughs and jokes with Maksumov about his 
1018 F. Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, trans. R. Philcox, Revised edition (New York; 
Berkeley, 2007).
1019 Rouland, Abikeyeva and Beumers, Cinema in Central Asia.
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past ignorance and antagonism. He reveals the Soviet- Central Asian integration 
process underlying the ambition in the Central Asian Western, “Аллах	послал	
мне	друга,	а	я	хотел	его	убить! [laughter from both]”.1020 Allah, in this presentation, 
looks favourably on identifying with the communists. The rage and irrationality of 
the Uzbek villager is presented as having to be soothed by Maksumov’s rational 
communist ideals, and in doing so he turns the villager into an anti-Basmachi 
ally. In this way, the Red Army officer, with this superior western ideology, is ca-
pable of convincing a villager to turn his back on the traditional and anti-Soviet 
ethno-religious identity promoted by the Basmachi.
Whereas in The Seventh Bullet criticisms of native levels of cultural and po-
litical development are explored through moral and personal failings, in The 
Bodyguard, traditional cultural practices are explicitly ridiculed. 
Figure 3. [Saifulo in ridiculed traditional costume], The Bodyguard
The film centres on Sultan Nazar, a Basmachi enemy who has been captured, 
and his transit with Bolshevik guards across the steppe and mountains. At one 
point, Saifulo, Nazar’s slave, dresses up in the ostentatious military uniform of 
his grandfather,1021 he shouts that “мужества	и	храбрость	моих	предков	вселяется	
в	меня!”.1022 Saifulo is shown to be foolish in his belief that pretentious dress can 
give the courage and strength that the Bolsheviks find in their common belief in 
Marxism-Leninism. The culture of the Basmachi is presented as antiquated and 
alien to Soviet-Uzbek values. An alternative is created by Khamraev in the form 
1020 “Allah sent me a friend, and I wanted to kill him!”
Sed’maya Pulya, dir. Ali Khamraev (Film, 1972, DVD, 2008) 42:24-42:28.
1021 [Figure 3.]
1022 “The courage and bravery of my ancestors takes root in me!”
Telokhranitel’, dir. Ali Khamraev (Film, 1979), 31:30, https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=gvI9MuUQ5So (14 February 2017).
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of the all Uzbek Bolshevik forces in the film, led by the hero Mirzo. When the new 
Basmachi chief, Fottabek, captures the convoy, he arranges to marry his wife in 
an elaborate traditional ceremony. A traditional slapstick farce is performed for 
the couple. The Basmachi company are blissfully ignorant that the performers 
are allies of Mirzo, and use the performance as a distraction – while a young boy 
severs the ropes of the awning covering the Basmachi. The cultural practices 
of the traditional Basmachi are reduced to an emblematic farce performance, 
where their engrossment in their native forms of entertainment lead to their am-
bush. This contrasts sharply with the presentation of tradition in the next scene, 
where an old man, Nazarat, laments his lack of land because of local Basmachi 
tyranny. Mirzo responds to his socio-economic issue, land reform being one of 
the Bolshevik tenants of winning peasant support during the Civil War, by saying 
that he will manage to force the Basmachi to give the old man some land and 
that he should take his word as “слово	горца”.1023
In a similar way to Khamraev’s invocation of ‘Allah sending a friend’ in the 
form of the Soviet officer Maksumov in Seventh Bullet, the use of “слово	горца” 
here is a way of appealing to a form of coexistence between a selective inter-
pretation of Central Asian culture on the one hand, and the heroism of commu-
nist heroes and their missions on the other. Suimenkul Chokmorov, who played 
Maksumov, also played a revolutionary captain in The Red Poppy Seeds at Isk-
Uslk, a Krygzfil’m production, in which the revolutionary Red Army protagonist 
attempts to sabotage a gang attempting to smuggle opium. 
The film presents the smugglers as more invested in their Central Asian herit-
age, and that their cultural self-indulgence is linked to their lack of Soviet moral 
and political values – additionally the film ties itself in with orientalist notions 
of opium as a part of eastern decadence and moral corruption.  These Central 
Asian films, in the manner of the Western,1024 focus on the racial conflict of the 
frontier, presenting developed civilisation as the Soviet imposed force of mo-
dernity emanating from the west. 
The Western, so concerned with the imposition of white male order over the 
wilderness and ‘uncivilised peoples’ is not dissimilar from Soviet cinema’s pro-
motion of Bolshevik values as a necessary step for the improvement of ‘less 
developed’ peoples of Central Asia. Both American and Soviet views on the 
historic imposition of their states and ideologies over peoples who drastically 
differed, ethnically and religious, are linked to conceptions of development 
and civilisation. The American and Soviet projects of state building in far and 
‘exotic’ lands, and the domination of their peoples, were forms of colonialism 
masked as modernisation.
1023 “The word of a mountain dweller” 
Telokhranitel’, 1:03:30.
1024 Pippin, ‘What Is a Western?’, pp. 230.
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CONCLUSION
The Soviet project involved the mission to capture the hearts and minds of citi-
zens, to try and create the novyi sovietskyi chelovek (New Soviet Person).1025 The 
creation of a new kind of person, an active citizen invested in Soviet values on 
an emotional and intellectual level was one of the core goals behind the official 
cultural policies of the state. The Soviet Western in the 1960s and 1970s was on 
such attempt to help create citizens through cultural output, requiring a balance 
between entertainment and ideology. These films are emblematic of more than 
the influence of the USA on Soviet culture, but they also actively demonstrate the 
way that genre could be used as a new way for ideology to coexist with entertain-
ment. In many respects, the surprising similarities between American and Soviet 
influences on the Soviet Western, demonstrate to us that cinema – and in particu-
lar genre cinema – could offer more than just culturally specific expressions. Even 
if the Western was a genre which was always “quintessentially American”,1026 it 
could also be adapted into a Soviet context and still be popular. 
One of the problems with Socialist Realism, raised by Katerina Clark, is how 
to create a work that adheres fully to ideological demands without being boring 
and unreadable.1027 In some respect, the fact that these Soviet Westerns could 
be enjoyed is reflective of the fact that the ideological demands on artists after 
1953 were fewer, and more freedom was given. Even under Brezhnev, there 
was no return to the absolute strictness of Stalinist cultural policy. The fact that 
these films were Westerns and were successfully sovietised and made popular 
suggests that cultural policy under Brezhnev had some successes in balancing 
ideology with popularity. Yet the irony is that while these films appeared to Soviet 
authorities to be adhering sufficiently to Soviet views on ethnicity, nostalgia, and 
heroism, they were doing so in a way that actually illuminated some of the under-
lying similarities between American and Soviet culture and society.
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1977, DVD, 2010)
Telokhranitel’ (The Bodyguard), dir. Ali Khamraev (1979), https://www.youtube.
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The Man Who Shot Liberty Valance, dir. John Ford (Film, 1962, DVD, 2005)
The Searchers, dir. John ford (Film, 1956, DVD, 2012)
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SPIES, STARS, AND STRIPES:  
HOW THE 1960S COLD WAR MADE RUSSIANS 
LIKEABLE IN STAR TREK AND  
THE MAN FROM UNCLE
tHALIA ertmAn
INTRODUCTION
“To be different is not necessarily to be wrong or ugly,” is one of the central themes 
of Star Trek according to its creator Gene Roddenberry.1028 This is, in fact, a central 
theme for the 1960s in the United States. While preceding decade had been one of 
conformity and fear of being targeted as a suspected communist, the 1960s saw 
the rise of counterculture and protest movements. Popular culture in the mid-1960s 
reflected these changes in popular consciousness, as well as changes in political 
relations with the Soviet Union in the midst of the Cold War. Two 1960s television 
shows, Star Trek and The Man from UNCLE each represented genres particularly 
indicative of Cold War preoccupations. Science fiction dealt with space travel and 
nuclear fear, but was also able to make social commentary from its setting in the 
future or in galaxies far away. Espionage  shows brought the excitement of public 
imaginings of spies, while also commenting on the growing international connec-
tions in the world. Additionally, both of these shows featured a popular Russian 
character. Pavel Chekov and Illya Kuryakin were appealing, especially to young fe-
male fans, and they were also likeable Russian characters, which had certainly not 
been present in the 1950s popular culture. These popular Russian characters were 
possible because of a combination of the political thaw in Cold War tensions, which 
made Russians less of a threat, and the counterculture movement in the United 
States, which made rebelling and disagreeing with authority the norm. Additionally, 
their portrayal and character traits speak to popular opinions at the time, as well as 
the greater public consciousness in the United States in the 1960s.
TELEVISION AND THE BIRTH OF THE AMERICAN MASS CULTURE
Television has become paramount to American culture since its introduction 
in the mid-twentieth century. Not only did television introduce a new form of 
popular culture and leisure in the 1950s, it also “became the window in which 
1028 Attributed to Gene Roddenberry, creator of Star Trek.
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most Americans began to look at and understand their lives, their culture and 
the world.”1029 Because of its multitude of genres and the fact that it usually 
found such a prominent place in the home, television pervaded many Ameri-
cans’ lives across class, gender, and racial lines, solidifying a larger American 
culture as opposed to the regional differences that had been common be-
fore. In the 1950s, the percentage of American households with televisions 
rose from approximately nine to 90.1030 The pervasiveness of television made 
it more influential, in many ways, than film, radio, or the written word.1031 As a 
result, television became the vehicle of mass culture in the United States. 
Television was also a medium of the Cold War. Television’s birth at the start 
of the Cold War created “a temporal bond that suggests a codependent 
relationship.”1032 From television’s inception the medium was connected to the 
ups and downs of the global ideological conflict, meaning it had to adapt to 
changing attitudes, both official and popular. Because of the ubiquity of televi-
sion, it was beholden to the will of its viewers and was forced to be adaptable 
to changing social currents. Thus, television is a useful medium through which 
to study social and cultural trends of the Cold War.
This adaptability allows scholars to periodize television in a similar way that Hol-
lywood is periodized. The role of American television during the Cold War is not 
something many scholars have specifically engaged with.1033 As a result, this pa-
per will consult the periodization of Shaw and Youngblood in Cinematic Cold War. 
While this periodization refers to Hollywood films, the larger social and cultural 
trends it reflects are useful in the examination of Cold War television, as well. The 
first era Shaw and Youngblood outline lasted from 1947-1953, during which “Hol-
lywood followed rather than led political and public opinion.”1034 The next era, from 
1953-1962, saw “the beginnings of negotiated dissent on the screen in the United 
States.”1035 The third era is the longest of the eras, lasting from 1962-1980, and it 
1029 Jerry Carrier, “Television,” Tapestry: The History and Consequences of America’s 
Culture (New York: Algora Publishing, 2014), 147.
1030 Tony Shaw and Denise J. Youngblood, Cinematic Cold War: The American and Soviet 
Struggle for Hearts and Minds (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2010), 227, n2.
1031 Thomas Doherty, Cold War, Cool Medium: Television, McCarthyism, and American 
Culture, New York: Columbia University Press, 2003, p. 2.
1032 Doherty, Cold War, Cool Medium, 2.
1033 There are some works, but very few that deal with narrative television on the whole, 
throughout the Cold War. For works on Cold War television see: Nancy Bernhard, 
U.S. Television News and Cold War Propaganda, 1947-1960 (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999); Doherty, Cold War, Cool Medium; Michael Curtin, Redeem-
ing the Wasteland: Television Documentary and Cold War Politics (New Brunswick, 
N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1995); and Daniel Hallin, The “Uncensored” War: The 
Media and Vietnam, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989.
1034 Shaw and Youngblood, Cinematic Cold War, 19.
1035 Ibid., 25.
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saw not only rising dissent in the spirit of counterculture, but also the introduction 
of new, young filmmakers.1036 The penultimate period lasted from 1980-1986 and 
reflects the shift back towards the political right under Ronald Reagan.1037 Finally, 
the period that lasted from 1986-1990 highlighted the victorious furor that envel-
oped the country at the end of the Cold War.1038 The period that this paper mostly 
delves into is the third, which reflects the social and cultural changes caused by 
the Civil Rights movement, counterculture, and the Vietnam War. While television 
was still a relatively new medium in this era, these events affected both creators 
and viewers, causing the rising popularity of shows that pushed back against the 
conformity of the 1950s, even if they did so indirectly.
While television traversed many genres, the two genres that most reflect 
Cold War themes are science fiction (sci-fi) and spy shows (spy-fi). Star Trek 
(1966-1969) and The Man from UNCLE (1964-1968) each fall into one of these 
generic categories, making them excellent signifiers of broader Cold War 
tropes. Both of these genres had long lives before the Cold War, but the mid-
century conflict forever shaped and changed them. While sci-fi became simul-
taneously an updated version of the western as well as a vehicle through which 
to explore modernism, spy-fi grappled with the globalizing world and the shift-
ing image of espionage. Each of these genres reflected Cold War themes in 
different ways and were also forced to adapt in the climate of counterculture. 
These two shows offer a new perspective on the cultural Cold War, as well as 
a renewed understanding of the broader cultural climate.
STAR TREK AND SCI-FI
Star Trek is a science fiction television show that takes place in the 23rd cen-
tury and is about the crew of the USS Enterprise. The Enterprise is a starship 
that is part of Starfleet, the military organization of the United Federation of 
Planets (The Federation). Star Trek relies heavily on allegory, using the future 
as a metaphor to talk about the present.1039 Thus, The Federation, which is a 
collection of diverse worlds that respect, tolerate, and celebrate their differ-
ences, represents an “idealized version of the United States.”1040 The lines that 
open every episode of the show describe the basic premise rather aptly:
1036 Ibid.,29.
1037 Ibid., 32.
1038 Ibid., 35.
1039 Steven D. Stark, “The Star Trek Galaxy and Its Glimpse of TV’s Future,” Glued to the 
Set: The 60 Television Shows and Events That Made Us Who We Are Today (New 
York: The Free Press, 1997), 260.
1040 Nicholas Evan Sarantakes, “Cold War Pop Culture and the Image of U.S. Foreign 
Policy: The Perspective of the Original Star Trek Series,” Journal of Cold War Studies 
7, Nº 4 (Fall 2005): 78, doi:10.1162/1520397055012488.
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Space, the final frontier. These are the voyages of the starship Enterprise. Its 
5-year mission: to explore strange new worlds, to seek out new life and new 
civilizations, to boldly go where no man has gone before.1041
The crew is also tasked with following the “Prime Directive,” which prohibits 
them from interfering with the internal developments of alien civilizations. Ni-
cholas Evan Sarantakes argues that this principle was largely anti-colonialist 
in nature, acknowledging “the limits to power, even American power.”1042 The 
prime directive as it played out in the show was actually more complicated 
than that. Often times, the actions of the crew reflect a principle closer to the 
Wilsonian impulse to remake the rest of the world in United States’ image. 
Additionally, the very nature of the mission “to explore strange new worlds” 
could also be neocolonialist. The creators of the show were largely motivated by 
the ideals of democracy, freedom, and morality,1043 making it possible to see The 
Federation as a neocolonial power, much like the United States in the Cold War, 
attempting to make the universe a better place by making sure every civilization is 
on the path towards liberal democracy. Initially, Star Trek was not incredibly popu-
lar, although it would grow to carve out a distinct presence in American popular 
culture. It was cancelled after three seasons because of low ratings. However, the 
few fans that the show did have were very enthusiastic. In particular, the show ap-
pealed to “highly literate” people because of its philosophical themes.1044 Further-
more, through Sarantakes’ use of extensive archival material detailing the creative 
process of the show, it is clear that the creators, especially Gene Roddenberry, 
were eager to engage with current events and geopolitical concerns.1045
The combination of philosophical themes, conversations about morality, and the al-
legorical nature in which the show tackled larger political events made it very appealing 
to a specific group of people. However, because it did not have wider success, NBC 
1041 In the future shows, like Star Trek: The Next Generation, the line is changed to be “… 
to boldly go where no one has gone before.” “Star Trek (1966-1969) Quotes,” The 
Internet Movie Database (IMDb), accessed 8 May 2016, http://www.imdb.com/title/
tt0060028/trivia?tab=qt&ref_=tt_trv_qu.
1042 Sarantakes, “Cold War Pop Culture,” p. 81.
1043 This view is reflected in many works that discuss the production process and the crea-
tors of Star Trek. See: Michèle Barrett and Duncan Barrett, Star Trek: The Human Fron-
tier, New York: Routledge, 2001; Susan R. Gibberman, Star Trek: An Annotated Guide to 
Resources on the Development, the Phenomenon, the People, the Television Series, the 
Films, the Novels and the Recordings, Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, Inc., 1991); 
Chris Gregory, Star Trek: Parallel Narratives (London: MacMillan Press Ltd., 2000; Rob-
erta Pearson and Máire Messenger Davies, Star Trek and American Television, Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2014; Sarantakes, “Cold War Pop Culture.”
1044 Gene Roddenberry, the show’s creator, said the show received fanmail from gradu-
ate students at Harvard and from astrophysicists. Pearson and Davies, Star Trek and 
American Television, 43.
1045 Sarantakes, “Cold War Pop Culture.”
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eventually cancelled the show. Soon after its cancellation, several stations picked Star 
Trek up for syndication, showing reruns of its three seasons. It was in syndication that 
Star Trek became widely popular, soon rising to be one of the most successful syndi-
cated shows.1046 This popularity and the resulting other additions to the Original Series 
led Star Trek to become a popular culture mainstay in the United States. As H. Bruce 
Franklin asserts, “by 1992 Star Trek had become its own cultural industry.”1047
One of the reasons Star Trek became so popular in syndication was because of 
its reputation for being diverse and progressive. The allegorical nature of Star Trek 
allowed the story of a starship in the 23rd century to stand in for contemporary 
America.1048 Many episodes centered on plots that dealt specifically with events 
viewers would have read about in their newspapers. In particular, both Sarantakes 
and Franklin draw attention to how the show dealt with the Vietnam War.1049 While 
the shows creators initially felt obligated to justify the messy but necessary action 
in Vietnam, as the war dragged on, they produced episodes, like “The Omega Glo-
ry” which were almost explicitly against United States involvement in Vietnam.1050 
This political commentary on the Vietnam War was one of many such ways Star 
Trek’s creators asserted the show as a liberal, anti-colonialist project. 
Aside from political liberalism, the show was also known for being relatively 
diverse and forward thinking, especially for its time. Star Trek had a “liberal-
humanist intent,” which involved unity across class, gender, national and racial 
lines as well as overcoming the “primitive past.”1051 Star Trek featured a black 
woman (Nichelle Nichols, playing Lieutenant Uhura) and an Asian man (George 
Takei, playing Lieutenant Sulu) in the core crew of the Enterprise. Additionally, 
Star Trek is credited as being the first television show to have a scripted inter-
racial kiss (between Captain Kirk and Lieutenant Uhura).1052
1046 Pearson and Davies, Star Trek and American Television, p. 46-48.
1047 H. Bruce Franklin, Vietnam and Other American Fantasies (Amherst: University of 
Massachusetts Press, 2000), p. 133.
1048 Franklin, Vietnam and Other American Fantasies, 131-150; Sarantakes, “Cold War 
Pop Culture.”
1049 While most networks would not allow specific references to the Vietnam for fear of pro-
voking unnecessary controversy, Star Trek could deal with the war because of its futur-
istic setting. Sarantakes, “Cold War Pop Culture,” 90. Additionally, several members of 
the creative team behind Star Trek, including show creator Gene Roddenberry, signed a 
petition in 1968 that stated “We oppose the participation of the united States in the war 
in Vietnam,” making their political position even clearer than it was through the allegori-
cal episodes of the show. Franklin, Vietnam and Other American Fantasies, p. 146.
1050 Franklin, Vietnam and Other American Fantasies, 131-150; Sarantakes, “Cold War 
Pop Culture,” p. 90-97.
1051 Daniel Bernardi, Star Trek and History: Race-ing Toward a White Future (New Bruns-
wick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1998), p. 28.
1052 Mike O’Connor, “Liberals in Space: The 1960s Politics of Star Trek,” The Sixties 5, 
Nº 2 (2012): p. 192.
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While the diversity of the cast certainly “made a progressive statement on 
race and gender relations that few in the late 1960s would have missed,”1053 
the race relations that were depicted in the show were still complicated. Much 
like the purported anti-colonialist sentiment behind the Prime Directive, some-
times the attempts to be progressive and diverse could backfire on themselves. 
However, through its futuristic setting, Star Trek and its creators were able to 
advocate for a future in which equality had been achieved, even if their own 
personal view of what that equality looked like was sometimes colored by in-
ternalized prejudices.  In fact, diversity and progressive thinking were in many 
ways a staple of the greater sci-fi genre. Robert Bloch, in a 1957 lecture, de-
clared that during the Cold War “science fiction became the vehicle for social 
criticism.”1054 Many science fiction writers agreed that the moment the United 
States dropped atomic bomb, science fiction became a respectable genre.1055 
While science fiction as a genre has existed for several hundred years,1056 the 
modern conception of sci-fi was born in the Cold War. Nuclear fear and space 
travel were two major Cold War themes that influenced this new form of sci-fi. 
Pessimism and dystopian themes were prevalent because of the nuclear fear, 
but the real possibility of space travel caused the genre to take on tropes of a 
different generic form – the western. Typically western themes like exploration, 
conquest, and survival dominated science fiction stories during the Cold War. 
Science fiction became an updated form of the western.1057 One of the fairly obvi-
ous connections between these two genres is the theme of conquering a “fron-
tier.” While the frontier in the western is the American West, in sci-fi it is space. 
The idea of manifest destiny and conquering the American frontier is en-
grained in conceptions of American identity.1058 Thus, by positing space as 
1053 O’Connor, “Liberals in Space,” p. 191.
1054 Quoted in David Seed, American Science Fiction and the Cold War: Literature and 
Film (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999), p. 9.
1055 Seed, American Science Fiction and the Cold War, p. 8.
1056 The exact origins of the science fiction genre are widely debated. There are two gen-
eral camps. One camp identifies the genre’s roots in fantastical tales from around 
2000 BCE. The other camp claims that science fiction only became possible after the 
scientific revolution, placing its origins somewhere between the 17th-19th centuries.
1057 One of the central sources that discusses how themes of the American West per-
vade science fiction stories is: Carl Abbott, Frontiers Past and Future: Science Fic-
tion and the American West, Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2006.
1058 Frederick Jackson Turner’s “Frontier Thesis” situates the concept of expanding into 
the frontier of the American West as central to American identity. He ends this es-
say with the claim that a new frontier must be found now that the west has been 
won in order to preserve American identity. Henry Luce, in his “American Century” 
essay, follows Turner’s line of thought and claims that the new frontier in the 1930s 
is the rest of the world, which American can become a great power of. These are 
just two examples of the centrality of the frontier conception in the imaginings of 
American identity and American history. Frederick Jackson Turner, “The Significance 
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the new frontier, or the “final frontier,” science fiction was able to rely not only 
on western generic tropes, but also on a part of the broader American story. 
Star Trek is the epitome of Cold War science fiction because of its social com-
mentary and its excitement about expanding in the new frontier of space. The 
other major Cold War theme that science fiction perpetrated was that of mod-
ernism. By the 1950s modernism had become a part of American mainstream 
culture.1059 During the Cold War, what had once been a rebellious concept 
became the American symbol of freedom and the superiority of capitalism over 
communism. In many ways, Cold War science fiction relied on this mainstream 
conception of modernism, as well as on the emphasis it placed on technology. 
In the midst of the space race, a genre like science fiction was very appealing. 
In this era, whoever had the most technology and whoever could prove they 
were the most modern could also prove that their ideological system was bet-
ter. Additionally, the spaceships and alien civilizations of sci-fi largely followed 
simplistic, modernist design.1060 These themes were present in American Cold 
War architecture, especially in embassies as a tool of soft power to prove 
American modernity and freedom of thought.1061 Modernism and futurism col-
lided in Cold War sci-fi, making it a genre that held promises of what the future 
could be if the American way championed over the Soviet way.
THE MAN FROM UNCLE AND SPY-FI
The Man from UNCLE was one of the first spy television shows of the 1960s, 
inaugurating a genre that would become ubiquitous during the Cold War. 1965-
1966 was the “Year of the Spy” on network television, with eight espionage 
shows airing across the networks.1062 UNCLE, which had its first season in 
1964, is largely credited with being the show that brought espionage to TV. The 
show is about an American from the CIA and a Soviet from the KGB who work 
for the United Network Command for Law and Enforcement, a fictional inter-
of the Frontier in American History,” Rereading Frederick Jackson Turner: “The Sig-
nificance of the Frontier in American History,” and Other Essays (New Haven, CT: 
Yale University Press, 1998). Henry R. Luce, “The American Century,” The Ambigu-
ous Legacy: U.S. Foreign Relations in the “American Century,” ed. Michael J. Hogan 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 11-29.
1059 Greg Barnhisel, Cold War Modernists: Art, Literature, and American Cultural Diplo-
macy, New York: Columbia University Press, 2015.
1060 For more on Cold War design see: Greg Castillo, Cold War on the Home Front: The 
Soft Power of Midcentury Design, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010.
1061 For more on modernist architecture during the Cold War see: Jane C. Loeffler, The 
Architecture of Diplomacy: Building America’s Embassies, New York: Princeton Ar-
chitectural Press, 1998.
1062 Rick Worland, “The Man From U.N.C.L.E. and TV Espionage in the 1960s. (cover 
Story),” Journal of Popular Film & Television 21, Nº 4 (Winter 1994): 150.
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national spy organization. In the spirit of the semi-documentaries of the 1950s, 
which would often thank law enforcement agencies for their help in the creation 
of the show, The Man from UNCLE would end each episode with a thank you 
message to UNCLE, blurring the line between fact and fiction.1063 The James 
Bond series also had a major influence on UNCLE. Dr. No, the first Bond film, 
came out in 1962, building on the popularity of Ian Fleming’s novels. Fleming 
himself was actually consulted in the creation of the show and is credited with 
creating and naming one of the show’s main characters, Napoleon Solo, who is 
very much like James Bond.1064 Originally, the show was just supposed to focus 
on Solo as the main character, but then a Russian agent in one episode, Illya 
Kuryakin, was so popular with fans that the two were paired up as partners. The 
interactions between the two characters, each from opposing sides of the Cold 
War conflict, became one of the defining features of the show.
Napoleon and Illya’s relationship seems very progressive for a spy show 
made during the Cold War. While they sometimes have disagreements that 
are rooted in their differing ideologies, they always remain civil. In fact, the 
trust and friendship that forms between the CIA agent and the KGB agent 
certainly seems to run contrary to Cold War tropes. UNCLE was not a specifi-
cally American institution. It was international and made up of agents of all na-
tionalities. UNCLE’s lack of allegiance to any particular nationality is reflected 
in their enemy organization, THRUSH. But, where UNCLE was committed to 
the cause of international peace and stability, THRUSH acted completely in its 
own interest, driven by greed and lust for power. Despite its lack of allegiance 
to any particular country, THRUSH is described as believing in a natural or-
der that consists of masters and slaves, which sounds suspiciously like the 
early American Cold War rhetoric about the Soviet Union.1065 Thus, in some 
ways, the evil organization is still aligned with the Soviet Union, even if not 
directly. Additionally, The Man from UNCLE used consumerism to reinvent the 
spy genre, further idealizing American capitalism. Unlike the “unstylish” and 
“empiricist” ideological policing in 1950s spy shows, UNCLE “focused instead 
on a hip, modern look that privileges individuation and commodity fun over 
group identity and uniformity.”1066 However, this consumerism was also used 
for parody, which was this show’s essential characteristic.
1063 The message read “We wish to thank the United Network Command for Law and 
Enforcement without whose assistance this program would not be possible.” This 
message was confusing enough to viewers that J. Edgar Hoover, the head of the FBI, 
received letters from people who wished to join U.N.C.L.E. Wesley Britton, Beyond 
Bond: Spies in Fiction and Film (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2005), p. 117.
1064 Worland, “The Man From U.N.C.L.E. and TV Espionage in the 1960s,” p. 154.
1065 Kackman, Citizen Spy, p. 83-84.
1066 Toby Miller, Spyscreen: Espionage on Film and TV from the 1930s to the 1960s, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 106.
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The Man from UNCLE was very popular while it was on air, a part of which 
is credited to the two main characters, but also to the satiric tone of the show. 
UNCLE departed from the spy-fi of the 1950s in its more complex worldview 
and its refusal to play directly in the Cold War trope of United States good, 
Soviet Union bad. However, the crucial difference between the spy shows of 
the 1950s and those of the 1960s was their satiric depiction of the Cold War 
conflict. This parody can be seen in the mock thank you message at the end of 
each episode and in the banter between Napoleon and Illya. 
While many credit UNCLE with being at the forefront of this satirical trend, it 
was a theme that permeated the whole spy-fi genre in the 1960s. In the espio-
nage dramas of the 1950s the agent models “appropriate” American citizen-
ship and more broadly represents the United States in his missions.1067 While 
UNCLE does revisit the authoritative 1950s model, it “reconfigures the agent’s 
relationship to the state as an implausible farce,” meaning that by the mid-
1960s, the notion that the spy was an “uncompromising symbol of American 
moral leadership” began to fall apart.1068
This spoofing of a previously serious genre was a direct result of the grow-
ing disillusionment that accompanied the counterculture movement of the 
1960s. Spy shows that represented the moral goodness and rightness of the 
state were no longer popular or necessary. Instead, the 1960s saw shows that 
poked fun at the infallibility of the American government, but still showed that 
the American way was ultimately the best.
Spy-fi changed from the dramatic nationalist project of the 1950s to the more 
comical international parody of the 1960s. While The Man from UNCLE was at the 
helm of this change, it was certainly not the only spy show of the 1960s to take 
on this more satirical tone. Shows like Get Smart, I Spy, and The Avengers relied 
on UNCLE’s popularity and built upon its themes. However, despite a generic 
history, by the 1960s, “espionage emerged not so much as a genre unto itself, 
but rather as an inversion of other, more established generic narrative forms.”1069 
Spy-fi had to learn how to grow and change with the shifting cultural and political 
environment of the United States in the 1960s, which saw the Soviet Union as less 
of a threat thanks to greater “thaw” Nikita Khrushchev brought on and which also 
saw less respect for the U.S. government and the “American way” due to the Civil 
Rights movement and the Vietnam War. Thus, the satirical spy shows of the mid 
1960s are examples of the growing pains of the greater genre, and can explain 
why these shows did not have particularly long lasting popular culture lives. 
One of the generic tropes of spy-fi that developed in the 1960s and helped to 
form the modern imagining of the genre, however, was the idea of international and 
world travel. Klaus Dodds discusses the geopolitics of James Bond based on the 
1067 Kackman, Citizen Spy, p. xix.
1068 Ibid., xxi.
1069 Kackman, Citizen Spy, xxii.
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locations the fictional agent travels to, but his arguments can be expanded to the 
greater espionage genre.1070 Dodds argues that scholars can learn about popular 
conceptions of geopolitics at a certain historical moment by looking at the role and 
significance of places and their inhabitants in popular culture. This idea is certainly 
reflected in many spy shows of the 1960s. Many episodes are set in exotic loca-
tions. The people in these locations are represented in a certain way – often in a 
racist or patronizing way – while the Western agents come in and save the day. 
However, the international travel of spy-fi also hints at a broader popular conception 
of a globalized world. Espionage shows portray a world that is connected enough 
that agents have no problem traveling all over the globe. Additionally, international 
organizations dominate the spy shows of the 1960s and international cooperation is 
often necessary to defeat the villains. This is one of the most important contributions 
of 1960s spy shows. The geopolitics of travel and the notion of a connected world 
were particularly important popular notions during the Cold War.
DIVERSE RUSSIANS: PAVEL CHEKOV AND ILLYA KURYAKIN
In the 1950s, as Cold War tensions solidified into what many considered a new 
world order, official propaganda in the United States was extremely anti-Soviet 
and anti-Russian. American popular culture also reflected this sentiment, further 
encouraging hostility and dehumanization of the new enemy.1071 Popular culture 
played an important role in “solidifying and perpetuating negative images that de-
veloped between 1945 and 1950” and that presented Russians as the primary en-
emy of the United States.1072 Russians were portrayed as degenerate and sneaky 
in some instances;1073 in other cases they were dealt with “in the allegorical guise 
of alien invaders” in order to further dehumanize them.1074 Popular culture held that 
Russians were ignorant and less educated, but it also portrayed the fear of the 
seduction of communism through sexually alluring characters.1075 Overall, in the 
1950s, Russian characters were not to be trusted and were often dehumanized. 
1070 Klaus Dodds, “Screening Geopolitics: James Bond and the Early Cold War Films 
(1962–1967),” Geopolitics 10, Nº 2 (Summer 2005): 266–89.
1071 Harlow Robinson, Russians in Hollywood, Hollywood’s Russians: Biography of an 
Image, Hanover: University Press of New England, 2007,  p.149.
1072 One of the reasons Hollywood was so anti-communist and, therefore, anti-Russian 
during the 1950s was the House Un-American Activities Committee hearings and 
the Hollywood Blacklist. These targeted filmmakers, accused them of communist 
leanings, and destroyed their careers. Thus, many in Hollywood felt it necessarily to 
be obviously anti-communist. Robinson, Russians in Hollywood, 149-152.
1073 Madison, Anti-Foreign Imagery, p. 167.
1074 Robinson, Russians in Hollywood, p. 168.
1075 Cyndy Hendershot, Anti-Communism and Popular Culture in Mid-Century America, 
Jefferson, NC: McFarlands & Company, Inc., 2003, p. 13-14.
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However, by the mid-1960s, two network television shows, Star Trek and The Man 
from UNCLE had exceptionally popular Russian characters, marking what ap-
pears to be a drastic change from the inhuman Russian characters of the 1950s.
In order to investigate how this change occurred, we can look to the greater geo-
political and cultural context of the era. In 1953, Joseph Stalin died and in 1956 the 
new Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev denounced Stalin and his policies. This led to 
what historians call “the thaw” in Cold War tensions, which lasted roughly from 1956-
1968. Khrushchev visited the United States and Vice President Richard Nixon visited 
the Soviet Union in 1959. Additionally, with the election of President John F. Kennedy 
and his somewhat amenable relationships with Khrushchev, the thaw did create a 
Cold War environment that was significantly less chilly than during Stalin’s time. Even 
through the crises of the early 1960s and Khrushchev’s removal from power in 1964, 
relations were able to stay relatively stable. Aside from this greater thaw culture in the 
1960s, cultural changes also occurred within the United States. Counterculture and 
protest movements began to take over the compulsory conformity and anti-commu-
nism of the 1950s, creating a space for dissenting voices. Both the Civil Rights Move-
ment and the Vietnam War were major causes for unrest. People began to disagree 
with U.S. political policy and to mistrust, even resent the government. This translated 
into a larger mistrust and resentment of authority and societal norms. These senti-
ments are part of what made popular Russian characters possible in the mid-1960s.
The combination of the thaw and counterculture created an environment in which 
American television creators could make likeable, even good, Russian characters 
and in which American television viewers were more able to like and identify with 
those Russian characters. This was true of various forms of popular culture, not just 
television. Hollywood in particular changed its attitude both because the larger po-
litical climate and because of large structural shifts within Hollywood that did away 
with the old studio system and brought in younger filmmakers.1076 This broader sen-
timent made it possible for shows like Star Trek to provide social commentary on 
the Vietnam War and shows like The Man from UNCLE to present a multinational 
spy organization as the arbiter of good. Additionally, both of these shows featured 
Russian main characters. Pavel Chekov is the navigator of the starship Enterprise 
in Star Trek and Illya Kuryakin is half of the main spy partnership in The Man from 
UNCLE. While they both still fall into certain stereotypes of Russian characters, the 
fact that they are presented as firmly on the side of good is an important develop-
ment in 1960s popular culture. Additionally, both of these characters had wide and 
avid fanbases, showing that viewers were also ready to like Russian characters.
Gene Roddenberry, the creator of Star Trek, added the character of Pavel 
Chekov to the crew of the USS Enterprise in the show’s second season, which 
ran from 1967-1968. Claiming that Chekov’s addition was to emphasize the 
theme of “living together or dying together,” Roddenberry introduced viewers 
1076 Shaw and Youngblood, Cinematic Cold War, p. 28-29.
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to the young Russian ensign.1077 However, there were other reasons to add a 
character like Chekov. Being a younger character, he was certainly meant to 
appeal to younger female fans. His “Beatle cut” hairstyle made Walter Koenig, 
the actor who portrayed Chekov, look like Davy Jones, the lead singer of the 
band The Monkees.1078 Additionally, Roddenberry has cited a Pravda article 
that complained about there being no Russians aboard the Enterprise as part 
of the impetus behind Chekov’s introduction. Chekov’s addition stresses that 
“by the twenty-third century the cold war is long gone,”1079 yet another instance 
in which the sci-fi genre allows for poignant social commentary. Chekov did 
appeal to a lot of young female fans, bringing in a teen audience who loved this 
character and who helped elevate him to series regular status. Here is an exam-
ple of a Russian character who is no longer portrayed as evil or inhuman as he 
might have been in the 1950s. Instead, he is not only one of the main crewmem-
bers, but also very popular in the fan community. Part of his popularity was due 
to the way the character was presented, almost in spite of his Russian-ness.
Pavel Andreievich Chekov joins the crew of the Enterprise when he is in his 
early twenties. He is portrayed as at once young and naïve, but also as an ex-
tremely smart and capable graduate of Starfleet Academy. His youth and exu-
berance certainly were part of what made him appealing to teenage viewers, 
who felt they had much more in common with him than with the older mem-
bers of the crew. Additionally, Chekov is very proud of his Russian heritage, 
reminding viewers time and again where he is from, if Koenig’s strong Russian 
accent had not already tipped them off. Chekov’s naivety and his Russian herit-
age became defining features of his character. Across many different episodes, 
Chekov claims that some of the most famous inventions and stories in the world 
originated in Russia. In the episode “Who Mourns for Adonais,” Chekov claims 
that the English story about the Cheshire Cat is actually a Russian story about a 
disappearing cat from Minsk.1080 He also claimed that the Garden of Eden was 
located just outside Moscow in the episode “The Apple.”1081 Such misconcep-
tions and “Russian-isms” are often played off for humor in the show, but they 
also make Russians in general seem uneducated, ignorant, and overly proud. 
If Chekov, someone who is so smart and well educated because of Starfleet 
Academy, still thinks that Russia is responsible for all of these things, then there 
is something wrong with the way Russians look at history. This could be a strat-
egy to make Chekov a non-threatening character. If most Russian characters in 
1077 Gibberman, Star Trek, p. 61.
1078 Gregory, Star Trek, p. 31.
1079 Ibid.
1080 “Who Mourns for Adonais,” Star Trek, videotape, directed by Marc Daniels (1967; 
Hollywood, CA: Paramount Studios videotape).
1081 “The Apple,” Star Trek, videotape, directed by Joseph Pevney (1967; Hollywood, CA: 
Paramount Studios videotape).
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film and television over the past decade had been inhuman and evil, present-
ing a Russian character who is naïve and silly would seem a good antidote to 
preconceived notions. However, this also plays into an older stereotype of Rus-
sian characters and communist characters as ignorant. In the mid-1950s, most 
Americans believed that “less educated and working-class people were more 
likely to be communists than the better-educated and white-collar people.”1082 
Thus, even though Chekov was created to be likeable, the creators still relied 
on certain tropes associated with Russians and communists. However, the fact 
that his Russian origins were never seen as a sign of evil or bad intentions was 
certainly indicative of a change in perceptions of Russians in the 1960s.
The Man from UNCLE was originally supposed to focus on CIA agent Napoleon 
Solo and his exploits working for the international UNCLE agency. However, Illya 
Kuryakin, a KGB agent who was originally a side character, unexpectedly seized 
the imaginations of viewers and “soon became the major icon of the program.”1083
Kuryakin, played by Scottish actor David McCallum, became very popular 
amongst young female fans, much like Pavel Chekov. Another similarity Kuryakin 
had to Chekov was his comparison to a pop music star. McCallum’s good looks and 
the enigmatic persona he created for Illya Kuryakin earned him nicknames like “the 
blonde Beatle” or “the fifth Beatle,” comparing the hysteria surrounding him to the 
hysteria surrounding the British pop group.1084 Kuryakin’s appeal “suggests popular 
renegotiations of previously rigid positions and assumptions with regard to orthodox 
Cold War ideology.”1085 And while the reception to his character was very similar to 
the reception of Chekov in Star Trek, the characters themselves were very different. 
Illya Kuryakin’s appeal lay in his mysterious and elusive air. McCallum’s approach to 
the character was to build a persona based on ambiguity and enigma in which he 
would often hide rather than reveal aspects of the agent’s backstory and personality. 
What is known about him is that he is a Soviet citizen of good standing rather than a 
defector. In the episode “The Neptune Affair” he even appears in the uniform of the 
Soviet Navy, suggesting a history in the military.1086 Kuryakin’s mysterious and exotic 
character plays on many tropes of Russian characters from before the Cold War, like 
the brooding heroes of Dostoevsky’s novels. This “sexy and enigmatic” Russian spy 
soon became a heartthrob character, appealing to many female viewers.1087
Additionally, Kuryakin was a good foil for his American partner, Napoleon Solo. 
1082 Survey quoted in: Hendershot, Anti-Communism and Popular Culture, p. 13.
1083 Worland, “The Man From U.N.C.L.E. and TV Espionage in the 1960s,” p. 155.
1084 Thomas M. Barrett, “The Undefined Agent, Illya Kuryakin: Making the Russian (in)
Visible in the Man from U.N.C.L.E.,” in: edited by Michele Brittany, Robert G. Weiner 
and Trevor Sewell, 103-120: McFarland, 2014.
1085 Worland, “The Man From U.N.C.L.E. and TV Espionage in the 1960s,” p.155.
1086 “The Neptune Affair,” The Man from U.N.C.L.E., videotape, directed by Vincent 
McEveety (1964; Hollywood CA).
1087 Worland, “The Man From U.N.C.L.E. and TV Espionage in the 1960s,” p. 155.
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While Solo’s outgoing, risk-taking personality is more like James Bond, Kuryakin 
is more intellectual, pessimistic, practical, and intense. This trope of the sexy and 
mysterious Russian is not a new one, and in fact was present in anti-communist 
popular culture of the 1950s. However, in those cases, it was often a sexy Russian 
woman who was trying to seduce a man to the side of communism.1088 Kuryakin’s 
sex appeal can be seen as building upon that particular Russian character trope. In 
addition, his mysteriousness exoticizes him, which may have fed into viewers see-
ing him as not quite human. However, his heartthrob status also made him some-
one that women could desire and who men could want to be like. While he was 
not harmless the way Chekov was, he certainly was a far cry from the Russian and 
communist characters of the 1950s who were often portrayed as grotesque or evil. 
The characters of Pavel Chekov in Star Trek and Illya Kuryakin in The Man from 
UNCLE are both Russians in mid-1960s television shows. They both appeal to 
young women because of the parallels drawn between them and pop stars and 
they both manage to overcome the negative stereotypes of Russian characters 
that ran rampant in 1950s popular culture. However, there is where their similari-
ties end. Chekov is innocent and naïve, and therefore harmless, but Kuryakin is 
mysterious, exotic, and a deadly secret agent. Chekov’s eagerness and youth-
fulness are played for laughs, while Kuryakin’s taciturn character balances out 
his more excitable partner. This variety in popular Russian characters of the mid-
1960s also says something interesting about the perceptions of Russians at that 
time. While these Russian characters can be diverse, if we compare the two major 
American characters from each of their shows, we find them to be eerily similar. 
Captain Jim Kirk from Star Trek and Napoleon Solo from The Man from U.N.C.L.E. 
are both somewhat reckless risk-takers whose optimism and charm get them 
through most tough situations. This trope of the American male hero is nothing 
new. The lone American leader with the burden of morality is a trope that is very 
entangled with American notions of masculinity.1089 While Russian characters grow 
and change in the 1960s, American characters stay relatively consistent. This can 
be broadened into the concept that American identity is constant during the Cold 
War because the United States was never in the wrong. The Soviets, on the other 
hand, have begun to realize the error of their ways and are changing, hence the 
greater thaw atmosphere and the more likeable portrayal of Russian characters. 
The other interesting thing to note about both Pavel Chekov and Illya Kuryakin 
is that they were made popular largely by young female fans. Certainly both were 
loved for their sex appeal, but there is also something interesting about the intensity 
of their female fandoms. Female fans of science fiction and espionage shows in 
the 1960s would not have had many female characters to idolize and look up to. In 
Star Trek there was Uhura and The Girl from UNCLE ended up being a spinoff show 
1088 Hendershot, Anti-Communism and Popular Culture, p. 14.
1089 Kenneth Mackinnon, Representing Men: Maleness and Masculinity in the Media, 
London: Arnold, 2003.
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staring a female lead. However, the people having the adventures and making the 
decisions were largely men. Additionally, the popular culture craze that surrounded 
musicians at the time, like the Beatles, certainly had an influence on young girls’ in-
fatuation with Chekov, Kuryakin, and other male characters. Women, as they were 
becoming more liberated from the gender expectations of the 1950s, might have 
felt that liking a Russian character was a small rebellion. Further, while men might 
have been threatened by appealing and masculine Russian characters, women 
might not have been as threatened. The gendered aspect of these characters and 
their fans is certainly something that deserves further insight and research. 
CONCLUSION
The memory of these two shows is still present in contemporary popular culture, 
just as the memory of the Cold War is. Both Star Trek and The Man from UNCLE 
have had modern reboots through film franchises in the twenty-first century. Both 
certainly pay homage to their origins, but they have also been updated. The nos-
talgia for the Cold War is still very much present in the United States today, and 
part of it can be seen in the revival of these Cold War shows. In terms of legacy, 
Star Trek and UNCLE switched places. While in the 1960s Star Trek had a core 
group of enthusiastic fans but was cancelled due to low viewership, UNCLE is 
cited as one of the most popular shows of the 1960s. However, in terms of legacy 
and influence in American popular culture, Star Trek is much more prominent and 
well known. In fact, until the release of the updated Man from UNCLE film, the 
fandom was relatively small and niche, with many people not really knowing any-
thing about the show. This is indicative of the adaptability of the sci-fi genre, while 
spy-fi has in many ways struggled to stay relevant in the post Cold War world. 
In the 1960s, however, the sci-fi and spy-fi genres were both particularly repre-
sentative of Cold War themes and concerns. Sci-fi was an update on the western, 
while also dealing with nuclear fears and space travel. Espionage shows played 
on popular conceptions of spies and spoke to the growing connectedness of 
the globe. Within each of these genres, two representative television shows each 
featured a Russian character who was made popular by female fans. Star Trek’s 
Pavel Chekov and The Man from UNCLE’s Illya Kuryakin are both evidence that 
the changing geopolitical and cultural climate of 1960s America was changing the 
way people thought. These Russian characters were stunning departures from the 
Russian characters of the 1950s popular culture. Instead of being evil, ugly, and stu-
pid, Chekov and Kuryakin were likeable, relatable, and fought for the side of good, 
alongside Americans. The existence and popularity of these two Russian characters 
in two shows that epitomize Cold War themes indicates a change in popular con-
sciousness. Because of the greater thaw in political relations between the Soviet 
Union and the United States and because of the growing counterculture movement, 
these characters were not only possible to create, they were also possible to love.
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RUSSIAN SPACE BRIDGE  
IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA1090
tInAtIn JAPArIdZe
“The enormous positive effect of […] unofficial [citizen] diplomacy  was dem-
onstrated by famous Pozner-Donahue Space Bridges. Today, it remains the most 
efficient protective measure against returning to the Cold War mentality.”1091
The two hosts of the Space Bridges: 
A Citizens’ Summit, Phil Donahue and Vladimir Pozner, cc. 1986.
1090 Photo material used in this research paper is a courtesy of Vladimir Pozner’s official 
website, http://pozneronline.ru/category/video/staryj-televizor/telemosty/ Accessed 
on May 8, 2016.
1091 Oleg Burmistrov, “U.S. and Russian Officials Stress the Importance of Citizen Diplo-
macy,” Eurasia Foundation, November 20, 2012, Web.  Accessed on May 7, 2016.
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INTRODUCTION: RETURN TO WINTER?
With Russian-American tensions escalating on the geopolitical scene, we are 
once again in dire need of regaining a basic understanding of the “other” by 
means of rebuilding the communication bridge that no longer connects the two 
former superpowers. A quarter of a century after the end of the Cold War and 
the demise of the Soviet Union, a cultural void persists. Although in the past 
several years, specifically since Vladimir Putin’s re-election for the third term 
followed by the Ukraine Crisis and the annexation of Crimea, scholars on both 
sides have resumed debates on whether the turbulent U.S.-Russia relations 
are entering a new phase of a new Cold War. “U.S.-Russian relations are worse 
today than they have been in twenty years. The relationship includes almost 
as many serious conflicts as it did during the Cold War,”1092 writes Stephen 
F. Cohen. Jack Matlock, the former United States Ambassador to the Soviet 
Union, disagrees. “We are not in the midst of a new Cold War, though both 
countries exhibit destructive hangovers of outmoded attitudes.” Stressing the 
need for solutions, he continues, “[T]he problems will only get worse if there is 
no cooperation.”1093 Thus the need for communicative diplomacy grows.
Indeed, a “winter” has settled in. Vladimir Pozner, a Paris-born, New York-
bred Russian journalist and TV personality, observes that today’s turbulent re-
lations between the two countries signal a return to a Cold War winter, largely 
due to geopolitical and media-driven misinformation on both sides. Miscom-
munication and misunderstandings stemming from them, Pozner argues, are 
at the root of Russia’s troubles with the U.S.: “I think the relationship is more 
dangerous than it was back then,” he says. While during the Cold War there 
was a “mutual fear” and “respect” between the two superpowers, at present, 
the relationship is largely based on “mutual scorn and contempt, with the U.S. 
having many more important priorities in the world than Russia,” such as the 
Middle East and the global problem of terrorism. Pozner laments, “The gorilla 
[U.S.] is no longer afraid, nor does the gorilla respect the chimp [Russia], which 
makes the chimp extremely angry. And anger can lead to actions that are un-
predictable, spontaneous, based on emotions rather than on serious thought.” 
But ultimately, actions rather than mere emotions are causing a deeper split 
between the gorilla and the chimp, whereby anger leads to arguments, which 
in turn results in prolonged periods of sulking at best and severe political con-
flicts at worst.
1092 Stephen F. Cohen, “The missing debate.” The Nation, May 1, 2008. Web. Accessed 
on April 3, 2016.
1093 Jack Matlock, “This Is Not a New Cold War.” Perspectives on Peace and Security. 
Carnegie Organization, August 29, 2015. Web. Accessed on May 7, 2016.
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JIM AND SALLY MEET IVAN AND ANYA
On January 16, 1984, President Ronald Reagan, who had memorably de-
scribed the Soviet Union as the “Evil Empire,”1094 addressed the American 
people with his policy of “credible deterrence and peaceful competition”1095 
to avoid a possible nuclear war with its Cold War opponent. He concluded by 
stressing the need to establish a common ground between the U.S. and the 
Soviets that would be portrayed through a hypothetical set of couples—Ivan 
and Anya and Jim and Sally. The American president wondered if the married 
couple would feel divided by the differences stemming from their “respective 
governments,” or manage to build a bridge through common interests and 
similarities against all odds: “[W]ould they find themselves comparing notes 
about their children and what each other did for a living?”1096 President Rea-
gan asked. “Above all,” he concluded hopefully, “they would have proven that 
people don’t make wars.”1097
Not coincidentally, Reagan’s call for engagement with the communist coun-
try signaled America’s newfound interest in reaching an accord with Moscow 
through a combination of “citizen diplomacy”1098 and the Soviet Union’s foreign 
policy of “New Thinking” under the incoming pro-Western leader, Mikhail Gor-
bachev. Unlike his predecessors, Gorbachev held a deeply rooted “aversion” 
towards “use of force,”1099 focusing instead on developing “approaches” that 
could end the “vicious […] U.S.-Soviet rivalry.”1100
1094 President Ronald Reagan, “President Reagan’s ‘Evil Empire’ Speech to the National 
Association of Evangelicals,” Making the History of 1989, Item #64, https://chnm.
gmu.edu/1989/items/show/64 Accessed on May 7, 2016.
1095 “Soviet-American Relations,” Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, vol. 20 
(January, 1984): 41.
1096 “Soviet-American Relations.”
1097 Ibid.
1098 The U.S. Center for Citizen Diplomacy defines “citizen diplomacy” as, “the engage-
ment of individual citizens in programs and activities primarily in the voluntary, pri-
vate sector that increase cross-cultural understanding and knowledge between peo-
ple from different cultures and countries, leading to a greater mutual respect.” For 
more on citizen diplomacy, see: Ann Olsen, “Citizen Diplomacy: Building a Nation 
of Global Citizen Diplomats.” Public Diplomacy Magazine, February 8, 2012. Web. 
Accessed on May 8, 2016.
1099 Vladislav Zubok, A Failed Empire: the Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to 
Gorbachev (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 319.
1100 Ibid., 285.
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CITIZEN DIPLOMACY AND SPACE BRIDGES 
Along with Gorbachev’s policies of “New Thinking”1101 and glasnost1102 came a 
revised modus vivendi for the Cold War enemies. With a shift in geopolitical and 
socioeconomic climates, the renewed possibility of a rapprochement between 
the two rivals beyond politics started to infiltrate the Communist Party rhetoric 
and consequently the Soviet psyche.1103 As the ban on “American viewpoints” 
was gradually being lifted, state-controlled communication services began to 
engage with the medium in hopes of “depriving foreign communicators of their 
assumed impact.”1104 Indeed, foreign policy discourse gained sudden popular-
ity on Soviet television with Space Bridges: A Citizens’ Summit.
At the launch of the glasnost’ campaign, celebrated Soviet journalist, 
Vladimir Pozner, was invited to co-host the series, Space Bridges: A Citi-
1101 Gorbachev’s “New Thinking,” according to David Holloway, offered a new approach to 
international relations, whereby “human interests take precedence over the interests of any 
particular class; the world is becoming increasingly interdependent; there can be no victors 
in a nuclear war; security has to be based increasingly on political rather than military in-
struments; and security must be mutual, especially in the context of U.S.-Soviet relations.” 
David Holloway, “Gorbachev’s New Thinking,” Foreign Affairs (Winter 1989): 66-81.
1102 Glasnost’ [“Russian: openness”): Soviet policy of open discussion of political and social 
issues. It was instituted by Mikhail Gorbachev in the late 1980s and began the democratiza-
tion of the Soviet Union. Ultimately, fundamental changes to the political structure of the 
Soviet Union occurred: the power of the Communist Party was reduced, and multicandidate 
elections took place. Glasnost also permitted criticism of government officials and allowed 
the media freer dissemination of news and information. Encyclopædia Britannica Online, s. 
v. “glasnost,” http://www.britannica.com/topic/glasnost. Web. Accessed on May 8, 2016.
1103 Tony Shaw and Denise J. Youngblood, Cinematic Cold War: The American and Soviet 
Struggle for Hearts and Minds (Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2010), 35, 171.
1104 Richard Gunter and Anthony Mughan, Democracy and the Media: A Comparative Perspective 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 96.
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zens’ Summit1105 with his American counterpart, Phil Donahue. The choice of 
Donahue was not accidental, as he had been one of the pioneers of modern 
daytime talk-show format, placing particular emphasis on audience participa-
tion with a live “cross-talk” centered on prevalent social issues.1106 Following 
his return to the USSR, Pozner was serving under the auspices of the Soviet 
state-controlled Gosteleradio1107, and was therefore the perfect candidate as a 
cultural “bridge” uniting the Soviet Union and the West. As one viewer would 
observe three decades later, “[Pozner] looked and behaved like an American 
and spoke Russian with an accent,” and so initially “some assumed he was an 
American who knew Russian and was sent to host the show from the U.S.” Yet 
the viewer added, “But suddenly he started to defend the Soviet system.”1108 
This immediately contradicted his Westernized image, conversely making him 
more “palatable” for internal Soviet consumption. The Space Bridges became 
an instant hit on Soviet television. “It was like a bomb exploding or [simultane-
ous] thunder and lightning out of a blue sky,” Pozner recalled years later.1109 
However, unlike Soviet Russia where the viewership exceeded 180 million, 
few U.S. television companies showed interest in purchasing the program that 
attracted eight million across the country—just a fraction of Soviet ratings.1110
While not always successful, the audiences on both sides of the “Iron Curtain” 
were encouraged to engage in a live “cross-talk,” conceived as a soft-power 
tool to break the ice and thus break down “cold war suspicions.”1111 In the open-
ing remarks of the very first Space Bridge broadcast in 1985, Donahue warned 
the studio audience in Leningrad (now St. Petersburg) about an innate “skepti-
cism” harbored towards the Soviet people on the American side. Yet, he added, 
this would only be the case among the unenlightened. Although the unedited 
version of the broadcast included limited opposition and “clashes” between the 
two opponents, they “virtually disappeared” in the final cut. Yet certain exchang-
es remained sharp, including those voiced by Donahue who was visibly more 
“dramatic” and “adversarial”1112 than the average “Jim and Sally” in the studio.
1105 In American broadcasts [on CNBC], the Space Bridges were named Citizens’ Sum-
mits. “Ordinary people debate on U.S.-Soviet TV link.” New York Times, December 
30, 1985. Web. Accessed on May 7, 2016.
1106 “Phil Donahue Biography,” The Biography.com website, A&E Television Networks, 
Web. Accessed on May 7, 2016.
1107 The governing body in charge of both Soviet television and radio broadcasting.
1108 Oleg Sokolov, “The Pozner Paradox, Part I,” YouTube, June 15, 2013. Web. Ac-
cessed on May 7, 2016.
1109 John Thornhill, “Vladimir Pozner: the ‘face’ of Russia.” Financial Times, July 10, 
2015. Web. Accessed on March 17, 2016.
1110 Vladimir Pozner, Parting with Illusions (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1990).
1111 “Ordinary people debate on U.S.-Soviet TV link.” New York Times, December 30, 1985.
1112 Ellen P. Mickiewicz, Split Signals: Television and Politics in the Soviet Union, New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1990, p. 47.
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STEREOTYPES PLAYING IN MONO
In “Identity and the Cold War,” Robert Jervis links identities to “stereotypes” 
that stem from “over-generalizations.”1113 Understanding the “other” without 
trying to change the opponent’s consciousness, Michel Foucault observes, is 
problematic as it is not about “changing people’s consciousness—or what’s 
in their heads—but [instead it is about] the political, economic, institutional 
regime of the production of truth.”1114 The assumptions and stereotypical im-
ages of the “other” are, often times, a direct (and inaccurate) by-product of the 
political climate orchestrated by the authorities and cultivated by their talking-
heads. Jervis attributes stereotypical characteristics, including popular key-
words such as “democracy,” “voluntarism,” and “individualism,” to the typical 
American identity that stems from a deeply rooted sense of exceptionalism.1115 
As for the principle of Cold War-era characteristics, in turn, attributed to the 
Soviet identity from the other side, American diplomat, Cold Warrior and Rus-
sia expert, George Kennan in his milestone “The X Article” (formally known as 
“The Sources of Soviet Conduct”), suggests that these overgeneralizations are 
rooted in the “innate antagonism between Capitalism and Socialism.”1116
These generalizations persisted throughout the Reagan era. “There was 
skepticism [about Russia] then, but there was also an immense curiosity to-
wards Russia and the Russian people more specifically,”1117 reminisces Sergei 
Zhuk, a Ukrainian-born American scholar who specializes in the social, cultural, 
and intellectual history of the USSR. This skepticism, Zhuk argues, was ignited 
by both curiosity and deeply rooted suspicion of Soviet “aliens” seen as “dif-
ferent species” altogether. In the live feed from the Soviet Union, Donahue pro-
claimed, “Not a few Americans believe that you are not really able to speak from 
your soul for fear of reprisal from Soviet Government authority.” He continued, 
“There are even some people in this country who feel that you will all serve as 
mouthpieces for the official party line because to do otherwise might earn you 
a visit to a psychiatric hospital or perhaps a prison.”1118 The stereotype of a 
typical Soviet man or woman as a “mouthpiece” of the KGB machine was still 
1113 Robert Jervis, “Identity and the Cold War.” In: Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne West-
ad, eds., The Cambridge History of the Cold War (The Cambridge History of the Cold 
War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 22-43.
1114 Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972–
1977 (London: Harvester Press, 1980), 133.
1115 Ibid., 23.
1116 George Kennan, “The Sources of Soviet Conduct.” Foreign Affairs 26, Nº 2 (1947): 
566-82.
1117 Sergei Zhuk, interview by author, April 12, 2016.
1118 John Corry, “TV: A Soviet-Donahue ‘Summit,’” New York Times, January 4, 1986. 
Web. Accessed on April 24, 2016.
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vibrant in the American imagination, and to this day remains a constant stere-
otypical characteristic of a true “Russian” in the American consciousness. Both 
the “American” and “Russian” had enduring Cold War stereotypes. 
Indeed, from the 1940s the father of Cold War containment constructed 
these stereotypes that helped form the nucleus of foreign policy. Kennan’s 
prognosis about the intricacies of dealing with the Russians—an issue that 
remains problematic in the U.S—Russian relations—can be partially attributed 
to a severe lack of insight into the Russian psyche and Soviet mentality in 
general, primarily stemming from stereotypical cultural, sociological and geo-
political observations made from the outside looking in. After all, the American 
observer perceives himself to be the Chosen One, whose mission as a proud 
citizen of the country waving a flag of exceptionalism is to convert the “other” 
to the universal answer that lies in Capitalism. This perception was further re-
iterated by Kennan in his speech on “Russia and the United States” delivered 
at the Annual Student-Faculty Banquet of the Russian Institute at Columbia 
University on May 27, 1950:
“[T]his heightened concern with the question of who among us is and who 
is not ‘a communist’ rests of course on the feeling that present with us in this 
world is something dreadful and unspeakable [...], incurable and incorrigible, 
which is not only hostile to us but is hopelessly committed to that hostility. [...] 
But if these assumptions [...] are dangerous to our understanding of the com-
munist movement itself, how much more so [are they dangerous] when it comes 
to our understanding of the Russian people. [...] For experiences of the Russian 
people [...] will be found [...] to have considerable relevance to the things which 
we in this country are now experiencing, and are yet to experience.”1119
The internal contradiction lies in both Kennan’s Columbia address and the 
iconic “The Sources of Soviet Conduct”1120 where he uses the terms “Rus-
sian” and “Soviet” interchangeably, thus ignoring the various ethnic layers 
embedded in the overgeneralized understanding of who is, in fact, a “Soviet” 
man. Literary icon and Soviet historian, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, believes these 
seemingly unintentional tendencies to be highly dangerous. “‘Russia’ is to the 
Soviet Union as a man is to the disease afflicting him,” he writes. “We do not, 
after all, confuse a man with his illness; we do not refer to him by the name of 
that illness and curse him for it.”1121
Additionally, Solzhenitsyn draws specific attention to the common faux pas 
of the West that “assume[s] an indissoluble link between the universal disease 
1119 George Kennan, “Russia and the United States,” speech delivered at the Annual 
Student-Faculty Banquet, Russian Institute, Columbia University, New York, May 27, 
1950. Print.
1120 Kennan, “The Sources of Soviet Conduct.”
1121 Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, “Misconceptions about Russia Are a Threat to America,” 
Foreign Affairs 58 (Spring 1980): 797-834.
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of Communism and the country where it first seized control.”1122 In today’s 
geopolitical world, the West continues to assume an indissoluble link between 
the Soviet disease of Communism and post-Soviet society of Putin’s Russia. 
Kennan’s early Cold War trope lasted through the 1980s, to the chagrin of both 
television newsmen. In Space Bridges, Phil Donahue, on his part, highlighted the 
presence of this Soviet “disease of communism” in the Western media. “Much 
of the reporting about your country in the West does have a Western spin,” he 
stated. He noted that an average American viewer does not get “as much varied 
information about you as we should.”1123 Donahue’s Soviet counterpart, Vladimir 
Pozner, in his impeccable Amerikanskiy Angliiskiy1124  remarked: “We are in fact 
different [and] [u]nderstanding this is the first step [forward].”1125
[AMERICAN] WOMEN TO [SOVIET] WOMEN
One year after its premiere, Space Bridges facilitated first-ever live television 
contact between American and Soviet women in Boston and Leningrad, enti-
tled “Women to Women.” In June of 1986, two hundred American and two hun-
dred Soviet women gathered in television studios in their respective countries 
and communicated through an interactive video exchange. Yet, even more sig-
nificant was the platform that facilitated an unprecedented woman-to-woman 
discussion during the time when there were hardly any other opportunities for 
a similar interaction.1126 One of the participants on the American side asked her 
Soviet counterpart, “May we see what’s in your purses?” 
Donahue reminisced years later, “[T]hey all opened their purses and there were 
the same things [inside]. [We were] beginning to see ourselves in others.” He add-
ed, however, that he was surprised to learn that “the Russian people were more 
curious about Americans than we were about them.”1127 The satellite cross-talk in-
volved controversial and provocative issues affecting the Soviets—all the more so 
than the American side, thus “transforming the Soviet public’s image of itself.”1128
Though not fully reciprocated on both sides, curiosity about the Cold War op-
ponent was a step towards mutual understanding. It had the potential to culmi-
nate in an idealistically tilted “peaceful coexistence” beyond meticulously-craft-
1122 Solzhenitsyn, “Misconceptions about Russia Are a Threat to America.”
1123 Corry, “TV: A Soviet-Donahue ‘Summit.’”
1124 Russian: American English
1125 “Ordinary people debate on U.S.-Soviet TV link,” New York Times, December 30, 
1985. Web. Accessed on March 25, 2016. 
1126 Alexander Gasyuk, “Phil Donahue: ‘We reached out instead of lashed out,” Russia 
Beyond the Headlines, Web. December 6, 2012. Web. Accessed on March 24, 2016.
1127 Gasyuk, “Phil Donahue: ‘We reached out instead of lashed out.”
1128 Philip Seib, Toward a New Public Diplomacy: Redirecting U.S. Foreign Policy (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan Series, 2009), p. 70.
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ed political statements that could rarely be applied to the real world inhabited 
by real people, not just cleverly scripted talking-heads on political programs.
Soft power practiced through citizen diplomacy shaped social and psycho-
logical factors that accelerated internal changes within the Soviet society. But 
as with all forms of power, soft power1129 undoubtedly has its limits and ramifi-
cations. The cultural products conceived and constructed to facilitate contact 
and create a common ground for communication between the Soviets and the 
Americans during the Cold War period appear to have vanished with the dis-
solution of the former perception of the “other” as the “enemy.”
MISSING PIECE OF THE PUZZLE
Today, we witness the rebirth of “us” vs. “them” narratives in both U.S. and 
post-Soviet Russian media and cultural products of the post-Cold War era. 
Amid the void of communication, the very lack of soft-power facilitators such 
as Space Bridges: A Citizens’ Summit between the two opponents across the 
geopolitical spectrum may be the partial cause of skepticism and stereotypes 
that inevitably stem from overgeneralizations.1130 The result is a reemergence 
of “in-group/out-group” clusters that have resurfaced in modern mass media, 
along with debates about the return to “winter.” While in his 1987 interview with 
Richard Heffner on The Open Mind, Vladimir Pozner noted that “the number of 
Soviet people hearing Americans [on radio and television] is probably greater 
than the number of Americans hearing Soviets.”1131, this is no longer the case 
in Putin’s Russia. “We have a very strange situation in today’s geopolitical 
world,” says Sergei Zhuk. “Americans are ready [for dialogue] whereas Rus-
sians, this time around, are not.”1132
The producers of the original Space Bridge series were criticized in a Commis-
sion on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) report for their “incomplete” 
theory, which assumed that “all that is needed to improve [tumultuous] internation-
al relations” is for nations to simply become friendly.1133 Instead of merely applaud-
ing the “desire” for friendship among peoples, the CSCE report underlined the 
overriding importance of true “mutual understanding” that can only be achieved 
1129 Joseph Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public 
Affairs, 2004), p. 15-16.
1130 Jervis, “Identity and the Cold War.”
1131 Vladimir Pozner, “The Pozner Paradox, Part I,” YouTube, aired in 1987, June 15, 
2013. Web. Accessed on May 7, 2016.
1132 Zhuk, interview by author.
1133 “Joint Statement Protesting the Audience Selection for the Phil Donahue ‘Citizens’ 
Summit’ Show,” Soviet Exchanges Citizens’ Summit, 1985-1986, Publicity, CSCE 
Report, December 27, 1985, Hoover Institution, Stanford, California, 94305-6010-
USA.
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by engaging in “honest dialogue” on dividing issues and inviting well-informed 
representatives to participate in discussions beyond generic nods of friendliness. 
Although hardly perfect and clearly limited in its abilities, returning to the very ba-
sics of citizen diplomacy is a vital piece that is missing from the complex puzzle 
of diplomacy. “It would be just one of the platforms for resuming communication, 
but the Space Bridges could serve as a crucial symbolic element for creating a 
common bond,” says Sergei Zhuk, “not only among Americans and Russians, 
but also involving all of the former Soviet states and representatives of different 
religious faiths and backgrounds.” Indeed, a collective bond—though temporary 
in its previous incarnation—has likely vanished in transition, along with a mutual 
understanding that has, yet again, been lost in translation.
In the closing remarks of the first Space Bridge between Leningrad and 
Seattle, Phil Donahue asked his Soviet counterpart to share his honest feel-
ings about the dialogue that had just taken place between the two rivaling 
nations.  “I don’t want to sound flippant,” Pozner started, “but in the musical 
My Fair Lady there is a refrain when Higgins is amazed at Eliza and says, ‘Why 
can’t a woman be more like a man?’ […] Sometimes we are asking each other 
why aren’t we more like each other, why don’t you act the same way as we 
do?” He went on, “Today, I think that if we’ve at least understood this on both 
sides—that we are, in fact, different, that each of us has his own viewpoints 
and it is worth something, this will be a first step—be it a trembling one—to-
wards understanding.”1134
Communism has fallen, the Iron Curtain has been successfully demolished, 
ideological contradictions can no longer be blamed for positive intent lost in 
translation and transition, but the misunderstandings persist. The reluctance 
to understand—let alone accept—the other side of the argument continues to 
dominate U.S.-Russian relations in the new post-Cold War world. In Vladimir 
Pozner’s words, it is only after we agree to try to understand the opponent 
that we can wholeheartedly claim that we are “no longer afraid of each oth-
er,” devoid of all forms of paranoia, and are able to finally engage in “normal 
conversation.”1135 Alas, for the time being, the prolonged state of post-winter 
coolness continues to permeate the hearts and minds of citizens on either side 
of the former Iron Curtain. In light of the increasingly strenuous relations be-
tween the two global actors, it is time for Space Bridges 2016 as a vital commu-
nication platform that has the potential to help resume dialogue to start rebuild-
ing the human-to-human bridge through citizen diplomacy beyond politics.
1134 Vladimir Pozner, “Spacebridge - “Citizens Summit” – Leningrad-Seattle – 1985,” 
YouTube, aired in 1985, April 12, 2013. Web. Accessed on June 10, 2016.
1135 Pozner, “Spacebridge - “Citizens Summit” – Leningrad-Seattle – 1985.”
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HYBRID REGIMES: STUCK IN TRANSITION OR 
FULLY-FLEDGED REGIMES?  
A COMPARATIVE STUDY WITH SPECIAL 
REFERENCE TO RUSSIA AND IRAN
mAtteO de SImOne
INTRODUCTION
Over the last two decades, an unprecedented trend toward democratization 
has taken place all across the globe. In a relatively short time span, military dic-
tatorships and authoritarian regimes have collapsed in Latin America, Southern 
Europe, sub-Saharan Africa and the former Communist bloc. Nearly the totality 
of the new regimes adopted the institutional formulas of western democra-
cies, with multiparty elections being the trademark. Unfortunately, the ensuing 
democratic optimism over a possible “end of history”,1136 brought about by the 
seemingly unchallenged supremacy of liberal democracy, was soon thwarted 
by the empirical observation of a much different reality. In fact, only some of 
the countries that embarked on a transition away from authoritarianism con-
solidated into stable liberal democracies. The majority of them did not follow 
suit and as of today, not only are these regimes not democratic, but they are 
no longer even “in transition” to democracy. Nor did they remain purely au-
thoritarian (with some notable exceptions, such as China): most of them truly 
underwent a regime change, whose trajectory, did not lead them to liberal de-
mocracy, but rather to mixed forms of political configurations in which formal 
democratic institutions coexist with substantial authoritarian practices.1137
Comparative democratization studies only recently started to take seriously 
the theoretical, empirical and normative problems raised by the proliferation 
of hybrid political regimes. More particularly, the literature that has emerged 
since the early 2000s has focused on the question of how to conceptualize 
these regimes: are they stuck in a transitional “limbo” or have they rather con-
solidated their political systems, albeit not in the way hoped for by the democ-
1136 Francis Fukuyama. The End Of History And The Last Man. New York: Free Press. 1992.
1137 Larry Diamond. 2002. “Thinking About Hybrid Regimes.” Journal of Democracy 13 
(2): 21-35.  
Andreas Schedler (ed.), 2006. Electoral Authoritarianism. The Dynamics of Unfree 
Competition. London: Lynne Rienner.
Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way. 2010. Competitive Authoritarianism. Hybrid 
Regimes After the Cold War. New York: Cambridge University Press.
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racy-promoters? And what consequences does this have for the stability of 
the regime? The present paper tries to address these questions by reviewing 
the existing literature and attempting a classification. It will further formulate 
a theory with regard to the role of contestation as a pivotal concept for the 
regime’s stability. The analysis will be concluded with the introduction of two 
case studies: Russia and Iran.
THE TRANSITION PARADIGM AND THE ILLUSION OF 
DYNAMICITY
Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe Schmitter, in their seminal work in 1986, 
were already warning about the uncertain outcome of transition, which could 
easily lead to hybrid forms that they labeled as democradura and dictablan-
da.1138 Yet much of the transition literature that followed has been flawed by a 
“democratization bias,” whereby regimes breaking away from authoritarianism 
were seen as necessarily heading towards democracy. As a consequence, 
their political situation is analyzed in terms of their movement toward or away 
from it.1139 This bias has led analysts to overstretch the concepts of “transi-
tion” and “consolidation,” encompassing cases where no real move towards 
democracy can be observed, such as in Russia, Congo or Cambodia. Indeed, 
adjectives such as “flawed,” “protracted,” “unfinished” or “stuck” transitions 
reveal the inadequacy of this interpretative lens. Through the empirical test, 
only a minority of the so-called “third wave countries” became fully-fledged 
democracies, while the majority entered the grey zone of hybrid regimes. Ex-
pectations about their democratic consolidation, which seem to be implied in 
the terminology of the “transition paradigm” appear to be mere wishful think-
ing, as “the assumption that hybrid regimes are (or should be) moving in a 
democratic direction lacks empirical foundation”.1140
This “dynamicity illusion” is dictated by the erroneous belief that the way from 
authoritarianism to democracy is a linear, mono-dimensional path. The variety of 
outcomes witnessed in the last two decades, however, have sufficiently demon-
strated that most of the current hybrid regimes constitute “alternative directions, 
not way stations to liberal democracy”.1141 It is therefore not a mere matter of 
1138 Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter. 1986. Transitions from Authoritarian 
Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies.Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, p. 9.
1139 Thomas Carothers, 2002. “The End of the Transition Paradigm.” Journal of Democ-
racy 13(1): 5- 21.
1140 Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way. 2010. Competitive Authoritarianism. Hybrid Re-
gimes After the Cold War. New York: Cambridge University Press, p. 4.
1141 Carothers. Op. cit., p. 14
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“moving forward,” or “backward”. Still, Larry Diamond, in one of his contribu-
tions on democratic consolidation, seems to maintain that this is the case when 
arguing that “if the shallow, troubled, and recently established democracies of 
the world do not move forward […] they are likely to move backward”.1142 Yet the 
persistence of some hybrid regimes for nearly two decades has shown that they 
can have some stability as they are, reaching a “dysfunctional equilibrium”1143 
which may be long-lasting. Hybrid regimes are here to stay.
Another crucial flaw highlighted by Carothers is the excessive reliance on 
electoral processes as “generators” of democracy. As mentioned above, most 
hybrid regimes, even those with the strongest authoritarian flavor, possess some 
formal characteristics of democratic elections. Elections, in fact, “are a neces-
sary but not sufficient characteristic of democracy”.1144 First of all, in order to be 
meaningful, elections need to be free and fair: competition for public office must 
be real and there must be a reasonable level of “uncertainty of outcome”.1145 
This means that the number of candidates must exceed the number of posts, 
that they must exhibit significantly different programmatic positions, and that no 
arbitrary disqualifications shall be posited by electoral rules. The voting process 
shall be secret, transparent and free, without pressures on voters nor relevant 
frauds. Regimes that do not fulfill these criteria, regardless of the formal setup of 
multiparty elections that they may display, violate the minimal democratic “rules 
of the game” to such an extent that defining them as democracies, no matter 
how “flawed,” “virtual” or “unconsolidated,” is plainly misleading. 
Free and fair elections, however, are not sufficient, as some cases like Mex-
ico, Moldova, Venezuela, Honduras, Nicaragua, Ecuador, Nepal, Bangladesh 
and others seem to show. As highlighted by Larry Diamond, the debate on 
hybrid regimes brings back to the table the never-completely-settled debate 
about what democracy actually is.1146 By looking at these countries’ political 
systems, we can spot the pitfalls of a minimalist, procedural, “Schumpeteri-
an” definition of democracy that only focuses on the electoral process. For a 
democracy to be liberal, in fact, the protection of civil liberties, fundamental 
rights, media pluralism and the rule of law are of vital importance. Focusing 
on the electoral processes alone, without adopting a broader definition of de-
mocracy, results in an inflated use of the democratic label which, although not 
totally misplaced, still misleadingly puts liberal and illiberal democracies on an 
equal footing.
1142 Larry Diamond. 1999. Developing Democracy. Toward Consolidation. Baltimore and 
London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, p. 64.
1143 Carothers. Op. cit., p. 13.
1144 Schedler, “Elections Without Democracy. The Menu of Manipulation”, Op. cit., p. 37.
1145 Adam Przeworski. 1991. Democracy and the market: Political and economic reforms 
in Eastern Europe and Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
1146 Diamond, “Thinking About Hybrid Regimes”, op. cit.
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A MATTER OF KIND OR DEGREE?
Defining univocally regime types is highly controversial since, to a certain ex-
tent, all regimes are hybrid and boundaries “are idealizations that admit vary-
ing degrees of realization in actual political practice”.1147 This is precisely what 
Robert Dahl implied when he introduced the distinction between democracy 
as an “ideal-type” and its real existing approximation, “polyarchy”.1148 Hence, 
hybrid regimes constitute a heterogeneous category that can be conceptual-
ized by referring to the similarities with the closer extreme ideal types (democ-
racy or authoritarianism), without for this renouncing to its conceptual inde-
pendence, nor its multi-dimensionality. Hybrid regime “is not an exceptional 
category … it is a state of normality for many societies”.1149
One common characteristic of virtually all these regimes is that they try to por-
tray themselves as democratic. International pressure has played a large role in 
establishing democracy as the only legitimate game in town. Yet if more regimes 
than ever before are shaping themselves into the form of democracy, most of them 
fail to meet the substantive test. Following Linz’s early mapping of regime types 
(published originally in 1975), where he makes a reference to “pseudo-multiparty 
systems”,1150 we can generally label these regimes as pseudodemocratic, “in that 
the existence of formally democratic political institutions, such as multiparty elec-
toral competition, masks (often, in part, to legitimate) the reality of authoritarian 
domination”1151. This dissonance posits the following question: are the differences 
between these mixed forms of regime and liberal democracies a matter of degree 
or kind? Are they simply less democratic, or something completely different? 
AN ATTEMPTED CLASSIFICATION
The ambiguous, shaky nature of hybrid regimes has favored the proliferation of 
labels and categories among scholars of democratization. Semi-democracy, 
delegative, electoral or limited democracy, competitive, electoral, soft or lib-
eralized authoritarianism, together with Freedom House’s “partly free” are just 
some examples. Yet not all of these regimes share the same features, and a 
rough classification is both possible and necessary. Schedler divides hybrid 
1147 Schedler, “Elections Without Democracy. The Menu of Manipulation”, op. cit., p. 38.
1148 Robert Dahl .1971. Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition. New Haven: Yale Uni-
versity Press.
1149 Carothers, “The End of the Transition Paradigm”, op. cit., p. 18.
1150 Juan J. Linz. Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 
2000, p. 60.
1151 Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz and Seymour Martin Lipset, (eds.) 1989. Democracy in 
Developing Countries: Latin America. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, p. xviii
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regimes into defective democracies, new authoritarianisms and hybrid regimes 
stricto sensu.1152
Although this latter category seems to be merely residual, the division between 
what we may call “democracies with adjectives”1153 and new authoritarianisms is 
helpful. Under the former label, we can put those regimes that fulfill the minimum 
requirement for electoral democracies, namely free and fair elections, but lack 
essential attributes of liberal democracies. The adjective usually refers to the 
particular flaw, such as delegative,1154 illiberal,1155 or clientelist.1156 To this catego-
ry belong also O’Donnell and Schmitter’s democradura,1157  as well as Carothers’ 
“feckless pluralism”.1158 In spite of these shortcomings, these regimes can still 
be defined as electoral democracies, and the distance from their liberal counter-
parts is in fact a matter of degree in terms of Quality of Democracy.
A different case is that of “new authoritarianisms”, where the demo-
cratic façade is a mere deception. This category encompasses disguised 
dictatorships,1159 dictablandas1160, dominant-power politics,1161 competitive au-
thoritarianisms1162 and electoral authoritarianisms.1163 These regimes “play the 
game of multiparty elections by holding regular elections for the chief execu-
tive and a national legislative assembly. Yet they violate the liberal-democratic 
principles of freedom and fairness so profoundly and systematically that they 
render elections instruments of authoritarian rule rather than ‘instruments of 
democracy’”1164. They are nevertheless markedly different from the classic au-
thoritarianism, where “no viable channels exist for opposition to contest legally 
for executive power”,1165 such as in Saudi Arabia, China or the former Soviet 
1152 Schedler, Electoral Authoritarianism, op. cit.
1153 David Collier and Steven Levitsky. 1997. “Democracy with Adjectives: Conceptual 
Innovation in Comparative Research.” World Politics 49(3): pp. 430-451.
1154 Guillermo O’Donnell. “Delegative Democracy.” Journal of Democracy 5 (1): 1994, pp. 
55-69.
1155 Fareed Zakaria. The future of democracy: Illiberal democracy at home and abroad. 
New York: WW Norton, 2003.
1156 Herbert Kitschelt. “Linkages between citizens and politicians in democratic polities.” 
Comparative Political Studies 33(6-7), 2000, pp. 845-879.
1157 O’Donnell and Schmitter. Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions 
about Uncertain Democracies, op. cit.
1158 Carothers, op. cit.
1159 Paul Brooker, 2000. Non-democratic Regimes: Theory, Government and Politics. St. 
Martin’s Press
1160 O’Donnell and Schmitter. Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions 
about Uncertain Democracies, op. cit.
1161 Carothers, op. cit.
1162 Levitsky and Way, op. cit.
1163 Schedler. Electoral Authoritarianism. The Dynamics of Unfree Competition, op. cit.
1164 Ibid., p. 3.
1165 Levitsky and Way, op. cit., p. 7.
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Union. On the contrary, here elections take place with some minimal degree 
of contestation and some limited forms of pluralism. Unlike classic oligarchic 
regimes, they endorse universal suffrage and mass participation, and unlike 
monarchies, the head of state or government (or both) are subject to electoral 
confirmation. “Rather than ‘partial,’ ‘incomplete’ or ‘unconsolidated’ democ-
racies, these cases should be conceptualized for what they are: a distinct, 
nondemocratic regime type”.1166
Among the most successful typologies for this latter category there are Schedler’s 
“electoral authoritarianism” and Levitsky and Way’s “competitive authoritarian-
isms”. These concepts are utterly similar and can be employed almost interchange-
ably, although a difference in degree does exist in terms of the level of contestation. 
As detected by Diamond, in competitive authoritarian regimes authoritarian rulers 
are insecure, while in “hegemonic” electoral regimes they are invincible. The follow-
ing pages will be dedicated to the analysis of “electoral authoritarianisms,” whereby 
Schedler’s term is used as a general category for those authoritarian regimes in 
which elections present some form of contestation of any degree.
THE GOWN DOES NOT MAKE THE FRIAR
One thing is to draw theoretic typologies; another is to empirically categorize po-
litical regimes. For electoral authoritarianisms, scholarly consensus is usually diffi-
cult to reach, given the dissonance between the declared and the actual nature of 
the regime. They promulgate constitutions, organize elections, set up parliaments, 
courts, local governments and supervisory authorities. They even allow private 
media and some degree of civic society organisms. None of these institutions, 
however, is designed to serve as counterbalancing mechanisms to governmental 
power. Although they portray a liberal-democratic landscape, their contribution to 
the rule of law and accountability (both vertical and horizontal) is fictive.
While outspoken supporters will praise their political system as “democra-tic,” 
or at least as “in transition to democracy,” or even pursuing “its own form of 
democracy,” the reality, especially as seen from the point of view of the opposi-
tion, may be extremely different. The incumbent rulers may even be so skilled 
in their manipulation of the channels of access to power that the illusion of a 
multiparty system may be even credible and subject to only minor criticism. In 
this case, the continuous defeat and marginalization of the opposition forces is 
usually justified as an exogenous consequence of the opposition’s incapacity 
or the genuine preference of the population for the incumbent party. Of course, 
it may well be the case that the opposition is actually ravaged by internal strife, 
organizational weakness and an incapacity to reach the wider electorate, but 
this condition of inferiority in this sort of regime has to be seen rather as a conse-
1166 Lewitsky and Way, op. cit., p. 4.
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quence, and not as a cause of the opposition’s exclusion from political power. In 
fact, in order to present themselves as committed to multipartism, oppositional 
forces are usually granted some representation in the legislative arena, although 
their participation in decision-making is usually voided by the solid majority of 
the ruling party or by the marginalization of the legislative organ, as such in favor 
of the strong role of the executive. It is then clear to what extent “the main meth-
odological difficulty in identifying electoral authoritarian regimes lies in the ob-
stacles that they establish to the visibility of their manipulative practices”,1167 thus 
compelling the analysis to operate a distinction between form and substance, 
between institutional approach and more actor-based ones, such as resource 
mobilization, power networks, political culture and informal practices.
Another difficulty is dictated by the imperfect information we possess on citizens’ 
opinion formation. Authoritarian practices, in fact, affect not only the way in which 
citizens’ preferences are expressed (through manipulation of elections, unfair elec-
toral laws, gerrymandering, exclusion of some parties from entering the competition, 
etc.) but also the way in which opinions are formed (through control of the media, 
monopoly of economic resources, patronage networks and pork-barrel spending, 
etc.). In this context, even a methodology based on opinion-surveys would not shed 
light on the dilemma as to what extent citizens’ preferences are formed independ-
ently from the authoritarian context. Levitsky and Way, for instance, argue that in a 
“competitive authoritarian” regime, voting results are manipulated but not subject to 
massive fraud, therefore making the act of voting not completely useless1168. If this 
is the case, electoral manipulation – although existent – would then amount only to 
a small share of the overall cast votes. For a relatively small percentage of votes to 
successfully determine the electoral outcome and a sufficient margin to secure the 
lead to the regime, the electoral outcome must be already sufficiently skewed in 
favor of the incumbent (or at least not excessively unfavorable to it) prior to the ma-
nipulation. This is compatible with the idea that the regime’s electoral manipulation 
starts already at the moment of opinion creation, and not simply at the time of voting.
CONTESTATION
From a historical perspective, the authoritarian use of elections is nothing 
new.1169 Elections were and are performed even in obvious authoritarian re-
gimes, such as in the former communist regimes of Eastern Europe, most of 
the former military juntas in Latin America, Belarus, Turkmenistan, China, North 
1167 Schedler, Electoral Authoritarianism. The Dynamics of Unfree Competition, op. cit., 
p. 7.
1168 Levitsky and Way, op. cit., p. 8.
1169 Diamond, “Thinking About Hybrid Regimes”, op. cit., p. 22; Schedler, Electoral Au-
thoritarianism. The Dynamics of Unfree Competition, op. cit., p. 1.
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Korea, Congo, Sudan and more recently in Syria, Myanmar, and others. Yet 
their degree of contestation is equal to zero, as the control of public authority 
over the result is nearly complete. In electoral authoritarian regimes, however, 
“official election results are the combined outcome of two unknown and unob-
servable variables – popular preferences and authoritarian manipulation”.1170 
“Competition is thus real but unfair”.1171
Manipulation of elections can take many forms, including discriminatory 
rules, control over the media and financing sources, restriction to public meet-
ings and demonstrations, corruption and patronage, establishment of mock 
parties and formal and informal pressure on voters, until outright repression, 
coercion and electoral fraud. Elections represent therefore a central arena of 
struggle, but it is not their final outcome that is at stake, but rather the process, 
which takes the form of “fluid, adaptive, contested games whose basic rules 
players try to redefine as they play the game itself”.1172
Albeit unfair, the intent of authoritarian leaders in allowing electoral competi-
tion is to obtain popular (and external) legitimation for the regime, reinforcing 
the validity of its claims to power by creating a fictional national unity. “Their 
dream is to reap the fruits of electoral legitimacy without running the risks 
of democratic uncertainty”1173. However, elections are an ambivalent tool: the 
more the regime is hybrid, the more they assume importance as a “critical 
juncture” in the regimes’ dynamic of stability and change. If they can demon-
strate the popularity of the authoritarian rulers, they at the same time create 
an opportunity structure for opposition forces to present alternative views and 
unmask the democratic façade of the political process. 
The “dysfunctional equilibrium” of electoral authoritarian regimes can hence 
be broken, since these regimes, no matter how deeply institutionalized, never 
fully consolidate. It is their very nature, characterized by a mismatch between 
norms and behavior (both necessary for consolidation to happen, according 
to Diamond),1174 that prevents it. Elections can therefore also work as a desta-
bilizing element if the authoritarian polity becomes too “competitive.” In this 
situation, the regime has two options: counterattack and increase repressive 
measures or work to gain real consensus. Although this usually takes the tone 
of reckless populism and remains highly skewed in terms of advantaged over 
the opponents, it is still a step into the antechamber of democracy.
1170 Ibid. p. 1-2.
1171 Levitsky and Way, op. cit., p. 5.
1172 Schedler, Electoral Authoritarianism. The Dynamics of Unfree Competition, op. cit., 
p. 12.
1173 Schedler. “Elections Without Democracy. The Menu of Manipulation”, op. cit., p. 37.
1174 Diamond. 1999. Developing Democracy. Toward Consolidation, op. cit.
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CASE STUDIES
The two cases, Russia and Iran, are both situated on the rather “authoritar-
ian edge” of hybrid regimes. Although Russia’s hybrid nature is relatively 
undisputed,1175 the literature is more reticent on Iran. Levitsky and Way exclude 
the Islamic Republic from their analysis of “competitive authoritarian” regimes, 
since they consider the Iranian case to fall under a different type of hybrid 
regime type, namely “tutelary regime,” a polity where “elections are competi-
tive but the power of elected governments is constrained by non-elected re-
ligious … authorities”.1176 However, this classification is based on the forms 
of exercise of power rather on the mechanisms of access to it. While the two 
dimensions cross-influence each other, it is to be stressed that the defining 
characteristics, alongside which electoral or competitive authoritarian regimes 
are defined, pertains chiefly to the processes of access to power (electoral, 
multiparty façade). If it is true that in Iran the religious “supreme leader” acts as 
a non-elected tutelary power, then it can hardly be claimed on the other hand 
that electoral competition for offices is genuine. Electoral manipulation, repres-
sion of opposition and freedom of expression, as well as candidates vetting, 
contribute to the balance of the electoral process tilting in favor of the incum-
bent executive. Taking this crucial element as our case selection criteria, it 
becomes clear that the Iranian case is well-suited for comparison with Russia. 
RUSSIA
Russia was considered for a long time to be a “country in transition”, and 
sometimes it still is.1177 It has however, become clear, especially since the 2012 
elections that “reinstated” Vladimir Putin as president of the Federation that 
Russia is not heading towards liberal democracy. On the contrary, its transi-
tion had led to an electoral authoritarian regime, which found its ideological 
formulation (or rather justification) in Vladislav Surkov’s idea of “sovereign de-
mocracy” (сувереннаядемократия). With this catchphrase, the Kremlin intends 
to make the point that the Russian Federation is indeed a democracy, just not 
a liberal, western one. In reaction to what it perceives as intrusive western 
1175 Richard Sakwa. 2010. “The Dual State in Russia.” Post-Soviet Affairs 26 (3): 185-
206; Levitsky and Way. Competitive Authoritarianism. Hybrid Regimes After the Cold 
War, op. cit.; Schedler. Electoral Authoritarianism. The Dynamics of Unfree Competi-
tion, op. cit.; Diamond, Larry. 2002. “Thinking About Hybrid Regimes”, op. cit.; Liliia 
Fedorovna Shevtsova, and Mark H. Eckert. 2001. “Russia’s hybrid regime.” Journal 
of Democracy 12 (4), pp.  65-70.
1176 Levitsky and Way, Competitive Authoritarianism. Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War, p. 14.
1177 For instance, McFaul (1999) talks about a “protracted transition”.
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(especially American) pressure, and in line with its anti-unipolar foreign policy, 
Russian leaders are eager to reaffirm their autonomy in handling the country’s 
political course, both at the level of principles and in political practice. This 
“sovereignty” translates into an exclusive and all-encompassing right of the 
government to supervise the definition of its institutional forms and political 
procedures, a monopoly over collective memory, political decisions, economic 
priorities and a strong grip over civil society, deemed necessary in order to en-
sure stability and, through national cohesion, strength. In a society where – af-
ter the chaotic years of Yeltsin’s presidency – order and stability are perceived 
as far more important principles than democracy, a strong leader and a strong 
state still remain the main legitimizing elements of Putinism and his preserva-
tion of a centralized, hierarchic and personalized institutional setting1178. 
The concept of “sovereign democracy” betrays the hybrid nature of the Rus-
sian regime, as well as its ambivalent relation with the west, primarily with the 
European Union. In its external relations, Russia punctually subscribes to the 
declarations of the Council of Europe and sees the west as one of its main 
points of cultural references. At the same time, the contacts with the west are 
relegated to economic-technological issues, while maintaining the defensive 
on political-ideological ones. On the domestic front, if, on the one hand, Russia 
formally upholds the general principles of democracy, on the other hand the 
notions of “national interest” and “sovereignty” sanction their negation. 
The 1993 Russian constitution is, after all, a fundamentally liberal document, 
proclaiming civil rights and freedoms as well as democratic representative 
institutions – the internet is not censored, freedom of movement across the 
borders is granted and numerous political parties exist. But as the theory on 
electoral authoritarianisms predicts, these guarantees turn out to be voided 
by what Sakwa calls “para-constitutionalist behavior”,1179 where strict consti-
tutional conservatism is coupled with the practice of bending and adapting 
the rules to the political end. In Russia this was pursued through the logic of 
a “power vertical,” namely the creation of agencies accountable to the execu-
tive power replacing the intermediary autonomous bodies.  A gulf has opened 
between state and society, whereby the constitutional institutions supposed 
to fill this gap have either been disempowered or coopted and corrupted from 
above. Not casually, when Sakwa postulates a Russian “dual state,” divided 
between a formal-constitutional and an administrative-informal one, he repli-
cates precisely that sort of dualism between form and substance that is the 
hallmark of hybrid regimes.
1178 Paolo Calzini. 2007. “Democrazia e sovranità nella Russia di Putin.” Relazioni Inter-
nazionali 66, pp.  66-75.
1179 Sakwa. “The Dual State in Russia”, op. cit.
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This trend is especially visible in the “arena of contestation”1180 most crucial 
for electoral authoritarian regimes, that is to say the elections. It has become 
almost a truism that “in Russian elections, it is the outcome that is certain, 
while the electoral rules are protean and constantly rewritten to effect the de-
sired result.1181 It is true that Russia has a number of political parties and that 
the 2012 elections took place in a context of mass mobilization in the main 
urban centers, against electoral frauds and for a “Russia without Putin,” but 
this did not prevent the expected result from materializing. The mixed use of 
repression, cooptation, vote-falsification, nationalist rhetoric, control over the 
media, state finances and local administrative elites, along with a strong cam-
paign against independent civil society organizations (and especially those 
receiving funding from abroad, portrayed as Trojan horses of the countries’ 
opponents) has once again managed to have Putin reinstated in the Kremlin, 
after the symbolic intermezzo of Medvedev. 
As Krastev and Holmes have argued, Russia’s rigged elections are not just 
a decorative façade.1182 Their role is not to select the country’s leadership, 
but they are not a complete fabrication either. Many observers contend that 
even without electoral manipulation, Putin would have obtained a sufficient 
majority both in 2000 and 2004 (and arguably also in 2012), although less pro-
nounced.1183 If, then, the manipulation at the level of opinion formation would 
have been sufficient, why hold stage rigged elections? Krastev and Holmes 
have a point when they suggest that these serve “to construct and drive home, 
on a regular basis, the ‘no alternative’ rationale for Putin’s rule”.1184 Rather than 
a risk for the perpetuation of the elite’s power, then, elections serve the role of 
consolidating it by displaying national cohesion, which is instrumental to the 
stability that a strong determined leader can offer. Their “free and fair” nature 
is, after all, of secondary importance. “The regime’s need to simulate some sort 
of coherent Russian nationhood has therefore been infinitely greater and much 
more urgent than its need to imitate an imported  model of democracy”.1185 
Elections are also an effective instrument to discipline regional elites, which, 
being directly dependent upon the President, can be easily replaced in the 
case of unsatisfactory results.1186
1180 Levitsky and Way. Competitive Authoritarianism. Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War, 
op. cit.
1181 Ivan Krastev and Stephen Holmes. 2012. “Putinism Under Siege. An Autopsy of 
Managed Democracy.” Journal of Democracy 23 (3): pp. 33-45.
1182 Ibid.
1183 Ibid., p. 35.
1184 Ibid.
1185 Ibid., p. 38.
1186 Ibid.
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IRAN
Similarly to Russia, the Iranian Islamic Republic can be seen as the result of 
a “failed revolution.” Although differently from the former Soviet Republic, 
whose revolution had been rather “passive,” the Iranian regime emerged from 
a strongly domestic and popular movement, initially having a great degree of 
legitimacy. This important feature has been crucial for providing the necessary 
political and cultural capital to the idea of Islamic revolution and the ensuing 
establishment of a semi-theocratic regime. However, the forces that united to 
overthrow the Shah were not composed only of religious factions opposed to 
his pro-western attitude, but also of democratic, socialist and secular forces 
who advocated a democratization of the institutions and popular participation. 
Although the instauration of the Islamic Republic by the Ayatollah Khomeini 
marked the success of the first over the second, still this mix of ideological 
sources of inspiration that composed the revolution have materialized in the 
fundamentally hybrid nature of the Iranian regime.
Iran presents “a strange combination of remarkably competitive elections 
and harsh repression”1187 operating at two levels: the superior level is the one 
of the tutelary power of the clerical-led Guardian Council, which enjoys consid-
erable executive power and, most importantly, the faculty to discretionarily vet 
candidates to presidency. The second, inferior level is represented by the ex-
ecutive itself, which since the 2005 election of Ahmadinejad as president has 
greatly increased the deployment of the state’s repressive apparatus against 
oppositional voices. This dual-tier system limits the prerogatives of the presi-
dent while it multiplies the possible sources of repression. This duality of pow-
er has created a sort of inconsistency in the system which allowed, in 1997, 
the election of the reformist leader Mohammad Khatami to the presidency, and 
which later, in May 2011, caused the outbreak of an internal power-struggle 
between President Ahmadinejad and the Supreme Leader, threatening the 
President himself with impeachment. This multiplicity of authorities dominat-
ing Iran’s political life represent well how the competitive side of an authoritar-
ian regime can develop, not only from the existence of contested elections 
(which Iran possesses), but also from the inbuilt ‘dissonances’ which, instead 
of pointing to a coherent system, represent “the deliberate and uneasy linking 
of competing notions of political community”.1188
From this point of view, the strange combination of repression and com-
petitive elections does not seem to result from what Brumberg calls a “survival 
1187 Marc F. Plattner and Larry Diamond. 2000. “Is Iran Democratizing?” Journal of De-
mocracy 11 (4): p. 107.
1188 Daniel Brumberg. 2000. “Is Iran Democratizing? A Comparativist’s Perspective.” 
Journal of Democracy 11 (4), p. 130.
 HYBRID REGIMES: STUCK IN TRANSITION OR FULLY-FLEDGED REGIMES?...   369
strategy” of the Iranian conservative clerical elites meant to lend legitimacy 
to the system.1189 Instead, it seems to be rather a contingent result stemming 
from the built-in loopholes in the constitutional system which, in spite of its 
closed design where the final authority resides in the religious leaders, is un-
able to contain the potentially reformist drives that elections and parties con-
vey. Elections in fact represent one of the few channels to express preferences 
independently from the ruling clerics. It is of significance, however, that the 
conservative judiciary in 2000 closed more than 100 reformist newspapers and 
jailed hundreds of liberal journalists and activists1190 and the Guardian Council 
barred from participation most of the reformist candidates in order to favor the 
victory of the conservative mayor of Tehran, Ahmadinejad. This type of incident 
occurred again in 2009, when the Council authorized only 3 of 475 proposed 
candidates,1191 yet did not prevent the popular Mir Hussein Mousavi from 
emerging as a credible challenger to Ahmadinejad, who had to resort to mas-
sive repression against a resurging civil society to confirm his hold on power.
CONCLUSION
The Iranian case demonstrates even more clearly than the Russian one that, 
as argued in the theoretical part, elections may represent a threat for leaders 
in electoral authoritarian regimes. This is especially the case in regimes where 
apparent stability in reality hides a latent, non-consolidated regime charac-
terized by internal power struggles and where opposition leaders represent 
a credible alternative. In order to maintain a “dysfunctional equilibrium,” the 
regime must therefore increase its dose of repression and control. More regime 
opening implies often a stronger burden for the state, to keep it under control. 
The existence of some degree of media freedom, for example, implies the 
necessity to constantly repress it.1192 This tendency towards a more accentu-
ated authoritarianism is visible also in Russia1193 as the result of the increasing 
challenges coming from civil society activism against Putin’s regime. However, 
the deeper sedimentation of the system and the absence of viable opposition 
leaders reduce the risks of the regime’s order being challenged.
Hybrid regimes and electoral authoritarian regimes in particular, do possess 
their own modus vivendi and can be enduring if they manage to maintain the 
suboptimal equilibrium that represents one of their main features. As the Rus-
1189 Ibid.
1190 Freedom House. 2012. “Iran.” Freedom in the World 2012. Available at http://www.
freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2012/iran.
1191 Ibid.
1192 Levitsky and Way, op. cit.
1193 Calzini, op. cit.
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sian and the Iranian cases show, elections can be both a source of empower-
ment and a threat. While in Russia they are functional to consolidate the idea 
of national unity and the supremacy of the incumbent over all other opponents 
and apparatchiks, in Iran – where they are arguably more free and fair – they 
represent a channel of “voice” outside the hegemonic powers, which exposes 
the deep division of the society. The apparent internal contradictions of hybrid 
regimes, then, represent a threat only if coupled with other, structural pitfalls 
and/or agency-based “strengths” (or weaknesses, from the regime’s point of 
view), such as an active civil society and oppositional parties capable of aggre-
gating consensus. At this point, the only way to survive without further opening 
to real contestation is an increase in repression, a strategy that, while effective 
in the short run, may prove counter-productive in the long run.
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GETTING OUR MONEY’S WORTH:  
THE IMPACT OF US AID 
ON DEMOCRATIZATION IN UKRAINE
tHOmAS ALexAnder GILLIS
Since the collapse of the USSR, the United States pushed to democratize the 
former Soviet sphere of influence. Continuing North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-
tion (NATO) expansion and the enlargement of the European Union (EU) have 
smashed the formerly impenetrable Iron Curtain, pushing Russia’s area of con-
trol further and further back. Over the last decade and continuing to today, 
Ukraine, the cradle of Russian civilization, has become the most vital and re-
vealing arena for these powers to compete, both symbolically and pragmati-
cally. With the Orange Revolution in 2004 and the surge of protests towards 
the end of 2013, it became apparent that Ukraine has a realistic chance at 
reforming into a functional democracy. The most powerful weapon each player 
possesses in this conflict is the mercenary incentive of financial aid. However, 
a key question remains: what is the most effective target of foreign aid funding 
in the struggle to democratize this former socialist republic?
In order to properly assess the success and shortcomings of democratiza-
tion efforts in Ukraine, it is first necessary to determine the goals of the United 
States. The main question that must be answered is whether the United States 
has been more interested in fostering a real shift towards democracy or merely 
establishing another friendly government in the former territory of its archrival. 
To explain this, I have employed the “realist-normative power” model that Chi-
ara Ruffa presents on EU policies toward Lebanon1194, as well as David Hyde-
Price’s neorealist model of analysis.1195 In this case, Ruffa frames the EU’s poli-
cies as both a symptom of its normative goals and its realist predisposition 
towards protecting itself and expanding its own power. 
These objectives apply equally well in the US-Ukrainian case. Despite lofty 
words about the importance of human rights and democracy, aid patterns 
suggest the United States acted opportunistically, using financial incentives in 
an attempt to foster closer ties and friendly relations with the Ukrainian govern-
1194 Chiara Ruffa, “Realist-Normative Power Europe? Explaining EU Policies Toward 
Lebanon from an IR Perspective,” Comparative European Politics 9, Nº 4 (2011) 
www.palgrave-journals.com/cep/journal/v9/n4/full/cep201117a.html, p. 562. (Ac-
cessed May 3, 2013).
1195 Adrian Hyde-Price, “Normative Power Europe: A Realist Critique,” Journal of Euro-
pean Public Policy 13, Nº 2 (2006), http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13501760500451634 
(accessed April 3, 2013).
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ment, particularly capitalizing on the initial success of the Orange Revolution 
in 2004. Regardless of the true intent, the correlation between aid patterns 
and the timeline of Ukrainian political events suggests that the goals of both 
democratization and power maximization are best achieved by using the same 
tool: foreign aid given to civil actors with the intent to strengthen civil society. 
This normative-realist approach provides a number of advantages over 
better established frameworks in International Relations Theory. Normative-
realism bridges the incomplete analysis offered by structural realist and liberal 
theory on their own. This article will consider US aid to Ukraine as a product 
of these goals. Hyde-Price’s approach helps move beyond the “explicitly nor-
mative” “liberal-idealist” view that is unable to objectively examine the power-
seeking strategies that come with the promotion of “normative” goals.1196 This 
approach is crucial to explaining why Western aid fluctuated and shifted recipi-
ents at key political junctures throughout Ukraine’s existence as a sovereign 
state, leading to the results that will be the ultimate focus of this research. 
The analysis will be broken into two distinct periods: the era between gain-
ing independence and the Orange Revolution, and the era including the Or-
ange Revolution and continuing to the present. The Orange Revolution marks 
a change in Ukraine’s relationship with the US which correlates to change in 
the aid pattern. Although it is impossible to draw a causal conclusion from this 
data alone, establishing a correlation provides meaningful evidence of a link 
between aid to civil society organizations and steps towards democratization, 
as well as a framework that can be used to test other cases.
PRE-REVOLUTIONARY ERA 
After gaining its independence in 1991, Ukraine struggled with the transition to a free 
market economy and privatization throughout the 1990s. The economy was char-
acterized by hyperinflation, poverty, and high disparities in per capita income. Esti-
mates place the per capita GDP of Ukrainians at just $1,307 USD as of 1991.1197 The 
national economy contracted annually since independence until 1996, anywhere 
from 9.7-22.7%.1198 Rampant corruption and the rapidly growing shadow economy 
negatively colored Western perceptions of the Ukrainian domestic situation.1199
In addition to the economic volatility, Ukraine’s political orientation towards Rus-
sia or the West was an issue that went largely unresolved in the 1990s. Although 
1196 Ibid., 218.
1197 Pekka Sutela, “The Underachiever: Ukraine’s Economy Since 1991,” Carnegie 
Endowment for Global Peace,http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/03/09/undera-
chiever-ukraine-s-economy-since-1991# (accessed May 5, 2013).
1198 Ibid.
1199 Ibid.
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Ukrainians displayed a strong will to “preserve the Union of Socialist Soviet Re-
publics as a renewed federation of equal sovereign republics” at an overwhelm-
ingly high 83.5% in 1991, Russia remained in a weakened position throughout 
the 1990’s, rendering it unable to exercise its historical influence in the region.1200
The United States government was the largest bilateral donor of economic 
assistance to Ukraine from 1992-2010.1201 Fortunately for this study, the US 
also provided some of the most detailed qualitative data on this assistance, al-
though changes in account/funding categorization do render a comparison of 
the 1990s to the 2000s slightly problematic. This aid flow seemed to correlate 
with the maintenance of a steady political relationship with the United States 
and Ukraine’s consistently poor economy. The one notable fluctuation in US 
aid in the period coincided with the only major political dispute.1202
The pillar upon which US-Ukrainian relations were built in the 1990s was the 
FREEDOM (Freedom for Russia and Emerging [Eurasian] Democracies and 
Open Markets) Support Act (FSA). This legislation, established in 1992, was 
the mechanism with which the US approached Ukraine and the other former-
Soviet republics during the transition period.1203 In the case of Ukraine, USAID 
reports on total economic assistance1204 showed a spike from 0.65 million USD 
in 1992 to 198.85 million USD in 1993, an increase of over 30,000%.1205
Ukraine received large sums from the fund for USAID assistance grants (1994-
1998) and then from the fund for the assistance for the independent states of the 
former Soviet Union (1999-2006), operating under the FSA.1206 The FSA’s heavy 
emphasis on “Economy and Society” is quite evident, comprising 59.5% of the 
aid in 1994 and 46.1% in 1999.  The heavily weighted emphasis on economic 
assistance began to change drastically in the 2000s. From 2001 onward, USAID 
Economic Analysis Data Service (EADs) makes available its expenditures by sec-
tor and implementing partner type. Although data from 2001-2003 will not reflect 
1200 “Referendum on the Preservation of the USSR,” RIA Novosti,  http://en.rian.ru/info-
graphics/20110313/162959645.html (accessed May 2, 2013).
1201 Natalia Shapovalova, “Assessing Democracy Assistance: Ukraine,” Fride: A Europe-
an Think Tank for Global Action, www.fride.org/descarga/IP_WMD_Ucrania_ENG_
jul10.pdf (accessed April 26, 2013): 3.
1202 Thomas Alexander Gillis, “Foreign Aid and Democratization: The Impact of Western 
Assistance on the Orange Revolution” (master’s thesis, Central European University, 
2013), 47, 54.
1203 George H.W. Bush, “Statement on Signing the FREEDOM Support Act.” The Ameri-
can Presidency Project, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=21658 (accessed May 
3, 2013).
1204 This assistance includes both loans and grants.
1205 USAID,”Ukraine,”U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants (Greenbook), (accessed 
May 13, 2013). http://gbk.eads.usaidallnet.gov/query/do?_program=/eads/gbk/
tablesByCountry&cocode=4UKR
1206 Ibid.
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trends in the 1990s, these years can help establish a basis of comparison for the 
revolutionary and post-revolutionary period from 2004-2011. The pre-revolution 
era’s aid scheme can be characterized by its emphasis on economic stimulation 
over politicized democracy promotion. There is also a marked lack of aid flowing 
directly to non-US governmental recipients, i.e. the Ukrainian government.
DONOR MOTIVATION AND EFFECTIVENESS
US aid to Ukraine in the period directly following independence was a reflection of 
the US’s neorealist agenda, as outlined by Hyde Price. Because of its proximity, his-
torical connection, and entrenched social as well as political relationship with Russia, 
Ukraine is a priority for any international actor at odds with Russia. Aid is one facet 
through which the United States attempts to gain a competitive edge against Russia, 
utilizing aid in effort to secure influence in Ukraine, thereby maximizing its power in 
the region. Of course, funding the development of a free market economy and pro-
moting democracy, rule of law, and civil society are normative endeavors. Though 
the promotion of these goals is seen as being to the benefit of Ukraine’s population, 
they also serve to align Ukraine ideologically and politically with the United States 
This particular period, between independence and the Orange Revolution, 
featured a greater emphasis on Ukraine’s market economy. This matter got the 
most attention in this financially struggling nation because it was a particularly 
pressing issue, the amelioration of which the US assumed would bring natural 
strides in progress with regard to humanitarian and democratic issues. 
However, US aid must be viewed as politically motivated and not strictly an ef-
fort to improve the lives of Ukrainians by spreading democratic ideals. If the latter 
were true, explaining the surge in aid around elections would be difficult. Presi-
dential election years have higher funding than either the preceding or the follow-
ing year and parliamentary election years show more mild spikes in funding. This 
trend holds true not only for the pre-revolutionary period, but for Ukraine’s entire 
existence as a sovereign state. Peaks in aid were seen in 1994, 1999, 2004-2005, 
and 2010, all years in which presidential elections were to be held.1207 This sug-
gests that aid, though not necessarily geared toward campaigns, governmental 
parties, or other political groups, is designed to have an impact on the elections. 
As Copsey noted, there was often a pro-Western and a pro-Russian candidate. 
By bolstering efforts in general for election years, the US’s aid patterns could be 
seen as trying to influence the elections and maximize its political influence over the 
Ukrainian state.1208 However, if this is either the direct intent or indirect intent of this 
1207 Gillis, “Foreign Aid and Democratization: The Impact of Western Assistance on the 
Orange Revolution”,
1208 Nathaniel Copsey, “Ukraine,” In The Colour Revolutions in the Former Soviet Repub-
lics: Successes and Failures, London: Routledge, 2010: 35.
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pattern, its effectiveness is dubious.  Although the Orange Revolution did not break 
out until the elections at the end of 2004, I have chosen to include it in my analysis of 
aid in the Orange Revolution and the post-revolution era because it is distinct from 
the previous period in that 2004 would be a critical election year.1209 Outraged by the 
reported electoral fraud, Ukraine’s domestic situation turned its attention towards 
the opposition, headed by Viktor Yushchenko, and civil society development.
Although it has been suggested that the West’s role is frequently “overestimat-
ed,” the pivotal role played by the OSCE, a multilateral governmental organization, 
should not go unmentioned.1210 It is also pertinent to justify claiming the OSCE as 
a representative of the West. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe’s (OSCE) election monitoring results that indicated fraud in favor of Viktor 
Yanukovych were the only truly causal contribution of the West. The “neutral and 
disinterested” party’s findings were taken seriously and led to outrage among 
Ukrainians and the international community alike.1211 Foreign powers of the West 
demanded that the OSCE’s findings be addressed. For example, the European 
Parliament went so far as to pass a resolution calling for another election.1212
Different funds for democracy promotion experienced differing patterns. In the 
midst of the Orange Revolution, democracy promotion funds of USAID were at a 
record high in 2005 at 58 million USD, nearly a 170% increase from the previous 
year.1213 Increased funding for democracy assistance came from the NED as well 
as from the Millennium Challenge Corporation from 2006/2007 onward. There were 
also high expenditures in 2005 for NGOs, both non-US and US, although such sup-
port would ultimately decline in the period between 2004-2007.1214 The higher levels 
of funding for democracy aid in 2004-2005, such as increased funds for non-gov-
ernmental organizations (NGOs) via the NED coincide with their role in mobilizing 
protestors and supporting the massive protests.1215 Civil society groups supported 
by the US were generally politically aligned groups and, especially in this period, are 
often focused on “voter education and mobilisation.”1216
Thus, although US efforts to support civil society dropped off during this period, 
there was significant funding in the critical years of 2004-2005 during which mon-
1209 Taras Kuzio, “Regime Type And Politics In Ukraine Under Kuchma,” Communist 
and Post-Communist Studies 38, Nº 2 (2005), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.postcom-
stud.2005.03.007 (accessed April 28, 2013): 170.
1210 Copsey, “Ukraine,” In The Colour Revolutions in the Former Soviet Republics: Suc-
cesses and Failures, 35.
1211 Ibid., 37.
1212 Theodor Tudoroiu, “Rose, Orange, And Tulip: The Failed Post-Soviet Revolutions,” 
Communist and Post-Communist Studies 40, Nº 3 (2007), accessed April 3, 2013: 
329, http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0967067X07000323.
1213 Shapovalova, “Assessing Democracy Assistance: Ukraine,” 3.
1214 Ibid.
1215 Gillis, op. cit.
1216 Shapovalova, op. cit., p. 3.
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ey was provided towards organizations supporting the political changes brought 
about by the Orange Revolution. From 2004 to 2005, US aid increased overall, but 
“Governance and Civil Society” expenditures rose nearly by 10 million dollars.1217 
Another trend that emerged from 2004-2010 was increased aid given to the gov-
ernment. Between 2004 and 2007, there was 70% less funding being awarded to 
all non-state actors, while the government sector received 59% more.1218 Although 
higher totals persisted for the US government itself as an implementing agency, 
rates also dramatically increased for aid granted to the Ukrainian government. 
This was presumably a symptom of the US government’s faith in the Yushchenko 
administration to successfully promote democratization efforts. 
In comparison to the period before the revolution, some significant changes in 
aid patterns can be observed from 2004-2011. Most significantly, general rates 
of aid decreased, democracy assistance received more funding, and there was 
an increase in assistance given to governmental sectors. This was a clear break 
from patterns that characterize the previous era. The outbreak of the Orange 
Revolution and Yushchenko eventually taking office indicated that US aid efforts 
helped move the situation in a favorable direction from a Western perspective. 
However, the US was criticized for its sudden drop-offs in democracy assist-
ance through the promotion of civil society and its persistent contributions to the 
Ukrainian government under Yushchenko.1219 This evidence supported the claim 
that the US “viewed the new leadership as the primary engine of democracy.”1220 
The positive result of the electoral revolution, which was the focus of much aid, 
led the US to support Yushchenko’s government directly. This premature faith 
caused assistance to channel into a government whose “democratic credentials 
and desire to quickly consolidate democratic gains...were never challenged.”1221
This government and the years after the Orange Revolution did not bring long-
lasting, full-fledged democratic change to Ukraine. Certain practices, such as a mi-
nor development of civil society infrastructure and slightly freer media, can be seen 
as enduring products of the revolution.1222 However, Ukraine remains, simply, “a 
more complex semidemocracy” that saw limited progress in the Yushchenko years 
as a result of the lackluster performance of his administration.1223 In some ways, the 
funding provided to the Ukrainian government was wasted. For example, The Mil-
lennium Challenge Corporation funding which totaled $64.58 million between 2006 
and 2010 was largely awarded to the Ukrainian government. Meanwhile, Freedom 
1217 Gillis, op. cit.
1218 Shapovalova, op. cit., p. 3
1219 Ibid.
1220 Lincoln Abraham Mitchell, The Color Revolutions, Philadelphia: University of Penn-
sylvania Press, 2012,  p. 175.
1221 Ibid., 167.
1222 Ibid., 184.
1223 Ibid., 181.
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House’s democracy ratings chart gives Ukraine an unfavorable score of 5.75 for that 
period, only to have it dropped to 6.00 in 2010.1224 However, in the past few years, 
both aid trends and rhetoric reflect a resurgence of support for civil society efforts 
in Ukraine. Perhaps due to the failure of the Orange Revolution to produce any last-
ing figures of political change, the US found that CSOs offered the only opportunity 
to spur the democratization process. Ukraine began receiving assistance from the 
Economic Support Fund, a program of the US Department of State, in 2013.1225 
During this year, the US gave Ukraine $53.957 million USD, a significant portion of 
which was spent on improving governance and strengthening civil society.1226
If the US was seeking to promote a more rapid democratization process, inter-
governmental aid proved to be a poor decision. Neorealism, however, does not 
limit us to this interpretation. The aid may have been “misguided” as Mitch-
ell claims because the quantity that was issued to its recipient did not result 
in major progress.1227 Alternatively, the aid may have been issued in order to 
spur political stability and promote an amicable relationship between the two 
governments, after the turbulence of the Kuchma years. Although not the most 
effective in promoting liberal ideals, these aid trends did coincide with years of 
stable, friendly, secure relations between Ukraine and the US. The data supports 
the proposition that excessive aid to the government and little aid to civil soci-
ety contributed to the stagnation of democratization processes in Ukraine. This 
leads to the ultimate conclusion that the development of civil society is a useful 
process to the development of democracy, particularly when new governments 
cannot be expected to initiate or implement democratic reform. 
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HUNGARIAN NEIGHBORHOOD POLICY 
TOWARDS ROMANIA FROM 1989
VIráG ZSár
INTRODUCTION
In this essay I would like to introduce Hungary’s neighborhood policy towards 
Romania since 1989. 1989 was a watershed regarding the relations between 
the two countries even though it is also important to get an overview of the most 
important features of the precedent years. We can speak about “real” neighbor-
hood policy only after the transition. I would also like to present its main objec-
tives, as well as hindrances that have occurred over the last 20 years. 
Furthermore, this essay summarizes the necessity of neighborhood policy 
during the Euro-Atlantic integration process. The case of Hungarian minorities 
will also be discussed, as when dealing with neighborhood policy we cannot 
pass over the question of their situation.
Additionally, I will try to underline those events, which have had a determinant 
and main role in the process of composing a neighborhood policy. Of course, 
this essay cannot specify each of them and would be a topic of a future study. 
Similarly, the role played by Hungarian political organizations and/or parties in 
neighboring policy will only be referred to and not explained in details due to the 
limits of the essay.
DEFINITIONS
When we use the term of neighborhood policy we talk about the political relations 
of the country concerned towards its neighbors. It is generally an important part 
of foreign policy; due to geography each country has land and/or maritime neigh-
bors therefore they have to define their relations to their neighbors. We can speak 
about good neighborhood policy in the case in which the parties can handle the 
common issues successfully. It does not mean that there are no problematic 
questions at all, rather that there is a common interest to solve these issues. 
Good neighborhood policy can be institutionalized. For instance, in case of Ro-
mania and Hungary, the Basic Treaty envisioned the functioning of joint commit-
tees on issues of common interests (environment, minority protection, etc.)
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In the case of Hungary, the issue of neighborhood policy is inseparable from 
minority policy and regional cooperation.1228 Both of them have to rely on hu-
maneness and stability. Minority policy is an instrument of the government 
to deal with the issue of different minorities within the borders of Hungary as 
well as to handle the questions related to the Hungarian minorities beyond the 
borders. 
Regional policy became more important after the change of regime in 1989-
90. Prior to the change of regime, within the Warsaw Pact and Comecon1229 
Moscow sought to prevent any intra bloc horizontal regional cooperation hav-
ing learnt from the case of Yugoslavia when regional initiatives of Tito resulted 
in deviation from the one centered communist regime.1230 As a result, there 
was no possibility for the East Central European countries to form a regional 
coalition without the participation of the Soviet Union.1231 After the transition, 
regional cooperation has become more relevant and could intensify the neigh-
borhood policy. As we will see, EU membership offers, and in some cases, 
necessitates the maintenance of regional policy.1232 The term ‘nation policy’ 
is a particular expression in this region. It refers to one part of the minority 
policy; nation policy deals with the national interests of Hungarians inside and 
outside Hungary.1233 In this sense, there is a conflict between state interest 
and national interest. State interest implies the interests of Hungarian citizens 
within the borders of Hungary while national interest includes additionally the 
interests of Hungarian minorities beyond the borders. Nation policy generally 
links the question of identity and the conditions essential for maintaining the 
identity and does not treat the concept of nation as belonging to borders and 
territories.
1228 Zsolt Németh, “Status Law, Nation Policy, Neighborhood Policy”. Foreign Policy 
Review, Vol. 1, Nº 2 (2002), 8.
1229 Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, also referred as CMEA was the economic 
organization of countries of the Eastern bloc under Soviet leadership.
1230 László Kiss J, “The Restatement of Hungarian Foreign Policy-from Kádárism to EU 
Membership”. Foreign Policy Review, Vol. 3, Nº 1 (2004), 40.
1231 László Kiss J, “Magyarország szomszédsági kapcsolatainak jövője.” [The Future 
of Hungary’s Neighbourhood Policy],  http://www.grotius.hu/doc/pub/FJFDTM/
kiss_j_l%C3%A1szl%C3%B3_magyarorszag_szomsz%C3%A9ds%C3%A1gi_ka-
pcsolatok.pdf, 2-3. 
1232 Within the enlarged European Union of 27 Member States, territorial cooperation 
programmes and macro regional strategies provide opportunities to countries lying 
in certain geographically defined regions within Europe. On the other hand, EU deci-
sion-making sometimes presses the set up of regional coalitions of certain Member 
States to defend their interests, e.g. in case of European Neighborhood Policy, etc.
1233 Zoltán Kántor, “Status Laws and ‘Nation Policy’: theoretical aspects”.  In Kántor, 
Zoltán, Majtényi, Balázs, Ieda, Osamu, and Halász, Iván (eds.): The Hungarian Status 
Law: Nation Building and/or Minority Protection. (Sapporo: Slavic Research Center, 
Hokkaido University, 2004), p. 105.
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Nation policy can only be realized by an effective neighborhood policy.1234 
However, this principle has been treated by Hungarian governments in a dif-
ferent manner: whereas the socialist-liberal coalitions have attributed more 
significance to the improvement of neighborhood policy with special regard 
to economic and commercial relations including the communities of the Hun-
garian minorities, right-wing governments have made the issue of Hungarian 
minorities beyond the borders as a precondition of good neighborly relations 
emphasizing the need to preserve the Hungarian culture and communities.1235 
Since nation policy is a constitutional responsibility of Hungary, for the Hun-
garian public the issue of Hungarian minorities living beyond the borders, es-
pecially in Romania,1236 is a crucial point. Therefore, the question of nation 
policy cannot be ignored when we analyze neighborhood policy. 
LATE KÁDÁR ERA: THE END OF THE NINETEEN-EIGHTIES
Antecedents 
Since communist policy neglected the issue of nationalism it did not deal with 
the problem of national minorities on the surface. After World War II, countries 
in the Eastern bloc regarded the question of minorities automatically resolved 
based on the principle of internationalism.1237 However, recent researches point 
out that before its dissolution, the Comintern, then Stalin himself, encouraged 
communist parties to take the national issue at the centre of the politics to 
increase their popularity.1238 In this context, internationalism referred to the uni-
ty of the communist bloc under Soviet leadership; whereas each communist 
1234 Kiss, J. Magyarország szomszédsági kapcsolatainak jövője, p. 5.
1235 Kiss, J. “The Restatement of Hungarian Foreign Policy”, (2004), p. 65.
1236 Romania is the home of the greatest community of Hungarian minorities living be-
yond the borders. According to the census of 1990, 1,603,923 persons declared 
themselves Hungarian in Romania; in 2002 1,414,718; and in 2012 1,238,000. Vide 
http://kitekinto.hu/karpat-medence/2012/02/09/mit_mondanak_a_szamok_a_roma-
niai_magyarokrol/#.Uz6qPKh_uO7.
1237 Nándor Bárdi, “The History of Relations between Hungarian Governments and Eth-
nic Hungarians Living Beyond the Borders of Hungary”. In Kántor, Zoltán, Majtényi, 
Balázs, Ieda, Osamu, and Halász, Iván (eds.): The Hungarian Status Law: Nation 
Building and/or Minority Protection. (Sapporo: Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido 
University, 2004), p. 62.
1238 As a result, communist parties only opposed the nationalism of aristocrats and emper-
ors, whereas they took over national symbols and regarded national heroes fighting 
against emperors or aristocrats as their forefathers. Vide Mevius, Martin, “A kom-
munizmus és a nacionalizmus viszonyának újraértékelése”. [The Re-evaluation of the 
Relationship between Communism and Nationalism] Regio, Vol. 21, Nº 2 (2010), p. 21.
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party in Eastern Europe created the notion of ‘socialist patriotism’.1239 First, this 
kind of internationalism benefited indeed national minorities. In Romania, the 
Hungarian Autonomic Territory was set up in 1952 under Soviet pressure led 
by ethnic Hungarian communists. The autonomous region had a population of 
more than half a million Hungarians whose rights could be protected in a  more 
efficient way,1240 in contrast to the rest of the Hungarian minority (around 1.5 
million) living in Transylvania, outside the autonomous region, whose assimila-
tion proceeded continuously. 
In the meantime, Hungary, following World War II, declared the policy of 
“new beginning” referring to the reconciliation with its neighbors and the re-
cognition of the borders.1241 During the communist era, de-nationalization in 
Hungary was more intense than in other countries of the bloc.1242 For quite a 
long time, the issue of Hungarian minorities targeted by assimilation policies 
of neighboring countries was not put on the table of the Hungarian leadership. 
The issue of nationalism, national state building became more important 
when communist leaders had to legitimize their power: following industrializa-
tion and urbanization in the countries concerned, competition for better-pay-
ing jobs and privileges intensified. For the management of the deriving social 
tensions, parochial nationalism proved to be a useful means in multiethnic 
societies.1243 In most cases this resulted in the oppression of minorities.
Consequently, minorities under communist leadership including Romania 
had to face double oppression: their assimilation was continuously on the 
agenda, whereas their political rights, as in case of the majority of the popula-
tion, were also denied.1244 Additionally, oppression of Churches by commu-
nist dictatorships also affected minorities badly since it also endangered the 
preservation of their culture.  However, the quasi freezing of this issue did not 
solve the problem at all, but rather prolonged it. Meanwhile, a greater empha-
sis on Romanian nationalism gradually superseded proletarian international-
1239 Ibid., p. 29.
1240 Vassals Petnisis, “Ethnic relations in Romania – The prospects for a new accommo-
dation”. In Tarrósy, István and Susan Milford (eds.), Regime Change and Transitions 
across the Danubian Region: 1989-2009. (Pécs: IDResearch Ltd. and Institute for the 
Danube Region and Central Europe (IDM), 2009), p. 95.
1241 Ibid., p. 212.
1242 This can be regarded on the one hand as a result of the fact that following WWII less 
than 0.2% of the population belonged to any of the minority groups. On the other 
hand, the communist leadership was opposed to the national “irredentism” of Hun-
gary’s pre-war government. Kiss J., “The Restatement of Hungarian Foreign Policy”, 
(2004), p. 40.
1243 Michail A. Molchanov, “Post-communism Nationalism as a Power of Resource: a 
Russia-Ukraine Comparison”. Nationalities Papers, vol. 28, Nº 2 (2000), p. 264.
1244 Géza Jeszenszky, Post-communist Europe and its national/ethnic problems. Buda-
pest: Kairosz Kiadó, 2009, p. 173.
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ism within the Romanian Communist Party. Nicolae Ceausescu, the Romanian 
party leader consolidated this approach to legitimize his power. As a result, 
the situation of Hungarians living in Romania became gradually worse.  After 
Ceausescu came into power in 1965 he dissolved the Hungarian Autonomic 
Territory in the frame of administrative reorganization of the country.1245
Then in 1972 Ceausescu announced the national homogenization program. 
Officially the program aimed at a reinforced industrialization of the country and 
rationalization of its resources; however, in fact, it resulted in an ethnic clean-
sing including the selling of Jews and Germans to their kin-states, as well as 
the colonization of Transylvania by the settlement of Romanian inhabitants to 
change its ethnic composition.1246 Its aim was the total elimination of minorities 
in Romania and the establishment of a unitary Romanian state. 
It was not until 1966/68 that the leaders of the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ 
Party (HSWP) put the issue of minorities on the table. The ideology of dual loyalty 
(to the kin-state and the state of citizenship) and the bridge role of minorities 
(providing a space for dialogue between countries) were formulated.1247 
Nevertheless, the first steps taken by the Hungarian government were rather 
negligible, therefore they had to face a certain degree of criticism from the 
society having not dealt with this particular problem. The relationship between 
Hungary and Romania became tenser partly because of the actions of the 
Ceausescu regime. Since bilateral negotiations were unsuccessful, the aim of 
Hungarian foreign policy was to “achieve the international denunciation of the 
Romanian policy in international forums directly”1248. The main argument was the 
issue of human rights, which was reasonable as the Hungarian government was 
the main promoter of the Helsinki process within the Eastern bloc. 
Since Hungary met the demands of Western powers in the field of issues cov-
ering the so-called “third basket”,1249 Kádár, the leader of the country delivered 
his speech at the final meeting in Helsinki highlighting that Hungary had no prob-
lems with its neighbors and propagated the importance of the “third basket”. 
1245 The autonomous region as such was deprived from its autonomy basically from its 
establishment. But its space for maneuvering was decreasing from 1956 gradually due 
to the sympathy movements of Hungarian minorities with the Hungarian revolution.
1246 Jeszenszky, Post-communist Europe, (2009), pp. 345-346.
1247 Nándor Bárdi, “The History of Relations between Hungarian Governments and Eth-
nic Hungarians Living Beyond the Borders of Hungary”. In Kántor, Zoltán, Majtényi, 
Balázs, Ieda, Osamu, and Halász, Iván (eds.): The Hungarian Status Law: Nation 
Building and/or Minority Protection. (Sapporo: Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido 
University, 2004), p. 62.
1248 Csaba Békés, “Back to Europe – The international background of the political transition 
in Hungary, 1988-1990”. In Bozóki, András (ed.), The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The 
Genesis of Hungarian Democracy.  (Budapest – New York: CEU Press, 2002), p. 30.
1249 Article 7 of Helsinki Accords, “the respect of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms”.
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The protection of national minorities, especially the Hungarian minorities living 
in neighboring countries, including Romania was not explicitly mentioned. Nev-
ertheless, Hungary had the legal basis to compel Romania on the treatment of 
Hungarian minorities at international fora. Although it corresponded to the ex-
pectations of Western countries at that time, nothing happened concerning the 
situation of Hungarians in Romania. In 1977 at the meetings taken place in De-
brecen (Hungary) and in Oradea (Romania), Kádár and Ceausescu had agreed on 
several issues; although the bridge role of minorities were built into the text of the 
agreement, Romania regarded the issue of national minorities as an internal affair 
which could not be the subject of a bilateral agreement.1250
In March 1987 at the Vienna follow-up meeting of the Conference on Eu-
ropean Security and Cooperation, Hungary forthrightly expressed its desire 
for the denunciation of Romania by supporting the Canadian proposal, which 
targeted the extension of the rights of minorities in Europe.1251 Nevertheless, 
the HSWP could never exploit the opportunity provided by the protection of 
minorities for its own legitimization purposes; it was rather the formulating op-
position that could capitalize on the issue.
‘SYSTEMATIZATION’ AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
In the beginning of 1988 Ceausescu announced the so-called ‘systematiza-
tion’ program referring to his urban planning program. Formally, its aim was 
the enforcement of urbanization through the demolition of villages in the coun-
tryside and reconstruction of regional industrial centers. However, since it re-
sulted in the destruction of historical buildings, including churches, monaster-
ies, theaters belonging mainly to the historical minorities of the country, the 
Federal Republic of Germany and Hungary harshly protested against the pro-
gram claiming that its goal was the final elimination of minorities. These ope-
rations resulted in a huge number emigrants from Romania, which motivated 
both the Hungarian government and the Hungarian public to do something.1252 
The most enormous public protest was held at Heroes Square in Budapest. 
In consequence of the Soviet pressure and initiative, a meeting of secretary 
generals of the two countries was held in Arad on 28 August 1988. Ceausescu 
did not want to make any compromises, what is more, he offered only two days to 
the Hungarian party to accept his conditions. The meeting was unsuccessful ag-
gravating the problems further.1253 In July 1989, in parallel with the session of the 
1250 Békés, “Back to Europe”, (2002), p. 31.
1251 Ibid.
1252 In March 1989 Hungary ratified the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refu-
gees; she was the first in the Eastern bloc.
1253 Békés, “Back to Europe”, 2002, 31.
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Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact in Bucharest, the Hungarian 
politicians (chairman of the HSWP Rezső Nyers, Prime Minister Miklós Németh 
and Foreign Minister Gyula Horn) had an ‘unofficial meeting’ with Ceausescu on 
the invitation of the Romanian leader. Again, in line with the Soviet pressure, the 
Hungarian politicians accepted the invitation. At that time the Hungarians leaders 
had a more powerful negotiating position by envisioning asking for an interna-
tional supervision of Hungarian minorities. Consequently, on this occasion they 
were those who imposed the conditions of the possible agreement: 
“the Romanian Side should cease its discrimination against the Hungarian 
minority as well as the propaganda and the military threats against Hungary, 
it should abort the fulfillment of the systematization project in the regions in-
habited by Hungarians, it should allow Hungarian cultural products into the 
country, and it should stop the humiliating harassment of masses of Hungarian 
tourists at the Hungarian-Romanian border. In addition, Gyula Horn indicated 
that if necessary, Hungary would propose international supervision of the situ-
ation of the national minorities and the systematization plan.”1254
Although the participants agreed on further negotiations, the events of the 
transition in Romania did not allow them to materialize. Right after the ‘1989 
episode,’ the germs of cooperation evolved: border control was normalized, 
new border crossing points were established, and the armies had common 
actions, although these were diametrically opposed to the official relations.1255
NEW DIRECTION OF HUNGARIAN FOREIGN POLICY (1990–1996)
After the peaceful change of regime, the Antall-government (1990–1993) restored 
the sovereignty of the country. Furthermore, it declared the basic principles of 
Hungarian foreign policy. Since then the targets have not changed significantly, 
but different governments gave different interpretations to them. The main prin-
ciples or the so-called triad are as follows: political, economic and military inte-
gration with the West; the policy of good neighborly and regional cooperation; 
and the protection of Hungarian minority rights.1256 However, balance among the 
three pillars of foreign policy varied from one government to the other; whereas 
1254 Ibid., 32.
1255 Levente Salat, “A román-magyar kapcsolatok alakulásának kilátásai és a francia-
német megbékélési modell”. In Salat, Levente and Enache, Smaranda (eds.), A 
román-magyar kapcsolatok és a francia-német megbékélési model. Cluj: Centrul De 
Resurse Pentru Diversitate Etnoculturala, 2004, p. 548.
1256 J. Kiss, “The Restatement of Hungarian Foreign Policy”, (2004), 64; Ferenc Gazdag 
“From Alliance to Alliance: Hungary’s Path from the Warsaw Pact to NATO”. Foreign 
Policy Review, vol. 2, Nº 1 (2004), 160.; Pál Dunay “Hungarian Foreign Policy in the 
Era of Transition (1990-2004)”. Foreign Policy Review, vol. 3, Nº 1 (2004), p. 200.
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right wing (so-called conservative) governments put more emphasis on nation 
policy instead of neighborhood policy; left wing (socialist-liberal) governments 
stressed the importance of neighborhood policy and favored less the protection 
of minority rights of Hungarian communities living beyond the border.
ALL BEGINNINGS ARE DIFFICULT
At the very start, the establishment of positive Hungarian-Romanian relations 
faced several obstacles. For the Antall-government, a precondition for the es-
tablishment of good neighborly relations was the proper treatment of Hungar-
ian minorities within the countries concerned, including Romania. On the other 
hand, it must be admitted that the Euro-Atlantic integration was considered to 
be the most important priority for the East Central European countries (even for 
Romania, following 1992), which meant that other problems like neighborhood 
policy, minority rights, etc. had only second-rank importance. Consequently, 
the development of the neighborhood policy was mainly the answer to an ex-
ternal need from the point of view of Hungary’s neighbors, including Romania. 
INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE 
For Western countries the preservation of stability was regarded as one of the 
most important goals in East Central Europe. For Western politicians ethnic 
conflicts in the Balkans and the Soviet Union anticipated the fear of similar 
conflicts in East Central Europe. During the Yugoslav wars Hungary undertook 
several efforts in order to prove its capacity for maintaining peaceful and ef-
fective relations with her neighbors. Though the Antall-government had neither 
intention nor capacities to change the borders, their strong insistence on mi-
nority rights increased concerns in the West.1257
In 1993 at the European Council meeting in Copenhagen the French Prime 
Minister Balladur initiated the preparation of a pact “directed towards assuring 
the application of the principles agreed by the European countries with regard 
to respect of borders and rights of minorities”1258. It was accepted as the “Eu-
ropean Union in favor of a Pact on Stability in Europe”. Its aim was to dispose 
the countries to regularize their neighborly relationships in the form of bilateral 
agreements, which would contain guarantees on the inviolability of borders 
and minority rights. The pact was inaugurated in 1994 and accepted in 1995. It 
represented a huge development even though the Declaration was not legally 
1257 Dunay, “Hungarian Foreign Policy in the Era of Transition”, (2004), p. 201.
1258 “European Council in Copenhagen, 21-22 June 1993, Presidency Conclusions”, 8. 
Pact on Stability in Europe,  http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/
docs/pressData/en/ec/72921.pdf, 16.
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binding which proved to be an enormous defect. Although it contained the list 
of requirements of good neighborliness, cooperation agreements and arrange-
ments, there is no sanction for the violation of the prescription. The so-called 
Copenhagen criteria1259 also defined the eligibility of a country for EU acces-
sion. Their importance derives from the fact that they emphasize the protection 
of minority rights as well.
Hungary and Romania perceived the need for the settlement of their rela-
tions in an agreement, but the negotiations were moving on quite slowly. Ion 
Iliescu, the leader of the National Salvation Front (NSF) was elected as presi-
dent of Romania in 1990. Iliescu’s policy was determined by slow and gradual 
reform in all spheres from the economy to foreign policy.1260
In the beginning of the presidency he did not commit himself and his country 
to Western integration or comfort Hungary with the requested minority policy. 
It was only after the 1992 elections that he took up a more Western-oriented 
policy. Meanwhile, the situation worsened due to the fact that extreme nation-
alists became the members of the Romanian government who rejected any 
compromise.1261
TURNAROUND IN NEIGHBORHOOD POLICY
In 1994 after the parliamentary elections in Hungary a socialist-liberal govern-
ment (1994-98) was formed. Gyula Horn became the Prime Minister. It resulted 
in a turnaround of Hungarian neighborhood policy because the government de-
clared that minority policy was only one element of its neighborhood policy.1262 
However, it was difficult to reach a real breakthrough even with this approach. 
The merit of the Horn-government is that it managed to reach an agreement 
with Romania though it was partly the result of the international situation. 
1259 The following requirements are listed among the political conditions: stability of in-
stitutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for 
and protection of minorities. Vide Accession Criteria (Copenhagen Criteria),  http://
europa.eu/scadplus/glossary/accession_criteria_copenhague_en.htm 
1260 Nikolaus El Papakostas, Romanian Foreign Policy post Euro-Atlantic Accession: So 
Far So Good. Institute of International Economic Relations, 2009, http://idec.gr/iier/
new/PAPAKOSTAS%20REPORT-%20ROMANIA%20-%20FINAL-%2013-5-2009.
pdf, 8.
1261 Following the 1992 elections in Romania, the Democratic National Salvation Front 
formed the government with the Romanian National Unity Party (PUNR), the Greater 
Romania Party (GRP) and the Socialist Workers’ Party.
1262 As regards the support of Hungarian communities beyond the borders, instead of 
charity shaped support, the Horn-government aimed to reinforce the economic in-
frastructure of the support for the respective communities. The failure of this policy 
resulted in the fact that the right-wing parties could blame the social-liberal govern-
ment for abandoning the minority groups beyond the borders.
 HUNGARIAN NEIGHBORHOOD POLICY TOWARDS ROMANIA FROM 1989  389
On 5 August 1995 Romanian President Ion Iliescu delivered a speech in which 
he proposed a solution for the problems between Hungary and Romania based on 
historical reconciliation patterned on the Franco-German model.1263 This proposal 
failed again, on the one hand, because Romanians did not want to accept the so-
called Recommendation 1201 (1993) of the Council of Europe on minority rights.1264
On the other hand, several articles of the Constitution of Romania hindered the 
compromise, as they declared the unity of the Romanian nation without any respect 
of the minority communities.1265 Additionally, the Hungarian party aimed to follow 
the South Tirol model instead of the above-mentioned Franco-German model.1266 
Several high-level meetings took place between the leaders of the two countries. 
Most issues in the frame of neighborhood policy could be settled easily, except 
for the question of minorities: the Hungarian part insisted on the necessity of the 
accepting Recommendation 1201, whereas the Romanian party rejected any refer-
ence to providing possible autonomy for Hungarian minorities. Notwithstanding, 
the agreement was an urgent necessity for both countries since the NATO Foreign 
Ministers’ Summit was to be held in December 1996 and would name the states 
invited to the organization. Both countries believed that in case of having solved the 
problems they would be able to join. Nevertheless, many political actors opposed 
the conclusion of the treaty both in Hungary and in Romania by rejecting the com-
promise on both sides, and also because of the upcoming elections in Romania.
SIGNING THE BASIC TREATY
For that very reason on 13 -14 August 1996 the announcement of an agreement was 
a real surprise. The Basic Treaty between Hungary and Romania on Good Neigh-
1263 Iván Gyurcsik, “Basic treaties, minority issues and the enlargement of the European 
Union”. In György Lengyel and Zsolt Rostoványi (eds.), The small transformation 
– Society, Economy and Politics in Hungary and the New European Architecture. 
Budapest: Akadémia Kiadó, 1998, p. 543.
1264 Romanian politicians opposed the Recommendation since it included certain arti-
cles giving the scope for local or regional autonomy, according to their understand-
ing. See: Recommendation 1201 (1993) of Council of Europe, http://www.forost.
ungarisches-institut.de/pdf/19930201-1.pdf
1265 Though the Constitution of Romania approved in 1991 granted the right to ‘preserve, 
develop and express their ethnic, cultural, linguistic, and religious identities (Article 
6.1), the subsequent articles (Article 6.2 and 16.1) excluded any positive discrimina-
tion on the basis of ethnic affiliation which is in contrast to international law. Similar-
ly, the right to education on mother tongue was tolerated, whereas the only language 
enjoying official status was Romanian according to Article 13. See: Petsinis “Ethnic 
relations in Romania”, (2009), p. 94.
1266 The major difference between the two models is the question of autonomy: the 
former does imply an importantly broad autonomy for minorities, whereas the latter 
does not deal with it. 
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borly Relations and Friendly Cooperation1267 was signed on 16 September 1996. It 
contained mutual recognition of borders; furthermore, Hungary explicitly renounced 
all territorial claims on Transylvania.1268 At the same time, Romania reiterated its re-
spect for the rights of its minorities and bound herself to meet EU standards. 
The parties agreed on mutual support of their Euro-Atlantic integration proc-
ess. The two countries decided to develop their economic and trade coopera-
tion and relations.1269 Other forms of cooperation were also objectives of the 
treaty, e.g. in the field of science and technology; Danubian shipping; culture 
and education; preservation of cultural heritage; health care; mass media; and 
regional level cooperation as well. In Article 14 they insisted upon the elimination 
of xenophobia and the establishment of tolerance and understanding between 
citizens. In addition, as a real breakthrough, the Recommendation 1201 was 
accepted by Romania as a legal obligation. The Treaty contained the rights of 
minorities, in addition to the means of implementation of these rights. Although 
collective rights of minorities including the concept of autonomy were rejected, 
the Treaty represents a milestone in Hungarian-Romanian relations.  
Despite of the fact that an intergovernmental expert commission was charged with 
the monitoring of the implementation of the Treaty, the control mechanism of the 
agreement became weak. After that the situation of minorities has improved less than 
expected, but otherwise the relations between the two countries began to develop.
A MORE EMPHASIZED NATION POLICY:  
THE STATUS LAW
In November, 1996 presidential and parliamentary elections were held in Ro-
mania. Subsequently, the Democratic Convention was elected as the majority 
in the legislature, and it contained the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in 
Romania (DAHR), the party of the Hungarian minority. In the next few years, 
neighborhood relations developed immensely since the presence of DAHR in 
the government put real pressure on the executive branch.
1267 Vide http://gyula.mae.ro/index.php?lang=en&id=50107
1268 During the negotiation of the Basic Treaty the proper treatment of Hungarian minori-
ties became linked to the preservation of the regional status quo. This was basically 
a gesture towards the Romanian party, since the Hungarian government following the 
transition had never had any territorial claims towards the neighboring  countries. See: 
Kiss J., “The Restatement of Hungarian Foreign Policy”, (2004), p. 68.
1269 In Article 8 the parties admitted that they would „pay particular attention to the co-
operation in the coordinated, international standard-conform development of their 
national and interconnected infrastructures, including their energy systems, trans-
port and telecommunication networks.” This aim gained importance after the EU-
accession.
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In 1998 the Hungarian parliamentary elections resulted in the establishment 
of a conservative government (1998–2002). Viktor Orbán became the Hungarian 
Prime Minister. Regarding neighborhood policy, the results of the elections im-
plied that the executive branch would begin to put more emphasis on nation pol-
icy patterned by the Antall-government. The international circumstances were 
positive: Hungary was on its way to NATO and EU accession. Moreover, accord-
ing to the Basic Treaty, Romania was not only neutralized,1270 but there were also 
good relations between the Heads of Governments of the two countries. As a 
result, the government maintained more proactiveness in neighborhood policy. 
The Orbán-government decided to institutionalize the Hungarian-Hungarian 
relationship1271 as they wanted to grant more support to the Hungarians living 
beyond the borders. Consequently, they prepared the so-called Status law. 
Its aim was to give support in the field of education, science or culture to the 
members of Hungarian communities living beyond the borders. Additionally, 
it provided recourse of health care insurance, as well as financial support for 
the families if their children went to a Hungarian educational institution. Also, it 
offered easier access to the Hungarian labor market.1272
As regards its legal aspects, the two main characteristics of the so-called 
Status Law were that it offered privileges to foreign citizens on the basis of 
ethnicity on the one hand; on the other hand, it provided a new narrative to 
the Hungarian nation concept by extending the scope of the nation from the 
citizens of the country to the whole Hungarian cultural community living in the 
Carpathian Basin.1273 This modern approach of the nation was hard to be ac-
cepted either by the European or international organizations at that time.1274
The Law on Hungarians Living in Neighboring Countries was prepared and 
accepted without any consultation or agreement with neighboring countries, 
including Romania. Since the law had extra-territorial applicability, the lack of 
consultation complicated Hungary’s relations with its neighbors. The Hungar-
ian government’s wrong-headed communication was also demonstrated by the 
inaccurate translation of the law. Subsequently, international discourse on the 
Status Law denounced Hungary mainly due to the extra-territorial feature of the 
law without looking at its initial aims. Investigation of the European Parliament 
1270 Dunay, “Hungarian Foreign Policy in the Era of Transition”, p. 203.
1271 Hungarian-Hungarian relationship refers to the connection between Hungary, as kin-
state, and Hungarian communities living beyond the border.
1272 Károly Szilágyi, (2001), “A státustörvény”, Jogi fórum, last modified May 28, 2001, 
http://www.jogiforum.hu/publikaciok/92 
1273 George Schöpflin, “Citizenship and Ethnicity: The Hungarian Status Law”. In Zoltán 
Kántor, Balázs Majtényi, Osamu Ieda, and Iván Halász (eds.): The Hungarian Status 
Law: Nation Building and/or Minority Protection. (Sapporo: Slavic Research Center, 
Hokkaido University, 2004), p. 94.
1274 Bárdi, “The History of Relations between Hungarian Governments and Ethnic Hun-
garians”, 2004, p. 83.
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led by MEP Eric Jürgens declared the law extra-territorial and discriminative in 
his report due to the fact that the definition of the nation was considered too 
broad which could have endangered the status quo of the actual borders.1275 
Similarly, the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities underlined in his 
statement that the protection of minority rights belonged to the state on whose 
territory national minorities are living.1276 By doing so, he disregarded the point of 
the Hungarian government which insisted on the fact the Hungarian minorities 
living in neighboring countries, including Romania, did not enjoy the same range 
of rights to secure their cultural reproduction as the majority does.1277
Meanwhile, the report of the Venice Commission recognized the right of the 
kin-state to support co-nationals living in another state including the provision 
of benefits in the field of education and culture to the minority. However, eco-
nomic benefits provided by the law were not acknowledged by the Commis-
sion.1278 Regardless, the law was accepted with a 92.4 % majority, which is not 
common in the Hungarian legislation.1279
SPECIAL AGREEMENT WITH ROMANIA
During the preparation of the law, Romania and Slovakia declared that the coun-
try of citizenship had the main responsibility for its citizen.1280 Romanian leaders 
were the first to reject the implementation of the act in the territory of Roma-
nia.1281 After a long process of negotiations in December 2001, the Agreement 
on Understanding was signed by the two Prime Ministers (Orbán and Nastase). 
The so-called Memorandum reflected most of the concerns raised by interna-
tional institutions. It contained three main parts: firstly, the Parties insisted on the 
enhancement of mutual support during the Euro-Atlantic integration; the second 
part dealt with the question of the law concerned; and thirdly, they agreed on 
further development of Hungarian-Romanian relations. The Parties accepted the 
above mentioned proposals of the Venice Commission word by word to withhold 
the possibility of any kind of illegal regulation. Over and above, they decided that 
preferences on employment would be available for every Romanian citizen, not 
1275 Zoltán Kántor, “Status Laws and ‘Nation Policy’”, 2004, 117.
1276 Judit Tóth, “Connections of Kin minorities to the Kin-state in the extended Schengen 
zone”. European Journal of Migration and Law, Nº 5, 2003, p. 221.
1277 Schöpflin, “Citizenship and Ethnicity”, 2004, p. 94.
1278 Kántor, “Status Laws and ‘Nation Policy’”, 2004, p. 114.
1279 Nº LXII Act of 2001. The adoption of the law of such a great majority can be consid-
ered mainly to a tactical choice of the then opposition preparing for the upcoming 
elections in 2002.
1280 Németh, “Status Law, Nation Policy, Neighborhood Policy”, p. 12.
1281 Tóth, “Connections of Kin minorities to the Kin-state”, 2003,  p. 221.
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only for Hungarian minorities.1282 Also, importantly, the issue of certificates for 
benefits could only be done by Hungarian authorities instead of Hungarian asso-
ciations functioning in the territory of Romania. Last but not least, the agreement 
envisioned further negotiations on the situation of Romanians living in Hungary 
and Hungarians living in Romania to preserve their cultural identity.1283
The Parties discussed opportunities for trade and investment as well. Moreover, 
they agreed on the necessity of general, bilateral top-level meetings. Since then, 
the Hungarian-Romanian relationships have changed for the better, although 
there are still some crucial points, such as the official use of the Hungarian 
language at local and regional authorities, the fact that Romania is still considered 
as a unitary state, etc. This agreement improved Romanian-Hungarian relations 
ostensibly, which was a prerequisite to ensure stability in East Central Europe. 
REDEFINITION OF NEIGHBORHOOD POLICY TO MEET EU 
CRITERIA
From 2002 Hungary had a socialist-liberal government meaning that the focus from 
nation policy turned to neighborhood policy.1284 There was a big challenge for the 
governments of East Central Europe to form their policies to meet the EU require-
ments. This was the same in case of neighborhood and minority policy. The oncom-
ing EU accession provided extra benefits for the neighboring states, which meant 
more possibilities for cooperation. In 2003 the government announced the necessity 
of the modification of the Status Law causing violent protests from the side of the ex-
governmental parties. Even so, the government submitted and passed the amend-
ment of the law and made an agreement with Romania according to the modifica-
tions. The agreement focused on two main issues. First, the use of the term ‘nation’ 
was modified; instead of referring to the unity of the Hungarian nation within and 
beyond the borders of the country, it described the subject of the law as “Hungar-
ians living in neighboring countries in their home-state”. Second, the law formulated 
the relation of Hungarian minorities to the kin-state through sharing Hungarian cul-
ture.1285 The aim was to urge Hungarian minorities to stay in their homeland where 
they were going to be supported to preserve their culture, national identity through 
the above described benefits provided by the Hungarian government.1286
1282 “Megállapodás született a státusztörvényről”, Jogi fórum, http://www.jogiforum.hu/
hirek/3109
1283 Tóth, “Connections of Kin minorities to the Kin-state”, 2003, p. 223.
1284 As far as the Hungarian minorities are concerned, the politics changed towards 
them: social-economic-cultural relationships got more support while the the issue of 
unity of the Hungarian nation got less support from the government.
1285 Kántor, “Status Laws and ‘Nation Policy’”, (2004), p. 118.
1286 “Aláírták a kedvezménytörvény módosítását”, Jogi fórum,  http://www.jogiforum.hu/hirek/9270
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RELATIONS WITHIN THE EUROPEAN UNION
The European Union has had several opportunities for the development and im-
provement of cooperation between Hungary and its neighboring countries, in-
cluding Romania. Several joint programmes were launched to enhance regional 
cross-border cooperation. The fact that Hungary joined the European Union 
in 2004 and Romania just 3 years later was a bit problematic, because some 
envisaged a new iron curtain due to (1) the strict control of EU borders and visa 
requirements and (2) different benefits and rights of EU citizens and citizens of a 
non-Member States.   Fortunately, it did not materialize even though Hungary’s 
membership in the Schengen zone complicated the relations: relations between 
bordering villages, free movement of workers and goods can be realized only 
through border control points whose number is still limited; whereas historical 
ties between bordering settlements are still separated from each other. 
THE QUESTION OF MINORITIES
The hope that the EU would solve the question of minority rights was unsub-
stantiated since within the framework of European institutions there is no single 
uniform system regarding their situation. Countries who want to join the Euro-
pean Union have to meet the above-mentioned Copenhagen Criteria. Many ac-
cused the socialist-liberal government because during accession negotiations 
Romania was not forced to guarantee wider rights for minorities based on the 
criteria. Furthermore, during the elaboration of the Constitutional Treaty there 
was also a possibility to enforce the protection of minority rights including col-
lective rights, which was not exploited by the Hungarian government.1287 Never-
theless, since the accession of Hungary and then of Romania, it became clear 
that Member States, following the fulfillment of the Copenhagen criteria are not 
called to account for respecting them. However, it shall be admitted that after 
the 2004 and 2007 enlargement of the European Union, another forum became 
an instrument for the law enforcement of minority rights. The European Parlia-
ment offers the opportunity for the deputies to fight for minority rights, e.g. either 
within the committees or intergroups such as the ‘Traditional minorities, national 
communities and languages’ or through non-legislative reports. On the other 
hand, European institutions have the additional advantage to offer a platform for 
closer cooperation among the members from different nations.
1287 After the French and Danish referenda rejecting the Constitutional Treaty, during the 
elaboration of the quasi successor of the Constitutional Treaty, minority rights were 
dropped out from the text, so the Treaty of Lisbon does not include them anymore. 
Additionally, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union did not be-
come part of the Treaty; consequently it is not legally binding.
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So far the European Union aims to be the community of communities, though 
this feature can have different understanding for the Member States. Many per-
ceived the EU accession as an opportunity for a virtual re-unification of the Hun-
garian nation through the realization of the four freedoms1288 of the EU within 
Member States: Hungarians living beyond the borders (in Slovakia and Romania) 
were guaranteed the rights of EU citizens throughout the Community, but in the 
first place, in Hungary. Following this, in 2007 nation policy was reformed by the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Its main objective was to meet the EU requirements 
and to enforce closer cooperation with neighboring countries and organizations 
within the EU in order to enforce the regional development policy.1289
RECOGNITION AND REALIZATION OF COMMON INTERESTS
The so-called Europeanization of foreign policies of both countries by adapting 
European politics has considerable effects on neighborhood policy; the way of 
resolving problems, continuous dialogue on various political issues, etc. con-
tribute to an enhanced level of political relations between the two countries. 
However, what is even more important, is that Romania and Hungary belong 
to the same group of countries (which can be called as EU-12 or new Member 
States) representing the same interests at EU-level negotiations, i.e. either in 
the field of cohesion or agricultural policy, etc. As a result, bilateral dialogue 
can hardly be stuck by certain debates especially in the field of minority policy. 
The recognition of the necessity and the perspectives of neighborhood coop-
eration facilitated the further deepening of relations along common objectives 
and interests. Since 2005, there are annual meetings of the ministers of foreign 
affairs of Romania and Hungary. 
Additionally, Hungary and Romania jointly asked for EU support for several 
projects; for instance, for the construction of a motorway which was to con-
nect Budapest and Bucharest through Transylvania. Since 2007, Romania and 
Hungary have harmonized their National Development Strategies, which was 
necessary for the better exploitation of EU resources. There are also many 
lower level initiatives, which are supported by the government. The Hungary-
Romania Cross-Border Co-operation Programme can also be highlighted. Its 
aim on the one hand is to improve the key conditions of joint, sustainable de-
velopment of the cooperation area; on the other hand, to strengthen the social 
1288 The so-called four freedoms of the EU refer to the free movement of goods, services, 
labour force, and capital.
1289 This kind of nation policy had a huge problem, because of the lack of determined 
and expressed actions in defense of the minorities. Regarding Romania it did not 
result in major problems, but Slovakia exploited this approached and violated the 
rights of Hungarian minorities several times.
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and economic cohesion of the border area.1290 Hence, there are other common 
issues like environmental protection, energy supply, gas pipeline links (e.g. the 
Nabucco project) and transport networks (e.g. the construction of a Vienna-
Budapest-Bucharest express rail line) which encourage cooperation. The role 
of non-governmental organizations is improving and NGOs are gaining greater 
importance in the formation and realization of neighborhood policy. Multina-
tional companies, research institutes and Churches can add surplus to the in-
tensification of Hungarian-Romanian relations.  Within the Union, regarding the 
enlargement strategy, Hungary and Romania have common interests in Balkan 
policy. Romania, due to its geographical position, formulated its foreign policy 
in a way to enhance its interest in the Black Sea region on the one hand; on the 
other hand, in the Balkans, as well as in the Danube Region. In relation to the 
latter, Hungary also considers the relations with Western Balkan and Danube 
countries of utmost importance. 
High-level meetings among Serbia, Hungary and Romania took place to dis-
cuss issues of common interest, such as transport, energy, and environment. 
The support of the EU accession of Serbia was put also on the table.1291 Fur-
thermore, the elaboration of the European Danube Strategy is of mutual inter-
est for the countries concerned.1292 Accordingly, following the example of the 
Baltic Sea Strategy, countries along the Danube aim to set up a macro regional 
strategy including topics of common interests, such as environmental, trans-
port, energy, education and science to address them in a more tailor-made 
approach with the better use of EU funds. Although the Romanian parties have 
lost their radical nationalist views and propaganda in the last decade, opposi-
tion to Europeanist forces still exist at a certain extent, which sometimes can 
hinder the efforts of neighborhood policy. Additionally, the question of minor-
ity rights is still used by certain political parties as a source of propaganda. 
Meanwhile in Hungary the change of discourse of governments influences the 
intensity of both neighborhood and minority policy. 
1290 Vide the official site of Hungarian-Romanian Cross-Border Cooperation Programme: 
http://huro-cbc.eu/en/objectives_and_priorities
1291 “Magyar-román-szerb külügyminiszteri találkozó”, [Meeting of Hungarian-
Romanian-Serbian Foreign Ministers], Kitekintő, http://kitekinto.hu/karpat-
medence/2009/07/20/magyar-roman-szerb_kulugyminiszteri_talalkozo
1292 The so-called Danube Strategy through the Ulm process got impetus in 2008 by two 
remarkable events: firstly, Peter Straub, President of the Council of Baden Württem-
berg proposed the establishment of the Commission of the Danube Regions within 
the framework of the Council of Regions. Secondly, the EU support for the Danube 
Region was initiated by Austria and Romania, which was endorsed by the EU Com-
missioner responsible for Regional Policy, Danuta Hübner. The adoption of the Ulm 
declaration in the same year has to be spelled out as well.
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SUMMARY
We can summarize that Hungarian - Romanian relations have improved signifi-
cantly in the past decade. Especially since 1996 the Romanian government made 
huge efforts to get closer to the Euro-Atlantic integration, which resulted in im-
proving its neighborhood relations. Although the Hungarian government gener-
ally changed the priorities of neighborhood policy according to their own percep-
tions, they never rejected its necessity and importance. Regarding minority rights, 
the situation of Hungarian minorities in Romania improved significantly compared 
to thereof in the beginning of the 1990s, even though there are still some incom-
plete problems, i.e. the autonomy, use of national language, local and regional 
administrative borders, etc.. Although the EU accession did not solve the prob-
lem of minority rights, it has provided wider opportunities for further cooperation 
which are supposed to be exploited successfully in the near future.
This positive process shows that neighborhood policy works in East Cen-
tral Europe but depends on mutual willingness and actions. Achievements in 
this field are strongly dependent on the actual governing powers.  The reason 
behind is many-folded: first, Hungary had to overcome the so-called Trianon 
syndrome and explicitly recognize the regional status quo. Second, both coun-
tries had to commit themselves to Western integration which was not totally 
evident in the case of Romania in the beginning of the 1990s. Nevertheless, 
the Euro-Atlantic integration processes demanded the efficient consolidation 
of neighboring relations between Hungary and Romania which was also time-
consuming and required compromises on both sides. 
In contrast to the Hungarian expectations, the European Union prescribes 
to pursue a consistent and advanced minority policy and provides only limited 
opportunities to enforce minority rights as such. Nevertheless, common inter-
ests in this framework and the room for continuous dialogue contribute to a 
more successful neighborhood policy which does not ignore minority policy. 
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THE INDEPENDENCE OF ESTONIA AND THE 
RUSSIAN-SPEAKING MINORITY
rOLAnd PAPP
This paper will discuss the ethnic situation in Estonia during the Estonian Soviet 
Socialist Republic and the early years of the Estonian Republic after the collapse 
of the Soviet Union. During the second half of the 20th century, following a few 
decades of independence, the Baltic States became part of the Soviet Union, 
including the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic (ESSR). In the years of the first 
Estonian Republic, the vast majority of its inhabitants were ethnic Estonians. Due 
to Soviet nationality policies and migration, by the end of the 1980s, only 61.5% 
of the inhabitants were ethnic Estonian.1293 The issue of nationality became the 
main point of contention during the years following independence, and it has 
continued to be one of the largest problems for the new Estonian Republic.
The Republic of Estonia first became an independent state in 1920 after the Tar-
tu Treaty. This state had more territory than modern Estonia. Estonia possessed 
lands that extended in the northeast close to the city of Narva and in the southeast 
to the city of Petsory. These regions contained a significant population of ethnic 
Russians. In 1945, these territories were annexed to the Russian SSR. Ethnic Rus-
sians had also lived on the bank of Lake Peipus for centuries and smaller groups 
in other regions of Estonia. These populations were not homogenous groups. The 
majority of them lived in rural areas (71%), but a strong Russian-speaking elite 
also existed.1294 In the entirety of the pre-war state, approximately 12% of the 
population was non-Estonian, but Estonia was still considered to be a nation-
state. The largest minority was Russian, but the Swedes, with a population around 
7000 in 1934, and Germans, with a population around 6000, held an important 
role in society as well.1295 According to the Molotov-Ribbentropp Pact, the Baltic 
States became part of the ‘Soviet sphere of interest’ and the Soviet Union first oc-
cupied Estonia in 1940. During the Second World War, Estonia was also occupied 
by Nazi Germany from 1941 to 1944, and in 1944, the second Soviet occupation 
began. During these years, thousands of Estonians emigrated or were either im-
prisoned or killed.  Several thousand Estonians served in both armies.
In the first years after the war, the Soviets had several means of taking con-
trol over society. The destruction of the local elites was one such example. 
1293 Andrus Park, Ethnicity and Independence: The case of Estonia in Comparative Per-
spective, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 46, Nº 1, 1994, pp. 69-87.
1294 András Bereczki, Az észt állam és az orosz kisebbség, Limes, 2011/3. pp. 55-70.
1295 Marika Kirch-Aksel Kirch. Ethnic Relations: Estonians and Non-Esonians, Nationali-
ties Papers, Vol. 23, Nº 1, 1995.
402 CSABA BÉKÉS – MELINDA KALMÁR: STUDENTS ON THE COLD WAR
The exact number of deported, imprisoned and killed people is still unknown. 
The Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic had both a government and a separate 
Communist Party. The real power was in Moscow, and at the local level, Rus-
sians or Estonians from Russia controlled everything. They were considered 
more reliable than the previous Estonian elite. 
The nominated leaders had to be loyal to the Kremlin party leaders, as this 
was their most important task. For example, the First Secretary of the Com-
munist Party of Estonia between 1950 – 1978, Johannes Käbin, was an ethnic 
Estonian, but he had lived previously in the Soviet Union and could not speak 
Estonian well. He came to Tallinn from Moscow, and he became the ‘voice of 
Moscow’ under Stalin, Khrushchev, and  into the Brezhnev era. 
The first time the ESSR had a leader who had lived his whole life in Estonia 
was in 1988 during perestroika when Gorbachev appointed Vaino Väljas as the 
First Secretary of the Communist Party of Estonia. Between Käbin and Väljas 
the First Secretary was Karl Vaino, an ethnic Estonian, who was born in Tomsk, 
Russian SSR, and who as a true “internationalist”, could speak only Russian.
During the war, there were large population losses in Estonia. In order to reju-
venate the area, thousands of people moved to Estonia from other republics of 
the Soviet Union. By 1959, 25% of the population were non-Estonians. From the 
nearly 300.000, 240.000 were ethnic Russians. Alongside the other historically 
present minorities (Germans, Latvians, and Finns), a significant group of Ukrain-
ians and Belarusians emerged.1296 The title of my paper is phrased as the Russian-
speaking minority, rather than the Russian minority. This is because ethnic Rus-
sians were not the only people who spoke Russian in everyday life. The Ukrainian 
and Belarusian immigrants also mainly used the “internationalists language”. 
Since education was in Russian or in Estonian, in one generation, these mi-
norities changed their language. Immigrants who arrived to the ESSR mostly 
moved to cities. Their first “task” was to become the elite of the new Soviet 
power as previously mentioned. Not only were the First Secretaries Russian-
speakers, but the majority of the Party organization’s leaders were also immi-
grants. During this time, there were huge industrial constructions, and the new 
“colonists” were the workforce for the new factories and other facilities.
Another large group of inhabitants were soldiers and officers of the Soviet 
army. While it is still unknown exactly how many soldiers served in the territory 
of the ESSR, it was definitely a large number. The geopolitical location of Es-
tonia also demanded a strong naval presence. Though troops lived separately 
from society, the military leaders held influence in several cities. Of course, 
the Soviet Army had only one official language, Russian. The millions of young 
soldiers also played an important role in maintaining cohesion of the USSR 
after their years of service.
1296 Ibid.
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This Russian-speaking group was supposed to be the new “Soviet nation”, 
the leaders of the communist Soviet Union. This population was seen as being 
the majority and were the only major “Soviet nation” that held power in every 
state and city of the Soviet Empire. The Party always emphasized the role of 
these people in the cohesion of the Soviet Union. They could move anywhere 
within it and usually were given better opportunities than native populations. 
They were never forced to learn other languages. Most of the Russian-speak-
ing people in the ESSR even had Soviet identities.1297
The standard of living was better in the ESSR than in other parts of the USSR, 
and the immigrants received better, newly constructed apartments in the cities 
as well. According to a survey taken in 1959, 81% of Russians lived in an apart-
ment with all amenities, in comparison to only 54.5% of Estonians.1298 86% of 
Russians lived in towns and cities. They only resided in certain regions, mainly 
in the industrial regions of Northeast Estonia (Ida-Virumaa). 
In the cities of Ida-Viru county, there were huge construction projects during 
the Soviet era because of the oil shale industry. Kohtla-Järve, Sillmäe and Narva 
became Russian-speaking cities, though it should be noted that Narva, a border 
city, had an important Russian minority even in the pre-war period.1299 Today, as 
the third largest city in Estonia, Narva still has a large Russian-speaking majority. 
Tallinn, the capital of the ESSR, became a Russian-speaking city according 
to Soviet policies. Until the collapse of the Soviet Union, the rate of ethnic Rus-
sians in the capital was growing constantly, and by 1989, nearly 50% of the 
population was part of the Russian-speaking community. In other cities and 
villages, the proportions were different. In rural areas of the ESSR, Russian 
speakers were still a small minority.
The immigrants of Estonia were a diverse group. Most of them were workers 
in various industries. They were essentially migrant workers who had come 
to Estonia for a few years to make up the workforce. The Russian-speaking 
minority who lived in bigger cities did not need to learn Estonian and could 
function using only Russian. Though a large percentage lived in the same place 
for decades, most did not learn Estonian. 
The Estonians were not forced to learn Russian, but for several jobs, 
knowing Russian was a necessity. By the end of the 1980s, an odd situation 
emerged in which more people spoke Russian than Estonian. In 1993, 83% 
of the inhabitants spoke Russian fluently while only 77% could speak Esto-
nian. In Soviet propaganda and in the Soviet Constitution, the right to use 
languages was declared, and everybody had the right to primary education in 
their mother tongue. However, this right was never actualized for millions of 
Soviet citizens. There was no official language in the USSR, though Russian 
1297 Sirje Sinilind. Malomkövek közt, AB Független Kiadó, Budapest, 1988.
1298 Ibid.
1299 Bereczki, op. cit.
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had a special role as the “language, which helps the communication among 
the nations of Soviet Union”. In reality, the Party made conscious efforts to 
assimilate the other ethnic groups of the USSR. The party saw emphasis on 
the importance of any other language as nationalism, which jeopardized com-
munist ideals. The effects of Soviet policies were only the facilitation of the 
“natural process” according to propaganda. Russification reached millions of 
Soviet citizens in every corner of the empire. In the economy, public admin-
istration and science, Russian was the most important language. Because of 
centralization of all of the important decisions in Moscow, the use of Russian 
was inevitable. Therefore, Russian became the de facto official language. 
In the Soviet Union Republics, each Republic’s native language was de-
clared the official language, so in the Estonian SSR the official language was 
Estonian. However, in different republics, the same legal status had very dif-
ferent meanings. What soon occurred was division in the use of languages. 
The majority of Estonians felt that the Estonian language was in danger. One 
important linguistic division was that knowledge of Russian was required for 
high positions. Estonian was excluded from city life and was on the precipice 
of becoming a rural language as it was until the mid-16th century. In the func-
tions of the languages, a process took place in the USSR. In public places and 
special environments, such as transportation, post, and administration, Rus-
sian became the first language and there was a real risk of the diminution of 
Estonian to it being only used in the private sphere.1300
Over the years of glasnost and perestroika, the Estonian nation began to ques-
tion the Soviet past. Public opinion came to view Estonia’s incorporation into 
the Soviet Union as military occupation. Initially, the goal was to see the ESSR 
continue its existence in a federal Soviet Union. However, this changed over the 
course of a few years, and the will was formed to achieve full sovereignty and 
an independent Estonian Republic. In the Gorbachev era, the Russian-speaking 
population (including ethnic Russians and other Russified Slavic groups) did not 
share any common ground or goals with the Estonians. One reason for this was 
the lack of a locally integrated intelligentsia. The elite of the ESSR had far more in 
common with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and leaders in Moscow 
than with ethnic Estonians. The transition of power was peaceful in Estonia. The 
period beginning in 1988 was named the “Singing Revolution”. The biggest pro-
tests in the late 1980s were huge concerts like the Tallinn Song Festival Ground 
(Lauluväljak) where hundreds of thousands Estonians gathered. 
In Estonia, song festivals were significant traditions since the 19th century, 
and formed an important part of their national identity.  The biggest event of the 
Singing Revolution was the “Baltic chain”. On August 23, 1989, also the 50th 
anniversary of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, approximately two million people 
1300 Sinilind, op. cit.
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joined together to make a human chain 600 km long from Vilnius to Tallinn. The 
stages of transition in the three Baltic States paralleled each other. While in 
the Caucasus region ethnic conflicts caused violence, the most brutal event in 
the Baltic States was in Vilnius when in 1991, Soviet tanks attacked unarmed 
protesters, killing 14 people.  It was not until the end of the 1980s that ethnic 
Estonians held important positions in politics. Newly formed political organiza-
tions such as the Popular Front of Estonia, the Congress of Estonia, etc. were 
predominantly ethnic Estonian. However, each of these groups had a small pro-
portion of non-Estonian members. In May 1990, 96% of ethnic Estonians and 
26% of non-Estonians supported independence from the Soviet Union. 
However, a group of “internationalists” continued to fight against “national-
ist Estonians” and supported the continued unity of the empire. This group, 
Interfront, was unsurprisingly controlled by Moscow. They drew support from 
a vocal section of Russian workers in Estonia who were worried about losing 
their privileges in a new regime. Unlike ethnic Estonians, non-Estonians did 
not have a shared identity or history except for perhaps victory in World War 
II, which to the local population signified the beginning of the occupation. The 
status of Estonia depended on Moscow and the situation in the Soviet Union. 
A day after a coup in Moscow against Gorbachev, Estonia declared its inde-
pendence. Finally, Estonia became an independent state again on 20 August 
1991. The division in nationality continued to be significant following the inde-
pendence of Estonia. At the time, the status of the Russian-speaking minority 
going forward was not clear. The majority of Russians did not want to leave 
their home in Estonia. The party elite left the country, but most of the ‘ordinary’ 
people stayed (even though in the early 1990s, there were special funds to help 
Russian families move back to the Russian Federation).
The Russian-speaking minority did not have special representation in the 
democratic transition. Though in 1990 and 1991, a large proportion supported 
democratization, there were no special Russian-speaking parties. The most 
popular politicians among Russian speakers were ethnic Estonians. It would 
be relevant to note that Edgar Savisaar, a reform communist in the late 1980s, 
became the first Prime Minister of the Republic of Estonia (1991-1992). Today, 
he is the mayor of Tallinn and the leader of the Centrum Party, which is the 
most popular party among Russian speakers.
This minority group, around one-third of the population, had special needs, 
but without real representation, there was no one to act on their behalf. As a 
result, it was a shock when they suddenly became the minority in a small inde-
pendent state after being part of the majority in a huge empire. Initially, most of 
the Russian speakers did not have citizenship either. Not every person within 
the new Republic of Estonia was granted Estonian citizenship. 
According to the nationality law, only those who lived in the jurisdiction be-
fore 1940 and their descendants automatically became Estonian citizens. Peo-
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ple who either did not wish to take up the new citizenship or could not pass 
the exams required became non-citizens, otherwise known as aliens. These 
people could apply for Russian citizenship, but the majority did not do so.
This issue has continued to be one of the most difficult issues for the state. 
However, there has been significant progress in integration over the last 21 
years. In 1992, 32% of the inhabitants did not have Estonian citizenship. Euro-
pean integration was one of the main goals for the new state, but the issue of 
non-citizens was a major obstacle to this goal. 
As the Estonian government made several steps towards the integration of 
Russian speakers, there were positive outcomes. The amount of non-citizens 
became recorded data. In 2011, only 7% of the population did not have citi-
zenship, and around 9% of these non-citizens were the citizens of a different 
state. This 7% includes approximately 90, 000 inhabitants, and it seems this 
will not decrease as most do not want to apply for citizenship either.
In conclusion, in the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic, the local ethnic Es-
tonian majority was only a minority in the whole empire. Due to Soviet policies 
and migration, a significant proportion of the population of the territory was 
non-Estonian, mostly ethnic Russians. This issue became visible in the transi-
tion years, as Estonians were demanding their own rights. Non-Estonians were 
not a homogenous group, but a significant number of them took part in the 
Singing Revolution that paved the way for the newly independent Republic of 
Estonia, where this particular issue has persisted over the last two decades.
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FROM CONFLICT TO CAUTIOUS EMBRACE: 
SINO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS AFTER  
THE COLD WAR
JOSePH LArSen
INTRODUCTION
Bilateral relations between China and Russia have scarcely been as important 
as they are today. A rising China and economically stagnant but geopolitically 
assertive Russia potentially pose challenges to the post - Cold War internation-
al order. On the other hand, a war-weary, heavily indebted and politically dys-
functional US appears to be turning inward, with political discourse adopting an 
isolationist tone and leaders showing more risk aversion. With the US in relative 
decline, it bears watching whether a Sino-Russian “strategic partnership” will 
have the strength - or more importantly the will - to balance it. 
Cooperation between Russia and the United States is at its lowest point since 
the end of the Cold War; at that same time, the former superpower has ben-
efited from deepening ties with China. While not enshrined in a formal alliance, 
the two states enjoy a relationship more positive than at any time during their 
history. Examples include regular cooperation in the UN Security Council, sup-
port for respective foreign and domestic issues like Taiwan and Tibet, Chech-
nya, arms sales and the recent bilateral $400 billion natural gas agreement.1301
This paper takes an in-depth look at the substance of the Sino-Russian rela-
tionship, starting with a summary of Sino-Soviet interaction before delving into 
the contingent events of the late 1980s and early 1990s. The overwhelming 
emphasis is on why bilateral relations have evolved from openly adversarial 
throughout most of the Cold War era to overwhelmingly positive today. While 
both the Chinese and Russian sides are analyzed in depth, special attention is 
paid to the Chinese perspective.
THE RISE AND FALL OF THE “UNBREAKABLE FRIENDSHIP”
No discussion of contemporary relations can commence without a preceding 
analysis of the formation and subsequent unraveling of the Sino-Soviet alli-
1301 Alena Mazneva and Stepan Kravchenko, “Russia, China Sign $400 Billion Gas Deal 
After Decade of Talks,” Bloomberg. Last modified May 21, 2014.
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ance during the 1950s. The victory of Mao’s Chinese Communist Party over the 
Kuomintang in 1949 pushed the two countries into an alliance for the first time in 
history. With the two powers being ideological brethren and with China desperate 
for military assistance, the formation of a bilateral anti-Western axis was natural. 
While the Soviet Union sought allies wherever possible, Mao’s fledgling re-
gime had only a tenuous hold on the country after decades of civil war. It had 
defeated but not vanquished the Kuomintang; Chiang Kai-Shek’s government 
was building a viable state in Taiwan backed by US military and economic 
power and bent on reclaiming the mainland. China also maintained a long-
running border dispute with India, further complicating regional policy. These 
factors necessitated attaining military assistance.
Mao arrived in Moscow on December 16, 1949 with the intention of forg-
ing an alliance with the incumbent leader of the Communist world. He made 
his country’s position clear, expressing the need for “a period of 3-5 years 
of peace, which would be used to bring the economy back to pre-war levels 
and to stabilize the country in general.”1302 Seeking to exploit China’s weak 
position, Stalin preferred to uphold a treaty previously signed with Nationalist 
China rather than sign a new agreement. This was unacceptable to Mao, who 
saw the Soviet-Kuomintang agreement as one of the “unequal treaties” which 
had ravaged China over the previous “century of humiliation.” Particular sore 
spots were territorial concessions made to the Soviet Union in Xinjiang and 
Manchuria and the creation of a Soviet client state in Outer Mongolia.1303
Despite Stalin’s desire to capitalize on his country’s superior position Mao 
successfully lobbied for a new agreement, albeit after conceding that Dalian 
and Lushun would remain Soviet bases. In 1950 the two powers signed the 
Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance. The event 
marked the USSR’s first official recognition of the People’s Republic of China. 
In addition, the self-proclaimed leader of global revolution furnished the Peo-
ple’s Republic with a $300 million loan. On close analysis the treaty seems to 
have been much more advantageous to Beijing than to Moscow, as it bound 
both sides to provide mutual assistance in case of a conflict with a third party. 
As Moscow was much more committed to treading lightly with regards to the 
West the treaty was more likely to thrust it into an unwanted war than it was 
for China. Mao’s exploitation of the mutual assistance provision was a major 
factor in the erosion of Sino-Soviet relations over the next decade and a half.
For China forming an alliance with the Soviet Union was a strategic and tactical 
necessity. The Sino-Soviet pact was strategic for China in that it balanced Ameri-
can power, with the mutual assistance clause protecting against a US-supported 
direct assault from Taiwan. It was tactical in that the Soviets provided desperately-
1302 Henry Kissinger, On China (New York: Penguin Books, 2012), 118.
1303 Ibid, 121
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needed material assistance and technical expertise. However, the fact that for both 
countries the tactical aspect always outweighed the strategic and normative facets 
of the relationship consistently proved an impediment to a lasting partnership.
In hindsight, three main factors caused the marriage between the two Com-
munist giants to become increasingly unhappy and eventually end in an unce-
remonious divorce. The first factor was the gap in intentions and expectations 
for both parties. Both countries saw each other primarily in tactical terms. For 
Moscow, the People’s Republic was a junior partner in a balancing alliance 
against the United States. The USSR was focused steadfastly on its European 
policy and saw China as a tool by which it could achieve its ends in the Asia-
Pacific region; essentially an auxiliary force.
For China, the USSR represented a tactical tool by which to pursue its own 
distinct national design. Mao needed stability on the country’s Western frontier 
so that it could focus on internal regeneration and the return to an assertive 
regional policy in the Pacific. In addition, Moscow provided desperately needed 
technical assistance in the form of loans, material, technology and expertise.1304 
Most importantly, the mutual assistance clause created a powerful deterrent 
against external security threats. Rather than seeing itself as part of a coherent 
strategic design against the capitalist West, China sought utilitarian ends from 
the USSR by which it could pursue its own national foreign policy. 
The USSR saw itself as the unquestioned leader of the Communist world and 
commanding force in the unfolding global revolution. Any country entering into 
an alliance with them would do so as a component in Moscow’s grand strategy. 
Thus China would have to be a junior partner in any bilateral alliance. This was 
a non-starter for the country’s leadership, who associated any subservient re-
lationship as an extension of the “century of humiliation.” For Mao, the USSR 
was a tool, not a big brother. This nascent tension was exacerbated by Stalin’s 
death and succession by Nikita Khrushchev, who never succeeded in com-
municating with Mao in a manner conducive to promoting Soviet interests.1305
The second main factor was the ideological gulf between the two Marx-
ist states. While they were ostensibly ideological brethren, the Chinese Com-
munist Party did not neatly hew to the standard Leninist line as promoted by 
Moscow. Orthodox Marxism treats national differences as illusory but China’s 
brand of Communism was distinctly Chinese, drawing on the country’s unique 
historical experience for inspiration as well as Marxist doctrine. Differences in 
official interpretations of Marxism became increasingly problematic, especially 
after Khrushchev’s ascension to First Secretary. 
The post-Stalin leadership was horrified at the abuses of his reign (even as 
most had been active participants in it) and sought an incremental “thawing” 
1304 David Shambaugh, China Goes Global: The Partial Power (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2013), 44.
1305 Kissinger, 283.
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of the country’s political system. This was exemplified by Khrushchev’s “secret 
speech” in 1956, during which he excoriated Stalin for numerous atrocities and 
declared the concept of “socialist legality” to be a leading force in Soviet policy 
going forward. Mao found the speech to be a grave error on Khrushchev’s part. 
As the leader of a totalitarian state depending on a near god-like cult of per-
sonality for legitimacy, the very thought of denouncing Stalin was a dangerous 
threat to party unity and public faith in the infallibility of the Communist Party. 
Mao’s animosity toward Khrushchev grew when the latter declared a policy 
of “peaceful coexistence” with the capitalist West, namely the United States. 
The Chairman considered this a form of “revisionism”; accommodating class 
enemies and backsliding from the revolutionary path.1306 Mao instead opted for 
a policy of constant confrontation with the US, initiating two crises in the Tai-
wan Strait in 1954 and 1958. He effectively masked China’s material weakness 
by aggressively engaging enemies, giving China the appearance of a power 
when in reality it lacked the capabilities to realistically assert itself in interna-
tional affairs. China consistently “punched above its weight” during the 1950s. 
The Chinese leadership increasingly began to see the USSR as an imperial 
power masquerading as a revolutionary state, even to the point of describ-
ing the Soviets as “red imperialists.”1307 Denouncing the USSR as a revisionist 
betrayer of socialist ideals, Mao attempted to seize the ideological leadership 
of the Communist world for himself, using rhetoric heavily-infused with refer-
ences to Western imperialism. In this sense, Chinese foreign policy was guided 
as much by a post-colonial “global south” perspective as by Marxism. 
The third explanation for the fissure is related to the first two. Viewing the 
USSR as a tactical tool by which it could conduct its own independent foreign 
policy, China became increasingly aggressive and unpredictable in the inter-
national sphere. Buttressed by the mutual assistance pact - which bound the 
USSR to support China in the event of war with any third party - Mao appeared 
willing to provoke conflict with the US, even at the cost of nuclear war. Mao 
repeatedly made statements during the 1950s and 1960s dismissing China’s 
susceptibility to nuclear arms. During the first Taiwan Strait crisis in 1954 Mao 
told the Finnish ambassador to Beijing: 
The Chinese people are not to be cowed by U.S. atomic blackmail. Our 
country has a population of 600 million and an area of 9,600,000 square kil-
ometers. The United States cannot annihilate the Chinese nation with its small 
stack of bombs…if the United States with its planes plus the A-bomb is to 
launch a war of aggression against China, then China with its millet plus rifles 
is sure to emerge the victor.1308
1306 Kissinger, 171.
1307 Ibid, 175.
1308 Mao Tse-tung,“The Chinese People Cannot be Cowed by the Atom Bomb” in Mao 
Tse-tung: Selected Works, vol. 5 (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1967), 152-3.
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This rhetoric was deeply unsettling to the Soviet leadership (as well as its 
Warsaw Pact allies); presiding over a country still devastated from the Second 
World War and not sharing Mao’s nonchalance toward the nuclear threat. It 
was even more off-putting for the leaders of small Soviet satellite states in 
Europe, who risked total annihilation in a nuclear war. The crisis marked the 
beginning of the straining of relations between the two powers, due to the fact 
that Mao seemed willing to risk a global nuclear war over an issue which held 
no strategic importance for the USSR.1309
The second Taiwan Strait crisis in 1958 involved even more intense sabre rat-
tling by Mao, by which time the USSR was no longer willing to provide a guaran-
tee of military assistance. The incident proved to be the final nail in the coffin for 
Sino-Soviet relations. The Soviet leadership was committed to peaceful coexist-
ence with the West, and to that end Mao had become a dangerous nuisance. 
No longer deriving any tactical benefit from a partnership with China, the USSR 
pulled support completely following the second Taiwan Strait crisis. 1310
CHINA CRAWLS OUT OF ISOLATION
China’s opening to the United States in the early 1970s is the symbolic moment 
in the country’s first-ever integration into the Western-led international system. 
However, the total process was the result of cautious, arduous and long-term 
diplomatic maneuvering with many states, the US being only one of them. After 
the death of Mao and suppression of the reactionary Gang of Four the Com-
munist Party under Deng Xiaoping’s leadership was firmly set on ending the 
country’s twenty years of political isolation and ruinous economic autarky.1311
Deng and other reformist leaders found China’s economic and technological 
backwardness to be the primary cause of the “century of humiliation.” Central 
planning of the economy and severing ties with foreign powers had exacerbat-
ed the problem rather than put China on a road to progress. For it to become a 
viable, prosperous state capable of looking after its interests in the international 
sphere, the country would have to find a new way forward. The reformists were 
inspired by Zhou Enlai’s famous 1975 “Four Modernizations” speech highlight-
ing agriculture, industry, science and technology, and national defense as cru-
cial areas in which China must catch up to the Western powers.1312 This would 
take a concerted strategy involving both unlocking the creative capacities of 
the Chinese people and top-run policy initiatives. David Shambaugh writes:
1309 Kissinger, 168.
1310 Ibid.
1311 Kissinger, 326-7.
1312 Gao Wenquian, Zhou Enlai: The Last Perfect Revolutionary, (New York: Public Affairs, 
2007), 275.
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Once Deng Xiaoping took command in 1978 and reoriented the national poli-
cy agenda singularly toward economic development, all spheres of state power 
were directed toward serving this end. Diplomacy and foreign policy were pri-
mary among them. Overriding emphasis was placed on nations that could pro-
vide China with advance technology, FDI, expertise, and export markets.1313
The privileging of economic development demanded that China attempt to 
stabilize its borders and forge beneficial relationships with as many foreign 
states as possible. Grappling with security threats on all sides, as the People’s 
Republic had done for most of its history, was not conducive to domestic de-
velopment. This meant making diplomatic overtures to immediate neighbors 
as well as countries in Europe, Africa, Latin America and North America. For 
Deng, positive external relations were useful for importing foreign technology 
and educating Chinese students in top universities abroad.1314
During the early 1980s Deng’s administration began a subtle campaign to repair 
diplomatic links with the USSR. The maneuver was intended primarily to stabilize 
China’s western frontier (as at that time parts of the Sino-Soviet border were still in 
dispute) so that it could focus on internal modernization free from a Soviet security 
threat. Long and arduous, the process bore fruit in 1989 when Mikhail Gorbachev 
became the first Soviet leader to visit China since Khrushchev. The two sides 
signed a border delimitation agreement in 1991, putting the territorial issue to rest 
and opening paving the way for a mutually beneficial relationship.1315
From 1989 on the two states were set on a course of incremental progress 
from adversaries to strategic partners, providing quid pro quo diplomatic 
backing on a variety of issues such as China’s long-running dispute over Tai-
wan and opposition to American “hegemonism” in a unipolar world order.  The 
two powers regularly support each other in the UN Security Council. While 
relations have deepened in many spheres including diplomacy, bilateral trade 
and cultural exchange, this paper will highlight military cooperation, which was 
a catalyst for the resumption of diplomatic ties during the early 1990s. 
SPOTLIGHT: MILITARY–TECHNICAL COOPERATION
The reconciliation of these former adversaries is best viewed through the lens 
of bilateral military-technical cooperation. While it is only one facet of the bila-
teral relationship, it was the main catalyst for the rapid deepening of ties du-
ring the early 1990s that endures to the present. In addition, military-technical 
collaboration provides a useful starting point for which to test theoretical ap-
proaches to the Sino-Russian partnership. 
1313 Shambaugh, 44.
1314 Kissinger, 335-6.
1315 Marina O. Dmitrieva, “The Creation of the Russian-Chinese Border,” Middle East 
Journal of Scientific Research, 20, no.7 (2014): 845.
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Cooperation, characterized primarily by Soviet and later Russian transfer 
of material, technological licenses and expertise to China, began due to two 
unique historical events. The first was China’s need for externally produced 
factors of production in developing its military. It had embarked on a moderni-
zation program in 1985 but advancement came to a grinding halt when the US, 
UK and France each placed embargoes on the sale of military equipment in the 
wake of the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989.1316
Just as China was in need of a new source of external military technology, 
Mikhail Gorbachev made a historic visit to Beijing with the purpose of normal-
izing relations between the two countries.1317 His arrival, happening in May, 
1989 and coinciding with the Tiananmen massacre, marked the first time a 
Soviet leader had set foot in China in over 40 years. Chinese need coupled 
with Soviet willingness opened the door to deepening military cooperation as 
well as the forging of ties in other spheres. While the military dimension is not 
what motivated Gorbachev to visit China in the first place, I argue that it was 
instrumental as a starting point for bilateral cooperation. 
The next year Admiral Liu Huaqing, Vice-Chairman of the Central Military Com-
mission, visited Moscow to open negotiations on the transfer of advanced weap-
ons systems.1318 Talks occurred regularly on the issue following Huaqing’s visit. The 
first major contract, a Chinese purchase of 24 mi-17 helicopters, was signed in 
1990.1319 A major deal to purchase su-27 fighter jets was signed in 1990 just prior 
to the dissolution of the USSR, with shipments arriving in China the following year. 
In 1992 China became the first foreign country to purchase Russian S-300 surface-
to-air missiles.1320 It drastically improved the country’s air defense capabilities. 
Facing severe constraints on demand while the economy was in a transition 
phase Russian defense contractors were desperate to secure external markets 
for their products. Government demand for domestically produced arms declined 
drastically, with procurement falling by 70 percent in 1992 alone, and produc-
tion dropping by 33.4 percent the following year. By the end of 1994 roughly 400 
defense enterprises had discontinued production, and 1,500 plants working only 
part-time.  Much of what Moscow ordered it could not pay for, lacking a tax collec-
tion system to provide financing for procurement. In 1993 more than 100 miG-29s 
1316 Kevin Ryan. “Russo-Chinese Defense Relations: The View from Moscow,” in The 
Future of China-Russia Relations ed. by James Bellacqua (The University Press of 
Kentucky, 2010), 180.
1317 Ibid.
1318 Jyotsna Baksi, “Russia-China Military-technical Cooperation: Implications for India,” 
Strategic Analysis, 24, no. 4, (2000): 634.
1319 Ibid.
1320 Alexander A. Sergounin and Sergey V. Subbotin, “Sino-Russian military-technical 
cooperation: a Russian view,” in Russia and the Arms Trade ed. Ian Anthony (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1998), 206.
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worth roughly $2 billion were parked at an assembly plant near Moscow after it 
was revealed that the government did not have the cash on hand to pay for them.
With the collapse of domestic procurement the Russian government showed a 
willingness to negotiate military-technical transfers with China. Bilateral trade vol-
umes in arms continued to trend upward. In 1992 Boris Yeltsin visited the People’s 
Republic during a tour of Asia, declaring Russia’s commitment to sell “the most 
sophisticated armaments and weapons.” While some voices in the Russian mili-
tary establishment were distrustful of China and expressed misgivings about aid-
ing the military modernization of a historical adversary sharing a 4,195 kilometer 
border, tangible benefits continued to trump hypothetical security concerns.1321
From 1991–2006 annual bilateral sales averaged $1 billion. That number 
doubled over 2001-2006.1322 Lo writes that the “U.S. government estimates 
that Russia has supplied around 95 percent of the arms sold to China over 
the past decade” (2002-2012).1323 That includes Kilo-class submarines, Sovre-
menny II-class destroyers and SU-30 MKK fighter aircraft, all sophisticated 
models crucial for the development of China’s navy. With military exchange 
providing the impetus, bilateral trade volume continued to deepen after 1991. 
China largely purchases military equipment, advanced technology and energy 
resources while Russia imports manufactured goods from China. 
THE INTEREST GROUP APPROACH
Within the military-technical cooperation lens there is one school of thought 
highlighting the importance of domestic interest groups on both sides in lob-
bying for the exchange of material and technology. Arms sales from Russia to 
China served a critical purpose for the military-industrial complexes of both 
countries. During the 1990s Russia’s economy was in freefall due to capital 
flight and partial state collapse stemming from the transition to a market econ-
omy. The Russian military-industrial complex was desperate to find a market 
for its products, especially considering that entire cities were maintained by 
arms production facilities.1324
In this context high-ranking government officials were candid about the pre-
mium they placed on securing arms deals with foreign buyers. In 1992 Yeltsin 
stated in an interview that “the weapons trade is essential for us to obtain the for-
eign currency which we desperately need and to keep the defense industry afloat 
1321 Bob Lo, Axis of Convenience: Moscow, Beijing and the New Geopolitics, (New York: 
Chatham House, 2008), 31.
1322 Arial Cohen, “The Russia-China Friendship and Cooperation Treaty: A Strategic Shift 
for Eurasia?,” The Heritage Foundation, accessed June 25 2014.
1323 Lo, 79.
1324 Lo, 30-1.
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(italics mine).”1325 Even as late as 1999 Russian Prime Minister Sergei Stepashin 
extolled the importance of arms exports both for advancing Russia’s foreign pol-
icy goals and in sustaining the massive military-industrial complex inherited from 
the USSR.1326 Exports provided a way to keep orders flowing in in the absence of 
domestic procurement by a cash-strapped state. Unable to pay for armaments 
and under pressure to keep the labor-intensive industry alive the government 
supported it by securing deals with foreign buyers, namely China. 
There is ample evidence to justify the argument that Russia viewed its emerg-
ing relationship with China as primarily commercial. Russian leaders have al-
ways put a higher priority on their relations with the West than with their Asian 
neighbors, China included. Yeltsin was unequivocally Western-centric in out-
look, seeing China as a card to play against the US, not an equal partner or sub-
stitute for Russia’s relationship with the West.1327 And while Putin has trumpeted 
a “multi-vectored” foreign policy and emphasized the importance of Russia’s 
relations with its eastern neighbors, his administration is also focused first and 
foremost on the West. However, there are clear indicators that Russia’s behavior 
toward China was not merely motivated by economic concerns or lobbying by 
the military-industrial complex. Russia has refrained from selling arms to Taiwan 
despite the obvious benefit for its arms industry; this serves as a clear indicator 
of the priority which Russia places on its relationship with China.1328
In the Russian case, the necessary conditions are present for establishing the 
interest group approach as an explanation for deepening military-technical ties 
with China. The motive for lobbying was the military-industrial complex’s in-
stinct for survival in the post-Soviet landscape. The opportunity for successful 
lobbying was also present: the body had been the most powerful bureaucratic 
structure since the Second World War and was the country’s largest employer 
at the time of the dissolution of the USSR. Last and most important, statements 
by senior officials like Yeltsin and Stepashin demonstrate unequivocally that the 
interests of the military-industrial complex were significant in informing foreign 
policy choices (which is not to assert that they were the preeminent factor).
On the other side of the coin, China had been plunged back into isolation fol-
lowing the Tiananmen Square massacre. The US, UK and France (three of the 
world’s top four military powers, along with Russia) each placed embargoes on 
military equipment sales to China. In an early stage of economic and techno-
logical development China did not have the domestic capabilities of designing 
or producing sophisticated weaponry. The military-industrial complex needed 
to secure a new external supplier in order to continue the modernization pro-
gram begun four years prior to Tiananmen. 
1325 Boris Yeltsin, “Interview with President Yeltsin,” Izvestiya, February 24, 1992.
1326 Baksi, 635.
1327 Lo, 160.
1328 Sergounin and Subbotin, 199.
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Establishing the interest group approach as a viable explanation for Chinese 
behavior during the 1990s is complex. The motive for extensive lobbying by 
the military-industrial complex is clear; the interest group was one of the pri-
mary beneficiaries of the modernization drive. Secondly, Deng’s gradual retire-
ment beginning in 1989 created a fluid political situation in which various Com-
munist Party factions and government bureaucracies could vie for influence. 
While historically relegated to taking orders from the civilian government, the 
removal of a charismatic leader created a unique opportunity for the People’s 
Liberation Army (PLA) to assert itself within China’s foreign policy machinery. 
Thus we observe conditions necessary for establishing the validity of the 
interest group approach. But is there strong evidence that lobbying efforts 
played a significant role in forging military-technical ties with Russia? The 
answer to this question is dubious. During the 1990s the Hong Kong press 
treated the PLA as “an extremely aggressive interest group in core areas of 
foreign policy.”1329 Despite these media portrayals, some experts like Michael 
D. Swaine argue that in reality the PLA’s effectiveness as a pressure group was 
insignificant.1330 The opacity of Chinese policymaking process and density of 
bureaucratic structures make it difficult to determine the precise role the PLA 
played in signing military-technical agreements with Russia after 1989. Thus 
while necessary conditions are present, none are sufficient to establishing the 
interest group approach as a compelling explanation for the Chinese case. 
THE STRUCTURAL REALIST APPROACH
Looking beyond the interests of the respective military-industrial complexes, 
deepening ties were advantageous to the broadly-defined state interest of both 
countries. During the 1990s the ongoing exchange was mutually beneficial 
and fit snugly into China’s utilitarian approach to international relations. While 
the leadership has become more assertive and self-confident, particularly after 
2008, China remains concerned first and foremost with domestic economic and 
technological advancement, of which military forms a crucial component.1331
Structural realism emphasizes security over power, relative gains over abso-
lute, and the effect that the external structure of the international system has 
on the behavior of individual states.1332 According to Waltz, “competition and 
conflict among states stem directly from the twin facts of life under conditions 
of anarchy: states in an anarchic order must provide for their own security, 
1329 Michael D. Swaine, The Role of the Chinese Military in National Security Policymak-
ing, (Washington, DC: National Defense Research Institute, 1998), 12.
1330 Ibid.
1331 Shambaugh, 40.
1332 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, (New York: McGraw Hill, 1979).
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and threats or seeming threats to their security abound.”1333 In the case of 
Chinese behavior in the post-Mao period the state chose a path of competi-
tion rather than conflict. Whereas Mao’s national security policy depended on 
the nuclear deterrent, deception, and the exploitation of tensions between the 
United States and the USSR, the reformists deemed economic and techno-
logical modernization to be the only sustainable means of ensuring security 
from external threats.1334 Essentially, the new leadership was determined for 
China to take sole ownership of its national security, rather than leave it, at 
least in part, to factors beyond its control. 
Post-Mao leaders, Deng Xiaoping in particular, realized that autarkic policies 
prevented economic growth and kept China subordinate to the United States 
and the USSR in the international structure. Its security and ability to project 
power internationally would always be tenuous unless it modernized in a man-
ner parallel to Japan’s modernization following the Meiji restoration in 1866. 
Thus it opened up to bring in the foreign technology and capital needed to 
strengthen its position vis-à-vis other states.
The structural realist approach is useful for analyzing the Chinese perspec-
tive as the state put an onus on ensuring lasting security and improving the 
country’s relative position in the international structure. Upgrading in the mili-
tary-technical sphere has been instrumental to this still ongoing program. 
In 1989 China’s rise was halted by the backlash of Tiananmen; at that point 
leaders turned to Russia as a new source for strategic imports. Mutually bene-
ficial relations were established and the import of sophisticated weaponry and 
technology from Russia has upgraded its military and industrial capabilities. Its 
security forces are rapidly becoming capable of projecting power abroad; the 
navy has become increasingly assertive in the South China Sea since 2008. 
While Russian imports qualitatively improved China’s national defense, spill-
over from the defense industry into other manufacturing sectors meant that 
arms purchases fueled economic growth and technological modernization at 
large.1335 Much of this has occurred through the use of military-technical coop-
eration as a forum for direct contact between Russian and Chinese firms, who 
establish links in non-military trade sectors.1336 Thus China has been able to 
bolster its security as well as the economic modernization campaign initiated 
by Deng, fueling its rise from regional actor to emerging global power. 
It should be noted that while the framework of structural realism is useful for 
explaining Chinese state behavior, its approach toward security and economic 
modernization has been colored by unique cultural characteristics, in particu-
1333 Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory,” The Journal of Interdis-
ciplinary History, 18, no.4 (Spring, 1988): 619.
1334 Kissinger, 331.
1335 Sergounin and Subbotin, 215
1336 Ibid, 198.
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lar its experience with Western colonial powers during the 19th and early 20th 
centuries. This period is remembered as the “century of humiliation,” starting 
with the Opium Wars of the 1830s and ending only with the victory of Commu-
nist forces in 1949. During this time imperial China suffered a string of military 
and diplomatic defeats at the hands of Western powers as well as Russia and 
Japan; the “unequal treaties” robbed the country of its sovereignty and indi-
rectly led to the collapse of the imperial regime in 1911.1337
Both Mao and Deng’s foreign policies were defined by their attempts to deal 
with this post-colonial legacy; while Mao turned inward, Deng turned outward. 
While Mao’s “anguish over China’s century of humiliation” led to him to milita-
rize Chinese society, Deng’s led him to modernize it.1338 Mao deftly used impe-
rial Chinese “psychological management” techniques to keep foreign threats 
at bay; Deng followed Sun-Tzu’s dictum of “cultivating changes in the strategic 
landscape”: undertaking decades of patient reform in order to tip the strategic 
balance in China’s favor.1339
This paper takes the stance that China has and continues to behave as a real-
ist power, putting security concerns at the forefront of its foreign policy agenda. 
But it has pursued that path along lines colored by its cultural characteristics 
and unique historical experience. This can be best described with a play on the 
famous Stalinist dictum, “nationalist in form and socialist in content.” China’s 
foreign policy can accurately be called “nationalist in form and realist in content.”
As for the Russian case, exports were primarily driven by the need for for-
eign exchange and political pressure from the defense industry. However, the 
Yeltsin administration became increasingly disappointed with its relationship 
with the US and saw China as a potential “balancing tool” against US hege-
monism. Yeltsin had harbored the “unrealistic expectation” that Russia could 
act as an equal partner alongside the United States in the emerging post-Cold 
War order.1340 These aspirations were dashed when events like the American 
intervention in Bosnia and a generally small regard for Russian interests made 
it painfully clear that the Americans would not treat Russia as an equal partner. 
Recognizing that their relative position on the international structure was 
tenuous and that the world order was unprecedentedly US-centric, the leader-
ship turned to China as a strategic counterweight to the United States To Rus-
sia, a strong, friendly China was a card which it could play against the West. 
Lo asserts that Yeltsin and later, Vladimir Putin, sought to revise the unipolar 
system into a multipolar one in which Russia would be a leading power and an 
“equal partner” to both the US and China.1341
1337 Kissinger.
1338 Kissinger, 100.
1339 Kissinger, 37.
1340 Lo, 29.
1341 Lo, 168.
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CONCLUSION
Sino-Russian relations have successfully recovered from the deep freeze of the 
Cold War years. While there are potential obstacles to deepening ties, the two 
states show an unprecedented level of cooperation in the diplomatic, military-
technical and economic spheres. The relationship evolved from constant con-
frontation to cooperation due to the emerging unipolar international landscape. 
On the Russian side, the dissolution of the Soviet Union and partial col-
lapse of the Russian state led the leadership to seek tactics for balancing the 
power of the United States, the unquestioned hegemon in the post-Cold War 
world. These concerns led Gorbachev, Yeltsin and later Putin to foster close 
ties with China as a counterbalance to the United States. On the other hand, 
the military-industrial complex successfully lobbied the political leadership to 
sign military-technical agreements with China as a means of selling surplus 
equipment. Russia sought close ties with China out of both realist motivations 
and the entreaties of domestic pressure groups. 
Chinese rapprochement with Russia stems from the country’s modernization 
drive in the post-Mao era. Reformist leaders such as Deng Xiaoping sought 
internal economic, technical and military development as a means of ensu-
ring the country’s security and position in the international structure; a real-
ist objective which had special meaning given the legacy of China’s “century 
of humiliation.” Modernization necessitated securing the Sino-Russian border 
and establishing beneficial arrangements with as many foreign states as pos-
sible, the Soviet Union (later Russia) included. After Tiananmen and the Soviet 
dissolution this involved the purchase of significant amounts of sophisticated 
Russian military equipment and technological licensing. While the Chinese 
military-industrial complex played a role in the forging of military-technical ties, 
research points to the conclusion that Chinese leaders turned toward Russia 
out of realist concerns more so than the lobbying of domestic interest groups. 
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DARWINIAN SUPERPOWER:  
“CAN THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY ADAPT 
TO THE PRESSURES OF CHINA’S DOMESTIC 
REFORMS?”
JOnAtHOn mArK WOOdruFF
INTRODUCTION
Susan Shirk declares that China’s contemporary one-party state is a “brittle, 
authoritarian regime that fears its own citizens”.1342 David Shambaugh goes as 
far as to proclaim that Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leaders are “haunted 
by fears that their days are numbered”.1343 Declarations by both domestic and 
foreign observers affirming that the CCP is on the verge of imminent collapse 
are not a unique phenomenon, but a consistent feature of the PRC’s history 
since 1949. John Fewsmith reminds scholars that often in the ‘China field’, 
predictions of the imminent collapse of the CCP have been wrong in the past, 
and any fatalist predictions concerning the future of the CCP, are far from 
axiomatic.1344 In contrast to these pessimistic depictions, this essay favours 
a cautiously optimistic approach as demonstrated by Andrew Nathan, who 
describes the CCP as an example of ‘authoritarian resilience’, and argues that 
the CCP’s adaptations have enabled it to survive and consolidate its power.1345
The unprecedented unravelling of socialist hegemony in Central and Eastern 
Europe during the revolutions of 1989 and the end of the Soviet Union in 1991 
led some scholars to mark the death of Marxism-Leninism as a serious po-
litical force in both ideological and practical terms1346. However, in wake of the 
devastating events of the June 1989 Tiananmen Square incident, the CCP has 
demonstrated a remarkable resilience to the titanic pressures of the ‘Third Wave 
of Democratisation’, which saw 75% of the world’s existing communist regimes 
swept away by the ‘Leninist Mass Extinction’ of 1989-91.1347 The CCP can be 
best understood through Nicholas Bequelin’s eloquent characterization of it as 
1342 Susan Shirk, ‘China, Fragile Superpower’, 2008, p. 5.
1343 David Shambaugh, ‘China’s Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation’, 2008, p. 25.
1344 John Fewsmith, ‘Since Tiananmen’, 2008, p. 3.
1345 A. Nathan, ‘Authoritarian Resilience’, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 14, Nº 1, January 2003, p. 6.
1346 A. Linklater, ‘Marx and Marxism’, (eds) Burchill, Scott, and Linklater, Andrew, ‘Theo-
ries of International Relations’, 2009, p. 112.
1347 Richard Baum, ‘Political Implications of China’s Information Revolution: the Media, 
the Minders, and Their Message’, in Li, Cheng, (Eds) ‘China’s Political Landscape, 
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the “first Darwinian Leninist Party in history”.1348  The CCP has both “atrophied 
and adapted”,1349 developing a strategy of co-naturalizing any potential opposi-
tion, namely the growing middle-classes, in order to maintain its primacy.1350
However as a result of this policy, the CCP runs the risk of ideological dilu-
tion, perhaps outright dissolution, and may cease to function as a coherent 
and viable organization.1351 This gamble will demand further long-term reform 
to balance between further economic liberalization and tight political control, 
while filling the ideological vacuum that the atrophy of communism has left in 
its wake.1352 Yet, as this essay will contend, this will most likely be on the CCP’s 
own terms and tailored to their political advantage. 
Since the beginning of reform in 1978, the PRC has enjoyed an era of unrivalled 
domestic economic achievement, with an average of 9% growth over the past 25 
years (nearer 10% over the last 15 years), per capita incomes that have increased 
six times and 400 million people lifted out of poverty.1353 China’s phenomenal 
ascendancy onto the international arena has reaped both material and political 
dividends for the CCP, allowing nationalism to fill the ideological void that threat-
ens to undermine the very existence of the CCP in the post-Maoist era. 
However, the combined forces of globalisation and domestic economic industri-
alization have lifted the lid of a Pandora’s Box of powerful challenges that threaten to 
undermine the legitimacy of the CCP and stability of the PRC.1354  Internally, prosper-
ity has led to increasing levels of corruption, inequality and higher levels of aspiration, 
which could deliver a fatal blow to the legitimacy of the CCP regime.1355 Externally, 
and linked to domestic reform, in an era of increasing globalisation, China’s domes-
tic prosperity is vulnerable to the flux of global economic markets. Nationalism has 
proved potentially in conflict with peaceful development. Worse still, the political 
asymmetry in Sino-Western ideological relations has given rise to fears among left-
ists in the CCP that U.S. economic leverage will lead to a peaceful evolution, which 
will result in increasingly forceful domestic demands for Western-democratisation 
Prospect for Democracy’ (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2008), p. 
181.
1348 N. Bequelin, ‘The Limits of the Party’s Adaptation’, The East Asian Economic Re-
view, 2009.
1349 D. Shambaugh, ‘China’s Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation’, 2008, p. 15.
1350 S.P. Huntington, ‘Third Wave of Democratization’, 1991, p. 68.
1351 MacFarquhar, ‘Debate #1: Is Communist Party Rule Sustainable in China? Remarks 
by Roderick MacFarquhar, Harvard University,’ October 2006.
1352 R. E. Gamer, ‘Understanding Contemporary China’, 2003, p. 85.
1353 Will Hutton, ‘The Writing on the Wall, China and the West in the 21st Century’, 2007, 
p. 118.
1354 Kenneth Lieberthal, ‘Governing China, from Revolution Through Reform’, 2004, p. 
137.
1355 Michel Oskenberg, ‘The Nature of Chinese Politics, from Mao to Jiang’, Unger, Jona-
thon (eds), 2002, p.204.
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that could spell the end of Leninist democratic centralism (min zhu ji zhong zhi) in 
China.1356 This essay will aim to demonstrate that the CCP has not only largely adapt-
ed successfully to meet the challenges of these demands, but that long term political 
reform may not necessarily lead to a loss of hegemony for the CCP.1357
STRUCTURE
As an ancient Chinese proverb proclaims, “the beginning of wisdom is calling things 
by their right name”.1358 For the purpose of this essay, we shall define success-
ful adaptation, in terms of the CCP being able through the development of various 
strategies to evolve to meet the needs of the Chinese state, in order to secure its 
monopoly rule.1359 Due to the vast and complex nature of the reforms and due to 
word limitation, this essay will focus primarily on economic reform since many schol-
ars consider this to be the primary pillar upon which the CCP has balanced its rule. 
Furthermore, considering that economic reform has amplified the demand 
for and shaped the dynamics of potential political reform pressuring the CCP 
to make the Party more accountable, the implications of possible political re-
form must also be examined. With reference to comparative political theories 
and specific schools of Chinese political analysis, this essay will be carefully 
structured for clarity. Initially, we will consider the nature of the domestic re-
form in the PRC which began primarily in 1978 under the leadership of Deng 
Xiaoping and developed further under the successive leadership of the CCP. 
Next, an overview of key reforms will lead us to consider the burgeoning social, 
economic, and political pressures that the CCP faces in the 21st Century. These have 
culminated in the cynicism of scholars such as Shirk, who claim that in the face of 
such challenges, the CCP’s grip on power is inherently unstable and unsustainable.1360 
Finally, we will consider how the CCP’s innovative strategies of pre-emptive reform 
and adaptation provide a bridge for both the CCP and the Chinese state to embark 
on an era of greater economic freedoms and potential political reform with distinct 
Chinese characteristics. This will allow the CCP both to successfully surmount the 
challenges presented by reform and avoid the apocalyptic fate predicted by critics. 
Along with concluding thoughts, contrasting scholarly opinions surrounding the 
topics of adaptation and regime survival must also be analyzed.
1356 Wu Xinbo,‘China, Security Practice of a modernizing and Ascending Power’ Part II. 
The Major Powers, Chapter 3, in ‘Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational 
Influences’, (eds). Alagappa, 1998, p. 113.
1357 Suisheng Zhao,  ‘Debating Political Reform in China, Rule of Law vs. Democratiza-
tion’, 2006, p. 50.
1358 William Tow and Taylor, Brendan, ‘What is Asian security architecture?’, 2010, p. 95.
1359 Andre Laliberte and Lanteigne, Marc (eds),‘The Issue of Challenges to the Legiti-
macy of CCP Rule’, 2007, p.6.
1360 S. L. Shirk, ‘China: Fragile Superpower’, 2008, p. 4
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THE NATURE OF REFORM – ‘OPENING PANDORA’S BOX’
For the purposes of this essay, we will focus upon the post-Maoist reform era, 
which began under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping in 1978 and then develop un-
der the successive leadership of Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao respectively. First, we 
will consider Mao’s legacy and the need for pragmatic reform for the CCP to have 
survived. Second, we will consider Deng Xiaoping’s moves towards pragmatic 
economic development in contrast to Maoist utopianism. Then we will consider 
the variety of reform undertaken on economic policy. After that, we will consider 
challenges presented to reform between 1985 and 1991. Finally, we will briefly 
consider the lessons learned from Tiananmen and external events (primarily the 
revolutions of 1989 and 1991) by the CCP and the future of reform within the CCP.
MAO’S LEGACY: ATROPHY AND CRISIS
Chairman Mao Zedong’s first revolution (1949-76) left a legacy of crises that directly 
threatened the legitimacy of the CCP. The PRC was left politically, economically and 
socially exhausted by the instability created by the Cultural Revolution (CR) of 1966 
to 1976.1361 The Party, which was the direct target of Mao’s campaigns in the 1970’s 
against revisionism,  was left devastated, atrophied and at the mercy of factionalism.1362
As Hobsbawm surmises, this was a period of economic woe, political insta-
bility, and what he terms Mao’s socialist utopianism. “Red was not necessarily 
more important than being expert, but it was its alternative, revolutionary fervor 
alone could bring revolutionary success”’.1363 With the death of Mao, his suc-
cessor Hua Guofeng, whom scholars argue derived his legitimacy entirely from 
Mao’s personality cult, offered only a continuation of Maoist idealism. This is 
evidenced through his proclamation of the “two whatevers” (liang ge fan shi), 
meaning adherence to whatever Mao did and whatever Mao said, and his “Ten 
Year Plan”, a Maoist vision with little concession to Chinese reality.1364
DENG XIAOPING: ‘PRAGMATIC REFORM TO UPHOLD 
SOCIALISM WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS’
Edward Friedman highlights the most significant legacy of the Mao era for re-
form. While the USSR’s entrenched and corrupt Brezhnev-era Communist Par-
1361 John Farndon,  ‘China Rises’, 2007, pp. 18-19.
1362 Kenneth Lieberthal, ‘Governing China, from Revolution Through Reform’, 2004, p. 
125.
1363 Eric Hobsbawm,  ‘Age of Extremes’, (1998), Chapter 16, ‘End of Socialism’, p. 467.
1364 Zhang Lijia, and Macleod, Culm, ‘China Remembers’, 1999, p. 174.
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ty successfully resisted Gorbachev’s economic reforms from 1988-1991, the 
CCP was so devastated by the Mao years that they largely accepted Deng’s 
reforms.1365 This was evident by the popular support for Deng and the PLA’s 
engineered downfall of the Gang of Four in mid-October 1976.1366 Following his 
third and final rehabilitation in 1978, Deng Xiaoping then moved to marginalize 
Hua Guofeng and reclaimed his vice-chairmanship of the CCP. Deng directly 
challenged the ‘whateverist’ line by augmenting the Maoist motto “Seek truth 
from facts’” to add “Practice is the Sole Criterion of Truth”.1367 Deng advocated 
building “socialism with Chinese characteristics”,1368 including the Four Mo-
dernizations (agriculture, industry, science and technology, defense). 
While appreciating the necessary and innovative nature of these reforms for 
CCP rejuvenation and survival, Minxin Pei is careful to remind scholars that Deng 
Xiaoping was no counter-revolutionary but a true believer in the Communist 
ideology that the PRC was founded upon. Reform was undertaken cautiously; 
‘crossing the river by feeling the stones’ (mo zhe shi tou guo he) characterized 
the more conservative aspect of the Dengist era.1369 Deng was careful to reaffirm 
the Four Cardinal Principles of the CCP: the socialist road, dictatorship of the 
proletariat, the ideological dominance of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism, and most 
importantly, the inviolable paramount leadership of the Party. Political reform 
was not on the agenda, illustrated by the closing of the democracy wall in 1978 
and the imprisonment of the human rights activist Wei Jingsheng.1370
The Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee in 1978 signaled a de-
cisive change in the balance of forces within the CCP. Tacit support was given 
to modernizing factions within the CCP,1371 which oversaw the prioritization of 
economic modernization in all party work, and the role of market forces in the 
economy was boldly increased in stark contrast to the strictly planned-econo-
my of the Maoist-era.1372 Deng allowed the creation of small private plots and 
private markets in which farmers could sell grain that was surplus to their quota. 
This experimentation was an important precursory image of the reforms that 
1365 Edward Friedman, ‘Debating Political Reform in China’,  Zhao, Suisheng (eds), 2006, 
p. 101.
1366 Kishore Mahbubani,  ‘Understanding China’, Foreign Affairs, 2005, p. 53.
1367 Richard Baum, ‘Burying Mao, Chinese Politics in the Age of Deng Xiaoping’, (Princ-
eton: Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 4.
1368 Deng Xiaoping, ‘Opening Speech at the Twelfth National Congress of the Commu-
nist Party of China’, September 1st, 1982.
1369 Minxin Pei, ‘From Mao to Deng: China’s Reform Experience Revisited: Has Autoc-
racy Triumphed?’ 2009.
1370 Kjeld Erik Brodsgaard, ‘The Democracy Movement in China, 1978-1979: Opposition 
Movements, Wall Poster Campaigns, and Underground Journals’, 1981, p. 748.
1371 Michael Schoenhals,‘The 1978 Truth Criterion Controversy’. The China Quarterly, 
126, 1991, p. 265.
1372 Tony Saich, ‘Governance and Politics of China’, 2004, p. 59.
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were to come. After this initial experimentation confined to the rural interior, 
Deng began reform in the cities.1373 Factory managers were extended a greater 
role in the strategic planning of the day-to-day running of their businesses and 
proletarian workers were offered incentives to boost their productivity.1374 Un-
der the direction of Deng, the PRC opened up gradually to the international 
economy through the creation of Special Economic Zones in July 1979 on the 
Southern Coast. Advantageous tax breaks among other incentive packages of-
fered by Beijing were designed to allure foreign investors to acquire desperately 
needed hard capital, meaning business experience and technology.1375 Initially, 
places on the coast sought to capitalize on nearby trade-partners including 
Hong Kong in order to exploit their experience, trade and the Chinese business 
diaspora working in these thriving commercial environments.1376
REFORM REVEALS UNDERLYING CHALLENGES  
TO THE CCP: EBBS AND FLOWS
As Hutton admonishes us, reform has charted a relatively gradual and erratic 
path, with the numerous ideational and economic challenges presented by 
reform led to Chinese policymakers oscillating between fang (opening up) and 
shou (tightening) as they moved forward at each stage of reform in response 
to the ‘ebbs and flows’ of political confidence and attempts to balance the 
factionalism among reformers and conservatives.1377
The period between 1985 and 1992 proved particularly challenging for reformists 
in the PRC. China was beset by economic crises: the lifting of price control, the 
incentive system and an overheating economy resulted in an inflation spike in 1985 
(inflation was viewed as an evil thought to have been banished from China since 
the founding of the PRC). This threatened to wipe out savings and shrink wages, 
and worse still, the CCP was embroiled in numerous corruption scandals, blamed 
by reactionary elements on the ‘corrupting effect of bourgeoisie liberalism’.1378
However, the greatest challenge were the events leading up to the 
Tiananmen Square incident on June 4th 1989. As Shambaugh surmises, “not 
1373 S. Shirk, ‘China: Fragile Superpower’, p. 18.
1374 Qiren Zhou, The Unfolding of Deng’s Drama’, China Center for Economic Research, 
2009, p. 8-9.
1375 R. Mitter, ‘Modern China: A Very Short Introduction’, 2008, p109.
1376 David M. Lampton, ‘The Three Faces of Chinese Power, Might, Money and Minds’, 
2008, p. 162.
1377 Will Hutton, ‘The Writing on the Wall, China and the West in the 21st Century’, 2007, 
p, 97.
1378 Zhang Lijia and Macleod, Culm, ‘China Remembers’, 1999, p. 177.
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since the Cultural Revolution had the CCP come so close to collapse”.1379 
The demonstrations initially started peacefully, but the protests quickly 
became more virulent. The crowds began to directly challenge the regime, 
and the Democracy Goddess, a statue built to imitate the iconic Statue of 
Liberty, cast a shadow over Mao’s portrait.1380 It became clear that the 
students wanted something that the CCP had refused to concede, glasnost 
(political liberalization), to accompany Deng’s perestroika. Tyson argues that 
many young and middle-aged Chinese thinkers were raised not as obedient 
Confucian servants of the state, but as Maoist rebels. Moreover, their rejection 
of Maoism left them “thirsting for a new way to make sense of the world”. 
Many young people looked to Western alternatives and began agitating for 
democratic reforms.1381 Deng was a reformer, but Deng was no Gorbachev. 
After much deliberation, the decision to deploy hard power to bolster CCP 
hegemony was made by the Party’s old guard. CCP Conservatives imposed 
Martial Law on the 20th of May, considering the demonstrations a fight for 
the life or death for the CCP.1382 Hobsbawm, in agreement, asserts that the 
June 4th “Tiananmen Massacre”, left the regime free to continue the policy of 
successful economic liberalization without “immediate political problems”.1383
Only the dismissal of Zhao Ziyang as General Secretary and three years of 
conservative ascendancy allowed incremental economic reform to continue.1384 
Deng’s “Southern Tour” (nanxun), in 1992 offered the PRC a glimpse of Shen-
zhen, the exemplar of the “glorious decade” of the 1990’s,1385 where economic 
growth (over 50% each year for a decade) resulted by 1991 in the economy 
reaching $3.5 billion. This proved vital in silencing anti-reformist reactionary 
critics within the Party.1386 The realization that economic reform had to continue 
now seemed apothegmatic, and it was under Jiang Zemin (1993-2003) that 
China continued deepening reform.1387 The 1998 NPC meeting saw a nation-
1379 David Shambaugh, ‘China’s Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation’, 2008, p. 42.
1380 Tsao Tsing-yuan, Wasserstrom, Jeffrey N. and J. Perry, Elizabeth, (eds), “The Birth 
of the Goddess of Democracy” from Popular Protest and Political Culture in Modern 
China,’ 1994, p. 140.
1381 Zhang Weiguo, ‘‘Touching the Scales of the Dragon’s Throat’’, The Dissident’’, Chap-
ter 8, In Tyson, Anne, and Tyson, James, ‘Chinese Awakenings, life stories from 
unofficial China’, 1995, p. 243.
1382 Zang Liang (eds), ‘The Tiananmen papers’, (New York: Public Affairs U.S., 2002), 
p.423.
1383 Eric Hobsbawm, ‘The Age of Extremes: The short Twentieth Century – 1914-1991’, 
1998, p. 487.
1384 T. Saich, ‘Governance and politics of China’, 2004, p. 69.
1385 A. Laliberte, Lanteigne, M. ‘The Chinese Party State in the 21st Century’, 2007, p. 10.
1386 John Farndon, ‘China Rises’, 2008, p. 23.
1387 Benjamin Yang, ‘Deng: A Political Biography’, (Armonk, Kew York, M. E. Sharpe, 
1998), p. 257.
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wide grain market established, an overhaul of the PRC’s investment system and 
the marketization of housing. China’s economic achievements were so suc-
cessful that the PRC was granted membership in the WTO in 2001. China’s 
level of foreign trade increased twenty-five times between 1978-2001, when 
just 23 years earlier, the PRC was largely isolated from the world economy.1388
THE DEMONSTRATION EFFECT: THE INTERNAL AND 
COMPARATIVE LESSONS LEARNED BY THE CCP
Crucially, the CCP prevailed where the communist regimes of Central and Eastern 
Europe, and even the Soviet Union had unraveled.1389 John Wong analyzes the fac-
tors that explain the ability of the CCP to retain power in China, while considering 
the varying opinions on the validity and importance of each factor. Wong believes 
the most significant lesson learned by the CCP was that the validity of incremen-
tal reform was necessary to avoiding the drastic changes (jubian), which some 
scholars blame on the “Big-Bang” approach adopted in Eastern Europe, where 
both major economic and political reform took place side-by-side.1390 Shambaugh 
characterizes the CCP’s reactions to lessons learnt from the downfall of commu-
nist-party states in Eastern Europe and the USSR as a process of “selectively bor-
rowing, adapting and grafting them to indigenous Chinese institutions”, becoming 
a hybrid, composed of “bits and pieces of a wide variety of systems”.1391
The CCP has taken to heart not only the lessons of 1989 and 1991, but has 
drawn from the successes and failures of political models from East Asian autoc-
racies and even European Social Democratic Parties. These lessons include plac-
ing considerable emphasis on expanding the economy, improving the standard 
of living, embracing globalization, targeting Party corruption, utilizing nationalist 
symbols, and courting the business classes. It also maintained tight control over 
security services, the media, and was flexible with its ideology, expanding party 
membership to co-naturalize opposition and reinvigorating local party cells and 
committees.1392 Post-Tiananmen, the CCP projects itself as a Hobbesian van-
guard of the nation (wen ding ya dao yi qie). They play on Chinese fear of a return 
to the chaos of the “Century of Humiliation” before the CCP’s rule, while under-
taking pre-emptive adaptive strategies combining eudemonic soft power and a 
Leninist tightening of political control through coercion and co-option.1393
1388 J. Wu, ‘Understanding and Interpreting Chinese Economic Reform’, 2005, p. 315.
1389 David Shambaugh, in ‘China’s Changing Political Landscape’, Li, cheng (eds),  2008, p. 293.
1390 John Wong, in Gamer, Robert E. (eds), ‘Understanding Contemporary China’, 2003, p. 126-7.
1391 Shambaugh, ‘Learning From Abroad’, in Li, Cheng (eds) 2008, p. 296.
1392 F. Bergsten, ‘China’s Rise: Challenges and Opportunities’, 2008, p. 98.
1393 Shaun Breslin, ‘Democratising One Party Rule? Political Reform, Nationalism and Legiti-
macy in the People’s Republic of China, Fride Working Paper 67, September 2008, p. 28.
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However, despite the astounding achievements of the CCP during the re-
formist era, the Party still sits atop a Pandora’s Box of economic, socio-eco-
nomic and ideological challenges that “no other country has faced on such 
a scale in history”.1394 The post-Dengist CCP in particular suffers from a dilu-
tion of its legitimacy and a struggle to maintain both relevance and primacy 
in a radically altered China. The question remains if “Market-Stalinism” will 
be a short-lived, contradictory, and ultimately transitory phenomenon,1395 or 
if China’s success is guaranteed only with a strong party-state at the helm of 
power? The challenges arising as a consequence of three decades of reform 
and their implications for the CCP will be outlined in the next chapter.
THE CHALLENGES OF REFORM: THE WRITING ON THE WALL?
The challenges of reform have significantly threatened to undermine the stabil-
ity of the PRC and have threatened the CCP’s ability to maintain control.1396 As 
a result of growing inequality, unemployment, and corruption, there have been 
widespread protests, particularly in the impoverished interior. For example, in Oc-
tober 2004, some 60,000 peasants in Hanyuan County clashed with police, con-
demning the actions of corrupt local officials.1397 We will now consider the array of 
challenges presented by reform to CCP legitimacy and monopolistic rule that have 
arisen largely as a result of economic reform in the following manner. First, we will 
consider the problems presented by growing inequality and a weak social welfare 
system. Next, we will consider the problem of the extensive corruption of Party 
cadres. Finally, we will analyze the impact of heightened aspirations leading to a 
demand for greater political openness and accountability of the Party to a wider 
array of domestic actors and the resulting schisms within the Party itself.
INEQUALITY AND INEQUITY: THE COLLAPSE OF  
THE “IRON RICE BOWL”
Lampton aptly summarizes the rapidly increasing socio-economic polarization 
prevalent in the PRC. He says that inequality has not meant that large groups 
1394 David M. Lampton, ‘The Three Faces of Chinese Power, Might, Money and Minds’, 
2008, p.219.
1395 Michael Cox, in Baylis, John and Smith, Steve (eds), ‘The Globalisation of World 
Politics’, 2001, p. 126.
1396 Bruce J. Dickinson, ‘Dilemmas of Party Adaptation: The CCP’s Strategies For Sur-
vival’, in Gries, P. and Rosen, S., (eds), ‘State and Society in 21st Century China’, 
2004, p. 141.
1397 Willy Wo-Lap Lam, ‘Chinese Politics in the Hu Jintao Era, New Leaders, New Chal-
lenges’, 2006, p. 90.
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of citizens are becoming absolutely worse off, but that most “boats in China 
have been rising, some just rising faster than others”.1398 The statistics illustrate 
this crisis, with the most prosperous 20% of the population retaining 46.6% 
of China’s wealth, while the poorest 20% of China’s population retain only 
4.7%.1399 As urban income grows at almost twice the rate of rural incomes, the 
CCP grows anxious about the destabilization this encourages. 
Rising unemployment levels and the collapse of the “Iron Rice Bowl” (tiefan-
wan) exacerbate the problem of inequality. The loss of housing and social wel-
fare coincides with the increasingly transparent opulence of cadres, who enjoy 
a standard of living far beyond a civil servants’ salary.1400 In many instances, 
the government is no longer willing to support State Owned Enterprises (SOE’s) 
that are not competitive, and staggering numbers were closed from 1995 to 
2001, leaving 65 million workers unemployed.1401 Solinger even claims that in 
1999, the real unemployment figure could have been as high as 100 million.1402 
Eminent PRC scholars Zhou Tianyong and Zhou Ruijin have proposed a policy 
comparable to Western trickle down economics in which the PRC should take 
advantage of the economic windfalls that globalization has created. This allows 
China to aggregate wealth rapidly, pooled largely in the coastal SEZs (areas 
of intense FDI investment since the 1978 era) and to then focus on equity and 
redistribution to the relatively impoverished interior later on.1403 Liu Guoguang in 
contrast claims that placing greater emphasis upon equality and equity can only 
combat the proliferation of protests and civil unrest that threaten national secu-
rity.1404 Furthermore, the recent economic recession has led to sharp criticism of 
this economic theory in the West, and it remains doubtful that it can underpin the 
CCP’s adaptive developmental model in the long-term.1405
CORRUPTION: THE FABIAN EPIDEMIC?
Despite the creation of a Ministry of Supervision and Discipline Inspection Commis-
sions, endemic structural corruption, a problem associated with the fallibility of the 
danwei system, has only intensified due to the gray areas of “primitive capitalism”. 
Moreover, ineffective rule of law governing the norms of the fledgling economy and 
1398 D. M. Lampton, ‘The Three Faces of Chinese Power, p.219.
1399 Robert Mitter, p., ‘Modern China’, 2008, p. 85.
1400 A. Laliberte, M. Lanteigne, ‘The Chinese Party State in the 21st Century’, 2007, p. 17.
1401 S. L. Shirk,  ‘China: Fragile Superpower’, 2008, p. 29.
1402 D. J. Solinger, ‘The New Crowd of the Dispossessed: The Shift of the Urban Prole-
tariat from Master to Mendicant’, in Gries and Rosen, ‘State and Society’, p. 50.
1403 Lampton, ‘The Three Faces of Chinese Power,’ 2008, p. 220.
1404 Liu Guoguang, in Ibid., p. 220.
1405 Michael S. Derby, ‘Trickle-Down Economics Fails to Deliver as Promised’, Wall 
Street Journal, June 2009.
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a drastically diminished sense of ideological fervor,  1406has led to estimates that 
corruption accounted for 14.9% of GDP between 1999-2001.1407 Wedeman argues 
that during the 1990s, corruption underwent a qualitative change as the increasingly 
high-stakes involved have led to a proliferation of high-profile cases. These high pro-
file cases in particular act as a catalyst, generating political cynicism and malaise 
among even CCP cadres.1408 Gavin Read’s recent fieldwork on the opaque business 
community of Guangdong province considers further the extent to which Chinese 
firms are beholden to the pervasive culture of guan xi, frequently vying for oppor-
tunities brought through bribing corrupt officials rather than focusing on increasing 
professionalism or adhering to open, market-based competition. This suggests that 
without sufficient rule of law, well-connected CCP officials will retain nearly all the 
keys to China’s economic rise, making the temptation of corruption a consistent real-
ity and placing a crippling burden on the expansion of the economy.1409 Richard Levy 
expands on the impact of corruption in Henan and Guangdong province, claiming 
that increasingly corrupt entrepreneurs and party officials are acting to exclude the 
rural poor from political participation through vote-buying, which threatens to induce 
governmental stagnation and the alienation of the CCP from rural society.1410
Crucially, the intensification of corruption directly conflicts with the CCP’s constitu-
tion article 3-(3), calling for Party officials to act selflessly on behalf of the PRC, “being 
the first to bear hardships and the last to enjoy comforts, working selflessly for the 
public interests”.1411 Corruption in reform-era China therefore, in a fashion comparable 
to the corruption and political stagnation of the Brezhnev-era USSR, threatens to un-
dermine the moral and ideological salience of the CCP as a governing organization.1412
HIGHER ASPIRATIONS: THE RISE OF THE MIDDLE CLASS
Most significantly, economic liberalization has led to the rise of a prominent 
middle-strata (Zhongchan Jeiji) of Chinese society. Estimates as to the size 
1406 Lieberthal, ‘Governing China’, p. 198.
1407 Willy Wo-Lap Lam, ‘Chinese Politics in the Hu Jintao Era’, p. 144.
1408 A. Wedeman, ‘The Intensification of Corruption in China,’ The China Quarterly 180, 
2004, p. 895.
1409 Reid Gavin C., and Xu, Zhibin, ‘Entrepreneurial Orientation, Intangible Assets and 
firm Growth: the Impact of ‘Spirit and Material’ on the Growth of Chinese Private 
firms’, 2009, p. 39.
1410 R. Levy, ‘Village elections and anti-corruption: Henan and Guangdong provinces’ in 
‘Grassroots Reform in Contemporary China’, Elizabeth j. Perry (eds.), 2007, p. 47.
1411 CCP, ‘Constitution of the CCP, Amended and adopted at the 17th National Con-
gress of the Communist Party of China on October 21, 2007’, Chapter 1, Member-
ship. Article 3-3.
1412 T. Saich, ’ Governance and Politics of China,’ p. 27.
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of this socio-economic group vary from 20 to more than 300 million.1413 This 
group has received implicit legitimization since Jiang Zemin’s July 2001 “Three 
Represents Speech” (“Sange Daibiao”), inducting business people and entre-
preneurs into the Party.1414 China’s 4th generation leaders are betting their rule 
on the development of a stable middle class that they presume will be patient 
and productive, economically and socially active, but not politically aggressive 
like in Singapore. However, it is a gamble they may lose.1415 Huntington, while 
recognizing that no isolated factor can fully explain the process of democrati-
zation, explains that in accordance with modernization theory, a strong-middle 
class is a strong indicator of a move towards democratic rule, threatening the 
one-party regime in the PRC.1416 This could pose a serious political challenge 
to the CCP’s political monopoly. Co-option may prove to alienate not just the 
impoverished majority of Chinese who are denied equivalent means of political 
representation, but worse still, may cause intra-party splits which could under-
mine the CCP’s historical mission as vanguard of the proletariat.1417
Furthermore, hardliners on the Party’s “New Left” (xinzuo pai) are increas-
ingly cautious of the growing political influence of the middle-class and the 
motives of Western investors and domestic entrepreneurs, arguing that peace-
ful evolution constitutes a significant threat to the CCP’s continued survival.1418 
Kelle Tsai disagrees with this pessimistic interpretation and argues that adap-
tive informal institutions will render the middle-class unlikely to demand regime 
change in China.1419 Crucially, the CCP leadership is paranoid that the multitude 
of disaffected groups arising as a result of these problems like the unemployed 
urban workers, impoverished rural farmers and an increasingly independent 
middle class will co-ordinate nation-wide protests towards the regime itself. 
Two imperial dynasties succumbed to the chaos caused by similar revolution-
ary movements (indeed one of which led the CCP to power in 1949).1420 The 
most significant strategies developed by the CCP to ensure its maintenance of 
power, followed by an overview of scholarly debate on their effectiveness and 
concluding thoughts, will follow in the next section.
1413 Lieberthal, ‘Governing China’, 2004, p. 295.
1414 D. L. Shambaugh, ‘China’s Communist Party: atrophy and adaptation’, 2008, p. 150.
1415 Lampton, The Three Faces of Chinese Power’, p. 230.
1416 Samuel Huntington, P.,‘The Third Wave’, 1993, p. 37.
1417 D. Goodman, ’’The New Rich in China, Future Rulers, Present Lives’, New York: 
Routledge 2008, p. 40.
1418 R. Ong, ‘‘Peaceful Evolution’, ‘Regime Change’ and China’s Political Security’, Jour-
nal of Contemporary China, Vol. 16, Nº 53, Nov. 2007, p. 727.
1419 K. S. Tsai, ‘Capitalism Without Democracy, the Politics of Private Sector Develop-
ment in China’, 2007.
1420 S. Shirk, ‘China: Fragile Superpower’, p. 7.
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‘WILL THE PARTY BE UNABLE TO ADAPT SUCCESSFULLY 
TO THE PRESSURES OF DOMESTIC REFORM?’
In the post-Tiananmen era and following the recognition of the domestic pres-
sures emerging in the 1990’s, Deng’s eudemonic development strategy,  which 
largely disregarded the social and political consequences of economic reform, 
has been augmented by both Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao’s leadership. In rec-
ognition of the socio-political pressures that aggregate from below as a result of 
economic growth and wealth accumulation,1421 the CCP leadership has sought 
adaptive strategies to supplement the CCP’s legitimacy beyond that of contin-
ued economic growth and coercion. Shirk identifies the main adaptive strate-
gies of the CCP: firstly, the policy of co-option and corporatism, and secondly, 
the CCP’s attempt at ideological rejuvenation through appeals to populism and 
greater party accountability to stave off governmental stagnation and most cru-
cially, the CCP’s retention of and strengthening of coercive capabilities.1422
CORPORATISM AND CO-OPTION
Dickinson argues that Jiang Zemin’s pragmatic policy of corporatism and co-
option, underpins the observation that in the 1990’s, the PRC was evolving to-
wards a more advanced state and that societal dynamism was creating new do-
mestic pressures that needed to be confronted by the CCP.1423 As Tyson affirms, 
since the early 1980’s, China’s market-oriented economic reforms have offered 
youths broad-opportunities outside the state-run planned economic system to 
create private businesses.1424 Continuing marketization and the opening up of 
China have acted as a socio-economic catalyst for those who increasingly seek 
social and material advancement without necessarily submitting to joining the 
CCP, which leaves the Party increasingly vulnerable to ossification.1425 Jiang 
Zemin’s Three Represents Theory, arguably his most important contribution to 
the CCP’s adaptation,1426 aims to broaden the Party mandate, from a concept of 
class struggle that focuses solely on poor peasants and the urban proletariat to 
include the safeguarding of the PRC’s advanced productive forces (first repre-
1421 D. Shambaugh, Deng Xiaoping, the Politician,’ The China Quarterly, 135, (September 
1993), p. 490.
1422 S. Shirk, ‘China, Fragile Superpower’, 2008, pp. 66-69.
1423 Dickinson, ‘Dilemmas of Party Adaptation’, p. 145.
1424 J. Tyson, and A. Tyson, ‘Chinese Awakenings’, 1995, p. 263.
1425 H. Sato, ‘The Changing Structure of the Chinese Communist Party Membership in 
Urban China, 1988-2002, Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 17, Nº 57 (November 
2008), pp. 653-67.
1426 J.  Fewsmith, ‘Since Tiananmen’, p. 269.
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sent), namely entrepreneurs and intellectuals from the private sector.1427
The Three Represents were added to the constitutional amendments in March 
2004, despite sharp criticism from the old guard and New Left factions within 
the Party.1428 However, the tactics appear to have worked well with the Organi-
zation Department announcing that college students entering the Party in 2005 
increased by 7340,000, a rate of expansion twice that of overall party growth.1429 
This bolsters the importance of the Party’s patronage system by incorporating 
individuals into the party who could have otherwise become independent op-
position, while simultaneously allowing the CCP to overcome the indifference of 
the entrepreneurs and to maintain its finger on the pulse of the social-strata driv-
ing China’s phenomenal economic growth. Yet the Party’s ideological cohesion 
is undermined by this change in Party composition. There is strong evidence 
to suggest that membership has been declining amongst those traditionally re-
garded as the revolutionary backbone with poorer peasants, workers and sol-
diers dropping from 83% of the party in 1956 to 45% in 2002.1430
POPULISM: IDEOLOGICAL REJUVENATION AND PARTY 
ACCOUNTABILITY
Since assuming power in 2003, the Hu-Wen administration has sought to tackle the 
waning ideational power of the Communist ideology due to co-option and market 
reform by outlining the Theory of Harmonious Society (hexie shehui) at the 2005 Na-
tional People’s Congress.1431 Increasing Party accountability is key to the Hu-Wen 
administration’s concept of a harmonious socialist society, and a prime strategy is the 
extensive targeting of corruption in order to stave off mass political cynicism.1432 The 
Jiang government saw the arrest of former Beijing Mayor Chen Xitong in 1998 and 
the decimation of the Yuanhua smuggling ring in Fujian in 2001.1433 Yet, the Hu-Wen 
administration saw an increase in the prosecution of prominent corrupt officials. In 
2005, 1,932 officials were convicted of corruption, including six at ministerial level.1434
Hu Jintao’s promotion of the Party’s school system has further augmented 
1427 G. Yang, ‘China in the Twenty-First Century Challenges and Opportunities S. Hua; S. 
Guo (eds), p.120.
1428 T. Saich, ‘Governance and Politics of China’, p. 85.
1429 Lampton, ‘Three Faces of Chinese Power’, p. 230.
1430 Dickinson, ‘Dilemmas of Party Adaptation’, p. 142.
1431 H. Holbig, ‘Remaking the CCP’s Ideology: Determinants, Progress, and Limits under 
Hu Jintao‘, Journal Of Current Chinese Affairs’, 38(3), 35-6, 2009, p. 36.
1432 D. R. Ewing, Hu Jintao: ‘The Making of a Chinese Secretary’ The China Quarterly, 
2003, p. 19.
1433 R. P. Peerenboom, ‘China modernizes: threat to the West or model for the rest?’, p. 
246.
1434 Shirk, ‘Fragile Superpower’, p. 32.
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China’s ailing socialist ideology. With a national network of approximately 2,700 
schools that provide mid-career training for Party and state cadres, they act as an 
effective mechanism for indoctrination, not only of these actors, but increasingly 
of entrepreneurs and military personnel, fostering a tight ideological grip over the 
driving forces of economic growth and coercion.1435 Crucially, intra-party democ-
racy offers the CCP a bridge to expand accountability and transparency within the 
CCP, while refraining from a rapid adoption of Western democratic models. 
The CCP has experimented with direct elections of village and township gov-
ernment committees, including contests between multiple CCP candidates and 
even a limited number of non-CCP members. It is estimated that around 20% of 
village committees now hold multicandidate elections and 70% of village govern-
ments are now contested this way.1436 This largely successful Party-strengthening 
strategy was institutionalized in the 1998 Organic Law, yet confined to the rural in-
terior.1437 The limited expansion of intra-party democracy is an attractive option as 
it encourages skilled graduates and managers eager to acquire political represen-
tation to offer their skills to the CCP, creating corporatism on the CCP’s terms.1438
Hu Jintao has further expanded the concept of inner-party democracy (dan-
gnei minzhu) in a paper published in October 2005 to foster horizontal consul-
tation and debate within a vertical system.1439 Yet, the popular election of Chi-
na’s top leadership, a cornerstone of Western democracy, is strictly prohibited. 
This marks Hu’s refusal to introduce Western multi-party politics to the PRC, 
believing there is nothing intrinsically fallible with the CCP’s core ideology, and 
that through limited intra-system political reform and adherence to scientific 
socialism, the CCP will perpetuate its mandate to rule.1440
Significantly, even if the CCP cannot avoid incremental steps towards multi-
party elections in the long-term while avoiding intra-party splits and successfully 
addressing socio-economic demands, the experiences of Taiwan’s KMT and 
Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party suggest that the CCP, emerging as a Social 
Democratic Party, will be able to maintain its political hegemony in society for a 
considerable time frame. Using this window of opportunity to fill the organizational 
space in society and retain control of key constituencies will bestow the CCP with 
1435 D. Shambaugh, ‘Training China’s Political Elite’, p. 827.
1436 D. Shambaugh, ‘China’s Communist Party’, p. 139.
1437 K. O’Brien, and Li Lianjiang, ‘Accommodating One Party Democracy in a One-Party 
State: Introducing Village Elections in China’, The China quarterly, Nº 162, (June 
2002), Cambridge University Press.
1438 Jae Cheol Kim, ‘From the Fringe to the Center: The Political Emergence of Private 
Entrepreneurs in China’’, Issues and Studies 41, (September 2005), pp. 113 – 43.
1439 CCP, ‘Building of democracy in China VIII. Democratic Rule by the CCP’, White 
Paper, October 2005.
1440 W. Wo-Lap Lam, ‘Chinese Politics in the Hu Jintao Era’, p. 35.
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an advantage over fledgling political groups.1441 The agglomeration of these poli-
cies allows the CCP to avoid the fate of the CPSU. By allowing limited space for 
civil actors to vent their frustrations and avoiding top-heavy reform, “all this will 
enable the CCP to remain a ruling, Marxist party”.1442
STRENGTHENING COERCION: “QIANG GAN ZI LI MIAN 
CHU ZHENG QUAN!”
Crucially, alongside deepening reform, the CCP has not only retained an iron grip 
over their coercive capabilities in accordance with the infamous Maoism, “Power 
grows out of the barrel of a gun”, but has strengthened the mechanisms of hard 
power to ensure the survival of the regime.1443 The CCP has evolved a policy of 
selective repression, in contrast to the indiscriminate mass terror of the Mao 
years, tailoring advances in technology to its advantage by subtly targeting the 
proliferation of any extensive networks of independent, civil society actors sus-
pected of opposing the regime.1444 Examples include the suppression of the Chi-
na Democracy Party in 1998 and the infamous repression of the Falun Gong.1445 
The CCP has responded to the Internet boom in the PRC with an estimated 384 
million users by tightening control over the media. In tandem with the creation of 
the Golden Shield Project and the Great Firewall in 1998, the Ministry of Informa-
tion in October 2000 declared the illegality of any site deemed subversive.1446
Regardless of the relatively permeable information flows, which resulted in the 
exposure of the SARs cover up by CCP officials in 2003, the CCP seems likely to 
retain a monopoly over political discourse at least for the foreseeable future.1447 
Furthermore, the swift deposition and humiliating televised execution of Romania’s 
communist dictator Nicolae Ceauşescu in December 1989, orchestrated by a dis-
affected military that sided with protestors, was a potent lesson for the CCP, par-
ticularly in light of the June 4th incident which severely tested PLA-CCP relations. 
Hu Jintao, despite his obvious lack of military credentials in comparison to 
Mao or even Deng (not a “long marcher”), has been careful to build up con-
nections between the CCP and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), appointing 
the children of the revolutionary leadership to key positions in the PLA to shore 
1441 Yun-Han Chu, ‘Taiwan and China’s Democratic Future: Can the Tail Wag the Dog?’ 
in Li, Cheng (eds) ‘China’s Changing Political Landscape.’ 2008,  p. 320.
1442 Hu Jintao, ‘Full Text of Hu Jintao’s Report at the 17th Party Congress’, 31/10/2007
1443 V. Shue, ‘Legitimacy in Crises’, in Gries and Rosen (eds), 2005, p. 25.
1444 M. Pei, ‘China’s Trapped Transition, the Limits of Developmental Autocracy’, Cam-
bridge MA and London: Harvard University Press, 2006) p. 81.
1445 A. Nathan, ‘Authoritarian Resilience’
1446 R. Mitter, ‘Modern China: A Very Short Introduction’, p. 89.
1447 T. Saich, ‘Politics and Governance of China’, p. 341.
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up their commitment to the Party.1448 Both Jiang and Hu since the early 1990’s 
have addressed the budgetary neglect of the military, a result of Deng’s pri-
mary focus on stimulating economic growth before Tiananmen.1449 Lieberthal 
highlights the coercive deficiencies, namely the shortage of well-trained police, 
which the CCP has attempted to overcome in recent years.1450
The 14.7% increase in the official 2006 PLA budget for example, was ac-
cording to Shirk, directed not only at augmenting the People’s Armed Police 
Force (Wu Jing), but also at ensuring the PLA remains loyal to the CCP and 
Hu Jintao personally.1451 Crucially, Mulvenon argues that it remains likely that 
the PLA would act decisively to quell a major political crisis similar to Tianan-
men due to two strategies adopted by the CCP since the 1990’s. Normatively, 
the CCP has portrayed the PLA as the muscular embodiment of the PRC’s 
nationalism, giving them a considerable face after the humiliation of June 4th. 
Instrumentally, the CCP has been careful to make it clear that their fates are 
intertwined. The CCP relies on the PLA for domestic survival, but the PLA 
recognizes that under any other political system, they would not enjoy such a 
degree of bureaucratic autonomy and power.1452 Through these coercive forc-
es, the CCP can effectively decapitate any groups that may develop into the 
organizational basis for larger scale collective action.1453
CONCLUSION: ANALYZING THE SCHOLARLY DEBATE
The magnitude to which the aforementioned adaptations have empowered the 
CCP to survive and rejuvenate is intensely debated by scholars. Whilst they pre-
dominantly agree that the CCP is a vulnerable institution, and that further political 
reform is evidently required in order to reverse the process of atrophy, they tend 
to dispute the success of existing reforms and the intensity of the CCP’s pre-
dicament.1454 Certain optimistic scholars such as Yun-Han-Chu contest that the 
CCP is more likely to follow the East Asian Model of development as opposed 
to that of Eastern Europe or the USSR, arguing that the balance of strengths and 
weaknesses of the CCP are comparable to that of the KMT in the late 1970’s and 
early 1980’s Taiwan, and that the regime’s strengths far-outweigh its weakness-
1448 W. Hutton, ‘The Writing on the Wall’, 2007, p. 141.
1449 D. Shambaugh, ‘Modernizing China’s Military: Progress, Problems and Prospects’, 
(Berkley: University of California Press, 2002), p. 191.
1450 K. Lieberthal, ‘Governing China’, p. 203.
1451 S. Shirk, ‘Fragile Superpower’, p. 73.
1452 James Mulvenon, ‘Civil-Military Relations’, in China’s Changing Political Landscape, 
p. 276.
1453 Vivienne Shue, ‘Legitimacy in Crises’, in Gries and Rosen, 2005, p. 25.
1454 David Shambaugh, ‘China’s Communist Party’, p. 38.
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es.1455 Fewsmith suggests that despite the pressures of domestic reform, existing 
Leninist institutions in China remain strong and that the intra-party debate at the 
2002 CCP Congress was directed at developing mechanisms to make govern-
ment more responsive to the demands of local society without threatening the 
ruling status of the Party. There are strong indications he believes in a revolutionary 
party (gemingdang) evolving successfully into a ruling party (zhizhengdang).1456 
Presenting a contrastingly pessimistic depiction of the Party’s future, MacFarqu-
har contends that the expansion of party membership to include entrepreneurs 
and graduates, although allowing the Party to grow to around 73 million members, 
entails a devastating corrosion of the CCP’s ideological mandate. The CCP, he 
believes, has ceased to represent an ideologically coherent organization and in-
stead is analogous to a socio-political club where membership is drawn not from 
ideological persuasion, but because it is beneficial for Party members’ careers.1457 
Minxin Pei, while refraining from predicting imminent regime collapse, still under-
scores the likelihood of a continued governance crisis and political stagnation.1458 
Shambaugh aptly refrains from zero-sum predictions, arguing that not all regimes 
facing acute domestic pressures suffer eruptions or implosions; rather, many sim-
ply react in an ad hoc fashion to the pressures of domestic reform.
Yet, the CCP has been remarkably proactive, adapting to retain power, and 
this adaptive strategy can stabilize, and even reverse, atrophy.1459 Weiss elo-
quently augments the debate, explaining that most states possess the ability 
to adapt. However, the inability of scholars to immediately identify these ca-
pabilities may lead to their mistaken assumption that the state is in decline.1460 
Adhering to the Weiss’ contribution, this essay identified some crucial factors 
that may sway the balance of atrophy and adaptation in favour of the CCP’s 
survival. Firstly, there is an absence of any coherent, independent and organ-
ized competition or civil society directed against the CCP, with even China’s 
democratic parties contingent on the volition of the CCP.1461 Furthermore, there 
is no apparent vanguard of democratic forces, the middle class has exhibited 
little signs of organized dissent and the tens of thousands of grassroots pro-
tests have not been unified or aimed at the central Party.  In summation, “the 
notion that such expressions of one-issue discontent will form the basis for 
1455 Yun-Han Chu, ‘Taiwan and China’s Democratic Future: Can the Tail Wag the Dog?’ 
in China’s Changing Political Landscape.’ pp. 319-320.
1456 J. Fewsmith, ‘What Kind of Party is this?’, Paper Presented at the 58th Annual Meet-
ing of the Association for Asian Studies, San Francisco, April 2006, p. 12.
1457 MacFarquhar, Debate #1: ‘Is Communist Party Rule Sustainable in China?’
1458 Minxin Pei, ‘China’s Governance Crisis’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 85, Nº 5, 2002, p. 109.
1459 D. Shambaugh, ‘China’s Communist Party’, 2008, pp. 39-40.
1460 L. Weiss, ‘The Myth of the Powerless State’, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
1999, p. 10-11, cited in Laliberte.A, Lanteigne, M. (eds.), ‘The Chinese Party State in 
the 21st Century’, 2007, p. 6.
1461 J. Farndon, ‘China Rises’, 2008, p. 50.
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call for a multiparty system seems fanciful”.1462 On the contrary, the new rich 
(xinrui) seem more concerned with protecting their wealth from the rural poor 
than “sharing political power with their fellow citizens”.1463 Additionally, as long 
as the CCP retains its monopoly on coercive power, no matter how despotic 
it becomes, it can remain in power for a significant period of time.1464 Most 
crucially, despite previous fears that the recession would cause the patronage 
system, which arguably underwrites CCP rule, to dissipate, allowing endemic 
factionalism to surface,1465 the PRC has bucked the trend of the devastating 
global recession by implementing a rapid $586 billion stimulus package, re-
sulting in an average 8.7% growth in 2008. This reached as high as 10.7% in 
the final quarter of 2009, leaving the West trailing behind.1466
With China’s economy emerging from the global recession intact, the current 
situation appears fortuitous. These factors underpin the window of opportunity, 
which scholars have earmarked as a crossroads for the CCP in the second decade 
of the 21st Century. Securing the party-state regime for the short-medium term will 
permit the CCP to evolve on its own terms, either retaining a monopoly on power 
indefinitely and favouring the intra-party democracy model (dangnei minzhu,) or 
more likely in the long-term, competing in multi-party elections as a Social Demo-
cratic Party, when it feels confident of victory. This transition will be a difficult proc-
ess, and relies on the choices and innovation of China’s 5th generation leaders. 
Crucial political reform (or an absence thereof) will most likely come from the top 
and is dependent on sustaining fragile economic stability, but there is hope. To-
day’s China is full of sharp and open minds, there is still everything to play for.1467
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UNLOCKING THE ENVIRONMENTAL DEBATE IN 
THE POST-COLD WAR ERA:  
THE CASE OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF OCEAN 
ACIDIFICATION
GáSPár BÉKÉS
Humanity has always strained the Earth’s resources to some extent, not just 
in recent centuries. The extinction of the Mammoths1468, the traces of lead in 
the Greenland ice from the times of the Roman Empire1469 are examples that 
mankind has had a transboundary and global impact on its environment. 
Humankind however, has developed even more significantly and exponen-
tially in the last two centuries. The Industrial and the Medical Revolution raised 
the consumption of the citizens in two dimensions: population boomed and the 
per capita consumption increased, and these put a heavy burden on the Earth’s 
seemingly endless resources. The effects of using more and more natural re-
sources, such as fossil fuels can already be felt. Since these effects know no 
boundaries, they are global problems without a doubt. Nevertheless, the ever-
growing danger was neglected in the international field until the 20th century. 
Although humanity has had an impact on its environment throughout history, 
the general acknowledgment of this by scientists and the society is fairly recent. 
Acting effectively upon these revelations is still lacking. A historical perspective 
helps us contextualize why the recognition of the issue is still disproportionately 
low among scientists, policymakers and members of the public alike. It also 
presents how environmental protection changed over the decades. 
Protection of the environment has existed for centuries in some shape or 
form. However, since cause-causality links were seldom established between 
pollution and health effects due to the lack of scientific knowledge, there were 
scarce regulations and local measures. One rare exemption for recognition 
was an article from 1896, which highlighted the possibility that CO2 is ab-
sorbed by the atmosphere and induces changes in the climate.1470 Generally, 
the first national environmental regulations came into effect in the second half 
1468  D. Burney & T. Flannery. “Fifty millennia of catastrophic extinctions after human 
contact”. Trends in Ecology & Evolution, 20 (7), 2005, pp. 395–401.
1469 S. Hong, J. P. Candelone, C. C. Patterson & C. F. Boutron. “Greenland Ice Evidence 
of Hemispheric Lead Pollution Two Millennia Ago by Greek and Roman Civiliza-
tions”. Science, 265 (5180), 1994, pp. 1841–1843.
1470 S. Arrhenius, “On the Influence of Carbonic Acid in the Air upon the Temperature of the 
Ground”. Philosophical Magazine and Journal of Science , 5 (41), 1896, pp. 237-276.
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of the 19th century, such as the Alkali Act of 1863 in England.1471 The first in-
ternational agreements on the environment were signed on narrow topics with 
a direct economic incentive, such as the Fur Seal Treaty of 1911.1472 Progress 
was slow, both in the  theory and practice of International Relations, with sig-
nificant progress occurring only after the Cold War.
International Relations (IR) itself became an academic discipline only in 
1919 with the founding of the first professorship, the Woodrow Wilson Chair 
at Aberystwyth, University of Wales. Some of the IR’s subfields, such as en-
vironmental protection, have yet to fully develop and incorporate the key 
principles of the discipline, such as multidisciplinarity. Treaties predomi-
nantly addressed conservation issues rather than transboundary pollution. 
It was not until the second half of the 20th century that international treaties 
emerged dealing with broader issues. From the beginning of the Cold War 
there were several scientists on Soviet side as well who predicted new phas-
es of the Scientific Technological Revolution, when the main issue would be 
to heal the damages caused by the previous phases.1473 Nevertheless, envi-
ronmental protection was mostly neglected up until the nineteen-seventies. 
In the first half of the Cold War period, however, many believed a nuclear 
war was imminent and would wipe out the human race anyways. Most of 
the resources by the two superpowers and their spheres of influence were 
focused on the political mechanisms of the competing camps. This was re-
flected in the International Relations discipline as well. Peaceful coexistence, 
the new doctrine emerging in the 1950s, was spreading very slowly towards 
such topics as global health or environment. In the era of the Cold War, the 
focus was on nuclear pollution at first. Consequently, one of the first treaties 
was the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer 
Space and Under Water of 1963.1474 By the 1970s, the fields of cooperation 
between the two superpowers widened, and the importance of the matter 
became clear for both sides. In this framework, the Hungarian government 
proposed several steps to tackle environmental problems.1475 In 1972, the 
United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) was established, which is 
the world’s most important environmental organization.1476
1471 Christman, B. A brief history of environmental law in the UK. Environmental Scientist 
, 22 (4), 2013, pp. 4-8.
1472 USA, Great Britain, Japan, Russia. (1911). Fur Seal Treaty. Washington.
1473 M. Kalmár, Történelmi galaxisok vonzásában. Magyarország és a szovjetrendszer, 
1945-1990, Budapest, Osiris, 2014, pp. 356-261.
1474 USA, USSR. (1963). Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in 
Outer Space and Under Water. Moscow.
1475 Kalmár, op. cit., 356-261.
1476 Encyclopædia Britannica Online. 2016, 03 05. Environmental Law. Retrieved 05 04, 
2016, from http://www.britannica.com/topic/environmental-law
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Connected to the establishment was the Convention on the Prevention of 
Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes or Other Matter in 1972.1477 This is the 
first treaty that is relevant to connecting land-based factors to ocean-based 
ones, although it made no mention of CO2 from atmospheric sources. In 1982, 
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea was signed, which ad-
dressed marine pollution from different sources.1478
Later on, the 1986 Chernobyl accident further highlighted the importance 
of international standards and safeguards, and several related treaties were 
signed. At the end of the decade, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change was established by the World Meteorological Organization and UNEP 
in 1988. This is a scientific body that assesses the findings of various scholars 
on climate change, and enables the UN and the world to formulate an effective 
response to the challenge.1479
After the Cold War the (now less divided) wider international scientific com-
munity started to identify the key problems and solutions. Social sciences 
were lagging behind even more, especially the relatively new discipline of in-
ternational relations. Its environmental subfield started to develop when the 
international community first addressed international challenges to environ-
mental protection, most notably the depleting ozone layer, at the 1988 Vienna 
Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer and climate change, and 
at the conference of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC), organized in 1992.
LAND-BASED FACTORS
The 1990s were the starting point to address harmful anthropogenic CO2 emis-
sions, the key factor in ocean acidification. These emissions were addressed 
by the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development. 
However, the conclusion of this conference did not include binding targets, 
but its result is the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC).1480 The UNFCCC’s goal is to “stabilize greenhouse gas concentra-
tions in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic 
interference with the climate system”; also it organizes yearly Conferences of 
1477 Inter-Governmental Conference on the Convention on the Dumping of Wastes at 
Sea. 1972. Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes 
and Other Matter. London.
1478 United Nations. (1982). United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Montego 
Bay.
1479 IPCC Secretariat. 2013, 08 30. ipcc.ch. Retrieved 04 05, 2016, from https://www.
ipcc.ch/news_and_events/docs/factsheets/FS_what_ipcc.pdf
1480 UNCED secretariat. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development. 
Rio de Janeiro, 1992.
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Parties (COP), to discuss findings and agendas.1481 Binding targets were finally 
established by the Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC of 1992, entering into force 
in 2005.1482 Since entry into force was delayed, and no substantial reduction 
of global emissions was achieved, the protocol was ultimately unsuccessful. 
Most recently a different instrument under the UNFCCC was established, the 
Paris Agreement, which contains self-established targets. 
Thanks to the aforementioned process of organizing an effective informa-
tional response to climate change, by now most of the world has realized that 
the main causes for climate change are Greenhouse Gas Emissions. There 
are several initiatives to battle the GHG emissions, regionally and globally as 
well. Countries are mostly focused on halting climate change, to protect their 
terrestrial environment. It is important to see what incentives countries may 
have to enact in order to reduce emissions, and what fault lines there are. As 
for drawbacks,  scientists can say that the biggest problem of the future is the 
reduction of greenhouse gases of developing countries. Although environmen-
tally-friendly technologies exist and are cheaper than before, they are still not 
always a viable alternative to polluting (or) fossil-fuel based ones. In addition, 
developing countries say that they have to go through the same phases of de-
velopment as developed states, and this is just a simple tool of discrimination. 
Moreover, developed ones do not want to limit their economies by any 
means. Also, recently the world price of oil dropped significantly, possibly 
weakening the cost-effectiveness of renewables, providing less incentive to 
invest in them. However, a fluctuating world price makes for a bad investment, 
whereas the cost of renewables is constantly decreasing.  On the international 
level the deciding factor of cooperation on reduction is the participation of the 
biggest emitters, the United States and China, who make up of almost half of 
all emissions. So far they were reluctant to approve the terms of international 
agreements (e.g. the USA did not ratify the Kyoto Protocol). 
BLIND SPOTS IN INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
There is, however, another obstacle to effective solutions besides the reluc-
tance of international actors. The treaties and measures regarding the environ-
ment (particularly Greenhouse Gas Emissions) either focus only on the marine 
environment, or on land. Therefore, they do not recognize the interconnected-
ness of the two spheres, namely the effect of CO2 emissions on the marine 
environment.  Because of this narrowly focused scientific and environmental-
diplomatic viewpoint there are grand discrepancies and blind spots between 
1481 United Nations. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. 1992.
1482 UNFCCC. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change. Kyoto, 1997.
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the fields of science, methods of implementation and information sharing. 
This results in ineffective and incomplete solutions, and the consequences of 
this will be presumably serious. Without firm action on all aspects of climate 
change, a global catastrophe is imminent. 
CASE STUDY
All these can be strikingly presented through connection with ocean acidifica-
tion, the prime example of the aforementioned problems. Ocean acidification 
is the decrease of pH in the oceans, due to the rise of CO2 concentration. An 
estimated 30-40% of atmospheric CO2 is dissolved in the water.1483 Since the 
beginning of the industrial age pH of the oceans has already decreased by 
0.11 units, accounting to a 28.8% increase in hydrogen ion concentration (indi-
cator of acidification).1484 Furthermore, this process is accelerating, and by the 
end of the century, the pH may decrease by up to another 0.3 units.1485 Even 
more troubling is the fact that the chemistry of the ocean is changing more 
rapidly than at any period in the past 20 million years.1486
Fortunately, there is total scientific consensus and ample data available on 
the reality of the issue. Projections vary for the future, but a rapid and dramatic 
increase in acidification is probable if we do not limit greenhouse gas emis-
sions. Overall, ocean acidification is a well-defined problem that will negatively 
affect global warming, the marine ecosystem, and thus livelihoods and food 
supplies. This would worsen the already severe problems of starvation around 
the globe, and create instability in international relations as well. There is still 
no clear financial estimate how much loss will occur due to this phenomenon, 
the data mentioned below are just approximations and not necessarily the total 
cost of ocean acidification, and even these numbers are alarming. 
The change in pH has devastating effects on many marine lifeforms, espe-
cially those with calcification processes, since the carbonic acid dissolves their 
shells. However, many more species are susceptible to changes in pH, and this 
will lead to a catastrophic collapse of the oceans’ biosphere. Several animals’ 
immune systems are weakened,1487 multiple elements of the food chain are af-
1483 F. J. Millero. Thermodynamics of the carbon dioxide system in the oceans Geochim-
ica et Cosmochimica Acta. Geochimica et Cosmochimica Acta, 1995, pp. 661–677.
1484 SCOR Biological Observatories Workshop. Report of the Ocean Acidification and 
Oxygen Working Group, 2009.
1485 Orr et al., J. F. (.). “Anthropogenic ocean acidification over the twenty first century 
and its impact on calcifying organisms”. Science , 2005, 437, 681 686.
1486 R. S. Feely. Impact of anthropogenic CO2 on the CaCO3 system in the oceans. Sci-
ence, 305, 2004. pp. 362 366.
1487 R. Rosa & B.  Seibel. Synergistic effects of climate-related variables suggest fu-
ture physiological impairment in a top oceanic predator. Proceedings of the National 
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fected, from top to bottom.1488 Moreover, corals may be vulnerable as well, which 
provide many species with a safe habitat, so animals are indirectly affected as 
well. Dwindling populations of sea animals combined with serious overfishing, 
many species would go extinct. These events would affect fisheries severely. For 
example, 73% of fish caught in US commercial fisheries in 2007 were calcifiers 
and their direct predators.1489 Several ocean goods and services are likely to be 
undermined by future ocean acidification potentially affecting the livelihoods of 
some 400 to 800 million people depending upon the emission scenario.
Besides direct biological effects, ocean acidification will lead to a decrease in 
the deposition of carbonate sediments, and the dissolution of existing ones.1490 
This will cause  a rise in ocean alkalinity (the quantitative capacity of an aqueous 
solution to neutralize acid), meaning that the CO2 absorption factor of the oceans 
will decrease dramatically, which in turn will increase global warming even more. 
Another problem concerns the effect the disappearing coral reefs will have on 
land. Environmental economist Luke Brander stated that coral reef tourism was 
valued at US$ 11.5 billion. The shoreline protection value of reefs was estimat-
ed at US $9 billion a year, and reef-supported fisheries at 30 billion. To gain a 
better understanding, scientists try to grasp the socioeconomic consequences 
of ocean acidification, and for ease of understanding try to form an economic 
value representing the loss from ocean acidification.1491 More alarming is that 
mostly developing countries, which are already vulnerable, sometimes monoc-
ultural in production of food and largely reliant on fisheries, or on tourism as a 
form of income, will suffer the most. Furthermore, they will be affected by the 
effects of global warming such as sea level rise. This creates a great deal of 
political inequality and conflict in internal and international relations. 
The ocean-based factors are predominantly the following. 71% percent of 
the globe is covered in water, yet generally oceans are a neglected environ-
ment. Some scientists go as far as to state that oceanography was not even 
recognized as a serious discipline until the last few years.1492 Also, it is stated 
that the ocean environment was separate from human sciences, and no multi-
Academy of Sciences , 105 (52), 2008, pp. 20776–20780.
1488 C. Mora, Wei C-L, Rollo A, Amaro T, Baco AR, Billett D, et al. Biotic and Human 
Vulnerability to Projected Changes in Ocean Biogeochemistry over the 21st Century. 
PLoS Biol 11(10), e1001682, 2013, https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pbio.1001682.
1489 V. J. Fabry, et al., C. L. Present and Future Impacts of Ocean Acidification on Marine 
Ecosystems and Biogeochemical Cycle. Ocean Carbon and Biogeochemistry Scop-
ing Workshop on Ocean Acidification Research, 2007.
1490 A. Ridgwell, I. Zondervan, J. C. Hargreaves, J. Bijma & Lenton, T. M. Assessing the 
potential long-term increase of oceanic fossil fuel CO2 uptake due to CO2-calcifica-
tion feedback. Biogeosciences, 2007, pp. 481–492.
1491 C. Winner. The Socioeconomic Costs of Ocean Acidification. Oceanus Magazine, 
January 8, 2010.
1492 N. Oreskes. Scaling Up Our Vision. Isis, 105 (2), 2014, pp. 379-391.
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disciplinary approach was applied, its history was not studied with the same 
scrutiny as other spheres. With this crucial element lacking, it is no surprise 
that human activities’ effects on oceans are not studied thoroughly.
Why is it so? Historically the emphasis was almost always on land, and later, 
during the Cold War, in space. Everybody heard of the Space Race, but the 
closest thing to an Ocean Race was in the 17th century. It is no surprise that 
so far more than five hundred people have been to space versus less than 10 in 
the deep ocean. The oceans still hold many secrets and potential, from natural 
resources to biological discoveries. When environmental historians organized a 
session on the history of ocean science in 2010, the audience consisted of one 
person. Oceanographers have a professional entity, the Oceanography  Society, 
only since 1988.1493 Even more troubling is that among oceanographers there are 
clearly divided fields of chemistry, biology, geology, etc. Overall we can see that 
the relative freshness of oceanography, the division between its branches and 
the lack of interest in the oceans make it difficult to cooperate. 
Fortunately, awareness has been raised through scientists, policy makers and 
NGOs in recent years. Scientific advances offer new possibilities for (deep) ocean 
exploration. With dwindling natural resources on the ground, there is a growing 
incentive to extract from the deep oceans, which besides posing new challenges 
to the environment, also raises the importance of all ocean-related issues. The 
next step however, is less certain. Universally the world’s waters are regulated 
by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. It regulates matters 
of business, environment, and the management of marine natural resources.1494
It is widely accepted and regarded as customary international law (even by the 
United States, which has not ratified it).  The main problem with it is that it only 
vaguely covers environmental problems, in very broad terms, and only territorially. 
Drafted in 1982, 33 years ago, its contents have not been changed much; the world, 
however, did change. Although the wide acceptance of the convention in itself is a 
positive aspect of international relations, it is its drawback as well, since amending it 
would change the fragile status of customary international law, and it seems almost 
impossible to come to an agreement. The original convention mentions pollution, 
however there are multiple aspects that render its statements ineffective. 
First of all, the text mentions in part XII Protection and Preservation of the 
Marine Environment, Section 5., Article 222 that countries have the obligation 
to prevent pollution to territories under their sovereignty. This shows that this 
is clearly a regulation for traditional sources of pollution, such as chemicals, ra-
diation or oil. Even in those times this was illogical, since due to ocean currents 
much of the pollution can cause spillover effects, and this is not covered. This 
1493 The Oceanography Society. (2014). www.tos.com. Retrieved 2015, from www.tos.com
S. Weart, The Discovery of Global Warming - Ocean Currents and Climate. Harvard 
University Press, 2008.
1494 United Nations. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Montego Bay. 1982
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is no surprise however, if we connect this to the fact that oceanography was in 
a pioneering phase, and scientific models of the relations between ocean cur-
rents and the atmosphere were only starting to take shape in the 1970s (partly 
due to advances in computer modelling).1495 At the time there was simply no 
recognized, established interconnectedness between the systems. What is 
more, CO2 was not regarded as a pollutant. 
The problem is that this type of pollution is not bound to territories, and this 
renders the UNCLOS regulation ineffective. Of course one can argue that the 
Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas (translated as “use your property so that 
the property of others is not damaged.”) principle may apply here as part of 
international customary law, since the famous Trail Smelter Case. The crucial 
point however, is that for something to become custom, both objective and 
subjective elements must be present. It is clear that subjective element of state 
practice does not corroborate this theory. 
Another problem with UNCLOS is its emphasis. It is clearly visible that its 
main purpose is to regulate international claims on waters, to allow for ex-
ploitation of natural resources governed by law and to create a framework for 
interstate relations on the seas and oceans. Much of its contents are focused 
on this, defining zones such as the Exclusive Economic Zone, and environ-
mental issues are phrased in a loose tone such as “States shall adopt laws and 
regulations to prevent, reduce and control pollution”1496. Also, most of the de-
bates on revising it are based on territorial and natural resource issues. There 
is much disputed territory in the Arctic for example, where multiple countries 
have competing claims over land. Another example is the South China Sea, 
where China, Japan and even South Korea have various conflicting claims. 
So far it seems that the focus of the international community on oceans or of 
the UNCLOS is on exploitation, however recent developments of global warming 
and the worsening developments both on land and sea may raise the importance 
of other issues than territorial disputes. The main question is if this problem exists 
with certainty, and if it is so serious, why is there relatively small recognition of it? 
The source of the problem has its similarities with other environmental problems 
(e.g. global warming), but it has unique characteristics as well. 
The main problem is what I call the blind spot of international relations in this 
matter. Since the source of the problem (CO2 emissions) is land-based, and the 
effects are ocean-based, there is a gap between the regulations, mindset and 
vision regarding the problem, because the connection is not made by many. This 
makes problem solving difficult even with incentive. The first step to solving/man-
aging it is to see clearly the connections and the circumstances. It is all a matter 
1495 The Oceanography Society. (2014). www.tos.com. Retrieved 2015, from www.tos.com
S. Weart, The Discovery of Global Warming- Ocean Currents and Climate. Harvard 
University Press. 2008.
1496 United Nations. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Montego Bay, 1982.
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of perspective, a point of view. That is why I address the problem as a blind spot. 
One culture or group may not see things the way the other one does, even if the 
facts are straightforward enough. One good example for this is the following story 
from anthropologist John Wilson, who was screening a film in Africa in a little vil-
lage. The film was about sanitation and health related issues, how to dispose of 
waste, etc. At the end, the tribesmen were asked what they saw. 
They all said they saw a chicken, but could not recall anything else. John Wil-
son was surprised, since he did not remember seeing a chicken in the film at all; 
however, after a careful examination frame-by-frame, he found that for a brief 
moment in one of the corners of the picture there was indeed a chicken.1497 This 
shows that people’s understanding of things is very different from ours. Because 
of this, information needs to be passed on in a manner that is clear and straight-
forward. We all know some people still deny or marginalize global warming and its 
effects, which is the same kind of blindness then the aforementioned anecdote.
So what does it take to address the complex problems regarding ocean acidi-
fication? To summarize the main points, we can now piece the puzzle together. 
First of all, awareness needs to be raised inside and outside of the scientific 
community. Then land-based actors need to adopt to the emerging problem by 
incorporating it into action and finally legislation on all possible levels. As men-
tioned before, the main regulations are the UNCLOS and the UNFCCC. These 
need to be altered or interpreted in a way that includes ocean acidification in 
a direct way. In the case of UNCLOS, Part XII Protection and Preservation of 
the Marine Environment should be amended to directly address the problem of 
1497 J. A. Tillmann, A vakfolt hosszú árnya. Retrieved from filoszofia.wordpress.com: ht-
tps://filoszofia.wordpress.com/2013/04/24/tillmann-j-a-a-vakfolt-hosszu-arnya/, 2011.
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GHG emissions. Since the UNCLOS has an enforcement/dispute mechanism, it 
could be effective in reaching a positive outcome. To limit ocean acidification, an 
acidity threshold should be introduced, similar to a temperature one. This would 
ensure an objective criterion for protecting the marine environment.1498 Further-
more, the UNCLOS should shift focus from territorial disputes to environmental 
issues, even if currently GHG pollution is only implied by its clauses. 
In the case of the UNFCCC, the text of the document should be changed as 
well to reflect the complexity of the carbon cycle rather than a focus on solely 
the atmosphere. Currently it does not acknowledge that the oceans act as a 
carbon sink, saving the world from further warming. This is especially danger-
ous, since targets for GHG emissions often do not take this into account, and 
if the oceans’ uptake decreases due to high levels of CO2, the atmospheric 
concentration will increase. Article I of the UNFCCC defines a ‘sink’ to be “Any 
process, activity or mechanism which removes a greenhouse gas, an aerosol 
or a precursor of a greenhouse gas from the atmosphere”.1499
In addition, the Kyoto Protocol was also ineffective by principle in solving the 
problem. It allows for a reduction of GHG emissions in general, and theoretically 
allows CO2 emissions to increase as long as other gases are decreasing.  There-
fore, the UNFCCC should incorporate an acidity threshold. This would ensure 
that the carbon cycle remains in check and that the atmospheric reduction is in 
parallel with oceanic reduction. Otherwise carbon leakage may occur, offsetting 
atmospheric gains at the expense of the marine environment. Unfortunately, 
the text of the COP21 final document only mentions oceans once, and makes 
no remark about ocean acidification or the marine environment as an equally 
important biosphere. This is somewhat a paradox, since a whole day of the 
COP21 was dedicated to the oceans, and the final document of the day by 
the International Working Group on Oceans and Climate expressed great con-
cern. The lack of focus on the marine environment is also supported by big data 
analysis. The research examined the roundtable discussions of the UNFCCC 
between 1995 and 2013.  It shows that discussions are centered around five 
main macro-themes none of which include the oceans. Although the oceans 
are carbon sinks, they are not taken into account by the UNFCCC discussions. 
As for the frequency of keywords, oceans’ is 17, water’s 20, amongst the least 
frequent terms. In comparison, emission has the highest frequency with 990.1500
Ocean acidification, albeit a relatively new field of concern, is among the top 
dangers to the marine environment, and it should be treated as such, meaning 
1498 R. Baird, M. Simons & T. Stephens, “Ocean Acidification: A Litmus Test for Interna-
tional Law”. Carbon and Climate Law Review , 3, 2009, pp. 459-471.
1499 United Nations. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Montego Bay, pp. 1982.
1500 T. Venturini, N. Baya-laffite, J. Cointet, I. Gray, V. Zabban et al. Three Maps and Three 
Misunderstandings : A Digital Mapping of Climate Diplomacy. Big Data & Society, 
July-December (1), 2014, pág. 1-19.
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that its priority is above, for example, territorial disputes. Principles that are 
connected to the subject, such as common but differentiated responsibility, 
polluters pay principle and loss and damage schemes should be adjusted to 
include the marine environment as well. Furthermore, affected regions should 
be connected with monitoring agencies, to get an accurate picture of the situ-
ation, and economic, social and environmental impacts should all be summa-
rized and then shared with policymakers and countries that may not be directly 
or as much affected by the changes. 
The economic incentive should be highlighted as well, since it is less costly 
to stop events now than later. Moreover, long-term consequences and oppor-
tunities must be examined. This means for example that investing in renewable 
energy is beneficial because it reduces CO2 emissions and it is getting cheaper 
every year. Not even the dreaded oil price drop hurts the sector. On the contrary, 
as Christiana Figueres, the executive secretary of the UNFCCC put it, “the in-
stability of oil prices is exactly one of the main reasons why we must move to 
renewable energy, which has a completely predictable cost of zero for fuel”.1501
The main reason to invest in renewables can be summarized in the following 
quote from a market report from Bernstein Research: “Renewable energy is a 
technology. In the technology sector, costs always go down. Fossil fuels are 
extracted. In extractive industries, costs (almost) always go up”. Until global 
warming is reduced, a contingency plan must be outlined. Since some species 
are more affected by ocean acidification than others, regional and specific pro-
tections must be created. This demands research on marine animals and then 
cooperation between stakeholders to implement effective policies. Currently 
only 1% of oceans are under protection.1502 This needs to change in order to 
combat the effects of global warming. Unfortunately, there is simply no other 
way to fight ocean acidification than to reduce CO2 emissions and battle the 
already present effects of global warming. Plans to use geoengineering tools 
have all failed.1503 Geoengineering altogether has been abandoned by US sci-
entists claiming that it was “not ready for deployment”,1504 leaving us with little 
doubt on what the course of action should be.
1501 EDF Energy Exchange. Why Falling Oil Prices Don’t Hurt Demand For Renewable 
Energy. Forbes, January 5, 2015.
1502 Ocean Conservancy. 2015. oceanconservancy.org. Retrieved from http://www.
oceanconservancy.org/our-work/marine-protected-areas/
1503 C. Lepisto. Iron Fertilization Experiment Proves Geo-engineering Unpredictable. 
Treehugger, 2009, March 29.
1504 National Academy of Sciences. (2015). nationalacademies.org. Retrieved Feb-
ruary 10, 2015, from http://www8.nationalacademies.org/onpinews/newsitem.
aspx?RecordID=02102015
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CONCLUSION
Overall, we can see that factors that hinder the solution of ocean acidifica-
tion come from multiple sources. The history of environmental protection, the 
development of oceanography, the technical advancements in science, the 
global stabilization of international relations, the awareness raised on ocean 
acidification, the economic incentives to act all contribute towards the goal 
of dealing with this issue. The relative rapid buildup of forces in environmental 
protection, renewable energy and sustainable development all give us hope 
that a solution may be possible. Even the blind spot seems to disappear slowly 
as more and more stakeholders connect the dots, which is crucial for success. 
Still, there are many obstacles ahead. Awareness of the problem is still not 
satisfactory, and there is no real sign that any of the future resolutions on cli-
mate change will specifically incorporate ocean acidification as one the most 
important issues (e.g. UNCLOS). Furthermore, there is no real sign that the 
US or China will actually reduce emissions (US reductions have fierce opposi-
tion in the legislation, claiming national interests, economic factors and sov-
ereignty, while China’s rapidly growing economy and huge population may be 
the reason for withdrawal). Besides these two countries, the developing states’ 
pollution may also present a great challenge, if they cannot industrialize with 
more sustainable technologies (NIC, BRICS countries mostly). This problem 
is worsened by the rapidly growing population of the Earth, who will demand 
more and more resources, and they cannot all be provided with sustainable 
energy yet (not even sustainable food production). 
There are also signs of a deteriorating international system, with a re-
emerging Russia, an ever-growing China, and conflict in the Middle East. 
Not to mention that time is against us, since global warming may already be 
irreversible.1505 Steps to combat and reduce its effects can be taken however, 
and it is a duty of every government and citizen to do everything in its power 
to support this effort, even against all odds.
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RFE in Hungary After 1956 and in the Sixties
Oskar MULEJ (CEU):
Armed Anti-Communist Resistance in Slovenia 1945-50
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Iji O. SOLOMON (McDaniel College):
The Hungarian Revolution of 1956 and the Whims of Soviet Power
Nello VERDE (CEU):
The decision-making of the Italian Communist Party in the context of the 1956
Hungarian crisis
15:00-16:40 Panel 3 - Transition in the former Soviet bloc
Chair: Erzsébet KAPONYI (Corvinus)
Susan COOPER (University College London):
The rejection of Socialism in the Hungarian national narrative
Laura CSEKE (Corvinus):
The Possibilities of Kazakh foreign policy at the end of the Cold War
Marja LAHTINEN (University of Tampere):
The regime transition in Czechoslovakia: Will the past experiences have an 
impact on the democratization process?
Roland PAPP (Corvinus):
The independence of Estonia and the Russian speaking minority
Day 2, Tuesday, July 10
10:00-11:40 Panel 4 - International Relations during the Cold War
Chair: Zoltán MARUZSA (ELTE)
Babak ARZANI (Azad University of Najaf Abad, Esfahan):
The Iran-Iraq War: A Cold War Proxy War
Thomas KOLLMANN (University of Bristol):
Nuclear Madness Revisited: What was special about the Brazil–West German 
Nuclear Accord of 1975?
Melinda KRAJCÁR (ELTE):
The National Security Council and the Korean Decision
Sabine TOPOLANSKY (Corvinus), Anett SZŰCS (Corvinus):
Anglo–American relations during the beginning of the Cold war – the 1958 
bilateral Mutual Defense Agreement
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12:00-13:20 - Panel 5 - International Relations in the post-Cold War era
Chair: Csaba BÉKÉS (Corvinus)
Victoria JONES (Clemson University):
The Responsibility to Protect
János KEMÉNY (Corvinus):
Counterinsurgency in Contemporary Political Thought
Dániel VÉKONY (Corvinus):
The American role in the Soviet–Afghan war and its implications on global
terrorism
13:20-13:30 Closing remarks
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IV. ANNUAL COLD WAR HISTORY RESEARCH 
CENTER INTERNATIONAL STUDENT 
CONFERENCE AT CORVINUS UNIVERSITY OF 
BUDAPEST
Dates: 9 – 10 July, 2013
Place: Budapest, Közraktár utca 4-6., room Nº C 316.
Day 1: 
9:00 – 9:15 Opening speech
László CSICSMANN, Dean, Faculty of Social Sciences, Corvinus University 
of Budapest
9:15 – 11:05 Panel 1: The Soviet Union and the United States in the Cold War and 
      its aftermath
Chair: Brianna GREENWALD, Intern, Cold War History Research Center 
at CUB
Sara RODA (Catholic University of Lublin)
The Logic of Force. Henry Kissinger’s PhD Dissertation about the Sense of 
Insecurity and the Origins of the Cold War
Jula DANYLOW (Free University of Berlin)
Cold War Representations in U.S. Museums
Orsolya PÓSFAI (Eötvös Loránd University)
The Moscow Youth Festival: Opening to the West or Simply Propaganda?
Laura GOUSHA (Central European University)
The Funding of Hungarian Refugee Students by the Rockefeller Foundation, 1956-1958
11:15 – 12:45 Panel 2: The third world in the Cold War and its aftermath
Chair: Daniel VÉKONY, Ph.D. Candidate, Corvinus University 
of Budapest
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Gábor WESZPRÉMY (Pázmány Péter Catholic University)
Sub-Saharan Africa in the Cold War
Bela MICZI (Corvinus University of Budapest)
Cuban and Soviet Intervention in the Ogaden War (1977 – 1978)
David VOGEL (National University of Public Service)
The Brazilian Miracles: Twelve Years Before and After the End of the Cold War
15:00 – 16:10 Panel 3: Hungary in the Cold War
Chair: Barnabás VAJDA, Selye János University, Komárno
Rita PARODA (Pázmány Péter Catholic University)
Top Secret Soviet and Hungarian Plans for Pre-empting NATO – USA Unex-
pected Nuclear Strikes
Daniel VÉKONY (Corvinus University of Budapest)
Bittersweet Friendships: Relationship Between Hungary and Countries of the 
Middle East During the Cold War
Day 2
9:00 – 11:10 – Panel 4 Europe in the Cold War and its aftermath
Chair: Zoltán KELEMEN, Ph.D. Candidate, Corvinus University 
of Budapest
Vanessa ROBERTSON (American University, Washington)
The German Question that Stumped the West: Errors in Czechoslovakia 1945-
1948
Annemarie EICHENAUER (University of Applied Sciences, Fulda)
Social Life in Germany During the Cold War Period
Roland PAPP (Corvinus University of Budapest)
Soviet Policy towards Eastern Europe, 1944 – 1949
Béla MICZI (Corvinus University of Budapest)
The Management of the Polish Crisis in the Eastern Bloc (1980-1981)
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Esztella CSISZÁR (Corvinus University of Budapest)
“Why Should I Be a Minority in Your Country when You Can Be a Minority in 
Mine?” Exploring the Roots of the Bosnian War in the Historical Context of the 
Disintegration of Yugoslavia
11:20 – 13:10 – Panel 5: International Relations during the Cold War
Chair: Csaba BÉKÉS, Corvinus University of Budapest
Jesse HIRVELÄ (University College London)
A Shift towards the Cold War: Interventionism and the Greek Civil War
Juho HÄKKINEN (University of Eastern Finland)
Finnish–Soviet Relations during the Kekkonen Administrations (1956–1982)
Éva MERENICS (Corvinus University of Budapest)
The Armenian Genocide and the Soviet–Armenian Public
Kate LEVCHUK (Central European University)
The Caribbean Crises in View of the Newly Released Documents
15:00 – 17:40 – Panel 6: International Relations in the Post Cold War era
Chair: Péter MARTON, Corvinus University of Budapest
János KEMÉNY (Corvinus University of Budapest)
The Problem of Unsatisfying Wars
Péter Pál KRÁNITZ (Pázmány Péter Catholic University)
The Balkanization of the South-Caucasus in the post-Cold War era
Thomas GILLIS (Central European University)
Tug-Of-War in Orange: How Ukraine’s Revolution Reveals Continuing Cold War 
Tensions
Brianna DZMURA (Indiana University)
Happy Divorces & New Relationships: The Russian Exclusivity Factor
Vusal HUSEYNOV (University of Wroclaw)
The Energy Dependence of the East-Central European Countries on Russia
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Matteo DE SIMONE (Central European University)
Hybrid Regimes: Stuck in Transition or Fully-Fledged Regimes? A comparative 
study with special reference to Russia and Iran
17:40 – 17:50 – Closing remarks
Csaba BÉKÉS, Director, Cold War History Research Center at Corvinus University of
Budapest
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V. ANNUAL COLD WAR HISTORY RESEARCH 
CENTER INTERNATIONAL STUDENT 
CONFERENCE AT CORVINUS UNIVERSITY OF 
BUDAPEST
Dates: July 8-9, 2014
Budapest, Közraktár utca 4-6. Room C102
Day 1
10.00 – 10:10 Opening speech
Csaba BÉKÉS, Professor, Director, Cold War History Research Center at Cor-
vinus University of Budapest
10.10 – 12.00 Panel 1: International conflicts during the early Cold War
Chair: Barnabás VAJDA, Professor, University Selye János, 
Komárno
Márton KOVÁCS (Corvinus University of Budapest, intern)
Ukrainian collaboration with the Axis powers duringWWII
Zsolt MÁTÉ (University of Pécs)
Khrushchev in the UN General Assembly in 1960
Irem Melis ÖZYURT (Gazi University of Ankara)
The Berlin Wall and its consequences
Talha TOL (Gazi University of Ankara)
Benefits of diplomatic maneuvers and long-term strategies in the Cold War era
13:30 – 15.30 Panel 2: International Relations during the Cold War
Chair: Erzsébet KAPONYI, Professor, Corvinus University of 
Budapest
Máté SZALAI (Corvinus University of Budapest)
Small state strategies during the Cold War
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László GULYÁS (University of Szeged):
Relations between Saudi Arabia and the superpowers from the beginning of 
the Cold War to the mid-1950s
Anikó MÉSZÁROS (Corvinus University of Budapest) 
Finding a loophole? Finland in the Nordic Cooperation during the Cold War
Derya ERTEMIZ (Gazi University of Ankara)
Terrorism during the Cold War and its aftermath
15:50 – 17:40 Panel 3 Hungary in the Cold War
Chair: Anikó MAGASHÁZI, Research Coordinator, CWHRC
Róbert BARACS (University of Szeged)
Hungary”s role in the Congo crisis
Tamás NGUYEN (Corvinus University of Budapest)
A comparison of the economic reforms in the Hungarian People’s Republic 
and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam
Olívia BESZEDA (Corvinus University of Budapest):
The 1956 Revolution of Hungary and the great powers
Bernadett KISS (Corvinus University of Budapest)
Hungary’s foreign policy vis-a-vis the West between 1975-1980
Day 2
10:00 – 12.00 – Panel 4: International Relations in the Post-Cold War era
Chair: Péter MARTON, Assistant Professor, Corvinus Univer-
sity of Budapest
Péter DARÁK (Corvinus University of Budapest) 
The end of the Soviet Union: Socialism as a religion
Joseph LARSEN (Central European University) 
From Conflict to Cautious Embrace: Sino-Russian Relations after the Cold War
Anna ÖLVECZKY (Central European University, Budapest):
Two decades of Latvian enthno political practice, 1989–2010
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Kia REPO (University of Tampere)
Chechen Political shift from separatism to religious radicalism and pro-Mos-
cow governance between the first and second Chechen wars, 1994–2009
11.50 – 12.00 – Closing remarks
Csaba BÉKÉS, Professor, Director, Cold War History Research Center at Cor-
vinus University of Budapest
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VI. ANNUAL COLD WAR HISTORY RESEARCH 
CENTER INTERNATIONAL STUDENT 
CONFERENCE AT CORVINUS UNIVERSITY OF 
BUDAPEST
Dates: July 7-8, 2015 
Place: Közraktár utca 4-6. Room C102
Day 1
10:50 - 11:00 Opening speech
Csaba BÉKÉS, Professor, Director, Cold War History Research Center at Cor-
vinus University of Budapest
11:00 - 13:00 Panel 1: East Central Europe in the Cold War and its aftermath
Chair: Zoltán KELEMEN (Corvinus University of Budapest, 
Ph.D. candidate)
Esztella CSISZÁR (Corvinus University of Budapest, PhD candidate) The Role 
of the Islamic Religious Community (IVZ) in Tito’s Non- Aligned Movement
Solveig HANSEN (Corvinus University of Budapest, MA student)
1970 Polish protests in Tricity
Daniel Janisz INDRI (Corvinus University of Budapest, MA student) Stretch-
ing the boundaries: Foreign relations of Hungary with the West between 1985 
and 1991
14:00 - 16:00 Panel 2: The Soviet Union and the United States in the Cold War
Chair: Csaba BÉKÉS (Professor, Director, Cold War History Re-
search Center at Corvinus University of Budapest)  
Szonja SZABÓ (Corvinus University of Budapest, BA student)
The founding conference of the Cominform in 1947
Zsolt MÁTÉ (University of Pecs, MA student)
Khrushchev and the Pepsi. The American National Exhibition in Moscow in 1959.
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Anna NÉMET (Corvinus University of Budapest, MA student)
US Cultural Propaganda in Western Europe during the Cold War: A Battle for Men’s Minds
Daniil KABOTYANSKI (Central European University, MA student) 
Broadcasting Freedom while Demanding Justice: International Solidarity in La-
bor Disputes of Radio Free Europe Employees
Day 2
11:00 - 13:00 Panel 3: Asia and Africa in the Cold War and its aftermath
Chair: Barnabás VAJDA, Professor, University Selye Janos, 
Komarno
Bálint KÁSA (Corvinus University of Budapest, English MA student) 
The Korean War
Andra-Daria SZASZ (Corvinus University of Budapest, MA student) 
Xiangqi - a Chinese strategy for survival during the Cold War
Száva Adél TAR (Corvinus University of Budapest, English BA student) 
The Prelude to the Split: Two Meetings between Khrushchev and Mao in 1958 
and 1959
Tamas NGUYEN (Corvinus University of Budapest, MA student)
The Doi Moi Reforms in the Cold War framework
András KOVÁCS (Corvinus University of Budapest, MA student)
The revolution of Burkina Faso - An attempt to leave the bipolar system
14:00 - 16:00 Panel 4: International Relations in the Post Cold War Era
Chair: János KEMÉNY (Ph.D., Research Coordinator, Cold War 
History Research Center) 
Max COHEN (St Andrews University, MA student)
Political Considerations for the future of Britain’s Nuclear Weapons
Mirtill Krisztina NAGY (Eotvos Lorand University of Budapest BA student)
The Role of Jihadi Symbols in the Transformation of Terrorism
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Gáspár BÉKÉS (Corvinus University of Budapest, English BA student) Global 
Cooperation on the Acidification of the Oceans
16:00 - 16:10 Closing remarks
Csaba BÉKÉS, Professor, Director, Cold War History Research Center at Cor-
vinus University of Budapest
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VII. ANNUAL COLD WAR HISTORY RESEARCH 
CENTER INTERNATIONAL STUDENT 
CONFERENCE AT CORVINUS UNIVERSITY OF 
BUDAPEST
THIS CONFERENCE WAS ORGANIZED IN 
COLLABORATION WITH THE EUROPEAN INSTITUTE AT 
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, NEW YORK
Dates: May 30-31, 2016
Place: Budapest, Közraktár utca 4-6 Room C 316
Day 1
10:00-10:45 Opening of the Conference
10:00-10:05 Opening Remarks
Csaba BÉKÉS, Professor, Director, Cold War History Research Center at Cor-
vinus University of Budapest
10:05-10:15 Opening Speech
László CSICSMANN, Dean, Faculty of Social Sciences and International Re-
lations, Corvinus University of Budapest
10:15-10:45 Keynote Speech
Victoria PHILLIPS, Lecturer in History, Columbia University Soft and Hard 
Power during the Cold War
10:45-12:00 Panel 1: Soft power in the Cold War era part 1
Chair: Anita SZŰCS (Associate Professor, Corvinus University of 
Budapest)
Fatima DAR (Columbia University, BA student, RFE fellow, European Institute) 
Psychological Warfare and Soft Power: A State of Total War
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Natalija DIMIC (University of Belgrade, PhD candidate)
Yugoslav Soft Power in the Third World. A Case Study of the Yugoslav Involve-
ment in the Angolan War for Independence 1961-1975.
Monique KIL (Columbia University, MA student, RFE fellow, European Institute)
A Penny for Every Word: Radio Free Europe’s Call for ‘Truth Dollars’.
13:00-14:30 Panel 2: Soft power in the Cold War era part 2
Chair: Victoria PHILLIPS (Lecturer in History, Columbia University)
Thalia ERTMAN (Columbia University, MA student, RFE fellow, European In-
stitute) Spies, Stars, and Stripes: The Portrayal of Russians in Star Trek and 
The Man from U.N.C.L.E.
Adriana POPA (Columbia University, MA student, RFE fellow, European Insti-
tute) Radio Free Europe: Intellectual Backlash
Tinatin JAPARIDZE (Columbia University, BA student, RFE fellow, European 
Institute) Rebuilding the U.S.-Russian Space Bridge in the Post-Cold War Era
14:45-16:35 Panel 3: the Soviet Union and the United States in the Cold War
Chair: Zoltan GALIK (Associate Professor, Corvinus University of 
Budapest)
Ádám CSILLAG (Corvinus University of Budapest, MA student)
The analysis of Russian-American relations in the mirror of the actual world-
political events: a comprehensive approach
Márton TŐKE (University of Szeged, MA student)
The Soviet Union in Henry Kissinger’s Anti-Revolutionary Criticism
Gábor VÖRÖS (Corvinus University of Budapest, MA student)
Ingredients to the Soviet war scare of 1983
Bryan PANACCIONE (United States Military Academy at West Point, BSc stu-
dent) Central Asian Human rights after the Soviet Collapse
16:50-18:20 Panel 4 Europe in the Cold War
Chair: Barnabás VAJDA (Professor, University Selye Janos, Komarno)
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Manolo MANCO (University of Siena, MSc student) 
Italy in the Cold War
Vincent GARNIER-SALVI (Corvinus University of Budapest, MA student)
The 1956 Hungarian revolution and its repression according to the French 
communist press
Veronika SZAKÁL (University of Szeged, PhD candidate)
Details from the history of Intervision
Day 2
10:00-11:50 Panel 5: Hungary in the Cold War
Chair: Maya NADKARNI (Assistant Professor, Swarthmore Col-
lege)
Eszter SZABÓ (Corvinus University of Budapest, MA student)
Hungary’s relations with the West, 1956-1965
Zsolt MÁTE (University of Pecs, MA student)
The first steps in America. Hungarian refugees in Camp Kilmer in 1956-57.
Eszter HERNER-KOVÁCS (Pazmany Peter Catholic University, PhD candi-
date) Hungarian American Advocacy for Hungarian Minorities during the 1970-
1980s
Andrea BORELLI (University of Florence, PhD candidate)
Against the Cold War: the role of Eugene Varga and the Institute of World Econ-
omy and Politics in Soviet foreign policy (1945-1948)
12:10-14:00 Panel 6 Asia in the Cold War
Chair: Tamás MATURA (Assistant Professor, Corvinus University 
of Budapest)
Levente SZABÓ (University of Szeged, MA student)
Pacifism and Reality. Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution
Jennifer PIERSON (Columbia University, MA student, RFE fellow, European 
Institute)
Veiled Student Activists: A Gender Analysis of the Iranian Hostage Crisis of 
1979
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Andrew GRELLA (United States Military Academy at West Point, BSc student) 
The Effects of US Participation in the Iran-Iraq War
Éva SZALAI (Corvinus University of Budapest, PhD candidate)
India and the Non-aligned Movement during and after the Cold War.
15:00-16:30 Panel 7: Latin America in the Cold War
Chair: Bernadett LEHOCZKI (Associate Professor, Corvinus Uni-
versity of Budapest)
Sarita Ruiz MORATO (Corvinus University of Budapest, MA student)
The Guatemalan Civil War: Under Cold War influence?
Dániel LAYKO (Corvinus University of Budapest, MA student)
Causes of the Bay of Pigs Invasion’s Failure
Rafael MORENO (Corvinus University of Budapest, BA student)
The Role of Mexico during the Cold War
16:30-16:40 Closing remarks
Csaba BÉKÉS, Professor, Director, Cold War History Research Center at Cor-
vinus University of Budapest

